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In this thesis, I question the understanding of structural transformation within 
mainstream economics, finding that it is too readily restricted to shifts in composition 
of output and promotion of total factor productivity. While this identifies the kinds of 
shifts necessary to transform the structure of production, it is not only ahistorical but 
also inadequately addresses the form of linkages necessary for a broader-based form 
of industrialisation, whilst leaving out of consideration the crucial agents essential to 
bring them to bear. 
By reference to the Developmental State Paradigm (DSP), the state is seen as a crucial 
agent for development, capable of successfully guiding and promoting structural 
transformation through its interventionist policies and interaction with political and 
economic interests such as private capital and labour. Nevertheless, to be of greater 
purchase in present discourse, the DSP must move beyond its limited focus and an 
intellectual framing underpinned by reference to a state-market dichotomy. This 
requires situating and framing the interactions of socio-political and economic 
interests through processes of accumulation, with development following from 
particular forms of growth and development. I make use of the Linkage-Agency 
approach and notion of a system of accumulation to identify the vital interests 
embedded in the immediate post-Independence Zambian economy. Through the lens 
of development planning in the 1960s and 1970s, the constrained if negligible form of 
structural transformation experienced in the post-Independence Zambian economy is 
found to be a consequence of the nature of interests and underlying system of 
accumulation, with continuities and limited shifts as point of departure from the 
colonial era.  
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1.1 Background of the Study 
Inquiry into the fundamental causes of economic growth and requisite conditions to 
bring about economic prosperity have increasingly occupied an important space in 
social sciences. It is widely held that addressing these would bring about 
improvements in living standards and thus enhance overall human welfare. However, 
installing courses of action to address these goals has not been easy. Researchers have 
come up with a multiplicity of growth and development strategies usually founded on 
certain ideological and subjective theoretical notions. Over time, methods and/or tools 
of analysing growth performance of nations have varied, and the results concerning 
determinants of growth have been mixed. Further, what role to prescribe to the state in 
developmental efforts has also been a subject of heated debates. 
Interest in growth can be traced back to classical political economists such as Adam 
Smith and David Ricardo (Fine, 2006; Fine and Jomo, 2006; Helpman, 2004). 
However, contemporary growth theory established itself around the mid-1950s, 
drawing upon the earlier Harrod-Domar model (Jones, 2002). The observed 
divergence in economic growth and living standards between the developed and 
developing countries in the post-1960s also worked to reinforce further developments 
and refinements of growth theory. Indeed, the large differences in income per capita 
across the world begged an explanation.1 Such has been the motivation for inquiry. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, growth theory prospered (Jones, 2002). However, Jones is 
referring to neoclassical growth theory. As will be argued in the next chapter, it is 
precisely during this period that neoclassical growth theory came under serious and 
damaging attacks, not least exposing its weaknesses both theoretically and empirically. 
The focus of inquiry into the causes of growth has shifted over the years from one 
issue to another. Before the early 1900s, natural resource-based growth strategies were 
advocated (Hirschman, 1958). Subsequently, attention shifted to savings and 
investment in physical capital as the main drivers of growth à la Harrod-Domar model. 
However, this view, although widely held until the second part of the 1950s, came 
                                                 
1 Economists have long used income per capita as a rough measure of people’s living standards. 
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under scrutiny, questioning whether increasing capital alone could bring about 
sustained long-run growth. It was argued that capital faced diminishing marginal 
productivity and thus growth in per capita income on the back of capital accumulation 
was not sustainable. Emphasis turned to technological progress as the prime mover of 
long-run economic growth à la Solow model. Because technological progress was 
given, it was contended that unpacking its mystery would solve the problem. To this 
end, geography, disease burden, human capital, among many other factors, have all 
been subsequently linked to economic growth. Today, the role of politics and 
institutions has gained prominence (Barton, 2015; Acemoglu et al., 2005).  
Despite the many insights into the fundamental causes of growth, uncertainties about 
which policies and how to implement them arise – from interventionist, protective 
states to free-market, liberalised ones. It remains unclear how to pinpoint the 
fundamental causes of growth and how to bring them about. This evolution in focus 
and emphasis suggests the complexity of studying the processes of economic growth. 
Implementing strategies for growth could pull the majority of people in the developing 
world out of impoverishment (Rodrik, 2007). A classic comparison in this vein is made 
between the economies of South-East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Empirics reveal 
great divergence in socio-economic indicators of the two regions. In the 1960s, an 
average sub-Sahara African individual was richer than an average South-East Asian 
but, by 2005, these standings were reversed – an average South-East Asian individual 
was more than twice as rich as an average sub-Sahara African. For 45 years after 1960, 
sub-Saharan Africa grew slightly above half of South-East Asia’s growth. Throughout 
this period, South-East Asian growth trended upwards, except for the mid- to late-
1990s with the Asian crisis, whereas sub-Saharan growth had been sluggish, showing 
great oscillations reflecting periods of expansion and contraction. For South-East Asia, 
this growth translated into massive payoffs for the citizenry in terms of improvements 
in socio-economic indicators. For instance, the incidence of poverty in South-East Asia 
reduced by around 70 percent whereas it has persisted at unacceptably high levels in 
sub-Saharan Africa (van Donge et al., 2012). 
The past decade has witnessed much more favourable growth records for Africa owing 
to sustained commodity booms. Growth averaged more than 5 percent between 2002 
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and 2008 but slumped to 2.2 percent in 2009 due to the global financial crisis 
(UNECA, 2013). However, Africa’s growth immediately rebounded and has averaged 
in the neighbourhood of 5 percent from 2010 to date. Worryingly, however, has been 
the recognition that this growth has failed to bear favourable social outcomes, not least 
its failure to reduce inequality and poverty significantly. Further, that growth has been 
commodity-driven has signified the continent’s susceptibility to the external 
environment and/or global trends. Between 1970 and 2010, while East Asia’s shares 
in world output and global exports have significantly expanded, Africa’s record shows 
a contraction. This, some observers argue, coupled with Africa’s falling share of 
manufacturing in total output, has signalled (premature) de-industrialisation as 
characteristic of Africa’s structural change (UNECA, 2013). 
It may seem straightforward to reason that differing rates and trajectories of growth 
over several decades between Africa and South-East Asia are largely responsible for 
these observed differences in growth outcomes but the story behind which poverty-
reducing growth-promoting policies/strategies work is far from straightforward. 
Nonetheless, a comparison of the two regions provides some optimism in terms of 
lessons to be learnt from the experiences of South-East Asian for sub-Saharan Africa 
economies. But South-East Asian experience has been variously interpreted and 
largely misunderstood (Jomo, 1997; Sikorski, 1998). One argument widely held 
resonates with the World Bank’s (in)famous 1993 study entitled The East Asian 
Miracle, that industrial export-led growth was the answer even though 
acknowledgement was made that policy configuration was varied. This position is in 
stark contrast with Henley's (2012) view that poverty-reducing growth, at least for 
some South-East Asian countries, relied heavily on agricultural development, and this 
came before export-oriented industrialisation. Henley’s view is shared by van Donge 
et al. (2012). The latter add that while interventionist strategies in some East Asian 
countries in agriculture held the key to success, it is precisely the lack of intervention 
in African agriculture that is paramount to its dismal overall economic performance. 
This argument not only suggests a strong agricultural focus for Africa to bring about 
poverty-reducing growth but also proposes a strong government presence. 
The above discussion questions the simplistic assertion that lessons for sub-Saharan 
Africa can be easily drawn from the South-East Asian experience. What is good for 
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African economic growth and development based on the South-East Asian experience 
is far from immediate, and this has been a subject of much debate with no consensus 
being reached. To re-emphasise, critics of the mainstream argue that failure to interpret 
this experience correctly has catapulted a series of misplaced policy responses by 
African governments. 
On the one hand, the conflicting views about lessons learnt from the South-East Asian 
experience for Africa afford an opportunity not only to review carefully the literature 
on South-East Asia but also to revisit Africa’s performance. Because of varied policies 
from the South-East Asian experience, country-specific analyses are preferred and 
need to be pursued in detail. This demands that country-focused studies examine in 
greater detail necessary policy prescriptions not only for growth but also for giving 
rise to desirable social outcomes.  
On the other hand, I proceed under the conviction that post-independence African 
growth experience has been misunderstood. Consequently, this has weakened the 
assault on Africa’s economic situation even through the wide-ranging interventionist 
strategies that have been adopted. Despite substantial growth in recent years, the 
failure to underpin its development by structural transformation more generally, and 
industrialisation in particular, has left Africa susceptible to the vagaries of primary 
commodity prices and external conditions. Recently, there has been increased interest 
in industrialising Africa and locating the state within it. However, because the 
immediate post-independence development experience has been misunderstood, there 
has been disdain for the kinds of economic policies practised at the time. Therefore, 
while the state was ideologically reduced to spectator in the wake of neoliberalism in 
the 1990s, a failure to broaden the economic base through diversified and integrated 
production has compelled many observers, analysts, governments and other agencies 
to rethink the role of the state. The state is being invited as participant. But there are 
problems. Firstly, eschewing the post-independence statist policies, confounded by 
neoliberal dogma, the state is being invited to do different things — mainly to create 
an enabling environment for private business. 
The post-independence statist developmental era has relevance today, particularly 
given that current conventional developmental discourse in Africa begs structural 
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transformation of African economies by gradually calling for greater state 
participation, if in piecemeal fashion, to pursue, although ironically incoherently, non-
statist policies. Some of the problems with recent discourse can be seen from various 
Economic Reports on Africa published by the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa (hereafter, ECA). For example, in 2013, the ECA suggested making use of 
Africa’s commodities to promote structural transformation. This entailed mainly value 
addition to the most dominant primary commodities, especially agro-processing, 
through forward and backward linkages. For Zambia, the state is, being asked to 
promote backward linkages in mining. Learning lessons from “import substitution” as 
a “policy failure after independence”, although they worked in East Asia, Africa must 
thus develop “coherent strategies to address market failures and externalities that 
constrained investment, growth and economic diversification” (UNECA, 2013: 8). 
This suggests that the post-independence problems have been properly unearthed and 
analysed, but as the experiences of Zambia will show, this is not the case. 
Industrial policy itself has been constrained by a lack of proper understanding of how 
it was applied in East Asian countries and, therefore, what lessons Africa can learn to 
make it work. “And without industrial policies to address policy and market failures 
(especially of information and coordination),” argues the UNECA (2013: 8; emphasis 
added), “African countries have been unable, until now, to diversify and parlay recent 
high growth and increased trade into social and economic development.” In this thesis, 
I trace the intellectual understanding of this line of thought through the prism of the 
Developmental State Paradigm to demonstrate the flaws in the lessons learnt from 
erstwhile developmental states and how those false lessons, if by their application in 
industrial policy, are liable to fail to launch Africa’s structural transformation.  
Hence, there are lessons for today that can be gleaned from the immediate post-
independence statist era, and these are different from what the conventional 
development discourse in Africa suggests largely because of the predisposition 
embedded in its analytical approach to fail to come to grips with the dynamics and 
contradictions of the socio-political and economic dynamics woven in post-
independence Africa. This is seen from the methodological and analytical approach of 
conventional literature that is generally ahistorical and bereft of analytical detail 
(theoretical and empirical). In light of the successes of statist policies in (South-) East 
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Asia, it is suggested that revisiting the socio-political and economic dynamics of post-
independence Africa is paramount in unravelling the actual underlying factors 
responsible for the failures of statist policies in post-independence Africa. Therefore, 
I focus on Zambia’s post-Independence economy and ascertain determinants of growth 
from a non-orthodox perspective as elaborated upon below. 
Following decades of economic calamities after Independence in 1964, 1999 marked 
an important year for Zambia. Since 1999, Zambia’s annual real GDP growth rate has 
averaged over five percent. Such high growth rates have overlapped with expansion of 
mining production and the unprecedented rise of copper prices as well as the 
strengthening of China-Zambia economic relations. This makes unique the context 
through which structural change can be analysed. How the government responds to the 
opportunities these developments present is worth exploring, and how such 
developments hinder or foster structural change. Importantly, these record growth 
rates did not correspond to significant lowering of poverty levels and inequality – in 
2010, it was reported that close to two-thirds of the population still lived below the 
national poverty line, and income was distributed with a Gini coefficient of 43.5 in 
2006 (Central Statistical Office, 2012).2 It is precisely such developments that make it 
important to analyse what type of growth is occurring and whether or not it is 
sustainable, and in what ways and with what results. 
In explaining the reasons for Zambia’s more recent high growth, much of the literature 
points to free-market type strategies with government’s role reduced to spectator. One 
explanation for this high growth is shared by many. The consensus in most of the 
literature on Zambia’s growth recovery is that macroeconomic fundamentals (had) 
have been stable and that structural reforms embarked on a decade earlier had proved 
fruitful (Bwalya, et al., 2011; Mwanawina and Mulungushi, 2008; World Bank, 2004a, 
2004b). Structural reforms such as privatisation of state-owned companies (and 
parastatals including copper mines) and liberalisation of the economy are usually 
pinpointed as having had desirable effects on the economy.3 Indeed, this widely-held 
                                                 
2 In fact, there is evidence of rising inequality - the Gini coefficient increased from 40.8 in 1996 
(Central Statistical Office, 2012). 
3 Supporting this view is the argument that “the allocation of resources in today’s Asia is much more 
efficient because of the predominance of market forces. Investment is largely private and not public” 
(Chen, 1997: 34). Chen derives this recommendation from computation of total factor productivity. 
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view relies predominantly on the traditional neoclassical conception of growth which 
points to government intervention as being mainly distortionary, not least breeding 
corruption in the face of weak governance and institutions. Due to its narrow 
theoretical focus on technical factors, this perspective generally fails to adequately 
give a potent voice to the social and political forces affecting performance. Indeed, the 
emphasis on technical conditions of production is short-sighted and thus limits the 
scope of investigation. 
On the contrary, Weeks et al. (2007) warned against a laissez-faire approach towards 
inclusive and sustained growth for Zambia. They propose strong government presence 
in economic management to bring about poverty-reducing growth. They note that a 
“non-interventionist approach to strategy would at best result in growth based on 
minerals and commercial agriculture. This would leave the economic future of the 
country hostage to the shocks of mineral and agricultural prices and the uncertainties 
of the climate. If poverty should be reduced within the time frame of the MDGs, 
indeed, if poverty should be more than marginally reduced over that time frame, a 
purposeful, integrated growth strategy is required that fosters an efficient 
manufacturing sector. Such a growth strategy requires well-designed interventions 
derivative from clear sectoral priorities. Public investment, with its significant 
crowding-in and linkage effects is the key instrument in that strategy” (Weeks et al., 
2007: 64). By recognising an active role for the state in mapping a growth strategy, 
this perspective also helps to unify the economic factors with the socio-political forces. 
This position accurately reflects my endeavour – to draw a growth strategy that brings 
structural change to bear, although this is taken up later. 
My main critical point of departure with non-interventionist strategies draws lessons 
from the South-East Asian economic recovery. Sufficient evidence exists to show that 
active state participation in economic management was important in fostering poverty-
reducing growth. While external factors were also important in bringing about 
remarkable growth, how the governments responded to the opportunities was key. 
Domestic policies had to enshrine a strong government role and this enabled these 
countries successfully to exploit the opportunities the external environment presented. 
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This vantage point raises questions about what would characterise/constitute a 
sustainable growth and development strategy for Zambia. But answers depend on the 
methods of analysis chosen. Thus, I begin with a critical assessment of growth 
performance based on the Zambian literature. This does allow certain features of what 
would be characteristic of sustained growth strategy to be teased out. But these are 
framed here in a more flexible and wide-ranging approach to structural change – i.e. 
one drawn out of a “linkage-agency” framework à la Hirschman (1977, 1958). Inquiry 
into the role of the government/state in effecting structural change is also integral to 
my analysis. Both the exercise of agency and the forging of linkages within and across 
sectors has to be supported by effective government intervention, as Zambia’s post-
Independence development record shows. To frame the role of the state in growth and 
development, I consider the developmental state debates as a critical point of 
departure. Interrogating the literature this way will help to draw out concrete policy 
problems that have resulted from incorrectly interpreting the developmental record of 
erstwhile developmental states. 
Szostak (2009) has recently warned of the complexity of the growth process and calls 
for an interdisciplinary approach. This is premised on the failure by conventional 
neoclassical analyses to capture and frame the fundamental causes of growth. I share 
the view that the growth process is extremely complex and requires heterodox analyses 
both to assess performance and launch an assault on the contradictions of growth. 
1.2 Objectives and research questions 
The main objective of the thesis is to develop a framework to assess structural 
transformation, locating the role of the state within it. The main research questions 
which are explored in this thesis are: 
• How is economic growth in Zambia understood?  
• How has Zambia’s growth performance been assessed? What is the 
theoretical and empirical content of these exercises? 




• What are the debates surrounding the role of the state in development, as 
framed in the developmental state debates? What is the role of the state in 
Zambia’s post-Independence development record? 
• How realistic are the currently employed methods of assessing Zambia’s 
growth performance? Do the economic conditions in Zambia allow the 
application of these methods? 
• To what extent can the state be located in Zambia’s immediate post-
Independence development record? 
1.3 Hypothesis 
The working hypothesis is that structural transformation needs to be divorced from its 
neoclassical sense of change in composition of output, and from the idea that it is 
merely a consequence of growth. Properly understood, it also drives growth; although 
the two-way relationship between growth and structural transformation is conditioned 
and underpinned by other factors, not least the role of the state, and its determinants. 
1.4 Significance and Rationale of the Study 
The choice of Zambia as a case study mainly rests on its chequered post-Independence 
economic history – episodes of experimenting with nationalisation and import-
substitution industrialisation policies followed by implementation of market-oriented 
policies and export-led growth, with none producing desirable outcomes. But this 
thesis shines light on the immediate post-Independence period, particularly up to the 
end of the 1970s. This period is taken as the formative post-Independence period under 
which much of accumulated capital under post-colonial Zambia had taken place. 
Subsequent periods were aimed at consolidating and reorganisation rather than 
diversification and transformation. Hence, it is imperative to examine the context 
under which capital accumulation took place, including how statist policies were 
applied to drive growth and development. This is done through the prism of 
development planning, and how it may have limited structural transformation. 
Zambia’s post-Independence development performance is analysed by examining the 
detail of the first two national development plans, exploring in what ways they 
promoted industrial development. 
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This thesis examines the application of neoclassical growth theories to Zambia and, in 
doing so, sheds light on an alternative understanding of Zambia’s growth process. In 
highlighting Zambia’s economic conditions, the study will show that current methods 
of evaluating performance provide unreliable results and hence obscure lessons to be 
drawn for policy purposes. Highly exceptional scholars such as Joan Robinson (1953-
4) argued that the neoclassical approach, by concentrating on the technical aspects of 
production (and subsequently growth), diverts interest away from more meaningful 
inquiry related to the factors affecting income distribution and, subsequently, growth. 
This thesis begins by offering a critique of the traditional approach to growth 
performance assessment. It is argued that underpinning this line of inquiry are flawed 
theoretical and empirical foundations. Chief to this study is to demonstrate the 
problems encountered when the traditional approach is utilised. However, the critique 
is not entirely a negative exercise. In offering a critical analysis of these methods, I 
will bring out some essential features of Zambia’s economy largely overlooked, or 
indeed set aside, by the conventional methods of assessment. This will aid in 
discussing the nature of the Zambian economy that in turn will feed into the 
understanding and context of development planning. 
This thesis claims its place in the wider literature explaining sources of economic 
growth in developing countries. However, the main contribution of this first part of the 
thesis is to illustrate that Zambia’s reality is incongruent with the conditions required 
to construct these traditional approaches which serve to explain growth while 
diminishing, or deploring, the role of the state. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
Broadly, besides this introductory chapter, the thesis is divided into two sections. The 
first section, formed of two chapters, examines the theoretical debates of growth theory 
and, the role of the state in development. The second section, excluding the conclusion, 
is made up of three chapters, which explore the detail of Zambia’s post-Independence 




Chapter Two introduces the discussion by exploring in what ways Zambia’s growth 
performance has been analysed. This is done to identify the intellectual thrust of 
leading (orthodox) analyses of Zambia. I then offer a critical assessment of current 
methods of growth performance assessment which compute Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) as an essential ingredient in the growth process. I find that aggregate production 
functions occupy an important place in (Zambia’s) growth performance assessment by 
making reference to the literature on Zambia. Of course, it should be mentioned here 
that use of aggregate production functions is a practice that is conventional among 
neoclassical theorists and applied researchers. I move on by erecting an integral pillar 
of critical analysis of the neoclassical approach; this is the Cambridge Capital Critique. 
The preface to alternative methods of economic performance assessment involves 
subjecting the assumptions underlying TFP measurements to the realities of the 
Zambian economy. Hence, I briefly bring out essential features of the Zambian 
economy; these features, it is argued, cannot be captured by current methods of 
assessment. In other words, I seek to answer the following question; do the realities of 
Zambia’s economy allow for TFP measurement?  
Chapter Two’s main task is to show the weaknesses, or invalidity, of current methods 
of growth performance assessment. It is subsequently stressed that the growth process 
is multidimensional and, therefore, highly complex. Thus, the neoclassical conception 
of the workings of the capitalist economy according to the narrowly-conceived 
production process is incapable of capturing and/or explaining the multidimensionality 
of the growth process. 
In the third Chapter, I explore the debates on the role of the state through the theoretical 
construct of the Developmental State Paradigm (DSP). By examining selected (South-
East) Asian countries through the conceptual understanding of development states, I 
uncover the process of development more generally, and structural transformation 
through industrialisation in particular, as an outcome of the interplay of social and 
economic processes, with the state playing an important role within them. The lesson 
drawn is that industrial policy should not be narrowly conceived as an economic 
process aimed at shifting the composition of output. Rather, there are interests in 
society which act through and without the state to promote their own agenda. 
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Chapter Four begins the more substantive exercise of empirical evaluation by 
examining the pre-Independence Zambian state. This is to situate not only the role of 
the state, but the motivation of intervention, and for whom. It is found that the colonial 
state pursued development in a very narrow way, by silencing the indigenous 
population, serving limited socio-political and economic interests. Importantly, wide-
ranging and effective interventionist strategies underpinned colonial 
developmentalism. This suggests that interventionism must be understood as serving 
a particular configuration of socio-political and economic interests. Also, Chapter Four 
briefly explores the postcolonial literature on African politics and the state. The 
postcolonial African state has often been interpreted as an obstacle to development, 
but a failure to recognise the societal composition of socio-political and economic 
interests has obfuscated analyses. The state, seen as a leading participant in the socio-
political and economic interactions, does allocate resources, but who gets to benefit 
from this allocation and what it does for development must be seen in light of the 
nature of the groups competing for resources and other actions through the state. 
Chapters Five and Six, through the prism of development planning, explore post-
Independence Zambia’s system of accumulation as one which strengthened rather than 
altered the inherited structure of production. While wide-ranging developments were 
pursued, they remained restricted in scope, because of the way in which resources 
through development plans were allocated. Fundamentally, this reflected the nature of 
socio-political and economic interests, which are mentioned although not explored in 
detail for reasons of space and scope of the thesis. Nevertheless, the thesis does 
examine the political context under which economic decisions were made and policies 
applied. In finding that the economic events and decisions responded to the political 
context, resources were largely placed in the hands of the unproductive groups who 
had gained political power following Independence. 
Development of the manufacturing sector is explored in detail in Chapter Six, to 
demonstrate the nature of developmentalism, and the nuance that the form of 
dependence and intervention for industrialisation matters. This is done, in part, to quell 
studies which see interventionism from a one-dimensional universalistic perspective 
as an attribute which is bad for growth. In sum, Chapter Five and Six aim to revisit 
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and reinterpret Zambia’s post-Independence development record, with reference to the 
1960s and 1970s. 
Chapter Seven will wrap up the thesis by using the discussion preceding it to make a 
case for the importance of the social in the understanding of the growth process. In 
addition, as the chapters preceding it presume, although with some detail, that socio-
political and economic interests underpin development, Chapter Seven suggests that 
further research would do well to explore in what ways Zambia’s post-Independence 
development record created and entrenched interests. Not only that, this would enable 
analysis to examine the interactions within and across these interests, and in what ways 
they promoted or blocked structural transformation, within a given socio-structural 





2 Growth Performance Assessment 
2.1 Introduction 
This section concerns itself with critically appraising the manner in which growth 
performance of Zambia’s economy has been evaluated. To do this, a critical 
assessment is made of orthodox growth theory as the main theoretical construct that 
has characterised assessment of Zambia’s growth performance. Thus, this critical 
analysis is not only important for Zambia’s literature but also generally useful in 
challenging growth performance assessment relying on the neoclassical methods. 
Resting on the belief that assessment of performance should help us understand the 
growth process, I seek to determine whether the theoretical and empirical 
underpinnings of the neoclassical methods are not only generally valid but whether 
they provide insights on actual growth processes. 
As a starting point, I summarise the methodological content of some studies that have 
utilised the orthodox theoretical construct and their subsequent empirical and policy 
implications. From this critical appraisal, I argue that evaluation of growth through the 
neoclassical lens is flawed and does not provide valuable insights into the actual 
growth process. It distracts from identifying and assessing the drivers of growth by 
casting a blind eye on the processes of structural change.  
This critical appraisal builds its argument around the key pillars mentioned above. 
However, the ensuing argument draws some fundamental interrelated conclusions 
from the deficiencies of neoclassical growth theory; that (1) TFP measurement is based 
on dubious theoretical propositions which renders it an erroneous construct (2) the 
aggregate production function, essentially an integral instrument for both theoretical 
and empirical neoclassical propositions in growth theory, is an illegitimate concept (3) 
the realities of Zambia’s economy significantly diverge from the assumptions of the 
theoretical model of the traditional neoclassical approach; the realities of Zambia’s 
economy do not justify the conditions necessary for the computation of TFP and 
therefore invalidate the narrow approach of neoclassical growth theory. 
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From the theoretical point of view, I question the underlying theoretical construct of 
old growth theory, by recourse to the Cambridge Capital Critique. For to argue that 
the aggregate production function is illegitimate is to imply that marginal product of 
aggregate capital and marginal product of aggregate labour are fallacious constructs 
even within neoclassical reasoning itself.4 
As previously mentioned and in prospect, I show that the realities of Zambia’s 
economy violate the economic conditions necessary for TFP computations. 
2.2 Zambia’s growth performance assessment 
While the literature across the world utilising old and new growth theory is vast and 
dense, very few studies have independently sought to explain Zambia’s post-
Independence growth performance.5 However, two studies that serve as representative 
independent standalone studies are notable (these are Mwanawina and Mulungushi, 
2008; World Bank, 2004a, 2004b). These are particularly important for my purposes 
of offering a critical review specific to both growth theory and its applicability to 
Zambia. They both attempt theoretically and empirically to offer an explanation for 
Zambia’s growth episodes. By recourse to the realities of Zambia’s economy, I argue 
here that the story of the evolution of the economy matters for it tells us something 
about the realities to which the theory should respond. 
The study by Mwanawina and Mulungushi (2008) was a product of the AERC’s 
Explaining African Growth Performance project which begun in 1998. The main 
output of this project is a two-volume book entitled ‘The Political Economy of 
Economic Growth in Africa, 1960-2000’ by Ndulu et al. (2008a, 2008b). The first 
volume, in part, takes neoclassical growth theory as its standard analytical approach in 
explaining sub-Sahara Africa’s poor growth account and, subsequently suggesting 
lessons for policy. While taking a retrospective view by synthesising key poles of the 
case studies, it provides an overview of the methodological benchmark and analytical 
approach adopted by the case studies; this is particularly so given in the first chapter 
                                                 
4 In a reply to Joan Robinson, Fisher (1971a: 405) argues that “If aggregate capital does not exist, 
then of course one cannot believe in the marginal productivity of aggregate capital”. 
5 Cross-country studies have included Zambia but have not solely focused on it. See for instance 
Sachs and Warner (1997); Barro (1991).  
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by Ndulu and O’Connell (2008). Among others, limited structural transformation is 
considered to have been a hindrance to growth. This limited structural transformation 
is typified by pointing at limited contraction of the agricultural share of the labour 
force and/or a focus on export diversification. For the latter, that primary commodities 
continue to dominate exports is reasonable evidence to suggest that structural 
transformation has been constrained. But the narrow approach to performance 
assessment coupled with the narrow conception of structural change lamentably fails 
to provide a convincing account of the two-way causal relationship between growth 
and structural change. Further, interventionist strategies are pinpointed as an ‘anti-
growth syndrome’, consequently advocating market-based policies. State participation 
is cautioned, side-lined and held up as an object of ridicule. This way, the methods fail 
to give a sound account of the role of government beyond social service provision. 
The second volume is a collection of country case studies of which Mwanawina and 
Mulungushi (2008) is a component of the volume’s accompanying CD-ROM. 
Methodologically, each country case study is informed by the outline given in the first 
volume. 
This project has been received with mixed feelings. Abrahams (2009: 618) regards this 
two-volume study as “monumental” and notes that “The ultimate strength of the book, 
however, lies in the perceived authority of the developmental economist’s approach in 
shaping economic growth policy in a neo-liberal context.” In essence, this remark 
suggests that the findings in the study provide empirical support and credence to the 
neoliberal policies advocated as recommendations. It goes without saying that the 
acclaim with which this study has been greeted propagates neoliberal ideological 
arguments supported by neoclassical theoretical constructs. On the contrary, Van De 
Walle (2009, 2008) offers a critical book review but importantly notes the study’s 
failure to consider properly the complexity of the growth process and its implication. 
For instance, the study overlooks the “dynamics of the growth experience” by focusing 
on “a narrow research approach that consistently favored an aggregate macroeconomic 
approach” while at the same time casting no light on the role of structural change given 
the “static analytical framework” (Van De Walle, 2009: 183). In this way, it misses 
the opportunity to inform and offer a compelling account of Africa’s growth record. 
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In hindsight, these weaknesses are shared and, therefore, largely characteristic of 
Mwanawina and Mulungushi's (2008) country’s case study. 
I begin by summarising the analytical framework adopted by Mwanawina and 
Mulungushi (2008), justified by Ndulu and O’Connell (2008) and claimed to offer 
empirical support to their arguments. The latter carry out growth accounting exercises 
on the back of what they call a ‘benchmark’ Cobb-Douglas aggregate production 
function of the form: 
 = ℎ 
where  is per capita real GDP, k is per worker capital stock and h is per worker human 
capital and A is an index of total factor productivity (TFP). From this theoretical 
construct and the associated results, the authors (i.e. Mwanawina and Mulungushi, 
2008) conclude and report that TFP accounted for most of Zambia’s economic growth 
performance since it corresponded significantly with fluctuations in the real GDP per 
capita. Further, while claiming that the growth accounting approach provided useful 
insights in explaining Zambia’s growth story by examining sources of growth, they 
note that it treated technology (as measured by the index of TFP) as exogenous and 
thus it ignored the effect of policy variables on capital accumulation (Mwanawina and 
Mulungushi, 2008: 278). To capture the effect of policy variables and “to gain further 
insights into the sources of growth”, based on new growth theory, the authors model a 











 is growth rate of real GDP per capita, 
’s are parameters to be estimated, 

’s are the independent variables (believed to capture the effects of policy variables 
on the growth rate) and 
 is the error term. The authors include seventeen explanatory 
variables and, unsurprisingly, nine of them were significant. Overall, the authors 
concede that “the regression was not robust owing to high correlation among the set 
of policy variables … the regression can be interpreted as indicating the joint 
contribution of the policy variables while the relative importance of each specific 
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linkage was somewhat less robust” (Mwanawina and Mulungushi, 2008: 278). Of 
course, one may claim that the combination of old and new approaches to economic 
growth as presented in these works, also common in the literature, has been justified 
based on their supposed correspondence (See for instance Barro, 1999). 
In a similar light, the World Bank's (2004: 14) study in its so-called growth analysis 
for Zambia carried out growth accounting exercises by first assuming that “GDP can 
be expressed as a function of physical capital and human capital” and given by: 
 = (,) 
where  is gross domestic product;  is total factor productivity;  is gross domestic 
capital stock;  is human-capital-adjusted labour input. Finally, using this framework, 
it is concluded that changes in output per effective labour were mainly accounted for 
by TFP. This parallels the previously mentioned study. 
A comparison of the methodological content of these two studies reveals a stark 
similarity, underscoring the implicit traditional assumption that this approach is 
conventional and, therefore, without fault. 
Clearly, underlying these two studies are aggregate production functions as an integral 
device. From aggregate production functions, practitioners compute a residual they 
call TFP.  
The main message is that TFP is an important factor in explaining Zambia’s growth 
story. Because of this, other studies have used such results as forming the basis for 
their own inquiry. For instance, without questioning the validity of this methodological 
approach, Bigsten and Tengstam (2010: 14; emphasis added) ask “What explains the 
low levels of investment and the poor TFP development?” (the duo based this inquiry 
on Mwanawina and Mulungushi (2002) which culminated in Mwanawina and 
Mulungushi (2008). It is important to note that the findings of one study have formed 
the basis of another; supposedly based on the acceptance that these findings are 
adequate. As I argue, TFP is a meaningless construct and thus such adjacent courses 
of inquiry are vacuous. 
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For both studies, underpinning the growth accounting exercises is the old growth 
theory, placing a production function at the core of the investigation. However, 
Mwanawina and Mulungushi’s (2008) recourse to regression analysis is rooted in 
endogenous (or new) growth theory, which too is implicitly underpinned by the notion 
of the production function, where output is represented as a function of a seemingly 
endless list of explanatory variables. 
In the critical analysis that follows, I want to demonstrate that, though this method of 
assessment is conventional among neoclassical practitioners, it is questionable on both 
theoretical and empirical grounds. Thus, I trace the history of the production function 
and show that while the problems encountered have been recognised by critics, they 
have been resisted and generally overlooked by practitioners. In a way, this is to show 
why mainstream economics continues to use these methods despite the huge history 
of accumulated problems. This helps to understand why practitioners generally accept 
such methods.  
A critical analysis of the Zambian case study is useful on several accounts. 
Importantly, it demonstrates that performance assessment is carried out by use of 
conventional methods as though these are without problems here. However, there is 
longstanding literature questioning the validity of this sort of analysis. Thus, I rekindle 
this critical discourse and trace it back to show that these conventional methods are in 
fact invalid in assessing performance. 
2.3 Growth Accounting and Core Propositions of Neoclassical Old Growth 
Theory 
Here, I show the core propositions of growth accounting exercises and, in this way, 
help to bring to the fore what is in dispute. 
Growth accounting exercises find their roots in the work of Solow (1956, 1957) and 
have since provided the criterion for measuring and/or calculating TFP. Proponents of 
growth accounting generally contend that economic growth can be decomposed into 
two parts. On the one hand, growth can be explained by accumulation of the factors of 
production (labour and capital) while, on the other hand, an index of technical progress 
(TFP) would then be used to explain growth. Each part, within this framework would 
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ultimately individually allow its contribution to economic growth performance to be 
measured. TFP is deemed to measure economic efficiency which is taken as an 
indicator of trajectories of how well resources are combined to produce output. The 
selection of an appropriate functional form of the aggregate production function as 
well as precision in measurement of both output and factors of production are 
important ingredients in growth accounting cookbooks (Caselli, 2005; Nadiri, 1970; 
Collins and Bosworth, 1996; Bosworth and Collins, 2003). 
A point worth noting at this stage is that TFP indices are derived when either a 
production function is unambiguously assumed or from the theory of distribution 
wherein production functions are indirectly assumed (Nadiri, 1970). From this, growth 
accounting practitioners use either the primal or the dual approach, which are by 
construction equal. Because the standard primal model of growth accounting is readily 
derived from a production function, it is usually claimed to be concerned with physical 
quantities while the dual approach, also known as the price approach, considers 
changes in prices of factors of production rather than their physical quantities by 
recourse to the national income accounting identity (Barro, 1999; Hsieh, 1999; 
Jorgenson and Griliches, 1967). This is misleading because value data is eventually 
utilised in empirical work. The dual approach is usually applauded when practitioners 
wish explicitly to avoid making assumptions related to the “underlying technology or 
market structure” (Hsieh, 2002: 504). These assumptions relate to type and form of the 
production function as well as the capital-labour ratio. Additional assumptions include 
profit maximisation, constant returns to scale, full employment and perfectly 
competitive input and output markets. These assumptions are necessary for 
neoclassical theory of growth and distribution, for without them, it is impossible to 
deploy the aggregate production function and its subsequent implications (Nadiri, 
1970; Felipe and Fisher, 2003). 
These core propositions – one-commodity world, conception of one-way causal 
relationship between inputs and output, distribution of income being solely determined 
by technology – were seriously questioned and thus more generally formed the basis 
of the Cambridge critique. This is the subject of the next section. 
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2.4 Cambridge Capital Theory Controversies: Yes, they matter! 
Important to this critical analysis is the neoclassical one-sector growth model as 
represented by the studies outlined above. So, output is represented as a function of 
factors of production – i.e., labour and capital. More worrying, however, is that 
acceptance that in such a representation, the output good and the capital good are the 
same, hence the term one-good model. TFP, measuring technical progress, usually also 
explains the efficiency with which factors are combined to produce output. To 
reproduce a theory appropriate for growth, capital is viewed as a factor of production 
whose so-called marginal product measures its contribution to output. In neoclassical 
theory, in addition to other neoclassical assumptions, marginal product of capital 
determines the rate of return to capital also called the rate of profit or interest. The 
Cambridge critique vigorously challenged many neoclassical propositions and showed 
the inadequacies of the one-sector model in explaining the growth process, not least 
because of the dubious theoretical constructs on which it is founded. In essence, the 
critique is a collection of the longstanding literature demonstrating the flaws of 
neoclassical growth theory as applied by Mwanawina and Mulungushi as well as the 
World Bank on Zambia’s data. It undermines the logic of the theoretical exposition of 
Zambia’s growth story; but doing so also sheds light on what aspects of the growth 
process are ignored and should, therefore, be considered in building a more coherent 
framework of performance assessment. 
Both studies outlined above have utilised aggregate production functions that treat 
capital as an input in production. Although the theoretical expression of capital is 
physical, constant price data is utilised in empirical investigations. 
Traditionally, the starting point of any theoretical appraisal of the calculation of TFP, 
in particular, and neoclassical growth theory, in general, is reference to the Cambridge 
Capital critique. Sadly, however, as noted by Cohen and Harcourt (2003: 200): 
“The Cambridge controversies, if remembered at all, are usually 
portrayed today as a tempest in a teapot over anomalies involving the 
measurement of capital in aggregate production function models, having 
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as little significance for the neoclassical marginal productivity theory of 
distribution.” 
What follows is a brief overview of some relevant aspects of the Cambridge critique. 
More detailed discussions of the Cambridge critique can be found in the works of, 
among others, Harcourt (1972, 1976); Fine (1980) and Sen (1974). The main purpose 
of this presentation is to establish whether or not they were (or are) of little concern.  
I restate here that use of aggregate production functions in growth performance reflects 
acceptance of the marginal theory of growth and distribution. The Cambridge debates 
showed that this was incorrect. As demonstrated in Fine (1980), the Cambridge 
critique shows that the marginal productivity theory of distribution is invalidated when 
an economy is composed of heterogeneous commodities, as reality would have it! I 
will confine myself to shedding light on this as it has direct association with my 
purposes – showing the questionable nature of neoclassical growth theory. 
The Cambridge debates lasted two decades and were much more than a debate on 
aggregation of capital. They spanned from aggregation problems in production 
functions to other controversial issues such as the theory of income distribution and 
processes of accumulation compared across dynamic and static equilibria (Felipe and 
Fisher, 2003; Cohen and Harcourt, 2003). In friendlier terms, the debates showed that 
the neoclassical parables are invalidated when a more than one commodity world is 
considered. 
Identifying and properly explaining the causes of economic growth is the underlying 
motive of neoclassical growth theory. Underpinning this, however, is the meaning and 
measurement of the concept of capital and how in turn it relates to the technicalities of 
the growth process. The contrasting interpretations of this concept and its role in the 
growth process were pivotal to the Cambridge critique. One side of the debate 
advanced propositions and justifications for neoclassical marginal productivity theory 
of value and distribution. At the core of this are technical conditions of production, 
pivoted on achievability of technical substitution of inputs. Because of the strong 
weight placed on technical conditions of production, setting aside the social aspects of 
society embedded in institutions is an unsurprising conduit of this method. The other 
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side contrasted this view in the spirit of the revival of political economy by arguing 
that an explanation of the working of a capitalist economy (and therefore the growth 
process) would require an appreciation of the context of analysis and characterisation 
of the institutional set up of an economy (Harcourt, 1972, 1976, 1979, 2013). 
In retrospect, my interest in the Cambridge critique lies in showing theoretical and 
empirical flaws associated with the concept of TFP. This is important in demonstrating 
the emptiness of the claim that Zambia’s post-Independence growth was largely 
explained by TFP fluctuations as claimed by the outlined studies. Recall that TFP 
measurement presumes acceptance of the neoclassical interpretation and 
representation of capital. In this schema, capital is merely a factor of production. But 
its role is largely relegated to a ‘factor’ in a production function. However, recognition 
that such a representation is faulty ignited the Cambridge critique with Robinson's 
(1953-1954) famous inquiry into the measurement of capital. Robinson questioned the 
concept of the production function and the propositions derived from it. She asked: “of 
what units is C composed? … The ambiguity of the conception of a quantity of capital 
is connected with a profound methodological error, which makes the major part of 
neo-classical doctrine spurious.” (Robinson, 1953-1954: 82, 84). In other words, she 
asked how capital is to be measured once represented in a production function.6 In a 
production function, quantity of capital is measured by a single number. This view is 
problematic in itself, not least because of the presence of heterogeneous capital. She 
was essentially unhappy with the neoclassical conception of the capital that treated it 
as if it were an argument whose contribution to (aggregate) production could be easily 
and uniquely measured without violating the neoclassical propositions; indeed, these 
depend upon a physical notion of capital. Her concern lay in understanding that capital 
was a heterogeneous entity whose value measure as a factor of production in aggregate 
production functions raised a number of issues. 
Suppose for a moment it is agreed that capital is homogeneous – so that we do away 
with difficulties imposed by the heterogeneous capital arguments. In this case, we can 
                                                 
6 Robinson frequently challenged the conventional neoclassical logic in other works. However, her 
introductory words in this daring but yet imposing icebreaker are worthy of note: “the production 
function has been a powerful instrument of miseducation …  and so sloppy habits of thought are 
handed on from one generation to the next” (Robinson, 1953-54: 81). It is imperative to shed light 
on these ‘sloppy habits of thought’. 
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investigate whether a technical relationship between homogeneous capital and output 
would allow derivation of the rate of profit. Even if indeed it is possible to obtain the 
marginal product of capital in terms of the output good, it is still difficult to establish 
what units would be used to represent it because the rate of profit, the ratio of the 
surplus to the advance, is a pure number (Sen, 1974). But proceeding this way exposes 
one to the relative price problem since the marginal product in terms of the output good 
would require a rate of profit computed by a ratio of the surplus to the advance. This 
is the well-known circularity in the so-called capital aggregation problem7 (Harcourt, 
1972; Sen, 1974; Fine, 1980; Cohen and Harcourt, 2003). It can be recalled that the 
neoclassical propositions require that the rate of profit is determined by the marginal 
product of capital. However, the goods that create the capital stock are themselves 
produced. Therefore, in a capitalist world, a profit is required from advances made on 
the purchase of these goods. A price should therefore be known a priori. It then follows 
that the one-way causation of marginal product and rate of profit cannot be established. 
In other words, an independent determination of the value of capital without 
knowledge of the profit rate is impossible. Moreover, it may be that the value of capital 
will change following a change in the prices (i.e. the rate of profits and wages) as 
opposed to changes in quantities alone (Sen, 1974; Fine, 1980). Put differently, the 
same physical capital would correspond to a different value if the rate of profit 
changed. Thus, assuming a homogeneous capital good does not avoid the circularity 
problem. 
 Following Joan Robinson’s remarks pinpointing difficulties of the neoclassical 
approach outlined above, a number of authors stepped forward to provide a string of 
intellectual justifications which arguably did nothing more than solidify the counter-
                                                 
7 It is important to clarify what is meant by the problem of aggregation as this departs from the 
conventional understanding of it. Here, as made clear in Fine (1980: 98-99), “To some extent, the 
problem of aggregating capital is a misnomer … the problem is to aggregate capital in such a way 
that the propositions of neo-classical theory remain valid – that a production function can be formed 
from which marginal products yield distribution.” Of course, several ways of aggregating capital are 
possible, such as aggregation of money values, but the problem here transcends that. So, what the 
capital aggregation problem implies is quite different from merely adding up diverse capital goods 
because this problem would still hold even if capital is assumed to be homogeneous given a different 
output good. It is a question of being able to obtain a rate of profit solely from the technological 
relationship (represented by a production function), and doing so in such a way that capital indexing 
poses no problems. The Cambridge critique shows that proceeding this way is illogical. Thus it holds 
that viewing the Cambridge critique as merely a problem of aggregating capital – conventionally – 
shows a lack of understanding of the deep issues raised by the critique. 
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arguments, not least raising additional questions. For instance, Champernowne (1953-
1954) rose to the occasion as regards the measurement of capital, suggesting a chain 
index measure of capital in production functions so that appropriate neoclassical 
results are obtained – i.e. equality of the rate of profit and the marginal product of 
capital, for instance. But this result depends not only on the revaluation of capital, 
oftentimes at odds with the market value (Sen, 1974), it also requires knowledge of 
either the wage rate or profit rate (Harcourt, 1972). This points to the inescapable 
impracticality of the postulate relating to obtaining the rate of profit from the so-called 
marginal product of capital since measuring capital, not least because using the chain 
index implicitly alerts one to see that capital measurement is contingent on prices and 
distribution. Nevertheless, the significance of this lies in arguing that the chain index 
fails to rescue the flaws of this aspect of neoclassical theory. Moreover, it is also 
important in documenting some of the challenges raised by antagonists and defences 
advanced by protagonists since the dawn of the debates. 
An ingenious approach to remove the relative price problem developed by Solow 
(1957) was, in addition to assuming homogeneous capital goods, postulating that the 
economy was composed of one good so that the capital good and the consumer good 
are the same. Even though this eliminated the relative price problem, it did not insulate 
the neoclassical approach from further, perhaps more devastating criticisms. 
Because the world is made up of heterogeneous capital goods, the propositions of the 
one-good world in terms of distribution are problematical. So, the capital indexing, or 
capital valuation, imposes inescapable problems to the neoclassical theory due to what 
are known as Wicksell effects, following Wicksell (1911). In simple terms, Wicksell 
effects are associated with changes in the value of the capital stock when interest rates 
change. Two types of Wicksell effects are usually distinguished, namely; price 
Wicksell effects and real Wicksell effects (Harcourt, 1972; Cohen and Harcourt, 
2003). Price Wicksell effects stem from revaluating the capital stock based on 
changing prices, i.e. as wages and rate of interest (profit) change given a particular 
technique. Real Wicksell effects emanate from changes in the quantity of capital i.e. 
real or physical capital stock such that as the technique changes, wages and the rate of 
interest also change. 
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The problems Wicksell effects imposed on the neoclassical paradigm are commonly 
known as double (or re-) switching and capital-reversing (or reverse capital-
deepening) (Cohen and Harcourt, 2003). The discussion that follows sheds light on 
each of these concepts and how they proved devastating to the neoclassical paradigm. 
But first, going back to the earlier argument relating to a series of defences developed 
by neoclassical followers, I bring neoclassical propositions regarded as parables, made 
famous by Samuelson (1962). He argues that “the "Surrogate Production Function," 
can provide some rationalization for the validity of the simple J. B. Clark parables 
which pretend there is a single thing called " capital " that can be put into a single 
production function and along with labor will produce total output (of a homogeneous 
good or of some desired market-basket of goods)” (Samuelson, 1962: 194). From this, 
three crucial parables are drawn. First is marginal productivity of capital, deriving from 
the technical conditions of production, determine rate of profit (rate of interest). 
Second is an inverse relationship between the rate of interest and the capital-output 
ratio income, including diminishing marginal productivity so that a higher quantity of 
capital is associated marginal product of capital (hence the rate of profit). This parable 
follows from the notion of scarcity in that a lower rate of profit is associated with a 
higher capital-labour ratio (Lavoie, 1999). Third, income distribution between wage-
earners (labourers) and capitalists is determined by technology and factor 
endowments, i.e. knowledge of which techniques are in use in addition to knowledge 
of the set of all available techniques.8  
Ideally, a production function representation is a physical relationship of output and 
inputs. This physical relationship forms the basis of characterisation of these parables. 
However, the physical relationship presumption breaks down when inputs 
(particularly capital) are heterogeneous because of the need for capital aggregation 
and, therefore, capital valuation. It is from this sort of procession that Wicksell effects 
present devastating problems for the neoclassical paradigm via reswitching and 
capital-reversing. 
                                                 
8 Moss (1980: 65) remarks that “The marginalist dictum that the price of capital is determined by its 
marginal product is a special case of the more general statement that the rate of profit is determined 
by the value of capital employed in given technical conditions of productions.” 
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The phenomenon of reswitching relates to the assertion that out of all available 
production techniques, a given technique may be most profitable at more than one rate 
of interest, despite other techniques being more profitable at rates of interest in 
between. Because of this, a one-to-one association between a given method of 
production and the rate of profit can no longer be established. Thus, in the presence of 
diverse goods, a lower value is placed on the same physical quantities of capital even 
though the rate of interest is higher (Fine, 2003).  
Reverse capital-deepening on the other hand points to a positive relationship between 
the capital-labour ratio and the rate of interest. Price Wicksell effects suggest that when 
prices change, so does the same physical capital stock (Robinson, 1955). In this case, 
given a technique of production, it is then possible for a positive relationship between 
the rate of profit and the value of capital per worker to exist (Lazzarini, 2011; Lavoie, 
2000). This phenomenon also raises problems for the neoclassical theory of growth 
and distribution that relies on the parables that no longer hold. 
So, discussions pertaining to policy prescriptions advocating capital-intensity, as far 
as the Cambridge critique is concerned, should be divorced from marginal productivity 
theory. To stretch this point further, certain interpretation such as propositions that 
labour abundant economies should use less capital-intensive techniques should be 
interpreted with care. This proposal may not necessarily derive from marginal 
productivity theory. As (Sen, 1974: 333) clarifies: “when one recommends choosing 
less capital-intensive techniques in a surplus-labour economy, one is usually making a 
statement about investment and not about the existing capital stock … it is not a 
question of treating capital as one factor of production but of economizing on the use 
of the class of non-labour means of production vis-a-vis the use of labour, which is 
relatively abundant.”  
The problems of reswitching have been recognised by many but received with mixed 
feeling. Samuelson’s famous concession is worth quoting here: “The phenomenon of 
switching back at a very low interest rate to a set of techniques that had seemed viable 
only at a very high interest rate involves more than esoteric technicalities. It shows that 
the simple tale told by Jevons, Bohm-Bawerk, Wicksell, and other neoclassical writers 
— alleging that, as the interest rate falls in consequence of abstention from present 
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consumption in favor of future, technology must become in some sense more 
"roundabout," more "mechanized," and "more productive" — cannot be universally 
valid” (Samuelson, 1966: 568). Other researchers cast aside the implications of 
reswitching and claim that it is unimportant in empirical work (see for instance Stiglitz, 
1974). Nonetheless, to argue that reswitching is empirically irrelevant is a proscription 
in itself in that it can be shown that the flaws associated with empirical estimations 
hold even in the absence of reswitching (Fine, 1980). In fact, a change that affects the 
price of capital is necessarily recorded as a change in technology even when real 
capital remains unchanged, with or without reswitching. For instance, due to the one-
commodity representation of an economy, an increase in price of capital goods is 
necessarily captured as an increase in quantity of capital. This interpretation of a false 
increase in capital while output remained the same would appear (erroneously) to 
reflect negative technical progress (Fine, 2003). Thus, treating an economy as being 
represented in a one-commodity sense conflates price and quantity changes, the former 
subsequently interpreted as real changes. 
So far, I have been concerned with arguing that the neoclassical paradigm does not 
hold. Further, it has been revealed that the proposition of the marginal productivity 
theory of distribution fails to represent a world in which there exists a spectrum of 
commodities. An additional point worth noting here is that incorporating the results of 
the neoclassical marginal productivity theory into a growth theory begs an additional 
explanation for how relative factor endowments are themselves arrived at. Savings 
behaviour of individuals are incorporated into the technicalities of the model itself 
pivoted on the crucial assumption of a classless equal savings share for the entire 
population. However, when savings of the entire population depend on distribution of 
income between labourers and capitalists, the assumption of an equal savings share 
disintegrates thus affecting the results of the neoclassical model. 
In revitalising political economy from classical contributors, the rate of profit for 
instance becomes the result of the accumulation process following the deduction that 
“the potential rate of profits on capital arises from differing power and social 
relationships in production, and the realization of profits is brought about by effective 
demand associated with saving and spending behaviors of the different classes and the 
“animal spirits” of capitalists” (Cohen and Harcourt, 2003: 208). It is this accumulation 
41 
 
process that drives growth. Indeed, post-Keynesians suggest that the adjustment of 
savings to investment rests on changes in the distribution of wages and profits against 
the fundamental principle that ‘animal spirits’ of investors determine the rate of growth 
(Kurz and Salvadori, 2003). Conversely, however, the neoclassical theory of growth 
has sought to argue that, with full employment of resources,9 there exists a steady state 
rate of growth that is uniquely determined and to which, over time, an economy will 
move (Harris, 1975, 1973). 
Today, analysts seem to be completely oblivious of the Cambridge critique and 
continue to apply models that violate (economic) logic, at least that is what the debate 
was all about in simple terms. Perhaps their implications are not fully understood or 
whether the debate itself is relevant in the first place.  
Viewing capital goods as being themselves produced exposes the weakness of the 
neoclassical conception of technical progress. The neoclassical schema of technical 
progress derives from the presumption that capital is a factor of production, in which 
case its contribution to output is viewed as a one-directional stream – i.e. from factors 
of production (including capital) towards output. But because capital goods are 
themselves produced, the neoclassical treatise is unable to capture “the feed-back 
effects of technical progress from one activity to another.” (Harcourt, 1972: 86). This 
point is especially made clearer when the Solow model is taken as true, following 
Solow (1957). Here, a constant savings proportion may be assumed so that technical 
progress reflects shifts in the production function and capital deepening represents 
movement along the production function. Viewed within this framework, technical 
progress would imply not only a higher capital-labour ratio but also higher savings. 
From this schema it is hard to know whether a higher capital-labour ratio is a result of 
technical betterment or capital deepening. It is correct, however, to suggest that the 
higher capital-labour ratio is attained only because the economy can save more, but 
this has, in turn, been made possible due to technical advance. Harcourt (1972) argues 
that Solow’s view is insufficient in giving a true account of cause and effect. For 
instance, it partially disregards the effect of technical progress on capital in terms of 
making capital more efficient. Indeed, Solow’s model would assign the rise in the 
                                                 
9 Full employment, in the neoclassical conception, is guaranteed in part through the principle of 
factor substitution.  
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capital-labour ratio to a rise in savings only whereas the movement along the 
production function before technical progress would be indicative of capital 
deepening, with the residual being assigned to technical progress. Thus, the Solow 
model ignores the bi-directional relationship that would result as technical progress 
brings about an improvement in capital use – i.e. makes capital more efficient. 
2.5 Realities of the Zambian economy 
Theory should respond to realities, i.e. actual economic experiences. This way, it can 
be used to understand what is going on. Thus, to help explain Zambia’s growth 
process, the theory used should not be incongruent with Zambia’s actual economic 
experience. While making assumptions may be argued to be important in order to 
simplify exposition, it should not be done at the expense of providing insights into 
actual economic experiences. I subject the assumptions necessary for TFP 
measurement to the realities of Zambia’s economy. Doing so serves two important 
purposes; firstly, it questions whether Zambia’s economic conditions allow for TFP 
measurement; and, secondly, perhaps more rewarding but related to the first, it 
presents key features of Zambia’s economy. These features will provide the foundation 
for characterising a structural change framework for Zambia. I argue here that relying 
on the neoclassical paradigm to explain growth not only fails to do so but also obscures 
the actual economic experiences that the theory should untangle. 
Few studies have assessed theoretical requirements for TFP against actual economic 
conditions, but two are notable (Fine, 1992; Sato, 2005). Fine (1992) offers a critical 
appraisal of the neoclassical paradigm utilised by Jones (1983) to compute and explain 
South Africa’s coal industry productivity. Importantly, Fine questions whether the 
industry’s economic conditions allow for TFP measurement, and by showing that they 
do not, he argues that he reveals some major features of the industry from which he 
draws conclusions poles apart from those of Jones’. Sato (2005) follows Fine's (1992) 
example by critically assessing Truett and Truett's (1997) study utilising the 
neoclassical technical apparatus embedded in the so-called duality of a cost function. 
From this cost function, the latter obtain narrow technical aspects of production 
including input cross price elasticities. Sato disputes this approach and examines its 
realism when weighed against actual industry conditions. In showing that assumptions 
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necessary for calculating TFP growth are at variance with the South Korean steel 
industry, Sato argues that he sheds light on some important patterns and characteristics 
of the industry, which he posits offer a different interpretation of economic 
performance than that advanced by Truett and Truett. In recognising the flaws of the 
methods selected to assess Zambia’s economic performance, this section of the critical 
analysis adopts Fine’s and Sato’s approach and thus draws its own conclusions from 
Zambia’s realities. 
In order to examine whether the economic conditions in Zambia permit TFP 
measurement, a few concessions need to be made. The neoclassical paradigm adopted 
in the studies summarised above is based on a number of simplifying assumptions 
including: Zambia is a one-good economy; perfect competition prevails in the output 
and input markets; full employment of resources. For my purposes, I provisionally 
accept them so as to investigate whether they are in agreement with the economic 
conditions prevailing in Zambia. This is important because it would be impossible to 
measure TFP without these assumptions. 
2.5.1 On Zambia’s performance and TFP Trends 
At Independence in 1964, Zambia was a thriving nation based on developing country 
standards. Evidently, from Figure 2.1 below, Zambia’s overall GDP growth post-
Independence has been far from satisfactory, particularly between early 1970s to late 
1990s, even when compared to developing sub-Sahara Africa. This unsatisfactory 
economic performance has been a subject of numerous policy debates. Key to these 
debates has been the consensus that a mixture of both external and internal factors was 
responsible for this undesirable performance. External factors such as falling copper 
prices, oil price shocks of the mid-1970s, droughts, global recessions have all been 
offered to explain this dismal economic performance (Carmody, 2009; Mwanawina 
and Mulungushi, 2008, 2002, World Bank, 2004a, 2004b). Further, government’s 
decision to pursue interventionist policies prior to 1991 was scorned in that it was not 
only unsuccessful in insulating the economy from external factors but it also failed to 
provide a sustainable economic roadmap.10 
                                                 
10 See Appendix A for an overview of policy regimes. 
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The studies outlined above were an attempt to investigate and explain this economic 
performance. Both studies were in agreement in suggesting that TFP largely accounted 
for GDP growth. This is of interest because this points to a theoretical approach to 
performance assessment. I, therefore, begin by examining the explanations offered for 
TFP trends in these two studies. 
Figure 2-1 Growth in GDP - Zambia and sub-Sahara Africa 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/africa-development-indicators) 
Overall, TFP trends were unsatisfactory, swinging between positive and negative from 
one year to the other, but giving an overall negative average for the entire four decades. 
For this, interventionist economic strategies prior to the structural adjustment 
programmes are claimed to have negatively affected performance by distorting 
economic activity. Additionally, lack of foresight and perverse development planning 
and implementation during the period of the so-called stabilisation policies is 































































































Bank study records a positive TFP and a positive real GDP growth to which it points 
to ripening of economic fruits on the back of liberalisation and privatisation policies 
embarked on a decade earlier (Mwanawina and Mulungushi, 2008, 2002, World Bank, 
2004a, 2004b). 
The foregoing explanation for TFP trends is problematic in itself. By measuring TFP, 
analysts are implicitly accepting the underlying assumption of a freely functioning 
(laissez-faire) economy. This is what Sato (2005: 639) refers to as “analytical 
confusion” in the sense that, in explaining TFP outcomes, analysts are (unknowingly) 
acknowledging absence of one of its core assumptions. This example, and many more 
as I argue, casts doubt on the very notion of TFP, whose explanation violates its 
fundamental requirements and thus offers no coherent explanatory content over and 
above the more serious theoretical issues in its conceptualisation, deriving from the 
Cambridge critique already discussed. 
Disastrously, though not surprisingly, the computation of TFP is weighed against 
different policy regimes (especially in the World Bank study). From here, it is overall 
concluded that state intervention led to poor economic management while market-
friendly policies reproduced a good growth record (also mirrored by an upward trend 
in TFP) albeit with a lagged effect. Such has been justification for World Bank-IMF-
type policy advice. Recovery of the mining sector, argued to have been made possible 
by liberalisation and privatisation policies, provided the vehicle for economic 
recovery. Because market-based policies coincided with somewhat impressive GDP 
growth, both for four fifths of the decade after Independence and the period post-2000, 
this is taken as evidence of a correct policy approach; hence argued to lend credence 
to private sector-led growth. 
However, such claims are based on conjecture rather than evidence. Going by the East-
Asian miracle, it would be a mistake to suggest universal correctness of market-based 
policies. The disagreement of Zambia’s economic conditions, some of which have 
been offered to explain TFP trends, and the underlying assumption of a freely 
functioning economy casts doubt on TFP and thus begs a relook at what was going on. 
In fact, critics have argued that the liberalisation and privatisation policies propagated 
by the IMF and World Bank were not only deindustrialising but also robbed the 
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Zambian state of an opportunity to reformulate structural change efforts to reorient the 
economy towards a sustainable poverty-reducing growth trajectory (Muuka, 1997; 
Carmody, 2009). Critics have in addition accused such market-based policies for 
having adversely affected the labour market, subsequently leading to 
flexibilisation/informalisation of labour. 
To foster economic growth, market-based policies essentially put the private sector at 
the helm of economic activity. From this postulate, another important assumption is 
that the Zambian economy is perfectly competitive. This raises additional problems. 
For instance, absence of perfect competition implies that TFP would in fact be 
measuring changes in the degree of non-competitiveness in given markets as opposed 
to contribution to output. Further, in the presence of unemployment and/or 
underemployment, TFP would also track variations in the degree of capacity utilisation 
(Fine, 1992). Zambia’s mining and agricultural sectors experienced long periods of 
under-capacity utilisation due to poor foreign exchange positions. Rampant 
unemployment was (is) the norm in the Zambian economy; it has persisted and 
continues to afflict the economy (to be taken up later). 
2.5.2 Competition and measurement of output 
It is explicitly (though erroneously) assumed in the World Bank (2004b: 14) study that 
GDP can be expressed as a production function. Supporting this claim, it is further 
argued that “the observed value of GDP is the interplay of demand and supply in the 
product and factor markets, a comprehensive analysis of constant-price GDP growth 
must examine its components on both the production and the consumption sides of 
social accounts.” In this way, the growth process is reduced to technicalities 
characterised by the mapping relationship between inputs and outputs. Output is thus 
represented by (constant-price) GDP. 
I note also that in practice, GDP, despite its known weaknesses in being unable to 
provide critical information on economic performance and living standards, is 
traditionally taken to represent the output of an economy. By this token, when 
subjected to the theoretical construct of marginal productivity theory, it is as though 
GDP represents a single output of an economy. In this vein, I proceed to examine the 
47 
 
legitimacy of this claim against the composition and structure of Zambia’s GDP post-
Independence. 
To qualify the Zambian economy as a one-good economy, by marginal productivity 
theory, constituent elements of GDP should themselves not only be represented by 
production functions but they should also be easily aggregated, within and across 
sectors. Before proceeding further on this point, I begin by noting that Zambia’s 
economy is characterised by many sectors and diverse economic activities. In other 
words, GDP measures the market value sum across sectors (See Appendix B below 
for a snapshot of structure of Zambia’s economy; GDP by type of economic activity). 
It is evident from this categorisation of GDP by sector that the presumption of a single 
good for the entire economy is seriously in jeopardy. It would take more than a ‘willing 
suspension of disbelief’ to contend that GDP is a homogeneous good. The breakdown 
of GDP by economic activity explicitly shows the heterogeneous nature of the goods 
and services that make it up. However, to compute GDP, it has been necessary to 
obtain value aggregates. The aggregate GDP figure combines a spectrum of physical 
commodities and/or intangible services. While many studies adopting the neoclassical 
approach have utilised aggregate production functions in their course of inquiry, there 
has been no convincing justification for their use. 
Fisher (1969) demonstrated long ago that the conditions necessary to obtain aggregate 
production functions are so stringent that it is impossible to find an economy that 
satisfies them. As it has been strongly argued, aggregate production functions do not 
exist. However, for purposes of further investigation, if analysts assume they do exist, 
as evidenced by their use, then it is only natural to test the conditions necessary for 
aggregation. Theoretically, such aggregation requires not only that production 
functions between and across sectors are the same but also the condition that they are 
linearly homogeneous so that constant returns to scale hold. Violation of such 
aggregation conditions would undermine the purported technical relationship between 
inputs and outputs, so that this relationship would in turn be determined by how output 
is distributed across sectors (Sato, 2005), thus requiring additional explanation for the 
determinants of distribution beyond technicalities of the neoclassical paradigm. A 
consideration of class interests for instance can be advanced as a factor influencing 
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distribution, not least the role of the state in transforming the outcome. It is hard to 
imagine that every sector in Zambia’s economy embodies the same technology; how 
can capital-intensive copper mining be aggregated with labour-intensive agricultural 
production, so that neoclassical propositions hold? The structure and composition of 
GDP shows that several sectors and, therefore, several producers exist. In 
demonstrating GDP constituent elements by sector, it is thus shown that producer 
specialisation and variability in scope and scale of technical conditions of production 
is part and parcel of the diversity of the economy. The validity of the assumption of a 
single output whose production depends on technical relations between itself and its 
inputs is thus questionable. It suffices to make our point by taking a particular sector, 
say the mining sector as a general example and copper mining in particular. The 
categorisation of type of copper mine as open-pit or underground uncovers diversity 
of technique of copper production. Further, copper production has undergone a series 
of changes in methods of extraction and refining for both old and new copper ore 
deposits and as ownership has changed hands. It is thus problematic to assume that 
copper producers have identical production technologies (identical production 
functions) and have been in equilibrium throughout the four decades post-
Independence. Indeed, the narrow focus on TFP would fail to pick up these intricacies. 
As has been repeatedly emphasised, in order to calculate the contribution of factors to 
output, further crucial assumptions are necessary to derive TFP calculations. To allow 
contributions of factor inputs to be measured by their factor shares, it is customary to 
assume that the economy’s technology exhibits constant returns to scale and that the 
economy is perfectly competitive. Otherwise, TFP will not necessarily compute 
contribution to output. 
Furthermore, in measuring TFP, absence of constant returns to scale is highly 
problematic as it renders pointless the presumption that factor shares measure the 
contribution of factor inputs (Fine, 1992). Let us return to the mining sector to 
underscore an important point here. There is sufficient evidence to suggest alternating 
periods of diseconomies and economies of scale in copper mining. Spells of buoyant 
copper prices coincided with high copper production, with the converse holding 
generally true (between 1964 and early 1970s; also post-2000), although this is mixed 
up with capacity utilisation as opposed to scale economies and raises issues over 
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whether the two are separable from one another except in theory. But this also 
underscores issues of demand that are largely ignored by the neoclassical approach. 
Nziramasanga and Obidegwu (1981) note that the period post-Independence but prior 
to 1970 witnessed improved labour productivity. However, under-investment in the 
copper mining sector coupled with external factors such as low copper prices and oil 
shocks put pressure on the fiscal obligations of the government, which combined in a 
complex way and manifested in low copper production and low capacity utilisation. 
Again, I argue that TFP focuses on supply-side factors and thus ignores the effect of 
demand and other external factors on growth. 
Negi (2010) suggests that some mining companies may have enjoyed substantial 
economies of scale against the backdrop of higher copper prices post-2000. For large 
mines at least, such scale economies have been suggested as being instrumental in 
insulating them from external shocks associated with the global financial crisis. 
Further, to claim that the copper subsector has been characterised by perfect 
competition is farfetched. Huge investments, economies of scale and concentration of 
small-to-medium firms, mainly operating as subsidiaries of international companies 
and a few large firms, show that the scale of operation and size of firms is varied 
(World Bank, 2011). In excess of fifty percent of Zambia’s copper is produced by two 
large companies. This diversity in terms of size of firms and huge investments required 
to open a copper mine are characteristic of conditions that diverge significantly from 
TFP requirements. 
Following the sale of state-owned copper companies, initial activities associated with 
revamping the sector involved resuming production in existing mines through 
additional investments (recapitalization) and, as surface level copper diminished, 
digging deeper was required (World Bank, 2011). Additionally, further prospecting 
has recently taken the form of opening new mines altogether as copper ore deposits 
are discovered in new places and areas of Zambia. Because the economy is regarded 
as a one-commodity economy, TFP measurement (erroneously) conflates such 
variations in production with other factors prevailing in the economy, including 
distribution and demand conditions. 
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Again, additional problems persist even if we remain in the one-good world. Because 
output and inputs, capital in particular, are measured using constant price data, choice 
of an appropriate price deflator is an important undertaking for the analyst, but the 
problems we encounter take us back to what we assumed away. Although it is 
customary to use the GDP deflator for the entire economy, it is a bit more complicated 
to choose an appropriate price deflator for different capital goods across the many 
sectors characteristic of Zambia’s economy. Again, even doing so would require that 
markets be perfectly competitive. Absence of perfect competition would point to 
varying degree of influence of market participants – producers and consumers – and 
TFP would in fact be tracking this rather than technological advancement (Fine, 1992). 
2.5.3 The Zambian Labour Market 
The structure of Zambia’s labour market questions the plausibility of the assumptions 
necessary for TFP measurement. For the wage rate to reflect the unit contribution of 
labour, it is required that the labour market is perfectly competitive. In the TFP world, 
labour is generally simply aggregated to form a single factor regardless of type, even 
though attempts can be made to compute effective labour as a distinguishing factor or 
some other form of human capital augmentation. More conceptual confusion is evident 
from the studies outlined above. For instance, Mwanawina and Mulungushi (2008: 
299), in their opening discussion of the labour market, remark that “The labour market 
was uncompetitive and dualistic in nature”. These authors adopt a method that treats 
the labour market as a competitive entity but violate this assumption to explain what 
is taking place in the labour market. By taking into account the dynamics of the labour 
market, I reveal more about its functioning and role in the national economy than 
simply presuming it belongs to the TFP world. 
At the time of Independence, Zambia’s labour market was characterised by inequality 
of opportunity mainly on racial grounds which derived from colonial policies. For 
instance, black Africans were not allowed to work in certain white-collar jobs, and had 
limited access to education, thus biasing labour supply. At Independence, there was no 
university in Zambia; only 76 Africans held university degrees, all bestowed on them 
from outside the country, while a meagre 961 held secondary school certificates 
(Turok, 1989: 37). This low investment in manpower has been dubbed as one of the 
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greatest development challenges inherited by the indigenous Zambian government and 
proved particularly problematic in the first few years after Independence (Whitworth, 
2015; Martin, 1972; Elliott, 1971). 
In addition to educational inequalities, wage differentials too were widespread. Katona 
(1982: 7) reports that a day before Independence the subsistence population accounted 
for around 86 percent of the labour force. The average annual income for white settlers 
was more than ten times that of the African wage earners. The subsistence population 
performed the worst in terms of earnings even when compared with wage-earning 
Africans: on average, the subsistence population received less than one-seventh of the 
income of African wage earners. 
When the new African government took charge soon after Independence, one of the 
main thrusts of its political and economic policies was to bring about an improvement 
in the standard of living of Africans through employment creation and diminution of 
income inequalities between Africans and Europeans, and urban and rural settlers. 
Foreign workers, also known as expatriates, were being displaced, and some opted to 
withdraw from the labour market against the pressure from the new government 
structures. Africans took over Europeans’ farms as some white settlers left the country. 
However, due to a chronically limited pool of skilled African workers, it soon became 
clear to the ruling government that an attempt to retain a certain modicum of skills 
would require some form of ‘outsourcing’ which was mainly achieved by hiring 
expatriates. These expatriates were generally generously paid, reflecting an incentive 
scheme that kept wages above the going market rate. Thus persisted the lack of 
competitiveness in the labour market that had previously stood on racial grounds. 
Despite the government’s move towards a more cohesive equal wage policy, 
inequalities persisted. For instance, by 1968, expatriate employees, mainly Europeans, 
earned around six times more than African wage earners. This opened up scope for 
government to push towards ensuring that wage differentials continued to diminish. It 
is also reported that average wages rose by 147 percent between 1963 and 1968 and, 
by 1970, the total number of employees increased by nearly one quarter (Katona, 
1982). In the face of increasing overall average wage earnings, a reduction in wage 
differentials required that increases for Africans were relatively larger than those of 
non-Africans. In the event, Martin (1972: 231) reports that between 1964 and 1968, 
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the overall wage bill increased by at least 20 percent per year, comprising an annual 
average increase of 30 percent for Africans and only 9 percent for non-Africans. The 
increase in nearly half of the wage bill for the first half of the period was mainly 
attributed to rising employment levels; but 85 percent of the increase for the latter half 
of the period represented larger wages for those already in employment. The 
government, through the parastatals and public service, was the biggest employer of 
formal employment (see Table 2-1 Employees by Industry, December 1980).  
Table 2-1 Employees by Industry, December 1980 
Industry Private Sector  Public Sector Parastatals 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries 10,340 11,210 11,080 
Mining and Quarrying 300 - 62,770 
Manufacturing 25,720 710 21,330 
Electricity and Water - 2,980 5,030 
Construction 17,860 25,890 - 
Distribution, Hotels and Restaurants 16,010 2,140 13,200 
Transport and Communications 2,530 1000 20410 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate Business  12,240 97,050 10150 
Community, Social and Personal Services 8,830 300 220 
ALL INDUSTRIES 93,830 141280 144,190 
Source: Turok (1989: 82) 
A new government, following democratic elections, came to power in 1991. With it, 
came reforms that would aim at, among other things, downscaling government 
administration and economic participation through privatisation of state-owned 
companies. By 1992, 15000 government employees were laid off. However, public 
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outcry and general discontent, apparently premised on huge social costs and 
government’s failure to pay off retrenched workers timely, saw the government 
suspend retrenchments. 
Following the sale of major parastatals including mining companies, the Zambia 
labour market experienced dramatic shifts in employment patterns and distribution and 
by 2008, informal employment had grown substantially (see Table 2-2 Employment 
by sector and by type of employer, 2008). 
Table 2-2 Employment by sector and by type of employer, 2008 
By Sector 
 Formal Informal Total 
Agriculture 84921 3727001 3811922 
Mining and Quarrying 15641 80098 95739 
Manufacturing 38757 129603 168360 
Electricity, Gas and Water 2119 12152 14271 
Construction 5166 81800 86966 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 133643 327815 461458 
Hotels and Restaurants 11591 33006 44597 
Transport and Storage 48056 49996 98052 
Finance and Insurance 20975 35669 56644 
Community, Social and Personal 161307 222445 383752 
Total 522176 4699585 5221761 
By type of employer 
 Formal Informal Total 
Central Government 209546 0 209546 
Local Government 26891 0 26891 
Parastatal 40000 0 40000 
Private 225012 659213 884225 
NGO/Church 13485 17479 30964 
International Organization 4675 2059 6734 
Household 0 3969991 3969991 
Others 2566 50842 53408 
Source: (Shah, 2012; Central Statistical Office, 2011) 
The majority of Zambians are employed in the informal sectors, over 90 percent. The 
effects of privatisation and liberalisation are thought to have contributed to the 
changing structure of the labour market now mainly characterised by growing informal 
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sectors (Gadzala, 2010; Weeks et al., 2007). The informal sectors are largely notorious 
for sidestepping employment regulations; workers for instance are ill-treated and paid 
poorly (Fashoyin, 2008). 
In terms of formal employment, the public sector continues to be an important 
employer. In 2010, it recorded close to half of formal wage employment but absorbed, 
on average, more trained workers as measured by education level of at least post-
secondary school level than the private sector. The World Bank (2013: 17) reports that 
“The public sector, particularly the quasi-government sector, also appears to be paying 
higher wages than the private sector for similar education, location, gender, and 
experience.” Such factors have a bearing on our analysis in at least showing that the 
realities on the ground have nothing to do with marginal productivity theory of 
distribution – that is, to assume that workers are paid by their marginal products. Such 
wage structures have a lot to do with shifting patterns and structures of the economy. 
Recruitment processes particularly in the public sector have frequently been reported 
to be unprofessional. Several accounts of non-competitive hiring practices, for 
instance, have been recorded (Fashoyin, 2008; Nielsen and Westergård‐Nielsen, 
2001). Therefore, to proceed as if labour operates in a competitive market is 
questionable even on simple grounds of hiring mechanisms and practices. 
Against this backdrop, it is ill-conceived to argue that the labour market in Zambia has 
experienced continuous equilibrium. Wage structures and labour market policies have 
undergone tremendous shifts, and adjustments and fragmentation of the labour market 
festered against the backdrop of expanding informal sectors. There has been some 
significant improvement in reducing unemployment since the 1991 (see Figure below) 
but this must be interpreted with caution. For instance, a significantly large proportion 
of newly created jobs have not been absorbed by high growth sectors. 
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Figure 2-2 Zambia: Unemployment, 1991-2012 
 
Source: World Development Indicators. 
The record of changes in the employment and wage structures across sectors and 
employers are associated with changing structural characteristics of the economy. The 
point, however, is that the changing/shifting patterns and/or structure of wages reflects 
social (and economic) relations and thus could not have been purely free-market 
determined to equate labour’s marginal productivity with the real wage for the entire 
post-Independence period. In addition, features such as chronic unemployment show 
how wildly divergent the reality is from the conditions of full employment of resources 
necessary to justify measures of TFP. 
2.5.4 Conclusions on the realities of the Zambian economy 
Once subjected to the realities of the Zambian economy, the assumptions behind TFP 
computations are shown not to hold, thus questioning the application of TFP to explain 
Zambia’s growth record. Indeed, TFP measurement appears to be an exercise in futility 
as it has failed to provide any convincing explanation of Zambia’s economic 
performance, not least because it is premised on a flawed theoretical foundation. The 
use of a production function to measure TFP as a residual does nothing more than track 
the deviations from the assumptions. In other words, TFP is tracking shift in 
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contributions of inputs and weighting them by their factor shares. So, what this residual 
is actually measuring is all deviations from the assumptions which are necessary for 
that tracking to take place, i.e. changes in unemployment, changes in rewards to factors 
of production, changes in degree of competition and so on. This raises serious 
questions about the legitimacy of the method given that in general any economy 
deviates substantially from these assumptions and this has been shown to be the case 
for the Zambian economy. 
The lessons to be drawn for further analysis are straightforward; examining 
performance against the back of a changing economic structure requires a more wide-
ranging approach. Equally important, however, is that the relevance of the analysis of 
the realities of the Zambian economy brings to light the significance of consideration 




3 From the Developmental State Paradigm (DSP) to Linkage-
Agency: Lessons for and from Zambia 
The role of the state in development has a long controversial history (Fine, 2006: 101). 
More recently, especially with respect to the so-called high-performing Asian 
economies (HPAEs),11 a debate emerged which, despite evidence to the contrary, has 
seen developing countries learn (flawed) lessons and adopt policies that diminish the 
role of the state in development. For sub-Saharan Africa, two parallel sets of literature, 
although occasionally cross-referencing each other, have broadly led to this position: 
first, the poor performance of post-Independence late 1960s to early 1990s state-led 
development, leading to the so-called lost-decade throughout the 1980s symbolic of 
stagnant economic growth and even reversal in some cases (Easterly, 2001; Singer, 
1989) have served to see state-interventionism within the context of Africa as inimical 
to growth and development;12 second, propagated and promulgated by juggernaut 
institutions like the World Bank, and neoclassical economists more generally, there 
has been dismissal of evidence which proved an extensive and a considerable role of 
the state in shaping East Asian developmentalism, instead sticking to and promoting a 
free-market narrative (World Bank, 1993; Jomo, 1997; Krugman, 1994; Amsden, 
1994). 
In opposing the free-market narrative, especially one furnished and reinforced by the 
Washington Consensus, extensive case studies were carried out to provide an 
alternative account of East Asian developmentalism leading to classical contributions 
such as Alice Amsden’s Asia’s Next Giant on South Korea (Amsden, 1989), Robert 
Wade’s Governing the Market on Taiwan (Wade, 1990a) and Ha-Joon Chang’s 
Political Economy of Industrial Policy (Chang, 1994). Yet one of the earliest classical 
contributions by Chalmers Johnson on MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Johnson, 1982) 
was driven by an aspiration “to call attention to the differences, not the similarities, 
between the capitalist economies of the United States and Britain, on the one hand, 
                                                 
11 HPAEs include “Japan; the “Four Tigers” – Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singaore, and Taiwan, 
China; and the three newly industrializing economies (NIEs) of South-east Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Thailand.” (World Bank, 1993: 1) 
12 See World Bank (1981) popularly known as Berg Report on the negative depiction of state 




and Japan and its emulators elsewhere in East Asia, on the other”, which were already 
showing by the early 1980s (Johnson, 1999: 32). The point of this alternative literature 
was to highlight that free-market developmentalism largely diverged from the actual 
experiences of East Asia, not least demonstrating the crucial role the state played to 
condition development in these countries. 
By the mid-1990s, the developmental state literature was welcomed on account of its 
intellectual gains in demonstrating the Washington Consensus’ flawed explanation of 
the socio-political and economic content of East Asian economies. However, at the 
height of the Asian crisis around 1997/1998, the relevance of the developmental state 
model for developing countries elsewhere and for the East Asian countries themselves 
was already being questioned, and this inquiry especially driven by the changing 
global context which witnessed the spread of neoliberalism. However, this was to show 
that the developmental state literature itself required introspection and reflection, and 
a deeper explanation and, if required, extension, in order to remain relevant. After 
being ridiculed as lacking analytical rigour and content following the 1990s Asian 
crisis, the development state literature re-emerged with renewed energy to explain this 
crisis and ways out of it by deference to, and calling for, greater state intervention in a 
neoliberal era. This has meant that ingredients of the intellectual recipe of the 
developmental state literature have had to be reconfigured although maintaining the 
flavour of the centrality of the state, to whatever degree and with whatever content, in 
development. 
Ironically, while the DSP was gaining further ground in the early 1990s, neoliberalism 
in practice was also gaining momentum. It is interesting indeed to observe that the rise 
of an alternative thread of scholarship did not deter the neoliberal project, if anything 
it strengthened its resolve as demonstrated by the role the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) played in facilitating the demolition of statism. Developing countries 
generally, and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, dismantled public enterprises, as a 
result of being ‘forced’ to in order to underpin their economies by private capital. They 
(developing countries) liberalised their foreign exchange markets, opened up their 
economies to foreign competition, including putting in place other neoliberal policies 
that essentially reduced the state to spectator. However, after over 25 years of 
neoliberal policies from the early 1990s in sub-Saharan Africa, the world is a changed 
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place, inequality has especially been notorious, and finance dominates, while 
development as envisaged has not been forthcoming. Instead, the tide of scholarship 
has shifted to one that is calling for a greater role of the state in the economy, but as 
discussed in Chapter 1, this shift in thought has been half-hearted; it has required the 
state to do what cannot be substantiated historically, especially within the context of 
East Asian development. 
In this chapter, I revisit the role of the state within the context of the so-called 
Developmental State Paradigm (DSP) in order to reflect on the literature opposing 
free-market developmentalism, but also, in the spirit of the central theme of this thesis, 
to examine what factors were responsible for (developmental) structural change, 
including what lessons can be learnt for Zambia’s economic historiography, 
particularly the post-Independence state-led development era. Chapter 4 (and going 
forward) will revisit Zambia’s post-Independence statist epoch to establish what 
factors were central to the performance of the economy, quite apart from what has 
been depicted in the literature. Informed by the DSP, the aim is to establish what can 
be learnt for Zambia’s post-Independence state-led policies, not least also an exercise 
in an attempt to uncover why statist policies might have worked for erstwhile East 
Asian economies. 
I start by giving a brief overview of the remarkable economic performance of selected 
East Asian countries, particularly between the 1960s to the early 1990s. I then explore 
the dominant narratives explaining this economic performance, with occasional 
reference to the developmental literature. Following this, I launch a discussion of the 
DSP, examining its overarching themes, its strengths and weaknesses. The DSP is 
discussed in terms of its dual trajectory corresponding to its two schools of thought, 
the political on the one hand, and the economic on the other hand. Deliberation on the 
DSP also opens up space to reflect on some of the experiences of the selected East 
Asian countries, by way of example to foreground what can be learned.  
After pointing out the relevance of the DSP in development as a way to establish what 
went wrong during Africa’s post-independence statist era, I launch an alternative 
analytical framework, the Linkage-Agency approach, this transition in methodological 
and analytical approach being "informed by the idea that economic development” is 
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“dependent upon the interaction between linkages and agencies" (Fine and Rustomjee, 
1996: 23). In a fundamental way, this transition in analytical terrain is an exercise not 
only simply meant to reveal the weaknesses of the DSP but also an approach to 
strengthen and extend its scope and relevance. Indeed, if the DSP is to have any 
usefulness, it must be flexible in its application, which means framing and extending 






3.1 Overview of economic performance of East Asia: selected indicators 
The purpose of this subsection is simply to spotlight the remarkable growth of 
(selected) East Asian countries as opposed to giving a detailed account of the nature 
of their growth.13 Hence, when discussions about East Asian economic performance 
is developed in later parts of this chapter, this subsection will serve as a crude reminder 
or reference point for how remarkable that performance was. 
                                                 
13 For detailed accounts of economic performance of selected East Asian countries, see Wade (1990: 




Table 3-1 GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) 
Country Name 1961 1969 1970 1979 1980 1989 1990 1995 
Zambia  1,483   1,561   1,583   1,290   1,284   1,079   1,045   906  
Sub-Saharan Africa  1,074   1,247   1,335   1,448   1,464   1,254   1,249   1,129  
South Asia  318   367   380   390   405   532   549   630  
Singapore  3,545   5,803   6,507   12,251   13,309   20,953   22,178   29,008  
Korea, Rep.  980   1,686   1,815   3,823   3,700   7,785   8,465   12,055  
Japan  9,396   18,837   18,435   24,986   25,489   36,028   37,906   40,369  
East Asia & Pacific  1,347   2,210   2,200   2,869   2,929   4,027   4,186   4,814  
*(excluding high income) 
Source: World Development Indicators, online 
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Crudely, the extraordinary performance of East Asian countries can be gleaned from 
Table 3-1 GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$). Take Zambia and South Korea (Korea, 
rep.) for example. By 1961, Zambia, then Northern Rhodesia, had a (constant) GDP 
per capita 51 percent higher than South Korea. By the end of the 1960s, South Korea 
had surpassed Zambia. In terms of this measure, South Korea, compared to Zambia, 
was already three times higher by the end of the 1970s, over seven times larger by the 
end of the 1980s and, more than 13 times bigger by 1995. South Korea itself between 
1961 and 1995, a period of 35 years (i.e. within a generation), experienced annual 
average real GDP per capita growth rates of about seven percent, such that the 1995 
GDP per capita was over twelve times its 1961 value. During the same period, the 
Zambian economy remained virtually stagnant. 
Along with the remarkable growth in per capita incomes, HPAEs experienced large 
dividends in human welfare, with life expectancy rising from 56 years in 1960 to 71 
years in 1990 (World Bank, 1993: 4). Additionally, and in general, HPAEs 
experienced egalitarian growth, while they transformed their industrial 
capacities/structures. In other words, their remarkable economic performance was 
underpinned by industrialisation which permitted a fairly reasonable sharing of 
wealth. For South Korea and Taiwan, for example, they are thought to have “achieved 
in fifteen years, what took Japan twenty-five years and Great Britain over fifty years” 
(Wade, 1990b: 42). By the 1980s, South Korea and Taiwan were both regarded as 
being well on their way to becoming high-wage, high-technology economies, which, 
with the benefit of hindsight, they had achieved. 
Meanwhile, the growth in GDP per capita in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, as 
entire regional blocs, remained disappointing throughout this period. In fact, average 
income per capita in sub-Saharan Africa declined by 1995 from its peak in the 1970s. 
For Zambia, the story is even more disappointing: from its zenith, by the early 1970s, 
Zambia’s average incomes declined by over 40 percent by 1995. 
The debates that emerged to explain East Asian successful economic performance 
were underpinned by a paradox: that is, why other regions, especially sub-Saharan 
Africa, seemingly implementing similar (statist) policies experienced stagnation, 
while East Asia experienced unprecedented economic success. This is partly 
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addressed in the next subsection, although the discussion is limited to explaining the 
performance of East Asian economies, roughly during this period. 
3.2 Some controversies in the explanation of East Asian development 
In this subsection, I examine more closely the (emerging) themes (and occasionally, 
the analytical scholarship) of the debates on East Asian development, not least 
locating the role of the state within it. Following the remarkable performance of East 
Asian economies, and, correspondingly, around the same time, the dismal 
performance of state-led developmentalism in other developing countries, mainstream 
(or, more or less equivalently, neoclassical) economics was in limbo. Consequently, 
it sought to reconcile how it could be that statist policies were exceptionally successful 
in East Asia yet disastrous elsewhere. By retreat to its technical analytical architecture, 
mainstream economics found itself performing intellectual acrobatics to evade, or, 
more appropriately, skirt around, the notion that state interventionism was a requisite 
character in East Asian developmenalism (Fine, 2013, 2006). Two central if broad 
themes underpinned its scholarship on East Asian economic development: to deny the 
broad and specific role of the state, and to make a case for an open economy.14  
First, in preserving its intellectual integrity, it could not afford to dismiss or contradict 
its ideological bias against statism. Thus, it explained away state intervention as 
central to East Asian development in a manner that resurrected the notion of free-
market developmentalism, even if relegating the latter to an intellectual coma. 
Second, it unpacked the nature of East Asian development as one that was 
underpinned by free-trade export-oriented strategies, industrialisation through market-
enhancing interventions as opposed to selective industrial policy. Cunningly, the 
consequence was not so much to deny state intervention within the context of East 
                                                 
14 For a more detailed account of neoclassical explanations of East Asian development more 
generally, and Taiwan in particular, see Wade (1990: 52-72) who, in twenty pages, ranges over a 
number of themes spanning: free trade regime for exports; competitive (free) labour market; high 
interest rates; conservative government budgeting; stable real effective exchange rate; high savings; 
well-trained labour supply; competitive industrial structure; stable government. Another major 
neoclassical theme was the nature of state participation through public enterprise as a strategy 
inherently pernicious to the economy. In short, Taiwan’s, and indeed more or less equivalently, 
South Korea’s or Japan’s, economic successes were deemed to have been due to free market factors 
and not government/state intervention. 
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Asian development but to diminish its nature as market-preserving or market-
conforming as opposed to one inimical to growth and development supposedly 
evidenced by other developing countries experimenting with statist policies. 
Proceeding this way enabled mainstream economics more generally to package East 
Asian development experiences as special cases with limited lessons for developing 
countries in other parts of the world. 
The opposing response to this view of East Asian development witnessed the rise and 
coming to prominence of the DSP as alternative intellectual explanation of East Asian 
development. The DSP, as it has been shown in section 3.3, roughly emerged as two 
arms of the same broad body of literature: on the one hand, it examined the nature of 
politics of East Asian development, situating the state within it; and, on the other hand, 
it supplied an explanation underpinned by economic policy. The evidence of the DSP 
was so significant and overwhelming that powerful promoters of neoliberal policies 
(underpinned by neoclassical economics more broadly) such as the World Bank 
thought it was necessary to respond. The DSP has already been discussed, but the 
response to it will be discussed in a little more detail below, although some of this has 
already been raised in demonstrating the shifting content of the DSP. 
Around the mid-1970s, South Korea and Taiwan were already being presented and 
analysed as open economies, archetypical of free-trade regimes. For example, Fei and 
Ranis (1975: 56) argued that Taiwan and Korea grew their economies and reduced 
unemployment on the basis of policy changes effected in both countries by 1963 
which enabled them to:  
“[dismantle] … the various existing direct control measures, on trade, 
interest rate and foreign exchange rates, thereby [creating] a more 
market oriented economy most conducive to access … large numbers of 
domestic entrepreneurs [were] seeking efficient utilization of the 
economy's relatively abundant resources via embodiment in labour-
intensive industrial exports.” 
The same line of intellectual thought, or, more precisely, ideology, carried on in the 
early 1980s when, for instance, Balassa (1982: 346, 348), suggested that Taiwan had 
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moved from an inward-looking economy to an outward one through liberal economic 
policies implemented between 1958 and 1961 which put in place measures to devalue 
and unify the overvalued exchange rate, while reducing restrictions on regulations 
governing investment and imports, in addition to emphasis on exports as opposed to 
import controls. These measures, as Balassa argues were essential for Taiwan’s 
remarkable performance during the 1960s and 1970s. At this point, mainstream 
economics literature drew an opposition between inward- and outward-oriented 
strategies, claiming to spotlight the superiority of the latter. In other words, import-
substitution and export-oriented strategies were mutually exclusive. This served to 
repudiate the role of the state other than in promoting openness. 
By the second-half of the 1980s, virtually the same content of mainstream intellectual 
economics scholarship on East Asian development dominated. Another prolific 
neoclassical promoter, Bhagwati (1987: 286), explains the poor performance of the 
Indian economy as a function of extensive regulation “with detailed controls over 
what entrepreneurs can do.” The importance of recalling this piece of work here is to 
show how Bhagwati attempted to contrast the interventionist nature of the Indian state 
and that of South Korea. Overall, he imposes a neoclassical archetypical framework 
that skirts around productivity-capacity-enhancing state intervention by labelling the 
Indian state as proscriptive as opposed to the prescriptive South Korean state. It worth 
spending a bit more time addressing Bhagwati’s typologies, not least to demonstrate 
how eloquence in analysis does not amount to substance and enlightenment, and can 
be misleading. 
Bhagwati (1987: 286) proposes the idea that “a prescriptive government may prescribe 
as badly as a proscriptive government proscribes, each leading to a suboptimal 
outcome if you believe that such interventions tend to subtract from efficiency. But a 
proscriptive government will tend to stifle initiatives, whereas a prescriptive 
government will tend to leave open areas (outside of the presciptions [sic]) where 
initiatives can be still exercised. Thus, even though each government might distort 
allocation of existing resources equally, the proscriptive government will tend to stifle 
technical change and entrepreneurial activity and hence hurt growth.” First, Bhagwati 
fails to demonstrate why within a socio-political and economic context one state 
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should be regarded as prescriptive and another proscriptive. In other words, he fails to 
draw a distinction, especially in practice, between the two categories. 
Second, with limited resources at the disposal of both the state and private enterprise, 
Chang (1994: 107-108) has argued convincingly that a prescriptive state, can in fact 
suffocate innovation and imagination while the opposite may be true for a so-labelled 
proscriptive state. A prescriptive state which requires private firms to do many things 
leaves them with fewer resources to execute their ideas, while a proscriptive state 
which requires private firms to do few things, leaves them with more resources to 
exploit their ideas. This is all to enter a theoretical world. However, Chang also 
demonstrates from the South Korean experience that the state was stifling in several 
ways: “The Korean prescription for private firms to invest in heavy and chemical 
industries in the 1970s was proscription against investing in less risky and often more 
profitable (partly due to higher protection) consumer-goods industries” (Chang, 1994: 
107-108). A case in point is the shipbuilding industry which resulted from president 
Park Chung Hee’s directive without the consent of the Hyundai group. Further 
accounts of the Korean state’s proscriptive tendencies are exemplified by the state’s 
power to approve most business activities, to exert influence on interest rates and 
exchange rates up to a certain considerable degree. The Korean state was also known 
to temper with market organisation, restricting entry or reorganising industries by 
promoting mergers and market-sharing options if it was convinced that too much 
(unhealthy) competition existed. These reflections not only cast doubt on Bhagwati’s 
typology, but they also demonstrate how actual experiences can diverge from some 
preconceived notions of how economies work. 
The neoclassical explanations remained virtually unshaken throughout the 1980s 
despite the growing evidence which sharply contrasted their views. For example, 
Balassa (1988), reporting lessons from the East Asian experience for developing 
countries elsewhere, offers a number of broad-brushing factors as critical to the 
admirable developmentalism of the former, these underpinned by a drive towards, and 
emphasis on, exports. By supposedly diminishing so-called bureaucratic controls and 
state regulation, the state and its actors are seen to feed into an overall incentive system 
tailored to systemic promotion of exports. To this end, policy interventions are seen 
to have been limited, particularly with respect to both the labour and capital markets, 
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while encouraging considerable private sector participation. Hence, “[t]he neutrality 
and stability of the incentive system, together with limited government intervention, 
well-functioning labor and capital markets, and reliance on private capital, thus appear 
to have been the main ingredients of successful economic performance in East Asia” 
(Balassa, 1988: 288).  
Yet by the second half of the 1980s, sufficient evidence existed which cast doubt on 
the neoclassical representation of East Asian development, although not to the tune of 
comprehensive classical DSP contributions, especially within the economic school of 
the DSP. For instance, Luedde-Neurath (1988, 1986) questioned neoclassical analysis 
on the basis of its propensity to exaggerate the extent and depth of liberal economic 
reforms, taking South Korea as a case study. Luedde-Neurath showed convincingly 
that, despite a turn towards liberal reforms, tariffs were still reasonably high, 
quantitative restrictions remained considerable, government supported credit to 
import-substituting industries and industries purchasing from the local market, which 
essentially served as restrictions on imports, and foreign exchange rationing remained 
pervasive. 
It was, however, the World Bank’s report entitled the East Asian Miracle, published 
in 1993, which raised the height of the controversy, not least given its influence on 
development policy in practice. For the World Bank, producing the Report was 
important because it partially “[reflected] recent attention by the academic and 
development policy communities to the relationship between public policies … and 
rapid growth” (World Bank, 1993: 1-2). Yet, to summarise, the World Bank’s Report 
essentially served to reject state-led development as the cornerstone of East Asian 
developmentalism. 
The basic premise of the report was that “[i]n large measure the HPAEs [High 
Performing Asian Economies] achieved high growth by getting the basics right. 
Private domestic investment and rapidly growing human capital were principal 
engines for growth” (World Bank, 1993: 5). When unpacked, never mind the 
theoretical controversies on their conception of human capital, the “basics” are a set 
of target variables that typically underpin “sound development policy” promoted by 
free-market scholarship. Among the most important, there is “macroeconomic 
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management” aimed at keeping inflation low, promoting stable and competitive 
exchange rates, while spending on social services such as education and general 
infrastructure. 
Although begrudgingly acknowledging the central role of the state in promoting 
development through intervention, doubt is cast on establishing intervention as a 
causal factor for growth: “But it is very difficult to establish statistical links between 
growth and a specific intervention and even more difficult to establish causality … 
[o]ther economies attempted similar interventions without success”, yet, ultimately, 
intervention is subordinated to macroeconomic stability (World Bank, 1993: 6-
7).15The World Bank skirts around the evidence of the centrality of interventionism 
by pointing to failed projects in other developing countries, hence pointing to other 
factors such as macroeconomic stability as being more important for growth and 
development. 
Broadly, a number of conclusions follow from the World Bank’s Report which seek 
to downplay, or, more appropriately, discourage, the centrality of state 
interventionism in industrial development in particular and economic development 
more generally. But more devastating, given its role in development policy in practice 
particularly in developing countries, is to sustain the idea that the actual experience of 
East Asia provides little or no substance upon which other developing countries can 
seek to emulate.16 Underpinning its entire study are three broad conclusions: “that the 
promotion of specific industries generally did not work and therefore holds little 
promise for other developing countries. Directed credit has worked in certain 
situations but carries high risk. The export-push strategy has been by far the most 
successful … and holds the promise for other developing economies” (World Bank, 
1993: 354). 
                                                 
15 In conceding to the notion of state interventionism, the World Bank report notes that “in one 
form or another, the government intervened – systematically and through multiple channels – to 
foster development, and in some cases the development of specific industries”, and some of the 
examples of the different forms policy intervention took were “targeting and subsidizing credit to 
selected industries, keeping deposit rates low … protecting domestic import substitutes, subsidizing 
declining industries” and so forth in line with selective industry support such that “[s]ome industries 
were promoted, while others were not” (World Bank, 1993: 5-6). 




On trade policy, the export-oriented strategy within the Report is arrived at on the 
basis of gaining competitiveness via global integration rather than insulation, 
replacing import-substitution with export-promotion. By allowing reductions in 
import controls and tariffs, it is argued that international competition forced the East 
Asian economies to bring their prices in line with world prices, such that “domestic 
prices for traded goods in the HPAEs [were] more closely aligned with international 
prices than in many other developing economies” (World Bank, 1993: 260). Below, 
it is shown that this conclusion is simply not true. 
State intervention is thus one that was market-confirming, to the extent that it sought 
to repair or assist dysfunctional markets. Thus, according to the Report, the state 
intervened only because markets were not working properly (Fine, 2013: 7). State 
intervention did work in the manner it did because the conditions of East Asia which 
permitted it were unique, and, consequently, applying their experiences elsewhere 
could not be of any use. 
It will be of benefit to spend some time discussing in brief detail some of the 
scholarship that emerged in response and opposition to the World Bank’s East Asian 
Miracle Report as this serves to underscore the shifting content of the DSP and rhythm 
of the debate on East Asian development in particular and state-led development 
specifically, yet never fully coming to grips with the social while sustaining the state-
market dichotomy, as will be elaborated below in section 3.3. Amongst the most 
notable critics of the World Bank’s Report it is unsurprising that some were the 
classical contributors to the developmental state literature. Amsden (1994: 626), a 
classical contributor of the economic school of the DSP literature, was strongly critical 
of the World Bank’s Report: while wondering why the East Asian experiences were 
not being tried out in developing countries elsewhere, she suggested that, “[t]he 
greatest disappointment of the report’s market fundamentalism is a failure to study 
seriously how elements of the East Asian model can be adapted to suit conditions in 
other countries.” She bemoaned the World Bank’s use of ideology to explain 
experiences, rather than use the latter to inform and, if necessary, redefine ideology. 
Wade (1994) launches his rebuttal by mainly addressing the issue of selective 
industrial policies, exposing the flaws of the evidence (and associated arguments) that 
71 
 
underpinned the World Bank’s Report. For example, its use of unweighted data and 
unjustified comparison of different time frames to make a case for sterility of 
(selective) industrial policy is not based on actual East Asian experiences but a flawed 
method which grouped different countries irrespective of their size, polity and policy 
in practice. The underlying presumption of the World Report, which it sets out to 
prove regardless of evidence and argument, was that per capita incomes would have 
risen even without selective industrial policy, yet the pace and extent of East Asian 
growth is unprecedented. However, there is no evidence to presuppose that selective 
growth of industry (pattern of industrialisation) would have resulted from free market 
policies, especially at the rate it did for the East Asian countries. 
The idea that East Asia’s relative prices were aligned to world prices is problematic 
because there is no evidence to support it; that relative prices diverged from 
international prices is precisely what the economic school of the DSP demonstrated. 
Wade (1990: xix), in a 2003 reprint of the paperback version of his classical work, 
Governing the Market, adds an introduction wherein he argues that “the [World Bank] 
report contains evidence – that is not put to use – that the relative prices in Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan deviated more from international prices than those notorious 
interventionists like India, Pakistan, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela in the period 
1976-85.” 
In short, the case for market-conforming intervention was based on the World Bank’s 
neoliberal ideology which it fervently defended and promoted, especially from the 
1980s. The DSP simply serves to quell dissent against the underlying logic of free-
marketism as the basis for developmentalism, particularly for developing countries 
whose economies are reflected in backward technology. In contrast, free-market 
ideology cannot be the basis upon which foreign technology can be borrowed and 




3.3 Opposition to Neoclassical explanations, and the emergence of the 
Developmental State Paradigm 
The rise of the scholarship generally making a case for state-led development emerged 
as a reaction to the neoclassical accounts of East Asian development. It sought to 
demonstrate that existing scholarship on the region departed from its actual 
experiences, and, hence, mischaracterised the nature of development. The extent to 
which the economies of East Asia had been shaped by state intervention had not been 
comprehensively and extensively documented and analysed, and, thus, 
underappreciated, or misunderstood, at least in the empirical sense brought to light by 
the developmental state literature. 
Ben Fine has carried out extensive work over more than two decades on the 
developmental state literature which not only led him to coin the term Developmental 
State Paradigm (DSP) but also to distinguish two schools of thought – the political 
and economic schools – within it (Fine, 2013, 2006; Fine and Stoneman, 1996; Fine 
and Rustomjee, 1996). Placing the literature explaining the experiences of the so-
called East Asian developmental states within the context of a paradigm has a dual 
purpose with respect to this thesis: first, it seeks to demonstrate the distinctive content 
and patterns of association of the scholarship that has emerged over the years to 
support or promote the notion of developmental state interventionism. Second, it maps 
out the rhythm and trajectory of change of scholarship, which underscores its limits 
as an analytical tool, revealing its weaknesses as the scholarship through which 
developing countries can learn lessons. 
While the political school has aimed to establish the political dynamics and conditions 
crucial for success without due regard to, or, more precisely, adequate treatment of, 
the exact configuration of economic policies, the economic school has instead 
examined what kinds of economic policies underpinned successful performance with 
limited reference to the general socio-political conditions necessary to permit 
execution of these policies. A discussion of these schools of thought is the purpose of 
this subsection, although some reflection of the actual experiences of some East Asian 
countries will occasionally inform the discussion mainly by way of example. 
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3.3.1 Reflections of, and experiences within, the political school 
As the name suggests, this school of thought is centred around the configuration of 
politics and how this permitted erstwhile East Asian developmental states to undertake 
their developmental tasks. Hence, the idea is to determine the nature of the political 
landscape and, its dynamics and capacity to use the institutions of the state to deliver 
development. Accordingly, examining the (historical and existing) conditions around, 
and within, the state that enabled it to perform its developmental functions is critical 
(Kohli, 1999). However, how scholarly contributions in the political school define the 
developmental state speaks of how the state’s role in development (or structural 
change) is understood and, not least, limited. For example, writing in honour of, and 
referencing, White (1988), Robinson (2003: 26) elevates the idea of development as 
a political project delivered through institutions designed for this particular 
(developmental) purpose: “Gordon cultivated the concept of the developmental state 
in his analysis of the successful East Asian ‘tiger’ economies, arguing that the 
deliberate construction of a set of institutions geared towards a clear vision of 
development under the guidance of a motivated political leadership was key to their 
success.” 
Conveniently, the political school understands a developmental state ex post because 
the basis upon which it is defined – the capacity of the state to “promote and sustain 
development” – can only be known after the state has discharged its duties. For Japan, 
Johnson (1982: 199) observes this ex post attribute of developmental states by 
mentioning that “[t]his high growth system was one of the most rational and 
productive industrial policies ever devised by any government, but its essential 
rationality was not perceived until after it had already started producing results 
unprecedented for Japan or any other industrialized economy.” In fact, the political 
perceives “economic development” to be “the combination of steady high rates of 
growth and structural change in the productive system” yet “not a goal but a means” 
through which a developmental state is legitimated (Castells, 1992: 56-57). Two 
lessons result from examining how the political school understands the developmental 
state: first, the nature of the state has a bearing on economic development, although, 
second, by implication, economic development defines the developmental state. But, 
as Fine (2006: 103) observes, such a conception “borders on the tautological.” 
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Johnson (1982) is the foundational if leading piece of scholarship within the political 
school of the DSP. The lynchpin of his work was an emphasis on the (indispensable) 
role of the state through the bureaucratic structures and actors of the Japanese Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in guiding high-speed growth and 
structural change. He observes that the elements that constituted successful industrial 
development, and structural change more generally, were only realised through 
extensive discussions within the structures of the so-called industrial-policy 
bureaucracy of MITI. This is to place the state at the centre of designing industrial 
policy, but also to express how policy itself was institutionalised within state 
structures, providing the basis upon which it proffered and continued. Overall, 
however, the core of his study was to examine the intricate details of the way in which 
MITI functioned which inevitably leads to an investigation of the bureaucracy and its 
key personalities. For example, he identifies “Sahashi Shigeru as the one who 
“institutionalized “administrative guidance … as MITI’s main means of implementing 
industrial policy” and hence “the best-known … of MITI’s vice-ministers” whose 
“policies laid the groundwork for the extremely rapid industrial growth of the late 
1960’s” (Johnson, 1982: 243). Ultimately, it was the continuity of bureaucrats in key 
decision-making positions from the start of industrial policy proper in the late 1920s 
through the 1930s Great Depression and well into the 1960s plus their intimate 
connection to their jobs, and even maintaining a close relationship to the bureaucracy 
upon retirement through their business interests, that Johnson traced as the central 
features promoting functional private-public relations. 
Japanese industrial policy is well rooted in synergies between private businesses and 
the state bureaucracy. Through mixed formal gatherings of private sector 
representatives and public officials, the latter part of the 1920s saw a focused approach 
to industrial policy and development. During these meetings, features of the Japanese 
economy that held it back were identified, and solutions were debated. Beyond the 
1950s, such forums birthed the Industrial Structure Council, a platform that allowed 
the private sector to air their views to MITI. In its infancy, the Council was the formal 
vehicle through which the business community could influence policy in its favour, 
with notable achievements ranging from the strengthening of planning by assembling 
industrial data to requisition and endorsement of sizeable loans. During the inter-war 
period and beyond the second-world war, Japanese industrial policy experienced 
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extensive, although gradual, experimentation and innovation, but it was the deflation 
of the late 1940s and the response to it that witnessed the emergence of MITI which 
then served to take industrial policy to new heights. Hence, the state in industrial 
policy is then seen in terms of a system of its institutions (and associated personnel, 
particularly the “economic general staff”), and through them, the capacity to bring 
industrial development to bear mediated by a mix of interventionist and protectionist 
policies such as provision of discriminatory financing, management of foreign 
exchange and purchase of foreign technology, including provision of tax incentives to 
lower costs and import tariffs to insulate local industries from being contested by 
foreign products.17 These policies, executed through the staff situated in state 
institutions, were designed to promote industrial development but in practice they 
enabled the state to select and nourish certain strategic industries while ensuring and 
facilitating their access to (local and foreign) markets. The point of this is to situate 
the state through its specific institutions, associated personnel and particular polices 
at the centre of industrial development. 
One of the most excellent recollections of the multiple essential roles the state played 
in promoting industrial development, as Johnson (1982: 236) remembers, involved 
the wide-ranging roles of the Japanese state through the agency of MITI. MITI was 
involved in a number of distinct, although interrelated, ways: first, to design a plan 
documenting the need for the industry and what is expected of it; second, financing 
options were set in motion by approving funding through the Japan Development 
Bank and then setting aside the required foreign exchange; third, control of technology 
importation was administered by means of import licenses; fourth, preferential 
treatment in form of a mixture of tax concessions and other state-provided resources 
such as land provision; and, fifth, to ensure industrial growth, competition was highly 
regulated and investment coordination of companies within the industry was also a 
                                                 
17 In demonstrating the state’s role in providing finance through coordinated mechanisms of 
institutions, Johnson (1982: 209-210) notes that “between 1949 and 1953 … the most important for 
industrial policy was the Japan Development Bank … within a year of its creation the JDB became 
one of MITI’s most important instruments of industrial policy” providing funds for selected 
industries like steel and coal, and ensuring control and coordination when “MITI also placed of its 
important retired “seniors” on the JDB’s board.” From 1953 onwards, the Fiscal Investment and 
Loan Plan of the Ministry of Finance gave more credit “and became the single most important 
financial instrument for Japan’s economic development”, although MITI through its Industrial 
Capital Section remained a key player and beneficiary.  
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requirement, both delivered through MITI’s administrative guidance structures and 
provisions. This recollection underscores the scale of state involvement. The state 
decided that the industry needed to emerge and be developed, and then put in place 
measures – policy and resources – to ensure that this aspiration was realised. 
Thus, by the end of 1959 when the first liberalisation was implemented, sufficient 
capacity had been gained. But because liberalisation itself was to disturb the status 
quo, it was subjected to a series of high-level debates within MITI which eventually 
led to “MITI’s invention of the concept of “industrial structure” and the creation of 
the Industrial Structure Investigation Council” aimed at identifying and promoting 
competitive capacity of industries (Johnson, 1982: 253). Throughout the different 
phases of Japanese industrial development from the interwar to the post-war period, 
institutionalisation and promotion of industrial capacity through the state is the key to 
understanding Japanese developmentalism more broadly. Although at the heart of this 
system, Johnson gives the impression that a committed cadre of experienced and 
skilled bureaucrats existed who had engineered and sustained their own 
existence/livelihoods by attachment to the success of industrial development. 
Following the liberalisation policies that effectively limited MITI’s industrial policy 
tools, new innovations to sustain competitiveness while promoting industrial 
development were required. How the Japanese responded to the liberalisation wave of 
the early 1960s serves to reinforce the central role of the state in ensuring and 
encouraging industrial development. Johnson tracks this response and its 
innovativeness through personalities and state structures. For example, MITI’s vice-
minister, Sahashi, handpicked Morozumi in August 1961 (based on the latter’s 
extensive foreign experience) to run the Enterprise Bureau of MITI and manage highly 
skilled personnel within it who already had extensive experience within the 
bureaucracy and industry for purposes of designing a strategy to respond to 
liberalisation (Johnson, 1982: 257). Their combined work produced the Special 
Measures Law which outlined well-rounded details aimed at promoting competitive 
industrial development. In practice, recommendations were made to identify and 
strengthen capacity of designated industries aiding their competitive ability, but this 
required the rules to be of sufficient detail explaining the necessity of compliance of 
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managers in earmarked industries while ensuring that the state structures provided 
finance and tax incentives. 
When liberalisation was already underway and when the 1965 recession peaked, the 
role of the state in industrial development remained unshaken. MITI responded to the 
recession by establishing and institutionalising mechanisms both to coordinate and 
promote investment. MITI set up cooperative discussion groups (eventually replaced 
by the Industrial Structure Council) in various industries ranging from petrochemicals, 
synthetic textiles to paper pulp. On these discussion platforms, issues of concern were 
generally focused on which industries, what type of plant within them and with what 
technology would they have to be financed and promoted. This demonstrates the depth 
and breadth of state involvement in decisions pertaining to industrial policy: 
determining and/or influencing how much would be produced, how should they 
produce, and who should produce, and then instituting measures to protect them (that 
is, by setting up barriers to entry) while eliminating the credit constraint through 
provision of investment funds were all functions that were well integrated in the 
structures of the state. 
There are virtually innumerable lessons to be learnt from Johnson’s seminal work, but 
what is critical in discussing key personalities, Johnson aims to show these 
individuals’ scale and scope of experience, and influence within the bureaucracy and 
industry. Importantly, in seeing these critical personnel as members of the bureaucracy 
committed to delivering a (developmental) service, Johnson is forced to make a grand 
claim of the alleged “inseparability of bureaucratic interests and substantive issues of 
policy when the state dominates administration of the economy” (Johnson, 1982: 243) 
yet he occasioned his analysis with instances of lobbying and corruption, including 
informal contacts between the state and powerful private sector interests.18 This 
                                                 
18 For example, Johnson (1982: 68-70) notes “incidents of seeming wholesale payoffs by the 
government to business interests with preferential access or advance knowledge” which “[s]ome 
writers have called “institutionalized corruption”” plus the system of “reemployment of retired 
government bureaucrats on the boards of industries currently designated as economically strategic 
also created many opportunities for hand-in-glove relationships,” but eventually disqualifies 
labelling them as corruption: “it is, rather, an adaptation by private business to a particular 
governmental environment” because “[p]referential access to the government for strategic 
industries is not an unintended consequence of the developmental state; it is in fact the objective of 
the developmental state.” Despite Johnson’s claim, it is difficult to see such interactions as resulting 
from planned rather than sporadic interrelationships. 
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reveals the tension inherent within DSP conceptualisation of what accounts for a 
developmental state, but as will be discussed below, the solution has been to seek, and 
define or refine through, further clarification. 
Following Johnson’s work, the political school has proceeded with further case studies 
and, inevitably, in the spirit of the original/classical contributions, an extension in the 
scope of factors responsible for identifying a state as developmental. In practice, this 
has required the literature to address conceptual contradictions and difficulties. For 
example, in the wake of democratisation of politics more generally within the 
erstwhile developmental states and Africa post-1990, questions regarding what form 
a developmental state would take emerged, and, to remain relevant, the political 
school has faced up to this challenge by imagining a democratic developmental state 
(Routley, 2014, 2012; White, 1998; Randall, 2007; Edigheji, 2010; Sandbrook, 2005).  
Given that classical East Asian developmental states were effectively authoritarian, 
although in varying degrees, the advent of democratisation (and neoliberalism more 
generally), especially in Africa, has promoted pluralistic politics, and created political 
conditions very different from those which placed the political and economic authority 
of the state at the centre of society and the economy more broadly (Randall, 2007: 
634). However, the political school has stayed afloat and met this challenge by 
integrating analytically, though uncomfortably if incoherently, the theoretical benefits 
of democracy into the notion of a developmental state. For Randall (2007: 649), the 
task should involve determining “what … political parties can or could contribute to 
a developmental state project.” Despite arguments against democracy given its 
tendency to promote short-termism and myopic politics (Routley, 2012), its benefits 
must be excavated given that it has more or less come to stay, and these should be 
applied to, and reconfigure, the conception of a developmental state. Hence, political 
parties within the context of developmental states should promote vision-building by 
fostering bureaucratic autonomy as well as state legitimacy.  
This then brings the issue of how autonomy is conceived within the DSP. Because the 
state has been conceptualised as a disciplinarian driven by vision to execute 
developmental functions, then it must necessarily insulate itself from capture from 
vested interests which have the potential to undermine the its developmental role. 
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Evans (1995: 12) has a lot to say about the nature of autonomy as experienced in the 
DSP: he suggests that “[on]ly when embeddedness and autonomy are joined together 
can a state be developmental.” This is obviously a somewhat confusing idealisation, 
a proposal that the state can be autonomous from society and yet embedded within it. 
Nevertheless, the notion of ‘embedded autonomy’ is qualified on the basis that the 
state can only be effective in delivering development if it is interwoven within and 
across different groups of society, profiting from this interaction and involvement to 
the extent that they enhance the developmental functions of the state and, 
consequently, deliver development.  
Embedded autonomy is unpacked and set in motion by suggesting that successful state 
involvement in industrial transformation should be guided by, and discharged through, 
institutional structures. Yet again, involvement as an analytical concept must be 
closely examined and this forces Evans (1995: 13) to transition from “how much” to 
“what kind” of involvement is required; however, this transition in focus is 
problematic because “what kind” is at the very least defined in terms of “how much”. 
An explanation of how Evans develops his notion of involvement will help 
demonstrate this contradiction. Involvement is distinguished by four categories: a 
custodian role is the case when a state is one which acts as regulator; a demiurge role 
is when the state assumes the functions of a producer through mainly state-owned 
enterprises; a midwife role is when the state performs functions, such as erection of 
tariffs, provision of subsidies, institution of import restrictions, and so on, aimed at 
stimulating productive activity through the private sector as opposed to creation of 
public enterprises; a husbandry role arises when the state strengthens and nurtures 
existing private enterprises. Thus, “[t]aken together, these four roles provide a 
framework for labeling the involvement of particular states in particular sectors. They 
are not mutually exclusive” (Evans, 1995: 81). It is easy to now see that the categories 
of state involvement are defined by how much the state intervenes. Some of the 
weaknesses of this approach to explaining state-society relations are explored in more 
detail below, but it is worth mentioning here that the state is conceived in terms of its 
capacity to suppress or promote the interests of capital. 
Further limitations of Evans’ conception of embedded autonomy (and the subsequent 
categorisation of state involvement) in explaining how the state performs 
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developmental functions are aptly demonstrated within his own work, particularly 
with reference to Zambia. First, in explaining Zambia’s dismal economic performance 
during the state-led era, he concludes, like many other scholars as will be shown 
below, that “the role of demiurge brought disaster” (Evans, 1995: 1985). This is to 
suggest that because the Zambian state lacked capacity to manage the copper industry, 
it should not have been involved to the extent that it was. Second, that Western copper 
production expanded by about four percent per year between 1974 and 1978 despite 
the global recession while Zambia’s copper production declined by up to eight percent 
during this period is taken as evidence of incongruence of the demiurge role within 
capacity-lacking Zambia. This position on Zambia’s economic performance is 
contested in later chapters (chapters 4, 5 and 6) which will demonstrate that the narrow 
view of state-society relations cannot capture the broader institutional dynamics and 
unique geopolitical circumstances Zambia faced. However, it is worth noting that 
Evans’ schema runs into further difficulties when, ironically, he charges that South 
Korea’s POSCO “demonstrates that the demiurge strategy can be a powerful 
instrument for industrial transformation” (Evans, 1995: 87). As will be discussed in 
more detail below, POSCO, the symbol of South Korea’s early industrialisation, was 
started when there was absence of state capacity and itself played a considerable role 
in creating it. This observation begs a different analytical lens to view these issues as 
opposed to one that confines state-society relations to be explained in terms of the 
nature of the autonomy of the state. 
Further extensions of the analytical landscape of the DSP have involved deeper 
reflection on the nature of bureaucratic involvement, even outside of industry. Francks 
(1998) addresses the question of state intervention in Japan by analysing the role of 
the state in agricultural development. Through the Food Control System, “the same 
‘bureaucratic developmental state’ which conditioned industrial development was 
able to design, manage and supervise agricultural policies” (Francks, 1998: 2). The 
underlying logic of state interventions in Francks’ research was to demonstrate in what 
ways the state got involved in agriculture which she shows in terms of administrative 
guidance to set and supervise output targets, as well as provision of subsidies to 
farmers. In short, agricultural development can be explained by bureaucratic 
intervention and regulation. 
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Chibber (1999) adds to the developmental state literature by questioning the source of 
the power of the state in guiding East Asian developmentalism. For South Korea, he 
proposes the notion of an accumulation model that was state-dependent for 
coordination across individual fractions of capital and protection of domestic 
production from hostile foreign competition, this being the legitimating factor of the 
disciplinarian role of the state. However, Chibber places the power of the state in the 
hands of the political and bureaucratic leadership, while the success of this power in 
stimulating industrial development is to be found in high-calibre bureaucrats who 
were capable of designing and reshaping mechanisms within the state’s institutions 
for the benefit of industry. In other words, what matters for the developmental state is 
not only quality of institutions but also the quality of personnel within them. In fact, 
it is the skilfulness and commitment of the personnel that renders state institutions 
strong and effective. 
The importance of the quality of institutions and its personnel in the conceptualisation 
of the developmental state is demonstrated in Johnson’s classical work which 
discussed extensively the meritocratic nature of the Japanese bureaucracy in MITI. 
This line of thought has also been reflected in Chan et al. (1998) which includes further 
qualities for the bureaucracy and the state in terms of cohesion and coordination of 
the bureaucracy, underpinned by social networks of diverse characters and an 
oxymoronically autonomous state which maintains its ties and contacts with society. 
The state must however be strong in designing, adapting and executing efficacious 
policies. 
Another way the political school explains bureaucratic excellence and its commitment 
to a national development agenda in East Asian developmental states is to locate the 
state as a hub for proliferation and establishment of values and ideas, including 
convergence of interests, through its institutional structures at the national and 
community levels (Marsh, 1999). Views and actions of different agents, and especially 
those acting on behalf of the state, are to be broadly cultivated and harvested within 
state institutions, and these will in turn influence the nature of the political system. 
Hence, planting developmental seeds and cultivating them in accordance with 
collective values and interests of state institutions is anticipated to harvest 
developmental outcomes. This shifts responsibility to state institutions as channels 
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through which developmental values are both cultivated and shared. In a similar light, 
at least in terms of situating the state as the driver of a national economic agenda, 
Grabowski (2000: 269) proposes that a developmental state should erect and assemble 
a national identity, but underpins his proposition by the assumption that “[a] 
developmental state is autonomous and pursues the national economic interest.” Woo-
Cumings (1999) also pointed to unification of fragmented interests into nationalism 
as a rallying cry within the context of East Asian developmental states. 
Pempel (1999: 146-147) casts light on the international political dimension as 
necessary to understand the broader conditions and influences under which 
developmental states operate; hence, he criticises the developmental state literature 
for its focus on domestic political and bureaucratic processes: “When developmental 
states examine hurdles that state bureaucrats must clear in carrying out their agendas, 
they mainly focus on domestic problems such as business organization; allocation of 
scarce capital, energy resources, and technology; infrastructure development; tax 
credits; budgetary incentives; mass education; labor regulations; foreign direct 
investment; and the like. Far less attention is given to the strategic goals of competing 
powers and superpowers; regional power balances; cross-national rules and 
regulations and relations governing trade, investment, energy, and investment … 
actions of multinational corporations … foreign aid; and so forth.” In short, 
developmental states must be situated not only by domestic socio-political processes 
but by how the external influences are mediated through internal dynamics. 
Within the political school more generally, the role of the state is seen in its institutions 
and structures, managed by a meritocratic bureaucracy having power over, as opposed 
to being influenced in a dysfunctional way by, society (private capital, labour, and 
other interest groups). In sum, in its entirety, the literature in the political school 
“focuses on the politics of economic policy with, paradoxically, little or no interest in 
economics as such” (Fine, 2006: 104). 
3.3.2 Reflections of, and experiences within, economic school 
Quite apart from the political school as a strand of the developmental state literature, 
the economic school of thought within the DSP has been largely preoccupied with 
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providing evidence of the nature of economic policy defining actions of the state 
without necessarily examining the socio-political conditions under which such policy 
was applied. Of concern to the economic school is simply to demonstrate that certain 
kinds of economic policy are necessary to promote growth and development, but this 
leaves unattended the exact configuration of politics that would permit these policies 
to be endorsed. By notion of economic policies is captured both industrial and trade 
policies. These policies are discussed in more detail below. 
The seminal works of Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) are typically the launchpads 
from which studies in the economic school have developed further. Thus, for my 
purposes of establishing the workings of this school, it is imperative to engage these 
studies in sufficient detail. 
Borrowed technology as opposed to invention was the basis upon which so-called late-
industrialisers transformed their economies and raised living standards of their people 
(Amsden, 1989). From this perspective, industrialisation then becomes a matter of 
acquisition and utilisation of tangible and intangible (foreign) technology. Industrial 
(and trade) policy then targets how to procure/obtain foreign technology to be sold at 
domestic and foreign markets (Deraniyagala, 2006; Chang, 2003; Wade, 2003). The 
latter market to a larger degree than the former necessitates competitiveness, and so, 
from the context of late-industrialisers, industrialisation is essentially acquisition and 
utilisation of existing (foreign) technology for purposes of “catching up” seen “as a 
process of learning how to compete” (Amsden, 1989: 3). From this vantage point, 
Amsden’s seminal work can be regarded as a detailed account of the precise 
mechanisms by which late industrialisers, particularly South Korea, gained 
competitiveness, and in the process transformed their productive structures. But for 
this thesis, it would be useful to keep this conceptualisation in mind in order to serve 
the greater purpose of understanding the failure to industrialise sufficiently for the 
case of Zambia as partly an outcome of failing to come to grips with industrialisation 
as a process served through learning rather than mere installation (and, to some extent, 
management) of plant and equipment. 
Amsden (1989) therefore sees learning as a process facilitated and promoted by 
extensive yet selective state intervention in order to ‘get relative prices wrong’ as 
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opposed to ‘getting prices right’, the latter advanced by, and seen through the lens of, 
neoclassical economics. Complementing the state, and in large measure facilitated by 
it, the emergence of large diversified business groups commonly known as the 
chaebols as the hubs of technology utilisation is seen as a necessary condition, at least 
within the context of South Korea, to gaining a competitive advantage through 
economies of scale and scope for instance. Operating these hubs of technology 
utilisation are highly skilled managers and their inexpensive, well-trained and 
educated workers who put in place effective and efficient shop floor control systems 
in order to make the most use of borrowed technology. 
The role of the state is seen in how it enabled foreign technology to be acquired and 
utilised, while promoting competitiveness of domestic productive agents. Because 
learners are required to compete internationally, breaking through to world markets 
forces them to supply products that are cheaper and/or of superior quality. The basis 
upon which products are kept cheaper and/or of advanced standard is seen through an 
amalgamation of wage policy aimed at keeping wage costs as low as possible, 
government backing and preferential treatment in form of government instruments 
like subsidies, tax concessions etc. Accordingly, analysis shifts to what role of, and 
the interrelationships between, the state and other productive agents such as private 
enterprises including, if rarely, labour. 
The vision of the developmental state is seen through the ideology of its leaders, and 
for South Korea between 1961 and 1979 when Park Chung Hee exercised control over 
industrial development, his views were critical. He could be regarded as nationalistic 
in a sense because he believed indigenisation of technology was a necessary condition, 
although he placed the actualisation of industrial development in the hands of large 
fractions of domestic capital to be guided by the state. Generally following this line 
of thought, the state is seen as a disciplinarian, punishing non-performing firms and 
putting in place mechanisms to repress labour revolt and what could be seen an 
unnecessary wage hikes. Hence, the coming to prominence of large diversified 
corporations is seen as a deliberate consequence of the state’s disciplinarian role 
whereby size, scale and range of productive activity embodied in any one such 
corporation is directly correlated with the state’s disciplining mechanisms. For 
example, a well-performing firm, say in export markets or new industrial territories, 
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would receive rewards in form of licences, subsidies and other forms of government 
support to expand their production, but, for the case of diversified corporations, 
additional licences and other forms of support would be awarded in other highly 
profitable ventures. 
The classical case study of successful industrialising within the context of South 
Korea is the Pohang Iron and Steel Company, Ltd., referred to as POSCO. The 
importance of discussing POSCO is to demonstrate the process of learning as an act 
of industrialisation, locating the role of the state, labour and enterprises within it. 
Against advice of the World Bank in 1960s on the basis of poor initial conditions, 
POSCO was initiated as a government project and funded wholly by the government 
in 1968, although it only rolled out production half a decade later.19 By the mid-
1980s, POSCO was already one of the most productive steel producers in the world. 
It is safe to say that without the state, POSCO would never have been born. In fact, 
the successful case of POSCO as a public enterprise has been used to dismiss 
universalistic arguments against state-owned enterprises as a model for accumulation. 
But POSCO’s case is much more than that, it contests notions of comparative 
advantage based upon factor endowments as the premise for entering a market as 
producer. Not only that, it also demonstrates that direction of capital accumulation 
resulted from planned guidance rather than so-called market forces. 
Because steel-making is a capital-intensive operation whose basis for competition 
depends upon productivity as opposed to low-cost labour, POSCO was forced to 
devise mechanisms to enhance profitability and productivity. First, POSCO kept its 
costs low from the beginning by relatively inexpensive construction costs at $400 per 
ton representing about half the costs of the United States or about 67 percent of those 
of Japan. Government subsidisation is seen to have helped to keep construction costs 
low while propping up POSCO profits in subsequent years. Second, by means of 
government support in various areas such as finance and infrastructure, the South 
Korean government made low-cost, long-term credit available, facilitated and 
                                                 
19 The initial conditions as prospects for POSCO were startlingly against it. South Korea did not have 
capital and steel-making skills at the time, had a small domestic market while the closest market, 
Japan, was a highly efficient world-leading steel producer and, the most important raw material, 
iron ore, had to be sourced further afield in foreign markets, yet the state injected its largest 
investment even by late-1980s of $3.6 billion (Amsden, 1989: 291-292).  
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expedited importation of equipment, including keeping costs for government services 
such as railway rates and electricity charges exceptionally low, ranging from 20-50 
percent of the normal rate. 
What is especially interesting for POSCO, and certainly provides lessons for Zambia 
as shown below, is that POSCO started off initially “almost entirely on a turnkey 
basis” (Amsden, 1989: 302). The initiating facilities of POSCO were administered 
and managed by foreign firms: Broken Hills Proprietary Corporation of Australia and 
the Japan Group handled specialised engineering works and reports. Hence, it is 
especially important to ascertain the mechanisms put in place for technology transfer 
and cutting off dependence on foreign expertise. South Korea spent huge sums of 
money to train engineers and other professionals abroad. Interestingly, some of the 
training was done ahead of production, such as the case for steel-making well before 
POSCO even initiated production. When these trained professionals returned, they 
worked virtually abreast of foreign experts. But training was not restricted to overseas 
places, a great deal of it was continuously administered at POSCO’s plants.  
Lall (1992, 2003) has argued that the extent that industrialisation profits from positive 
spill-overs and externalities is less determined by stochastic emergence of industries 
than by creating or identifying strategic sectors for promotion that have the highest 
potential to spread such benefits. His contribution is also aimed at showing that 
technology transfer is not as easy as the DSP seems to suggest – that is, simply by 
learning. There are a number of additional factors that determine not just the pace and 
scale of technology acquisition, but also whether socio-political conditions would 
permit such acquisition of technology in the first place. While, on the one hand, 
technology acquisition can be seen as the means through which capabilities are 
developed, on the other hand, it can also be acknowledged that the pace and scale of 
technology acquisition is very much likely to increase as capabilities are enhanced. 
That is, a virtuous circle phenomenon arises. But, Lall (1992: 180-181) suggests, “that 
the development of capabilities is the outcome of a complex interaction of” state 
intervention “with human resources, technological effort and institutional factors … 
It is the interplay of all these factors in particular country settings that determines at 
the firm level how well producers learn the skills and master the information needed 
to cope with industrial technologies and, at the national level, how well countries 
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employ their factor endowments, raise those endowments over time, and grow 
dynamically in the context of rapidly changing technologies.” In short, learning is as 
much a technical problem as it is a social one. 
This is to suggest that merely recognising that industrial development should be 
furnished by technology transfer does not mean it can be adopted naturally. Rather, 
conditions that allow technological transfer to be actualised cannot simply be 
explained by a pure economic analysis (Fine, 2006: 105); the recognition of the 
existence of social interrelationships inter- and intra-groups in an economy thus brings 
to light the equally important dynamics of socio-political conditions that have a 
powerful effect on whether, and how, technology can be absorbed. Neglecting the 
social dimension can be misleading in the design of industrial policy, not least 
perpetuating conditions that preclude spreading productive capacity. Ranis (2003: 34) 
underscores the tendency of the economic school to disregard, or, more appropriately, 
pay little attention to, the social interrelationships (and their consequences) that may 
exist between private capital and representatives of the state when the state positions 
itself to promote and favour certain fragments of capital over others as in the case of 
encouraging requirements for domestic content: “scant attention” has been paid “to 
the potential abuse of market power bestowed on industrialists by friendly government 
officials who do the selecting and share the rents.” Ranis’ observation is of 
significance to the case of Zambia as will be seen later in Chapter 5, 6 and 7, in that 
these social relations, within the context of a restricted accumulation system, can act 
as a powerful hindrance to structural transformation. However, he highlights this point 
to promote the notion of non-selective industrial policy in order to prevent potential 
abuse, but this goes against that grain of the actual pattern and nature of 
industrialisation that East Asian countries experienced. As is argued throughout this 
chapter, selective targeting and discriminatory policies do partly explain and underpin 
East Asian industrialisation. 
Another way in which the economic school of the DSP has countered conventional 
knowledge regarding government expenditure which seems to favour austerity, 
especially in recent times in both developed and developing countries, is to 
demonstrate how the government undertook debt financing, even in the face of global 
recession. During the mid-1970s oil crisis, keeping industrial development going 
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ensured that “[t]he government borrowed its way out of balance-of-payments 
difficulties and sustained fast growth. Aggressive borrowing coupled with bailouts of 
financially troubled firms created a supportive environment for big business” 
(Amsden, 1989: 93, emphasis in the original). Such measures on public finance were 
crucial to sustain economic activity, without which both public and private businesses 
would have suffered. 
Similar to Amsden who views the South Korean state as disciplinarian, Chang's (1994: 
123) analysis of South Korea’s industrialisation is premised on a “strong state, able to 
discipline firms whenever necessary.” This is to explain why the South Korean state 
was capable of playing a central role through state interventions of varied forms as 
devices to order the affairs of development. In this work, Chang endeavoured to 
develop the theoretical and empirical nuances of South Korea’s developmentalism. 
On the latter, drawing on ‘a new institutionalist theory of state intervention’, he 
proposes that government failure, seen as resulting from information asymmetry and 
rent-seeking as plagues upon (or inherent within) the state, may in fact be reduced, if 
not eliminated, by transformation of the organisational structure of institutions of the 
state, choosing an appropriate instrument for intervention and enforcing changes in 
the regulations of political competition. From this foundation, Chang’s subsequent 
work has attempted to demonstrate (theoretically and, complemented by evidence 
from empirical experiences) that a case can be made for state intervention which often 
results in more desirable outcomes compared to free market options. Complementing 
private enterprise, the South Korean state intervened in decisive ways, even direct 
participation especially in sectors where the private sector was reluctant to invest.  
It was Wade (1990) who developed the notion of governing the market, symbolic of 
the crucial role the Taiwanese state played to influence, in large and extensive 
measure, the market as opposed to necessarily putting in place strong controls. For 
Taiwan, Wade demonstrates not just state intervention in terms of the different 
interventionist policy devices such as targeted finance/credit, insulation from foreign 
competition and so forth, but he also explores the way in which the state participated 
in the economy through public enterprises: “the state led rather than simply followed 
the market” and “[i]n many sectors public enterprises [had] been the chosen 
instrument for a big push” (Wade, 1990a: 110). In sectors like textiles and plastics 
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where the Taiwanese state did not participate directly through public enterprises, the 
behaviour of private capital was modified in compelling ways by the state’s tools 
including but not limited to import controls and tariffs, entry restrictions, investment 
incentives as well as administrative guidance. A mixture of price instruments like 
tariffs and, administrative interventions like import controls and entry restrictions 
including administrative guidance, were indispensable in Taiwanese industrialisation, 
and not least the devices at the disposal of the state to condition in a decisive manner 
the depth, breadth and direction of capital accumulation. Although public enterprises 
dominated the economy throughout the 1950s, by 1963 only 45 percent of industrial 
production resulted from public enterprise activity. Through state machination, public 
enterprises had initiated some of the projects and were the first to take risks in some 
new sectors which the private sector eventually came to dominate. 
Taiwan’s export promotion strategies were already in place by the early 1950s, and in 
1952 exporters of (twenty) selected products were allowed to keep some of their 
foreign exchange earnings, although this particular strategy was eventually replaced 
by a series of other policies which ranged from subsidies in form of cash payments 
made to exporters, through granting import permits for well performing exporters, to 
reduction of import duty on exporters’ inputs. 
The Taiwanese government also ensured that it had control of what kind of technology 
to import, through direct means until the end of the 1970s when it installed conditions 
that “imports of equipment for new plant receive prior approval”, and then afterwards 
through indirect means such as fiscal incentives to firms who imported certain kinds 
of technology (Wade, 1990a: 133). But state intervention on acquisition of technology 
for industrial development did not end on deciding what kinds of technology to 
import, the government also put in place mechanisms to institutionalise the transfer of 
technology. Among the most notable is the Industrial Technology Research Institute 
established in 1973 which, fifteen years later, had 4,500 staff spread across six 
divisions – electronics, machinery, chemical engineering, energy and mining, 
industrial materials and standards and measurements. Another noteworthy feat in this 
light was the Hsinchu Science-based Industry Park formulated in 1969 but only 
commissioned eleven years later; this Park augmented efforts to reduce reliance upon 
foreign technology. Overseas and local educational scholarships were also supported 
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by the government. Various other interventions were put in place by the state such as 
technology-upgrading schemes supported by government funds and other incentives. 
While the cases of South Korea and Japan demonstrate the importance and centrality 
of finance in industrial policy, especially through state-controlled financial 
intermediaries/banks awarding discriminatory financing to selected projects in order 
to promote capital accumulation in strategic activities, the case of Taiwan did not seem 
to provide ample evidence to justify this device as indispensable to its industrial 
development strategy (Wade, 1990a: 165). Chowdhury and Islam (1993: 141) as well 
as Wade (1988: 133) recognised a state-dominated credit-based system as prevalent 
in Taiwan wherein the government owned virtually all financial intermediaries. Wade 
sees this character of the financial system as important during Taiwan’s rapid 
industrialisation because it enabled large investments to be channelled to specific 
sectors, something which would have been difficult to accomplish if capital expansion 
had depended on firms’ profitability or, indeed, to be decided by free markets. 
The role of finance as a tool for the state to foster industrial development can also be 
seen in how the Taiwanese state responded to the second oil shock of 1978/1979.20 
The Taiwanese state, committed to preferential investment financing in strategic 
sectors and, especially to promote industrial diversification away from energy-
intensive industries, set up the Strategic Industry Fund in 1982 (Wade, 1990b). 
Financial resources from this fund aimed to promote purchase of locally-produced 
equipment, or purchase of equipment from international sources for utilisation in 
strategic industries. Special cases were to be examined by the planning agency before 
approval would be granted. There is an important lesson to be learnt here in 
anticipation of the nature of the Zambian state’s response to this same oil crisis. An 
external shock presented the state in Taiwan with new challenges, yet through 
innovation and commitment to industrialisation, the response served to both broaden 
and strengthen existing energies dedicated to industrial development. 
                                                 
20 “Oil prices began to rise rapidly in mid-1979, more than doubling between April 1979 and April 





In demonstrating how the state can confront market failures, taking the East Asian 
1997/1998 financial crisis as critical point of departure, Chang (2000: 778) 
underscores the importance, yet misunderstood role and nature, of industrial policy: 
“contrary to the widespread assumption, state guarantee through industrial policy need 
not be bad. There are all kinds of ``market failures'' that justify socialization of risk 
through industrial policy … complementarity between investments across industries 
… externalities present in research and development (R&D) … Once again, the point 
is not that such socialization of risk does not generate any moral hazard, but that the 
benefits that it brings about (e.g. higher productivity, better-coordinated investments, 
prevention of the ``wastes'' from duplicative investments) can more than offset the 
costs from the moral hazard that it may generate.” In short, this is to resurrect the role 
of the state more generally, and industrial policy specifically, even in the presence of 
crisis. In other words, industrial policy can be reconfigured to confront or respond to 
influences of different forms, but doing so to enhance productivity and gain economies 
of scale, crucial for successful developmentalism. 
To summarise, the economic school underpinned its economic analysis by 
demonstrating how the state’s interventions with respect to resource allocation, trade, 
finance and credit, capital accumulation, direct state participation through public 
enterprises, exchange rate regimes and so forth, all worked together through the state 
to forge a developmental model that promoted rapid industrialisation and 
development. Put differently, the unprecedented rapid development and 
industrialisation experienced by East Asian countries could hardly have resulted from 
a free market system. The economic school has responded to different dynamics, both 
domestic and international, including the interactions of these, in a manner that has 
shifted, or, more appropriately, broadened its domain to cover market imperfections 
of various sorts, and locating the state in how these have been confronted. 
3.4 The Verdict, Towards an alternative: The Linkage-Agency Approach 
While the neoliberal project, spearheaded by powerful institutions like the IMF and 
World Bank, has exerted great energies to undermine the role of the state more 
generally, and the DSP specifically, virtually ignoring it in within the development 
discourse (Fine, 2013: 1), honest analyses of the actual experiences will have more to 
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say than any concept or ideology. Indeed, it is undeniable, even within the terrain of 
neoliberal scholarship that state interventionism was almost synonymous with success 
within the context of East Asian developmentalism. By deference to state intervention 
within the context of market-conformance more broadly, or, particularly, correction 
of imperfections in the market, the neoliberal project has attempted to undermine the 
DSP. However, the DSP, as an analytical tool, points to treasure troves, or Sutton’s 
law21 within the context of developmentalism, ‘because that is where the money is’, 
the state is required to promote development more generally as opposed to blocking 
it. The DSP does more than just point to where the treasure is, it also seeks to 
demonstrate how to excavate it. However, the DSP itself, given its shifting content 
has shown both within itself and from polemical critics that it is indeed imperfect. Its 
omissions are its weaknesses, and these are elaborated upon within this subsection and 
will constitute the basis upon which the DSP can be recast into an alternative approach 
– the linkage-agency framework. 
Whereas it is acceptable to conceive of late-comer industrial development as a process 
of learning from ‘borrowed’ technology, it must be understood as it has been 
previously argued that acquisition and application of technology is dependent upon 
the broader socio-political and economic dynamics of a country. Technological 
change – as the basis upon which capital accumulation and economic change take 
place, for instance – is largely associated with social change since nature of 
technology (labour- or capital-intensive), its application and location are underpinned 
by social relations. Seen this way, it is immediately clear that introducing (new) 
technology, including deciding on its physical location, cannot be understood through 
a pure economic feasibility analysis alone; rather the decision to install (new) 
technology is a matter of politics (Leys, 1984; Kiely, 1998: 4). That is, the impact of 
technology acquisition can both change the nature of politics and the underlying social 
relations. 
                                                 
21 Sutton’s law is attributed to William Sutton, a bank robber, who, when caught was asked why he 
robbed banks, and his reply was, “Because that’s where the money is!” In the field of medicine, 
Sutton’s law is used to focus resources or energy on the most obvious diagnosis, avoiding waste of 
resources in the process (Altman, 1970). Perhaps economics would do well to implement Sutton’s 
law, and save scarce resources by experimenting with the obvious! 
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While statist literature had gained prominence by the mid-1990s, having also 
responded in decisive ways to the World Bank’s East Asian Miracle Report, two 
events are worth mentioning that sought to bury it. First is the East Asian financial 
crisis in the second half of the 1990s, and the second is the shift in mainstream 
economics’ intellectual scholarship which provided the post-Washington Consensus 
with ample ammunition to capture the central theme of statists. 
On the one hand, an inquiry was channelled to answer questions within the 
developmental state literature as to why states that had been successful in promoting 
rapid growth over a period of over a quarter century could have been ill-equipped to 
anticipate, let alone, shield, themselves against the crisis. This called for an 
introspection on the nature of the state with the bias on politics. Nevertheless, the 
overarching theme was to see the developmental state as a temporal feature of 
developmentalism, restricted up to only the phase of late-comer industrialisation – that 
is, the point at which developing countries catch up with developed countries marks 
the expiration of the developmental state. For example, Moon (1999: 220) perceived 
the developmental state as an interim system, and in fact anachronistic in “the age of 
globalization and liberalization”, thus, as opposed to the developmental state and its 
“institutional inertia” the “[a]bility to deprogram state intervention [would] determine 
the future of the East Asian economy.” As development comes with more dynamic 
institutional change, with pockets of powerful economic interests, the developmental 
state is called to act in a different way. For instance, democratic change is asked of 
developmental states. Hence, development both digs the grave and buries its 
instrument – the development state. 
 On the other hand, the economic school of the DSP responded to the East Asian crisis 
by referencing it as a structural break, marking the critical point of departure, and 
consequences, of neoliberalism in general, liberalised finance and mainstream 
macroeconomic policy in particular. In other words, it is not so much the fault of the 
DSP that the crisis should have taken place, but that the developmental states have 
been stripped of their power and influence over the broader economy, and especially 
finance. Wade (1998) explains the East Asian financial crisis as the amalgamation and 
outcome of the real economy speculations and under-regulated national and 
international financial markets, which should be confronted by reinstallation of capital 
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controls and establishment of a regional financial stability fund. However, the strategy 
to reintroduce capital controls for example ignores the powerful economic interests 
that benefited from prevailing neoliberal arrangements. 
A parallel to these views of the developmental state, and marking the occasion of 
shifting scholarship in mainstream economics, the emergence of the post-Washington 
Consensus as an internal check within the mainstream intellectual scholarship, was 
devastating to the developmental state literature. Launched and promoted by Joseph 
Stiglitz, the post-Washington consensus was a critical review of its ancestor, the 
Washington consensus (Stiglitz, 2005, 1998). The post-Washington consensus allows 
for state intervention within the context of market imperfections, the latter being 
understood in terms of informational imperfections and asymmetries. By permitting 
intervention in the context of market imperfections, the post-Washington consensus 
has the potential to swallow up the DSP.22 
But a general outlook of weaknesses within the DSP itself and those imposed on it by 
broader considerations have been often cited as a way to seek out its relevance. 
Although understandably as a feature that resulted from the DSP’s opposition to the 
Washington Consensus, the DSP’s account of East Asian developmental success is 
premised on a (false) dichotomy between state and market. Evans (1995) for example 
recognises the existence of classes or (powerful) social groups but qualifies the 
(solicitous) state as one concerned about the overall welfare of the nation, requiring it 
to be autonomous from, yet embedded within, society. But autonomous from which 
interests? When certain fractions of capital were promoted at the expense of others, 
would this not represent or reflect conflict and/or its resolution rather than autonomy? 
States can be thought of as organised structures that mediate, guide and oversee pure 
social relations and those that result from capital accumulation. Yet these structures 
are themselves malleable, reflecting the way in which different interest groups 
influence them. While for Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985: 47), the state is “an arena 
                                                 
22 The essence of this discussion here is to highlight that the post-Washington consensus has 
managed to recall state intervention except in a restricted and piecemeal fashion within the context 
of market imperfections as opposed to extensive state intervention supported by the DSP. For a 
detailed critical analysis of the new development economics in general, and of the post-Washington 
consensus in particular, see Fine et al. (2013), Fine (2013, 2006) and Fine and Jomo (2006) 
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of social conflict … [va]rious groups, both dominant and subordinate, will try to use 
the state as a means of realizing their particular interests”; Fine (2006: 114) similarly, 
more or less, sees “both market and state” as “the consequences of or form taken by 
underlying economic and political relations and interests.”23 
The interrelations of different social and economic groups (or, simply, relations and 
representation of class interests) foster capital accumulation in decisive and systemic 
ways. What obtains as composition of national output by sector, pattern and nature of 
investment, technology and so forth at the aggregate level is nothing less than an 
outcome (or reflection) of these political and economic relations. This is not to say 
that external influences do not impact upon the configuration and relations of 
socioeconomic groups, rather, such external forces will be mediated through this 
system, reinforcing or redefining it. Accordingly, any one system of accumulation is 
underpinned by the unique configuration of socio-political and economic interests 
prevailing and evolving, which requires to be understood within its context and 
history. Fine (2006: 115), for example, correctly argues that South Korea’s system of 
accumulation was largely underpinned by the promotion of the interests of the 
chaebols. From this vantage, it can be further argued that development policy in 
general, and industrial policy in particular, seen as policies mounted to encourage 
diversification and capital-deepening, for instance, were essentially designed to serve 
the interests of the chaebols.  
Chiang (2016) observes the coming to prominence of the chaebols as a result of long-
term government support which erected entry barriers in selected manufacturing 
industries to influence competition, while providing (state-supported) generous 
funding to particular firms. Park Chung Hee’s administration of the 1960s to 1970s is 
taken to have grounded a system of accumulation aimed at expanding chaebols both 
vertically and horizontally, including diversifying into other sectors. Following the 
global financial crisis of 2008/2009, South Korea’s system of accumulation witnessed 
a concentration of wealth in the hands of the chaebols, such that by 2015, the top five 
                                                 
23 Skocpol (1985: 4) points to emerging scholarship which, arguing in the same line of thought, sees 
the government “primarily as an arena within which economic interest groups or normative social 
movements contended or allied with one another to shape the making of public policy decisions. 
Those decisions [are] understood to be allocations of benefits among demanding groups.” 
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chaebols produced 58 percent of South Korea’s GDP, rising from 37 percent in 2008 
and 45 percent in 2009 (Chiang, 2016). 
In fact, the post-Asian-crisis Korean system of accumulation is regarded to reflect 
three sets of forces: “a conventional IMF agenda, a US trade and investment opening 
agenda, as well as a Korean-imposed institutional reform agenda” (Mathews, 1998: 
747). Consequently, the ensuing policy initiatives and their impact, even in the narrow 
sense of domestic output and social relations, are a reflection of these agendas. With 
the rise and spread of neoliberalism, chaebols have responded by seeking alternative 
finance especially from external sources (foreign borrowing) while exerting pressure 
to remove regulations and restrictions. But these measures have served to polarise 
wealth, with 90 percent of the top 30 conglomerates’ net profits accounted for by only 
four large multinationals by 2012 – Samsung, Hyundai, SK Group and LG – 
representing more than a two-thirds increase between 2009 and 2012 (Chiang, 2016: 
i). 
For this thesis, the importance of seeing South Korea’s pattern of accumulation is to 
demonstrate that the DSP can be complemented and, neoliberal analysis can be 
opposed by, an alternative framework of analysis. This thesis develops such a 
framework within the context of Zambia. I will argue that a system of accumulation 
underpinned by the copper industry was established within the post-Independence 
state-led development era which included a dynamic of socio-political and economic 
interests. It is this system of accumulation as such (as opposed to statist policies as the 
received wisdom suggests) that served to block developmental structural change more 
generally, and industrialisation in particular. 
3.4.1 The Alternative: The Linkage-Agency Approach 
Fundamental features of a developmental state within the context of the DSP have 
been gleaned, which have essentially pointed to the role of the state in aiding economic 
progress through interventionism of sorts as opposed to spectator or creator of an 
enabling environment of private capital accumulation in the neoliberal sense. Evans 
(1995: 6) points to the “transformative role” of the state since “[e]liciting 
entrepreneurship and facilitating the creation of new productive capacities require a 
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more complicated involvement [of the state] in the affairs of the citizenry than simply 
eliciting loyalty and enforcing good behaviour.” In other words, the existing 
developmental model underpinned by neoliberalism within the context of developing 
countries that sees the state as simply promoting good conditions for private capital 
cannot be the basis upon which meaningful developmental structural change can be 
expected to emerge. 
But, for purposes of learning practical lessons for developing countries such as 
Zambia and launching an alternative analytical framework, addressing the weaknesses 
(and/or omissions) of the DSP as an analytical tool helps to frame (developmental) 
structural change as a matter of understanding the nature of both linkages and 
interrelationships of agencies that forge these linkages. Structural change is not just 
about identifying what kinds of linkages would profit a nation’s development, but also 
about (availability of, or creation of, capacity of) agents responsible for bringing the 
linkages to bear, framed within wider societal and international forces (potentially) 
impacting upon growth and development. 
Fine and Rustomjee (1996) brought together the Linkage-Agency approach to 
understand the political economy of South African industrialisation. They argued that 
while linkages have been readily identified, less clear has been the analysis of how 
agencies functioned, because, in fact, there is a tendency to “[reduce] the agency to 
[the] linkage itself” without explaining why agencies are able to perform their 
designated functions, whether by their own design/will or force (Fine and Rustomjee, 
1996: 38-39). 
Ashman et al. (2010: 31; 2013) understand the dynamic of the South African economy 
by recourse to the Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC), this drawing upon the Linkage-
Agency approach à la Fine and Rustomjee (1996) which “identifies economic and 
political interests and how they gave rise to a system of accumulation through both 
the state and the market.” This thesis draws insights on how the Linkage-Agency 
approach as a method of analysis was applied to the South African economy. Hence, 
for the Zambian economy, an attempt is made to identify the underlying socio-political 
and economic interests that have underpinned Zambia’s developmentalism (and a lack 
of structural change), with an initial focus on the first fifteen years of post-
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Independence as the defining period, and later years as attempts to rehabilitate or 
change course. Examining the political context which governed decision making does 
highlight the role of agents within the state and party structures, in alliance with other 
groups across society such as labour within the civil service and parastatals, and 
capital in the private sector, in influencing the direction of accumulation. In noting 
that resource distribution in terms of expenditure allocation as well as economic policy 
changes responded to political expediency, it is seen that the nature of politics cannot 
be divorced from distribution and utilisation of resources (and other policies and 
outcomes). 
By reference to the nature of relations of agencies and how this brings linkages to 
bear, “[i]ndustrialization [must be] best considered as a social process”, such that “the 
very process of industrialization … is ultimately socially determined” (Kiely, 1998: 
17), not in the narrow sense of its impact on social change, but that it is itself a 
reflection of social relations. Thus, in examining the nature of Zambia’s post-
Independence industrialisation experience, locating the role of state through agencies 
such as the INDECO, analysis requires attention to the agents who managed the 
process of industrialisation and how these interacted with the political leadership. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have highlighted the remarkable performance of East Asian 
developmental states. I have also covered some controversies in explanations of their 
performance. On the one hand, it is found that the dominant narrative has been the 
free market narrative, despite, on the other hand, the alternative narrative supported 
by ample empirical evidence. 
I then discussed the developmental states literature within the context of a paradigm 
from two schools of thought as dual explanatory trajectories, with occasional although 
limited and cosmetic contact. Both schools of thought have undergone shifting content 
as focus in response to changing national and global circumstances, and explanations 
for them. However, I have argued that sufficient scope exists to learn lessons from the 
DSP for developing countries, and in particular Zambia. 
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Since White (1998: 4) regarded the one-party era in Zambia as a developmental 
democracy whose political conditions largely depart from today’s democratic 
conditions, I regard this as an invitation and indeed fertile area to cultivate scholarship 
which seeks to understand why the epoch of state-led development should have failed 
to produce results anywhere close to the experiences of East Asia. This is in fact the 
underlying purpose of this entire thesis – to establish a cogent and coherent argument 
within the context of Zambia’s structural change efforts understood as (interaction of) 
processes, technical and social, that reconfigure the structure of production. Chapter 
five, six and seven elaborate on these processes and define them within the context of 
a system of accumulation. 
Structural change understood through the process of industrialisation is thus more than 
capital accumulation through acquisition of technology, it is essential that appropriate 
socio-political and economic context is given due regard because the case of East 
Asian development demonstrates that “[s]ocial and political factors have been crucial 
in the taking of decisions on whether or not to adopt a particular technology, and the 
effect of this technology has had different effects on social groups such as classes and 
genders” (Kiely, 1998: 169). Explaining the failure of structural change of the 
Zambian economy has been to limit discussion, and focus it on, the dependence of the 
economy on copper, and to suggest the limited direct productive linkages inherent in 
enclave-dependent economies (see Young (1973) for example). 
In the next chapter, I sketch the industrialisation and developmental efforts of post-
Independence Zambia. The aim is to discern the nature of industrial development and 
industrial policy in particular within the context of a broader development strategy 
underpinned by a complex dynamic of socio-political and economic interests. 
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4 The roots of Zambia’s post-Independence system of 
accumulation: a synopsis of the pre-Independence political 
economy 
In this chapter, I proceed on the premise that to understand Zambia’s post-
Independence development efforts more generally, and industrial development in 
particular as the driver of structural change, it is important to trace the nature of 
Zambia’s developmentalism before Independence, and especially the development of 
the mining industry and how it induced non-mining industrial development and 
broader economic activity. This necessitates a brief overview of the pattern of 
development during the colonial era as the basis upon which developmental structural 
change attempts were made by the post-Independence Zambian government. I find 
that during ‘colonial times’, the territory that is today known as Zambia was designed 
as an extractive community as opposed to a white settler community.24 The discovery 
of rich ore reserves, and boom years during the interwar period, catapulted Zambian 
copper mining making Zambia a global mining giant. Consequently, the scale and 
pattern of development was a reflection of the attitudes and commitments of the White 
administering authorities and the private interests engaged in the limited productive 
activity. It was the interplay of politics between the foreign capital, the colonial 
government and the white south that underpinned the direction of accumulation, its 
pace and scale. 
To back my underlying argument, I begin by tracing, though briefly, the nature of 
polity in pre-Independence Zambia. I then shift emphasis to explore the pre-
Independence economy, placing copper development at the centre, both in its 
contribution to public revenues and its spread effects in inducing economic activity. I 
find that mining companies’ interests were best served by the colonial government’s 
policy that created an environment conducive to mineral exploration and 
development, which undermined the progress of Africans, including blocking 
industrial and agricultural development. I highlight the dualism of the Zambian 
                                                 
24 Colonial times is loosely used to refer to the period between 1891 and September 1964. White 
settlers and Europeans are used loosely in this chapter as synonyms. Northern Rhodesia and Zambia 




economy as a result of the attitudes of the colonial government, which, on the main, 
were conducive for copper mining development. I shift my focus to industrial 
development throughout the three governance epochs of pre-Independence Zambia. I 
find that industrial development progress restricted and confined to the copper 
enclave, this resulting, in part, from the dualistic nature of the economy, as well as the 
geopolitical and economic position of Zambia in relation to the south. I conclude by 
reflecting on the main themes resulting from the overview of the economy, and then 
launch a central argument that failure to industrialise pre-Independence Zambia 
resulted from socio-political and economic forces that promoted and entrenched 
interests in mining development, at the expense of industrial and agricultural 
development. 
4.1 The pre-Independence polity in brief 
Zambia attained its Independence on 24th October 1964. Before that, and particularly 
with respect to modern Zambia, it existed as a territory under the rule and 
administration of three authorities: first, from 1890s to 1924 under the British South 
Africa Company (BSA); second, under the Colonial Office from 1924 to 1953, and, 
finally, under the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland from 1953 to 1964. 
The BSA engaged in relations with local chiefs, obtained mineral rights over the 
region and established its headquarters at Mongu in today’s Western Province. BSA’s 
principal engagement with this territory was to prospect for minerals in the region. 
Among its notable achievements was the completion of the railway in 1909 to 
transport copper from the Katanga region of the Congo. Linking the south and north 
by railway was an important economic investment. By 1904 the railways south of the 
Victoria Falls had already been completed. Within six years, extensions of the 
railways system ensured that Livingstone, a town in Northern Rhodesia, was linked 
to Elizabethville (now Lubumbashi) in the Congo (Burdette, 1990: 78). By 1910, BSA 
had achieved a major feat, linking the south and north by railways. 
In general, BSA imposed its authority on the local chiefs and, by 1911, the entire 
region now occupied as Zambia, was ruled as Northern Rhodesia. The number of 
Europeans occupying this region increased by 142 percent to 3,624 between 1921 and 
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1911. Regulations by the BSA were already in place which restricted Africans from 
engaging in free (agricultural produce) trade, while reserving the most arable land for 
Europeans. Some 36,000 Africans were already forced into wage-labour in the mines 
by 1921, especially after BSA instituted native taxes to cover some of its overheads 
and other administrative costs, collecting £6,000 and £72,000 in 1902 and 1914, 
respectively. 
On the whole, the majority of the Europeans lived along the railway line. A third of 
European males were engaged in agriculture, mainly growing maize for local demand 
and export to the Congo, and this became the main source of food security early in 
Zambia’s history. At the time, copper mining contributed little to domestic output and 
exports, amounting to only £7,000 in total exports. Some 133, 58 and 52 Europeans 
were engaged in copper mining, manufacturing and construction, respectively. Of the 
36,000 Africans in wage-employment, a tenth were domestic servants while just under 
two-fifths were farmworkers. The region was uneconomically sustainable as an 
administrative and economic outpost for BSA, with the company incurring a deficit 
of £1.5 million by 1924 (Burdette, 1990; Turok, 1989: 17-18). 
BSA, in 1924, maintained in perpetuity mineral rights over the territory while placing 
Northern Rhodesia under the British government as Protectorate and Crown 
Colony.25 The Colonial Office thus established a sort of bureaucratic structure with 
continuities from the BSA system, and by 1926, administering and governing the 
region proved costly with the Native Tax as the single largest contributor to public 
revenue. The first Governor of Northern Rhodesia was a national of South Africa who 
was well acquainted with the system of racially segregated governance. However, 
numbers of white settlers (see Table 4-1 The Population of Zambia, 1911-1962) 
compared with the south were low; it was the mass production of copper after 1928 
that induced substantial migration of Europeans into the region.26 By 1939, taxes 
from copper had already substituted the native tax as the largest single contributor of 
public revenue, and accounted for 70 percent of total government revenue which was 
                                                 
25 But in 1950, BSA “agreed that 20 percent of the royalties might go to the government until 1986, 
when it would surrender its right. However, the arrangement did not last so long, for in 1964, just 
before Northern Rhodesia became independent under the name Zambia, the BSA Company 
relinquished its rights in return for a payment of £4 million” (Pedler, 1975: 102). 
26 For instance, 35,000 whites lived in Southern Rhodesia by 1923 (Burdette, 1990: 79). 
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roughly the same figure the BSA appropriated as custodians of mineral royalties 
(Turok, 1989). 
Table 4-1 The Population of Zambia, 1911-1962 
Year European Coloured (Mixed race) Asian African (estimated) 
1911  1,497  -  39   820,000  
1921  3,634   145   56   980,000  
1931  13,846   425   176   1,330,000  
1946  21,907   804   1,117   1,660,000  
1951  37,079   1,112   2,524   1,890,000  
1956  65,277   1,577   5,450   2,100,000  
1959  73,000   10,000   2,280,000  
1962  77,000  
   
Source: Baldwin (1966: 41) and Turok (1989: 20) 
By 1931, about 30 percent of the European population lived in the Copperbelt with 
many of them working in the mines, and the majority of these came from South Africa. 
In practice, the exploding numbers of white skilled expatriates concentrated and 
augmented both economic and political power in the hands of the Europeans. Formal 
consolidation of white supremacy led the 33,000 Europeans in 1948 to begin putting 
pressure on the Colonial Office to merge the North with the South. In fact, by 1949, 
Welensky, the then governor of Northern Rhodesia (who later became the second 
Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland), had already intimated 
his repulsion of an African government in Northern Rhodesia. Eventually, the Central 
African Federation in 1953 was formed, constituted by Southern Rhodesia, Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 
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The African Welfare Associations with their roots in those founded in 1923 by David 
Kaunda, the father of Zambia’s first President Kenneth Kaunda, unified and morphed 
into the Northern Rhodesia Congress (NRC) in 1948. The African Welfare 
Associations were mainly concerned with confronting inhumane discriminatory 
policies, while insisting on their approach as non-radical, non-antagonistic and 
therefore subservient to the ruling authorities. The NRC was the confluence of black 
interests, and indeed, a watershed in black politics. On the side of labour, African 
labour’s consciousness of the state of affairs that subordinated black interests to those 
of the Europeans caused Africans with the aid of an envoy, a Mr. Comrie, from the 
British Labour Party to form their union, the Northern Rhodesian Mineworkers Union 
in 1949. African labour generally kept away from nationalistic movements and 
national level politics, this being demonstrated by the union’s refusal to engage in a 
Congress-led industrial action in 1953. Turok (1989: 23) argues that the African 
political leadership failed to subdue the interests of the mineworkers’ union under the 
African political leadership, and efforts by the latter to take over the leadership of the 
former caused the cleavage between them to grow even further. 
Within four years of the formation of the Federation, Africans were increasingly 
becoming aware of their socioeconomic situation in relation to the minority 
Europeans, and this led to divisions within the African polity. While Nkumbula’s 
party, the NRC, aligned with the moderate European-dominated Constitution Party, a 
new party led by Kapwepwe and Kaunda – the Zambian African National Congress 
(ZANC) – held no such reservations with respect to a neutral stance against European 
interests. Consequently, some 1,000 NRC supporters defected to ZANC (Turok, 
1989). Growing militancy by Africans, in a period of two months in 1959 between 
February and March, led to some 2000 arrests throughout the Federation,and the 
prohibition of ZANC. In fact, following NRC’s acceptance of the Benson Constitution 
spelling out the terms for Africans to cooperate with the colonial authorities, ZANC 
effectively mounted opposition against the NRC. When ZANC was banned in March 
1959, with the NRC remained unaffected, Africans grew increasingly suspicious, and 
doubtful, of the NRC’s ability to safeguard their plight (Mulford, 1964: 35). 
On the whole, however, before 1961, both the ZANC and the NRC were regional 
parties, the NRC’s support stemming from Southern Province. After 1961, the United 
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National Independence Party (UNIP), a descendent of the ZANC, increased its 
organisation on a territory-wide scale, arousing nationalist sentiments along the way 
and, strongly opposing and calling for the dismantling of the Federation. What started 
off as a restricted African polity was gaining momentum and beginning to challenge 
the rule and authority of the Federation. 
While African voices were spreading and independence struggles and successes 
diffusing across the continent, the Federation was drawing its last breaths. By 31 
December 1963, the Federation was dissolved formally, with territorial governments 
appropriating and sharing its assets. Unsurprisingly, Southern Rhodesia appropriated 
the largest share of the cake, and Northern Rhodesia received negative net transfers. 
4.2 Situating the pre-eminence of copper mining in the pre-Independence 
economy 
The purpose of this subsection is to highlight the centrality of copper mining in pre-
Independence Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia), and the limited growth of the 
manufacturing sector as an ancillary activity. This is not meant to be a detailed account 
of pre-Independence (lack of) developmentalism, but rather a very brief exposition of 
the nature of the Zambian economy that was bequeathed upon the indigenous African 
government at Independence. From this descriptive overview, the urgency for 
structural change for the post-Independence Zambian government is immediately 
apparent, broadly given the inferiority of the development of the manufacturing sector 
and retarded agricultural development. 
Copper production in present day Zambia started commercially in the 1930s, with 
output growing from one thousand long tons in copper 1926 to 579 thousand long tons 
in 1960 (Baldwin, 1966: 33). However, under BSA, the extension of the railway from 
Broken Hill to the border of the Congo in 1909 did not lead to mass production of 
copper for at least one reason - poor ore grades averaging at most 5 percent copper in 
the ore. In the Congo, ores with at most 7 percent copper were actually disposed of, 
being regarded as “too poor to treat” (Baldwin, 1966: 31). Eventually, the only notable 
copper mine before the 1930s was at Bwana Mkubwa which made consistent losses 
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after the First Word War due to high mining costs and low-grade oxide ores, leading 
to its closure in 1930. 
Broadly, “[b]y 1930 mines were either in production or under development at Bwana 
Mkubwa, Roan Antelope (now Luanshya) Nkana (Rhokana), Mufulira, Nchanga 
(Chingola), Chambishi and Kansanshi” (Daniel, 1979: 6). However, by 1931, when 
the ripples of the Great Depression were being felt in the Copperbelt, the ongoing 
developments in the mines were halted, with smaller mining companies permanently 
leaving the market, and two large multinational corporations – Anglo-American 
Corporation and Roan Selection Trust – staying put for several decades. During the 
colonial era, the entire copper industry was owned by these two mining giants, and 
this reflected the colonial administration’s views regarding ownership and 
development of mineral resources, placing the primary responsibility of mining in the 
hands of private enterprise. 
Nevertheless, despite this tenuous start, technological development led to a floatation 
process which in turn “made possible and profitable the extraction of copper from the 
sulphide ores of the Copperbelt” (Burdette, 1990: 80). A reversal in fortunes in favour 
of copper from around 1933 enabled the two mining companies to open new mines. 
For example, an electrolyte refinery at Nkana mine was initiated by American-Anglo 
Corporation in 1933. Four years later, Northern Rhodesia was already the world’s 
fourth largest producer of copper, churning out annually 210,000 tons of copper by 
1937 (Burdette, 1990: 83). 
Pedler (1975: 103) observed that “[i]n general … colonial governments relied on 
private enterprise for the development of mineral resources”, although “in the last 
phase of the colonial rule, however, the Colonial Development Corporation, a United 
Kingdom government agency, supplied finance and management for the development 
of certain new mines.” Roberts (1982: 353) notes that “[i]n 1943 the British 
government made a loan of 750,000 pounds to help expand operations at Nchanga, 
bulk-buying of copper was suspended by Britain from 1944 to 1947.” This is to 
emphasise that before Independence, the colonial state was involved in guiding and 
directing mining development but this was tied to accessing external credit, as well as 
aligning production with demand. However, through its approval of mining projects, 
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provision of finance and management, the colonial government would influence both 
the pace and direction of accumulation more generally. 
Indeed, even during BSA administration, the broad ideology was that Africa’s wealth 
could only be reasonably appropriated by putting in place mechanisms to inject 
foreign capital into developmental infrastructural projects like hydro-electricity, as 
well as central planning systems to administer extraction and governance, in addition 
to promoting large-scale mechanised economic activities whether in agriculture or 
elsewhere (Duignan and Gann, 1975: 26). By 1938, development projects would be 
funded in part by the newly-established National Development Board of Northern 
Rhodesia. The five-year roads plan that followed has the NDB to thank. Between 1938 
and 1953, gross domestic capital formation at current prices as a proportion of GDP 
ranged between 47.2 percent and 10.7 percent, although it averaged just over 24 
percent. Between 1953 and 1961, during the Federation years, gross capital formation 
averaged just over 31 percent. Accounting for this capital expenditure were 
infrastructural developments in railways and hydro-electricity as well as ancillary 
industries like cement manufacturing, financed by a combination of sources from the 
state and foreign capital. 
The dominance of copper mining (and inferiority of the manufacturing sector) in 
relation to the rest of the economy can be seen by the latter’s share in total national 
output. This is shown in Table 4-2 Sector Contribution to GDP (%) In Zambia, 1954-
1961 on sector contribution to GDP. Statistics were based on crude estimates given 
absence of structures and systems to capture much of the economic activity, but they 





Table 4-2 Sector Contribution to GDP (%) In Zambia, 1954-1961 
Industry 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 
Agriculture 
        
      Non-African 2.0 1.6 1.8 2.7 2.1 2.4 2.1 2.8 
      African 11.0 8.8 8.4 10.6 11.2 9.5 9.3 9.8 
Mining and quarrying 52.4 56.8 54.0 39.0 32.6 45.4 47.5 44.1 
Manufacturing 4.0 3.9 4.4 6.4 7.1 5.6 5.5 5.9 
Building and construction 6.1 6.2 6.7 8.6 9.7 5.8 4.5 4.1 
Electricity and water 0.4 0.4 1.6 1.9 2.5 2.0 2.3 2.2 
Transport and communications 3.4 3.4 3.7 5.2 5.3 5.0 5.1 5.1 
Distribution  5.7 5.1 5.1 6.5 6.4 5.2 5.4 5.6 
African rural household services 6.6 5.4 4.9 6.4 7.9 7.0 6.2 6.9 
All other 8.4 8.4 9.4 12.7 15.2 12.1 12.1 13.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Baldwin (1966: 35), Table 2-3 
Copper contribution to total national output ranged from one-third to over half, 
averaging around 46.5 percent between 1954 and 1961. Copper exports (figures not 
shown here) averaged around 86.5 percent of value of all exports. The manufacturing 
sector as a share of GDP averaged about 5.4 percent, less than half of the entire 
agricultural average share of 12 percent between 1954 and 1961. 
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In practice, the centrality of mining to the rest of the economy can be perceived from 
Pedler's (1975: 103) statement: 
“The mines created markets for all kinds of products. The growing urban populations 
[had] to be fed. Money went into such enterprises as workshops, repair outfits, 
electric-power plants, cement factories and water works. The Northern Rhodesian 
mining companies had to build and manage their own townships. They also created 
medical facilities. Development in turn attracted a multitude of people anxious to 
supply the growing demand for building materials, fuel, clothing and all manner of 
personal services.” 
Similarly, Katzenellenbogen (1975: 360-361), argued that mining contributed to 
Africa’s economic growth through its multiplier-effect (potential) by inducing a host 
of economic activities spanning: attracting and hosting technical skills and 
technology; establishment of social services such as housing, health facilities, water 
and sanitation and, recreational facilities; and development of a host of ancillary 
enterprises such as repair shops, facilities for the manufacture of steel and iron, cement 
production and other services like electricity generation. Further, mine workers were 
also a source of demand for various other products and services straddling food and 
clothing, banking services as well as trade stores, services of craftsmen and so forth. 
Mining also contributed to the public purse through taxation and licence fees, which 
in turn were used on other economic activities and services of the state. 
However, both Pedler’s and Katzenellenbogen’s accounts say nothing about the 
underlying processes, institutions and systems including the role, and 
interrelationships, of agents involved in these developments. Put differently, mineral 
mining does (potentially) induce economic activity through its wide-ranging spread 
effects as described, but the nature and form the development of these economic 
activities take are underpinned by socio-political and economic dynamics, which must 
be explored within their domestic and international contexts. As will be demonstrated, 
for instance, the location of housing and social services was as much political as it 
was economic, and so too were the kinds of manufacturing enterprises which saw the 
light of day. 
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In Northern Rhodesia, the expansion of copper production as early as the late-1930s 
induced the development of additional economic activities, although these remained 
restricted in scale and scope to serving the economic interests formed around mineral 
development. By 1943, copper production had escalated to 251,000 long tons; along 
with this boom in copper mining, supporting industries developed, as exemplified by 
the construction industry. Copper mining developments and economic activities 
generally induced by it followed world copper demand; to meet world demand 
“[m]ore shafts were opened and more refineries and smelters were built; this meant 
more housing and roads as well. Importantly, manufacturing also grew” (Burdette, 
1990: 86). 
A look at direct purchases of copper firms from the rest of the economy will help to 
locate the direct contribution, although the more enduring contribution to the economy 
lies in the broader spread-effects that come with mining which may not be directly 
accounted for by material flows across sectors (as opposed to links through 
expenditures of revenues). However, copper companies, for instance, purchased no 




Table 4-3 Copper companies’ purchases from other sectors, 1956-1957 
 




(thousands of £) 
Gross output of 
Northern Rhodesian 
industries purchased 
directly by copper 
companies 






   
Mining and Quarrying   
  
Metal mining 136,470   
Stone quarrying  154   32   21  
Manufacturing 
   
Grain mill products, slaughtering, 
dairy, and other food manufacturing 
 4,426   528   12  
Alcohol, beer, soft drinks, etc.  1,831  
 
 -    
Manufactures of textiles, wearing 
apparel, and footwear 
 317   44   14  
Manufactures of wood and cork, 
except furniture 
 739   195   26  
Valcanizing and chemical products  679   161   24  
Bricks and structural clay  411   23   6  
Cement and other nonmetal products  1,724   30   2  
Ferrous and metal products  2,040   1,146   56  
Repair of equipment and motor 
vehicles 
 2,639   82   3  
Printing and other manufacturing 
industries 
 822   6   1  
Total manufacturing  15,628   2,171   14  
Electricity and water 
   
Electricity  9,777   6,150   63  
Water  337  
  
Construction 
   
Payments to contractors  28,247   8,128   29  
Railway services  6,553   3,991   61  
Government tax revenue   48,500   32,100   66  
African wages in monetary sector  26,000   6,300   24  
Total European wages and salaries  41,800   15,700   38  
Source: Baldwin (1966: 38-39), Table 2-4 
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Mining also provided substantial resources to government through public revenues 
such as taxation, licence fees and dividends for itself as shareholder. In the fiscal year 
1956-1957, for example, copper mining accounted for about two-thirds of total 
government tax revenue. 
The interests of the mining companies in diversifying their developments outside of 
copper were varied but often limited. While Anglo-American ventured into secondary 
industry by promoting and establishing new firms under its subsidiary Rhoanglo, RST 
restricted its interests to copper mining, save for a co-owned hotel and farm. Rhoanglo 
set up firms to “manufacture cement and ball bearings” (Burdette, 1990: 86). Hence, 
whatever developments took place outside of mainstream mining, especially those 
pursued by the mining companies, they were meant to complement mining or mainly 
serve the interests of the agents connected with the mines. In fact, it was the initiative 
of the mining companies themselves to install some ancillary operations and facilities 
in order to reduce costs that would otherwise have been incurred by imports. 
Although the mining sector was an important market for other industries within the 
country, the mining companies often sourced a large amount of their capital inputs 
from South Africa and Zimbabwe. Zambia was part of a larger market of the 
Federation from 1953 to 1963, and also economically integrated into a more advanced 
southern African region as a whole. Copper production is inherently capital-intensive, 
utilising large amounts of specially-designed machinery and equipment. Absence of 
skilled labour in Zambia and a small domestic market for specialised mining 
equipment made it difficult to source these inputs locally, and, besides, they were 
already being competitively produced from the South, so there was no incentive for 
such industries to develop in Zambia (Baldwin, 1966). 
The extent of the backwardness of the manufacturing sector in Zambia within the 
context of other developing countries can be seen from Table 4-4 Population, GDP 
and Manufacturing output in selected African countries, 1960. From these selected 
countries, with roughly comparable populations, Zambia had the third highest GDP 
per capita after Ghana and Zimbabwe, yet, in nominal terms, Zimbabwe’s and 






















Nigeria 40  3,500  88 157.5 4.5 
Ethiopia 20.7  1,021  49 61.3 6.0 
Tanzania* 9.6  671  70 20.1 3.0 
Kenya 8.1  641  79 60.9 9.5 
Ghana 6.8 1,503 222 94.7 6.3 
Uganda 6.7  583  87 37.9 6.5 
Angola 4.8  726  151 31.2 4.3 
Zimbabwe** 3.6  751  209 120.2 16.0 
Zambia*** 3.2  511  160 28.1 5.5 
Formerly: *Tanganyika **Southern Rhodesia ***Northern Rhodesia ****Gold coast 
Source: Adapted from Kilby (1975: 472), Table 112 
It is generally agreed that industrial sector development during colonialism was one 
that was based largely on economic viability which took into account transportation 
costs relative to the value of the product, local availability of raw materials and other 
inputs as well as economies of scale. Accordingly, for Northern Rhodesia, the size of 
the domestic market in relation to agreements and political and economic interests in 
the south were of considerable importance (Baldwin, 1966: 182; Kilby, 1975 : 472-
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474). However, the colonial government occasionally, through the Colonial 
Development Corporation, stepped in to provide the funds and other expertise for 
development projects that would make mineral development more profitable. One 
such project benefiting from this was the cement industry near Lusaka, which was 
developed soon after the second World War in order to supply the hydro-electricity 
project at Kariba. A private firm later purchased the plant. Rising copper production 
and industrial activity required the expansion of electricity sources leading to the 
construction of a hydro-electricity dam at Kariba. 
Although, the Kariba dam hydro-electric project itself in terms of its location was not 
without controversy, it was not the first electricity-generating plant installed in 
Zambia, but it became the most important source of power. A hydro-electric plant on 
the Mulungushi river was built in 1926, financed by the Rhodesia Broken Hill 
Development Corporation. Later, another was installed in 1945 on the Lusemfwa 
River. Industrial expansion in Zimbabwe (then Southern Rhodesia) and expansion of 
copper mining in Zambia required more electricity to be generated. Although two 
proposals were submitted for hydro-electricity plants, one at Keshima on the Kafue 
River (in Zambia) which was preferred by the copper companies and another at Kariba 
on the Zambezi, the border between Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Northern 
Rhodesia (Zambia), “the decision to proceed with Kariba was taken in 1955” with 
initial generating equipment located on the southern side (Pedler, 1975: 120; 
Katzenellenbogen, 1975). The controversy that arose was to view the location of the 
Kariba dam project as motivated by politics, with Southern Rhodesia choosing to 
control an important economic resource. Yet, the Kariba location, estimated to have 
costed between £85.75 million and £114 million, was over £30 million more 
expensive than the Kafue location.  
A technical report by two French consultants favoured the Kariba project on grounds 
of cheaper current in the long term, and questions about whether Kafue would 
generate sufficient electricity for the mines and other areas of economic life.27 
                                                 
27 See Katzenellenbogen (1975: 405-406) for more details, but in general, the following financing 
arrangements were made, and these involved pooling funds from various sources, with the 
International Bank being the biggest single funder: “the Northern Rhodesia copper companies each 
loaned the federal government £20 million at 4.5 percent interest. The British South Africa Company 
provided £4 million, while the Standard Bank of South Africa and Barclays Bank, DCO, put up £2 
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However, the decision to locate the electricity generating equipment in the south casts 
doubt on whether the hydro-electricity location in Kariba was purely technically 
motivated. Adding this consideration to the fact that the Kafue river project was 
cheaper, closer to the mines, and favoured by the mining companies adds more voice 
to politics as the main factor in selecting the Kariba location for the hydro-electricity 
project. In fact, Burdette (1990: 98) suggests that the positioning of the Kariba Hydro-
Electric project shines light on political power embodied in Southern Rhodesia: “[t]he 
Kariba Dam’s main power station was supposed to have been built on the Northern 
Rhodesian side of the gorge. Instead it was put, at far greater cost, on the south bank, 
under the control therefore of the settlers in that territory. The political significance of 
this was hidden until years later when Northern Rhodesia became the independent 
nation of Zambia under the majority rule after the break-up of the federation.” 
The growth of the manufacturing sector also relied on availability of local raw 
materials. Zambezi Sawmills, one of the oldest firms which started production in 
1916, came to life due to presence of local raw materials in the form of teak and other 
local timbers. Its main products were railway sleepers and other furniture products. It 
was the BSA’s ambition to link the territories which led to railway installation, and, 
subsequently, development of such ancillary economic activities. That is, the 
development of the sawmill was not intended to bring support to industrial 
development, but mineral exploration and development. 
Another significant way the copper industry influenced, or, more appropriately, 
retarded, the growth of the manufacturing sector was through its European labour 
force which was “highly paid [and] followed an expenditure pattern similar to that 
found in rich, developed countries” (Baldwin, 1966: 184). This group (the European 
labour force) was too small to support local industry, and, therefore, in the absence of 
local options, resorted to imports. Baldwin also notes that while urban Africans on 
                                                 
million each. The Colonial Development Corporation provided £15 million, the Commonwealth 
Development Finance Corporation £5 million and the International Bank £28.5 million” with a 
consortium of Italian firms being awarded major contracts of the first phase while equipment was 
made in Britain. Work started in 1955 and in January 1960 power started flowing. Although 
“planners intended to build generators on the north bank of the river”, this decision only came into 
action in 1971, five years into Zambia’s Independence. 
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average spent about 60 percent of their incomes on food, drink, and tobacco, 
Europeans spent only 32 percent of their incomes on these items. 
On the whole, manufacturing activities, and, indeed, economic activities in general, 
were firmly entrenched in the copper mining sector. Baldwin (1966: 40), concerning 
the state of affairs towards the end of the 1950s, neatly observed that: “[t]here are few 
domestic manufacturing activities left to be counted, once the local industries from 
which the copper companies make significant purchases are enumerated.” This 
suggests that industrial development was restricted in pace, scope and scale by the 
demands of the copper companies, but also by the scale and profitability of mineral 
development. 
The dualism of the Northern Rhodesian economy was reflected in two further ways: 
first, the superiority and sophistication of the modern sector versus the backward rural 
economy and African agriculture sector; second, the racially segregated wage 
structures and occupational opportunities. Consider Table 4-5 Earnings and 





















share in total 
earning 
Agriculture  40,300   54   670   956   18   2  23 
Mining and quarrying   37,800   293   6,840   2,326   8   15  59 
Manufacturing  21,600   137   3,430   1,493   11   14  63 
Building and construction  30,000   120   2,400   1,434   12   7  49 
Electricity and water  2,900   124   510   1,875   15   15  73 
Wholesale and retail trade  14,400   124   4,990   976   8   26  73 
Finance and Insurance  500   146   1,260   1,056   7   72  95 
Transport and communications  10,300   168   2,900   1,349   8   22  69 
Government administration  20,600   149   3,040   1,365   9   13  57 
Education  9,300   176   1,310   1,121   6   12  47 
Health  6,200   122   1,140   1,256   10   16  65 
Private domestic services  33,400   81   100   622   8   0  2 
Other services  10,800   113   2,270   992   9   17  65 
Total  238,100   139   30,860   1,294   9   11  55 
Subsistence population  1,692,000   18  
 
Source: Adapted from Baldwin (1966: 43), Table 2-6 
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Europeans were three percent of the total population, yet they constituted 11 percent 
of the entire labour force and accounted for over half of the national wage bill. There 
are variations by sector, but the earnings differences by race remain similar. In mining, 
Europeans constituted only 15 percent of the total mining labour force, yet accounted 
for 59 percent of the mining wage-bill. In manufacturing, the Europeans accounted 
for over 63 percent of the wage bill despite being only 14 percent of the manufacturing 
sector labour force. 
The wage differences reflected at least two things: the discriminatory employment 
conditions by race and the differences in skills and education. Africans were mainly 
working in low-skill positions, while managerial and technical skills jobs were 
reserved only for Europeans. Colonial government policy in education and 
employment is largely responsible for a lack of skilled and educated pool of 
indigenous Africans. In general, the Northern Rhodesian government committed to 
providing only four years of schooling for Africans. Although some improvements 
had been made after the Second World War in terms of providing educational facilities 
for indigenous Africans, it was reported that by 1960 educational facilities and 
infrastructure could only accommodate 15 percent of school-age children for the first 
eight years of schooling, and at most only three percent to reach secondary school. 
This must be contrasted with European children whose schooling between ages seven 




Table 4-6 Enrollment of Africans in Northern Rhodesian schools in selected years 
  
1937 1944 1960 
Class 
 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Primary 
       
Substandard A  15,113   50.92   52,776   51.64   69,234   23.86  
 
B  6,525   21.99   19,527   19.11   60,001   20.68  
Standard I  3,773   12.71   13,527   13.24   53,115   18.31  
 
II  2,168   7.30   8,099   7.92   51,317   17.69  
 
III  1,223   4.12   4,342   4.25   19,943   6.87  
 
IV  611   2.06   2,425   2.37   17,491   6.03  
 
v  154   0.52   830   0.81   8,679   2.99  
 
VI  110   0.37   620   0.61   7,756   2.67  
Subtotal 
 
 29,677   99.99   102,146.00   99.95   287,536.00   99.10  
Secondary 
       
Form I nil nil  30   0.03   1,311   0.45  
 
II " "  747   0.26  
 
Remove* " "  19   0.02   235   0.08  
 
III " "  139   0.05  
 
IV " "  111   0.04  
 
VI (1st year) " "  28   0.01  
 
VI (2nd year) " "  28   0.01  
Subtotal 
 
 -    
 
 49   0   2,599   0.90  
Grand total 
 
 29,677  
 
 102,195  
 
 290,135  
 
        
*This class [was] in session for 6 months and links the Northern Rhodesia school year ending in 
June with the "Cambridge" year ending in December 
Source: Baldwin (1966: 50), Table 2-10 
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Education levels in Northern Rhodesia were among the lowest in any British colony. 
For example, Ghana had a population of roughly double Northern Rhodesia’s by 1960, 
yet the number of children in secondary school it attained in 1957 was about three 
times the figure Northern Rhodesia achieved only three years later. For Ghana, Meier 
(1975: 451) argues that the colonial government was partly responsible for  
“[achieving] good … educational progress” by instituting measures to 
ensure that secondary school education kept apace with remarkable 
growth in elementary school , such that by 1924 “the government 
founded Achimota College, which for a time provided education from 
kindergarten to college level, and which later developed into a full-
fledged university.”28 
On the one hand, this suggests that the rate of educational progress for Africans had a 
lot to do with colonialism in general, but on the other hand, it leaves room to perceive 
that the energy and resources for African educational advancement committed by any 
territorial colonial government could be explained by the attitudes of the authorities. 
Table 4-7 Number of Children in school in Ghana in selected years 1935, 1938, 1955, 1957 
Level 1935 1957 
 
Number Number 
Primary  63,000   456,000  
 
1938 1955 
Secondary  919   7,711  
Source: Meier (1975: 451) 
Crudely, the uneven distribution of technical and managerial skills by sector can be 
gleaned from the employment figures of Europeans by sector. Although it is 
acknowledged that this is a rough approximation, given the different levels of 
technology (capital-labour-skill ratio) combinations across (and to a lesser extent 
within) sectors, the relative share of the capital-intensive copper sector should be 
                                                 
28 See footnote 31 which describes the role of the colonial government in general and, Guggisberg, 
as the Governor of the Gold Coast (Ghana) in particular, in putting in place deliberate measures to 
mobilise resources to improve the education standards of the Indigenous population. 
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indicative of its importance. The relative unimportance of agriculture to the colonial 
government can also be seen by the numbers of Europeans within it. 
Table 4-8 Share of Europeans in sectoral employment, 1961 
Sector Percent 
Agriculture and forestry 1.6 
Mining and quarrying 15.3 
Food, drink, and tobacco 11.1 
Textiles and clothing 1.8 
Wood and furniture 3.5 
Construction 6.8 
Electricity and water 15.8 
Commerce and finance 26.1 
Rail transportation 31.3 
Source: Baldwin (1966: 77), Table 4-2 
The neglect of agriculture is not simply in terms of numbers of Europeans in the 
sector; resources for agriculture were virtually minimal. Europeans were also favoured 
in terms of arable agricultural land and access to finance, in addition to their superior 
technological and agronomical skills. European farmers were exceedingly more 
productive than African farmers, but few numbers of the former in the sector meant 
that agricultural output was restricted. By 1964, the 700 European white farmers 
mainly engaged in cash crops, tilling 180,000 acres of land, contributed £7.7 million 
to total agricultural output, compared with £3.2 million from Africans on a land area 
of five million acres (Zambia Office of National Development and Planning, 1966: 
2, First National Development Plan, 1966-1970). 
In 1944, colonial governments were asked to submit ten-year development plans by 
Secretary of State Oliver Stanley in order to compute figures and associate them with 
developmental activities in colonial territories. For Northern Rhodesia, the welfare of 
Africans was brought to the fore when about 12 percent of the £13 million 
development plan budget was allocated to African education compared with 2 percent 
for European education. Roughly, Europeans were about two percent of the total 
African population in 1947, yet the funds allocated to education for European children 
was about 16 percent of the African share. Despite this inequality in resource 
allocation, on the whole, the ten-year development plan recorded more resources 
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allocated than previous years, and hence suggested a commitment to improving the 
welfare of Africans.  
However, before the 1947 plan could actually be implemented it was replaced by a 
1953 version which reduced the relative allocation to African education to only three 
percent, an amount equivalent to law and order in the now enlarged plan budget of 
£54 million. Accounting for this change in allocations was the influence of the 
Legislature which instead proposed and pushed for provisions of three urgent goals: 
increasing food production, making available more housing and, refurbishment of 
roads. European as a proportion of the African population stood roughly at about three 
percent, yet African education received half the budget allocation of European 
education. Rural development was disappointing in the new plan, being allocated less 
than two percent of the total plan budget while agriculture only about the same as the 
allocation for African education (Baldwin, 1966). 
Federal development spending after 1954 increasingly relied on loans as a source of 
development financing. While in 1947 the share of loans in total spending amounted 
to 31.1 percent, this share increased under the Federal government: loans would 
account for just over three quarters of the 1957-1961 plan, a figure which was updated 
two years later to 85 percent. Importantly, however, was the capital expenditure by 
federal government, which showed that contrary to what was initially planned in 1947 
to improve livelihoods of Africans by channelling more developmental funds into 
rural development and agriculture, resources were increasingly diverted into urban-
centred developmental projects. Power and water, and communications, large capital 
projects situated throughout the entire length of the line of rail, gobbled up 45 percent 
of total capital expenditure, while an additional 25 percent was urban-biased being 
appropriated by African and European residential development, and loans for local 
(urban) authorities. Combined funds spent on rural development and agriculture were 
no more than those allocated to European housing (Baldwin, 1966: 197-201). 
Budgetary allocations to different sectors are underpinned by particular configurations 
and interactions of socio-political and economic interests. Indeed, it is true that 
African education and welfare in general were undermined by deliberate colonial 
government policies. What stands out is that before the start of the Federation, plans 
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in place to improve education and welfare for Africans were overhauled by the 
Legislature, replacing them instead with an even larger allocation for European 
advancement in business and education. This suggests that the 1953 version of the 
ten-year development plan reflected, in its allocations, the interests of society, with 
white settler interests promoted at the expense of the Africans. 
In sum, the economy of Northern Rhodesia developed alongside mineral 
development. The colonial government left mineral development, and much of the 
economic activity formed around it, to the private sector. Indeed, mineral development 
induced economic activity, which, on the main, relied on its viability and scale of 
development. There was limited concern for African advancement in education, while 
rural development and agriculture were also generally neglected. Broadly, the dual 
economy that underpinned the structure and nature of Northern Rhodesian 
developmentalism was a function of deliberate colonial policies, which reflected the 
interests of copper mining companies, and, to a lesser extent, the interests of the white 
settlers. 
 
4.3 Industrial Development under the BSA and Colonial Office eras, 1891-
1953 
The manufacturing sector at the end of the BSA rule was virtually insignificant. By 
1935, only the Zambezi Sawmills Ltd. was recorded officially in the Blue Book as the 
only establishment in the manufacturing sector of Northern Rhodesia, although 
another sawmill was recorded later in the year. It has already been pointed out that the 
availability of local timber and demand for railway sleepers for Rhodesia Railways 
and South Africa were effectively the main contributing factors that brought into 
existence the timber industry, but it also underwent some diversification by producing 
wooden furniture and parquet. On the whole, the timber industry had a respectable 
employment record of about 3,795 Africans and 100 Europeans by 1935. However, 
the figures of the manufacturing sector in official statistics underestimated the scale 
of manufacturing sector activities because a complex set of industrial processes 
associated with mining copper are often excluded from this category (Young, 1973). 
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A number of ancillary industries around copper mining sprung up during the interwar 
years, and by 1947 when the first Census of Industrial Production was undertaken, 79 
establishments were recorded under ‘Factory and Workshop Industries’, with 6 
percent of these located in the mining sector. The timber industry proxied by ‘Wood 
and furniture’ continued to play a dominant role in the manufacturing sector in terms 
of its contribution to net sectoral output and employment, accounting for about 30 
percent of total sectoral net output and around 55 percent of the total sectoral 
employment. ‘Food, drink and tobacco’ accounted for 19 and 16 percent of total 
sectoral net output and total sectoral employment, respectively. The textiles and 
wearing apparel subsector was relatively underdeveloped, amounting to only 23 




Table 4-9 Number of establishments, net output and employment in the manufacturing sector, 1947 
Establishments, Net Output and employment in the manufacturing sector, 1947 




























Food, drink, and 
tobacco 
      
Baking and 
confectionary 
9  69,845   286  9.8 4.5  7,760.56  
Grain milling 6  58,079   394  8.2 6.2  9,679.83  
Brewing and mineral 
waters 
7  40,913   257  5.8 4.1  5,844.71  
Other 4  36,376   389  5.1 6.1  9,094.00  
Textiles and wearing 
apparel 
5  19,245   163  2.7 2.6  3,849.00  
Metal engineering 
and repairs 
22  82,634   413  11.6 6.5  3,756.09  
Wood and furniture 7  
210,890  
 3,473  29.7 54.8  
30,127.1
4  





 178  15.5 2.8  
27,616.7
5  
Miscellaneous 4  71,410   341  10.0 5.4  
17,852.5
0  
Total 74  
710,653  
 6,334  100 100.0 
 
Source: adapted from Young (1973: 7), Table 1.2 
Although given the difficulty of obtaining statistics, Young (1973) used estimates of 
the 1947 Census of Industrial Production gross output to proxy sales from local firms 
compared with f.o.b. rather c.i.f. import figures to demonstrate that domestic 
manufacturing was insufficient to meet local demand. Admittedly, if taken too strictly, 
these comparisons are not accurate, but for my purposes, they are indicative in 
illustrating the inadequacy of local production capacities. Out of a total gross 
manufacturing output of £1,498,111, exports accounted for £239,444, 85 percent of 
which came from the ‘Wood and furniture’ subsector alone. Although the ‘wood and 
furniture’ subsector had net exports amounting to £33,781, fifty-eight percent of its 
total domestic demand was met by imports. The food, drink and tobacco subsector 
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had imports worth £1,499,044, while gross output net of exports was only £705,759, 
implying that about 68 percent of total domestic demand was met by imports. Overall, 
the manufacturing sector was in a net exports deficit worth £9,688,828, more than six 
times the value of gross domestic manufacturing output. Based on these crude 
estimates, it appears substantial scope for domestic industrial development existed 
through import substitution. 
Manufacturing sector development remained limited by 1954, with the sector 
accounting only for three percent of the 1954 GDP, although this figure can be said to 
underestimate the scale of manufacturing activities, given that those tied to mining are 
excluded. Within the food processing sector, a wheat-flour mill started operations in 
1950 in Ndola, while a brewery also in Ndola was installed a year later. 
Geographically, Ndola was right at the heart of copper mines; this is to demonstrate 
how manufacturing sector growth was increasingly concentrated in urban centres, and 
especially in the Copperbelt. By 1935, Ndola was being promoted as the industrial 
capital of the territory. A 1946 report of the Advisory Committee on Industrial 
Development referenced a “General Notice No. 397 of 1935” as underpinning the 
agenda of the colonial government to “develop Ndola as the commercial and 
distributive centre of the Copperbelt and to provide only retail trading facilities 
elsewhere to the extent required to meet day to day needs of the inhabitants and to 
secure healthy competition.” (Tembo, 2016: 104-105). The choice of Ndola as the 
commercial hub invited criticism, not least given its distance to the south, but also to 
the rest of the African population. But the concentration of white settlers on the 
Copperbelt, all within reasonable driving distance from Ndola, suggest that their 
interests were being met by this decision. Observe, however, the reluctant attitude of 
the colonial government to stimulate economic activity into value adding 
establishments. Instead, only retail trading activities were being promoted, and these 
narrow in scale and scope, serving mainly the interests of the white settlers. 
The growth of mining-supporting infrastructure led to a construction boom, and, 
eventually, the coming into existence of a number of economic activities such as the 
Chilanga Cement plant in 1951 just outside of Lusaka. This particular capital project 
was largely financed by the Colonial Development Corporation, its initial co-owner 
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with the government, before selling it to a private investor. Without government 
involvement, it is difficult to see whether private capital would have taken the risk. 
A number of technical (economic) as well as political economy factors, and their 
interrelationships, are often pointed to as having hampered the growth, and restricted 
the scope, of manufacturing sector development. These are discussed below. First, 
among the most obvious were the low levels of education of Africans (see Table 4-6 
Enrollment of Africans in Northern Rhodesian schools in selected years) which 
reinforced existing natural challenges (Young, 1973; Baldwin, 1966; Kilby, 1975). 
Owing to the extremely poor education record for indigenous people, Africans 
possessed limited semi-skilled and virtually no technical skills, thereby undermining 
the productivity of the African labour force. This limited their (Africans) contribution 
to industrial output in the event that they had a job. Limited resources for African 
education which eventually restricted their progress can be seen as a result of attitudes 
and legislation. The negligible education record for Africans can also be seen to have 
undercut their (Africans’s) role as agents for industrialisation not simply in their 
contribution to existing enterprises, but also eliminating the potential for them to 
emerge and contribute to new enterprise development (Kilby, 1975). Further, absence 
of an educated and skilled indigenous labour force meant that “industrialists setting 
up in Zambia were obliged to pay the very high salaries necessary to attract expatriates 
to the country, in order to meet their skilled labor requirements” (Young, 1973: 7). A 
lack of an educated pool of Africans therefore raised the cost of labour by raising the 
wage rate for skilled and professional labour, but it also reinforced and strengthened 
the existing wage disparities between Europeans and Africans. 
Zambia’s geography as a landlocked country is also identified as hindering the growth 
and scope of the manufacturing sector. Absence of naturally-endowed or cheap local 
raw materials meant that most inputs of producing enterprises had to be sourced 
externally. Compounding this problem was a poor communication and transport 
network domestically and particularly one linking Zambia to the rest of continent, 
especially those with seaports. In addition, if using the most reliable transport 
channels, the distance from Lusaka to the nearest seaport, Beira in Mozambique, 
spanned some 1,249 miles, or to Cape Town covering a distance by rail of about 2,000 
miles. During this period, access to a port was through the Benguela Railway to Lobito 
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Bay in Angola, or through the Rhodesia Railway to Beira or Cape Town. However, 
extended supply routes in terms of distance alone should not be seen in isolation, 
because imports too are disadvantaged by this factor, yet they made it to the domestic 
market at reasonable cost. Other factors (discussed above and below), in addition to 
this, must be seen as a web of complexities that must be overcome or confronted in 
order to develop a competitive manufacturing sector. 
By the early 1950s, power/electricity sources were limited. The Broken Hill Mine 
received its electricity from the Mulungushi and Lusemfwa hydro-electricity plants, 
while the Copperbelt, which lodged most mines, relied on the expensive steam power 
plants established by the mining companies which fed off coal from Southern 
Rhodesia’s Wankie Colliery (Baldwin, 1966; Young, 1973). Due to insufficiency of 
electricity facilities, potential industrialists were discouraged from injecting capital 
into Northern Rhodesia, choosing instead the larger, more developed market in the 
south. 
The restricted scale of the market for manufactured products is also regarded as an 
important factor contributing to the failure of the manufacturing sector to develop to 
an acceptable standard. By market is meant not just the population of inhabitants, but 
their buying power. Judging from the low earnings of Africans and low numbers of 
high-earning Europeans, the Zambian market could be considered as extremely small 
in supporting meaningful manufacturing sector development. In fact, the high-earning 
Europeans residing in Zambia on the most part consumed goods very different from 
those consumed by the indigenous people (Harvey, 1976; Young, 1973; Baldwin, 
1966). Hence, Young (1973: 9) contends that “there were, in fact, two very small 
markets in the territory rather than one” in part due to “stratification” stemming from 
“income inequalities.” 
The pattern of development in Zambia, which centred around copper, restricted the 
development of the manufacturing sector in considerable ways. For example, copper 
production ensured that Zambia was neatly economically, politically and 
geographically linked to the south. Thus, Young (1973: 10) argues that “the 
underdevelopment of the Zambian manufacturing sector both as regards intermediate 
and final products has to be considered in relation to the country’s geographical 
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situation at the periphery of southern Africa. Southern Africa was easily the most 
advanced part of the continent, and the “backwash” effects of industrialization in 
South Africa and Rhodesia had a detrimental effect on the prospects for manufacturing 
expansion in Zambia.” Although this is partly true, it must, however, be seen within 
the context of absence of an integrated industrial policy in Zambia aimed at 
encouraging and fostering local entrepreneurship. Hence, if one wishes to ascertain 
why such an industrial policy strategy was absent, then one must look to political 
economy factors as the root of the problem. A tendency of the mining companies to 
favour and source their inputs from the south and a lack of commitment by the 
Zambian colonial government to foster local industry, and the relationship of the two 
agencies, should be situated at the heart of the problem. As the DSP account in the 
previous chapter demonstrates, South Korea was successful in the development of a 
number of industries with some of the most notable being the ‘iron and steel’ and 
‘shipbuilding’ industries despite the nearness of similar establishments in more 
advanced and larger Japanese industry and market. 
Nevertheless, the copper mines in colonial Zambia could effectively cheaply import 
specialised equipment and machinery from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, both 
of which already had relatively advanced and integrated industries, including mining. 
As demonstrated, the post-war expansion had positive effects on copper in terms of 
its price and production volumes, which translated into increased revenue and imports 
for Zambia, and considerably less so in stimulating manufacturing sector 
development. From Table 4-10 Imports (fob) to Zambia by place of Origin, 1945 and 
1953, two points are worth observing: the extreme dependence on just three countries 
and the scale of import growth. 




Value (£) % Value (£) % 
United Kingdom  2,170,243  31.4  18,937,290  36.5 
South Africa  1,780,448  25.8  15,063,881  29.1 
Southern Rhodesia  1,439,312  20.8  7,682,094  14.8 
Other  1,518,681  22.0  10,149,565  19.6 
Total*  6,908,684   100   51,832,830   100  
*excludes “government stores” in 1945 
Source: Young (1973: 12), Table 1.4 
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In both 1945 and 1953, the United Kingdom alone accounted for about two-thirds of 
Zambia’s imports while the south (South Africa and Southern Rhodesia) accounted 
for more than two-fifths of total imports. Between 1945 and 1953, total imports grew 
by almost eight times, yet these aggregate statistics hide an even more interesting 
picture of the dependence of Zambia on the south. For example, Zambia generally 
received most of its processed food from South Africa. In addition, half and three 
quarters of mining equipment and explosives, respectively, were sourced from South 
Africa alone. 
Colonial Zambian government policy was largely laissez-faire, leaving the 
development of industry to private enterprise under a free market system. However, 
as the record demonstrates, the invisible hand of the free market stimulated invisible 
industrial development: that is, industrial development under the free market private-
capital-led system was virtually negligible, except in special circumstances. Where 
tariffs existed, they were meant to supplement the government’s fiscal revenue rather 
than a tool to stimulate domestic industrial development. The laissez-faire attitude 
reinforced the dependence on the south, and by the first half of the 1930s, part of the 
most economically vibrant parts of Zambia were tied down by a Customs Agreement 
with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia which generally promoted free trade among 
them. 
While the colonial government occasionally acknowledged the harmful effects of 
regional free trade by way of exploring options for protective measures, as was 
proposed in the 1932 inquiry into unemployment which led to the government 
establishing an Unemployment Committee, the recommendations from these inquiries 
did not yield any action on the part of the government (Young, 1973: 13). Generally, 
it appears the government was constrained from contesting free trade, perhaps by its 
own attitude towards domestic industrial development or by the anti-interventionist 
ideology of its advisors. For example, the ‘Report of the Commission appointed to 
enquire into the financial and economic position of Northern Rhodesia’ (commonly 
known as the Pim Report of 1938 because of Sir Alan Pim as the Chair of the Inquiry) 
in 1938 emphasised the spread effects from the customs union with the south and 
concluded that granting customs autonomy would lead to increased domestic costs 
rather than industrial development. Pim was convinced that due to poor industrial 
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development, most African countries, and Northern Rhodesia in particular, would 
have to import virtually all manufactures from abroad, such that raising protective 
duties like erecting tariff barriers would cause costs to escalate “rather than diverting 
trade to alternative sources of supply” (Gardner, 2012: 42). Hence, Pim discounted all 
infant industry protection arguments: 
“It has been suggested that the customs agreements operate to the detriment of the 
commercial community, in that they make it difficult to develop secondary industries 
… It is impossible to see … how a policy of customs autonomy could lead to any other 
result but a rise in the cost of living … Northern Rhodesia is bound to the South by 
national commercial ties, and a system of free exchange of products, subject to 
reasonable regulation, must be to the general advantage. The erection of artificial tariff 
barriers is a policy to be avoided” (Pim and Milligan, 1938: 102, quoted in Gardner 
(2012: 46) and Young (1973: 14)). 
Pim’s recommendations reinforced the colonial government’s existing policy attitudes 
in practice, but this ran into conflict with Northern Rhodesian settler whites who 
advocated for some domestic industry development. By 1943, a proposal, although 
not adopted at this time, to establish the Industrial Development Board in Northern 
Rhodesia marked a watershed in interventionist arguments which called for 
coordinated regional industrial planning if Northern Rhodesia was to keep apace with 
the south. These discussions reveal the narrowness of the conception of industrial 
policy instruments, both by anti-interventionist and pro-interventionists. Infant 
industry protection by itself can hardly automatically translate into industrial 
development. This has been demonstrated by exploring in the previous chapter how 
the developmental states mounted cohesive strategies and coordinated investments 
under the tutelage of the state. 
Nevertheless, pressure on the colonial government forced it to give an ear to 
politicians and businessmen who then made proposals on the kinds of industries to 
underpin industrial development, namely a cement plant, establishment of copper 
fabrication facilities, installation of agro-produce processing facilities and a 
development of manufacturing capacities of glass (Bhagavan, 1978; Young, 1973). 
Consequently, in 1944 the government engaged the consulting services of W. J. 
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Busschau, a South African economist, whose report – ‘Report on the Development of 
Secondary Industries in Northern Rhodesia’ – in 1945 dismantled all arguments in 
favour of protectionist industrial policy. By referencing weak conditions for industrial 
development such as the size of the domestic market, skills differentials based on dual 
systems of employment and education and, extended supply lines, Busschau was of 
the view that the prospects for manufacturing development based on infant industry 
arguments were misguided, and instead suggested that industrial development should 
take advantage of existing resources and capacities which in practice meant expanding 
existing subsectors such as the timber industry and heavy engineering.29 
Interestingly, the Busschau Report went to great lengths in discouraging the 
establishment of a local cement plant, suggesting its non-viability and advising the 
government to steer clear of it. Nevertheless, the Report also recommended the 
establishment of an Advisory Committee on Industrial Development (ACID) 
constituted of 23 members of diversified expertise. ACID was adopted by the end of 
1945 but was only made up of six members who produced three reports within two 
years of its inception. On the whole, ACID functioned on Busschau’s viability criteria 
for industrial development, but on one occasion when it did not, it recommended the 
establishment of a cement factory, this decision being rationalised by social gains as 
opposed to profit maximisation, although with a caveat of ensuring commercial 
viability. As Young (1973: 17) recalls: “[t]he Committee’s recommendation was 
accepted by the government, and Zambia’s first enterprise in state capitalism, 
Chilanga Cement Ltd., was formed in 1949, with a share capital of £1 million, 
£750,000 being held by the Colonial Development Corporation (Central Africa) Ltd. 
and the remainder by the government. The factory, which was situated a few miles 
south of Lusaka, came into operation … in 1951.” A number of factors are worth re-
emphasising. First, the decision to build the cement factory resulted from the initiative 
of the white settler community to set the state into motion to actively promote 
industrial development. Second, by establishing the ACID, the state transformed its 
structures to invite more meaningful dialogue and to catapult itself into active rather 
than passive engagement. However, ACID itself was short-lived, having claimed to 
                                                 
29 See Young (1973: 15-18) for a summary of the Busschau Report’s recommendation, its critics (the 
politicians), and a critical appraisal and reflection of the comparative advantage ideology 
underpinning the report.  
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have explored all options for industrial development given the existing economic 
conditions, the members decided to terminate it before 1950. 
In anticipation of carving out a system of accumulation for Zambia which is 
underpinned by restricted and narrow industrial development formed around copper 
mining developments, ACID’s decision to pursue a cement plant was in anticipation 
of the Kariba hydro-electricity plant; the latter aimed primarily at servicing copper 
mining development. As Deane (1953: 48) remarked, “[t]he cement factory has been 
established at Chilanga, which is a few miles from Lusaka and is designed for 
expansion to serve the Kariba Gorge hydro-electric project, should that materialize.” 
With the benefit of hindsight, the Kariba hydro-electricity plant did materialise and 
continues to be an invaluable asset for Zambia (and Zimbabwe) even after close to 
seven decades later. This particular cement plant is also still Zambia’s major economic 
asset almost a quarter century later. 
Despite the demise of ACID, and contrary to its despondency, the politicians in the 
Legislative Council continued to represent the interests of the white settlers which 
pressed for greater industrial development. Roy Welensky proposed in 1943 the 
establishment of the Industrial Development Board, but his plea was largely ignored. 
Later, he was the politician who harshly criticised Busschau’s Report, and was at the 
forefront of pressing for greater industrial development. His influence and 
mobilisation of support in the white settler community caused the government to 
concede political pressure as reflected by a proposed motion in 1950 for the 
government to consider setting up a finance development corporation. The aim of this 
initiative was to aid and establish industry and business in Northern Rhodesia. 
Welensky’s proposal was accepted and in January 1951, the Northern Rhodesian 
Industrial Loans Board was born (Young, 1973). An important lesson from this is that 
pressure on politicians by the white settlers set them in motion to confront a reluctant 
government, although the options and tools for industrial development eventually 
shifted, from vigorous initiatives in establishing industries, such as the Chilanga 
cement project, to simply providing finance. It should also be emphasised that many 
of such large investments were approved because they claimed to facilitate mineral 
development, although with potential spread effects to the rest of the economy. 
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Between its inception in January 1951 and the end of 1953, total funds committed by 
the Industrial Loans Board had more than doubled to over half a million pounds. 
Despite this impressive growth, these resources were negligible, equivalent to only 
one percent of total imports in 1953. Nevertheless, although its scale of activities was 
small, it pacified the white settler interests and even “generated an expectation of and 
a demand for continued state intervention” (Bhagavan, 1978: 12). 
Reflections of this sort are important for at least four reasons: first, they point to the 
nature of advice the government received which left industrial development to the 
invisible hand; second, it highlights the growing awareness and desire by the white 
settler population to lodge manufacturing capacities domestically; third, they 
underscore the role of politics in influencing policy trajectory; and fourth, importantly, 
however, they underscore the role of the state, if willing, in bringing industrial 
development to bear. As Bhagavan (1978: 11) recalls: “Left to itself, the colonial 
government showed no interest in pursuing policies that would promote the growth of 
manufacturing in Northern Rhodesia. It was the strong and constant pressure from the 
European settlers that forced the government.” 
Industrial development by 1953 was extremely disappointing, especially given the 
scale of copper mining development that had been accomplished. As Deane (1953: 
48) correctly observed by 1953, “[m]anufacturing industry in Northern Rhodesia 
[was] directed towards the local market and [was] on a small scale” while “[a]s a 
matter of deliberate policy the colony’s factories [were] largely concentrated at Ndola 
on the edge of the Copperbelt, the chief industrial market. However, there are minor 
manufacturing concerns at other centres of European population … including a small 
cigarette factory at Fort Jameson [now Chipata].” 
Not only was manufacturing sector development restricted by following or, more 
exactly, leaving to the market, but also ratifications of customs agreements which 
precluded infant industry protection by an already parsimonious colonial government. 
For example, Tembo (2016: 104) contends that, “the establishment of a cigarette 
factory in Northern Rhodesia was discouraged because of the existence of agreements 
with Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, wherein Northern Rhodesian leaf tobacco 
entered these markets under free quota in exchange for the entry into Northern 
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Rhodesia at reduced rates of customs duties of tobaccos and cigarettes manufactured 
in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.” Hence, Northern Rhodesia’s budding 
manufacturing concerns were undercut by competition especially from Southern 
Rhodesia, leading to the demise of a cigarette factory at Choma, with only a smaller 
plant remaining at Fort Jameson (now Chipata). 
By opting out of interventionism, the state withheld the tools for manufacturing sector 
development, while allowing the market forces to determine both the pace and scale 
of development within the context of a customs agreement with the south. This option, 
however, ensured that domestic industrial development progressed in a narrow and 
restricted way. When some sectors did produce some manufacturing enterprises, this 
was to serve existing markets rather than to alter the pattern of production. Inward-
looking manufacturing development within the context of effective demand limited 
its own scope for further development. The discontent expressed by the white settler 
community in terms of lack of industrial development in Northern Rhodesia 
compelled the colonial government to act. However, because the indigenous African 
population was on the main excluded, this remained a conversation between the white 
settlers and the colonial government. Thus, whatever success resulted, it was limited 
in scope because it was confined by geography, and capacities, and because it was tied 
to the development of the copper mining industry. 
4.4 Industrial Development during the Federation, 1953-1964 
Against the will of over six million Africans in central Africa (Hyam, 1987: 172), the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was born on October 23, 1953.30 It brought 
together three different economies, one with a relatively advanced industrial structure 
(Zimbabwe), another with backward industrial development but a modern copper 
mining industry (Zambia), with the last (Malawi) possessing a backward agricultural 
sector and neither of the characteristics of the others, yet important as a labour reserve, 
but especially for South African gold mines. 
                                                 




Six years from 1954, gross national income of the Federation in real terms rose by 43 
percent to £4,44.8 million, before virtually levelling off till the demise of the 
Federation in 1963. However, much of the growth that had taken place was biased in 
favour of Southern Rhodesia, with limited improvements in both Northern Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland. 
Consider Table 4-11 Net manufacturing output in Zambia, 1955 and 1963, for an 
indication of the performance of Northern Rhodesia’s manufacturing sector during the 
Federation. 
Table 4-11 Net manufacturing output in Zambia, 1955 and 1963 
 
1955 1963 
Food, beverages, tobacco 1.56 5.13 
Textiles, clothing, footwear 0.14 0.43 
Wood industries 0.46*** 0.85 
Paper, printing, publishing 0.36 0.64 
Nonmetallic minerals * 1.58** 
Metal industries (except transport equipment) * 1.83 
Transport equipment 1.36 1.43 
Other 2.53 0.8 
Total 6.40 12.68 
*included in 'other'; **Excludes pottery;***excluding furniture 
Source: Young (1973: 20), Table 1.5 
Based on reservations of reading too strictly Table 4-11 on manufacturing output in 
Zambia during the Federation because of statistical errors and omissions (Young, 
1973), the data must be taken as indicative of trends. The food, beverages and tobacco 
subsector dominated manufacturing sector development. Notable projects in this 
subsector include a sugar factory in Ndola in 1959, and in 1961, the opening of 
brewery in Kitwe, while later a wheat-flour meal processor was established in Broken 
Hill (Kabwe). The growth of this subsector reinforced and concentrated the number 
of establishments in the line of rail areas, and especially in the Copperbelt. 
Six years into the Federation, Northern Rhodesian politicians expressed discontent 
which appears to have simply been a continuation of ongoing misgivings at the uneven 
development within the Federation, charging that Southern Rhodesia had profited 
unfairly from the union. A Legislative Council debate approved the establishment of 
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a Committee for Industrial Development restricted to ministerial level to explore ways 
to coordinate inter-territorial industrial development while promoting intra-territorial 
industrial development. The Federation did not effectively prevent South African 
goods from accessing its market, and for the most part, South African goods received 
favourable tariff terms that were too low to discourage inhabitants of the Federation 
from importing. During the Federation, statistics were compiled for the whole region 
rather than for individual territories, but it was learnt when the federation was 
dissolved after Zambia published its own statistics that Southern Rhodesia had grown 
during the Federation years to become Zambia’s largest single trading partner in terms 
of Zambia’s imports, accounting for two-fifths of total imports. This must be 
compared with the figure during the start of the Federation in 1953 when imports from 
Southern Rhodesia accounted for only 15 percent. What can be deduced from this 
observation is that Southern Rhodesian interests had penetrated successfully into 
Zambia during the Federation. 
In terms of industrial policy, the Northern Rhodesian Industrial Loans Board which 
came into operation in 1951 continued its activities for the next nine years, 
cumulatively giving out loans totalling only about £1 million. Industrialists operating 
in existing markets such as metal engineering and building supplies were its main 
clients. Although the Industrial Loans Board was set up to encourage new industry, it 
had to wait for clients to reach out for help if they could, ironically, show that they 
were creditworthy. In addition, it was run by personnel who only served part-time. 
Putting these features together, it appears the Industrial Loans Board limited its own 
scale and range of activities by its own design. 
At a later date in 1960, the Committee for Industrial Development accepted proposals 
submitted to it in the previous year by the Industrial Loans Board to consider 
incorporating the Board into a limited liability company. On 28 April 1960, the Board 
morphed into the Northern Rhodesian Industrial Development Corporation. Among 
its objectives, the Industrial Development Corporation was tasked with expanding the 
scale of activities to encourage local industries, including capital provision, and 
management services as required. Within two years, the Corporation moved from 
government to private control. By the third year of its operations, the Industrial 
Development Corporation endorsed only 46 projects worth £658,087 in total. In 
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addition, some feasibility studies and surveys it undertook before Independence were 
especially important because these came to life several years into Zambia’s 
Independence. 
The Federation had largely been seen as a major drain on Zambia’s copper resources. 
Under the Federation, the Federal and not the territorial government had most control 
on fiscal matters. Some K194 million (approximately about £200 million) is estimated 
to have equalled the net transfer of public revenue from Northern Rhodesia to the 
other two territories (Faber, 1971: 301). The infrastructural developments that did 
come to fruition during the Federation were often those related to supporting copper 
mining such as the Kariba hydro-electricity project and, refurbishment and extension 
of the railways system. Virtually negligible improvements had been made on road 
transport, with Zambia spending a third on roads of what Zimbabwe had by the end 
of the Federation. 
African advancement in education was limited by policy which promoted unequal 
progression, with white settlers benefitting the most. During the Federation years, the 
government maintained under its responsibility the education of white settler children 
from primary to secondary, while for African children, the territorial governments 
were chiefly responsible. In 1962, the per capita expenditure up to secondary school 
for white children was more than eight times what was spent on African children. 
Whatever educational progress that did place at the tertiary level, it was broadly 
restricted to only building trades. Although the mining companies sponsored the 
establishment of the Copperbelt Technical Foundation in 1956, its main goal being 
mainly to provide some technical training, it mainly benefited white students who had 
acquired at least a secondary level of education, but after 1958, the de facto racial 
segregation in admission and employment operated to block any further advancement 
by aspiring Africans. By 1961, only two Africans had been admitted to the 
Foundation.  
In the twilight years of the Federation, two additional educational facilities are 
noteworthy: Ndola Technical College which began operation in 1960 and, in 1963, 
the College for Further Education in Lusaka rolled out its operations. By 1963, only 
74 indigenous people were recorded as university graduates. Thus, by Independence, 
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there was an absence of a pool of Africans to fill any administrative or management 
jobs including those requiring more than secondary education. On the whole, no 
radical change took place during the Federation to improve the training needs of 
Africans, except in restricted cases and professions. The result was that post-
Independence Zambia had to depend on expatriates for many of these jobs. 
Development of productive capacity for industrial development was limited by the 
federal government’s pursuit of discriminatory policies against the Africans. 
The federal era (1953-1963) did not bring to life any notable investments, except for 
the few which were accounted for by the food processing subsector – a wheat-flour 
mill at Broken Hill (now Kabwe), a sugar refinery in Ndola, and brewery in Kitwe. 
For Bhagavan (1978: 12), the Industrial Development Corporation “was nothing more 
than a sop to keep the articulate settlers’ lobby quiet.” Where industrial development 
did take place, it was confined to serving existing markets, or to strengthen mineral 
extraction. Based on these considerations, it is unsurprising that at Independence, the 
indigenous Zambian government inherited an industrial structure and economy that 
was not underpinned by an integrated productive pattern of production.  
4.5 Some reflections and conclusions from Zambia’s pre-Independence 
political economy 
This chapter has shown that about seven decades before Zambia’s Independence, three 
eras of governance administered the affairs of the territory occupied by Zambia. As 
Turok (1989) correctly observes, the pre-Independence history of Zambia under 
foreign control was one of social reorganising and dislocation, with copper mining 
hastening and deepening the processes. He notes that: 
“[t]he pre-Independence history of Zambia’s economy can be divided 
into three phases: pre-colonial subsistence farming, the period of 
consolidation of the extraction of labour and the penetration of settler 
farming, and the establishment of an indigenous copper mining industry. 
The first phase was marked by stagnation, the second by the steady 
dislocation of African agriculture and traditional social structures, and 
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the third by the rapid reorganisation of the whole economy to create one 
of the most distorted economies in Africa” (Turok, 1989: 25). 
Copper mining created aspects of a modern economy biased against both industrial 
and agricultural developments. The interests of the copper companies, reflected by the 
colonial government policies restricted African participation in economic activity, 
providing cheap labour to the mines, hence safeguarding the economic and political 
interests entrenched through mineral developments. 
Under the colonial government, Zambia had a backward industrial structure, even by 
African standards, and, ironically, one of the most sophisticated mining complexes in 
the world (Kilby, 1975). It will be shown in subsequent chapters that this divide was 
the basis upon which post-Independence development policy was formulated, seeking 
to place industrial development at the centre, as the vehicle for improving living 
standards of the many Africans subjected to poverty and decades of exclusion from 
economic activity.  
The administrative and economic system under colonial authority not only failed to 
stimulate industrial development, it also limited the emergence and growth of African 
entrepreneurship. Africans engaged in retail trading amongst themselves depended 
upon credit supplied by European firms. On the one hand, Pedler (1975: 123; 111) 
observed that a “competitive private enterprise had produced a structure of trade that 
could hardly have been expected to win the approval of African nationalists as the 
continent moved into the era of independence”, yet, on the other hand, he notes that 
“[d]evelopment owed a good deal also to the general administrators, no matter 
whether they worked in some remote out-station or in a gubernatorial office.”31 This 
                                                 
31 Pedler (1975: 111-112) gives evidence of the role of administration in delivering development by 
referencing the commitment and zeal of Sir Gordon Guggisberg who served as Governor of Gold 
Coast from 1919 to 1928. Pedler sees Guggisberg in terms of “administrative ability and managerial 
skill.” During this period, Guggisberg recorded to have energetically pursued development for the 
indigenous population. First, his planning skills were regarded as impeccable when upon taking 
office, he outlined a Ten-year Development Plan which placed education of the indigenous at the 
centre. During his service, Guggisberg is credited for devising systems to raise revenue from the 
colony in order to finance education. Such a system involved the expansion of the communication 
system; more railways and roads were built. This facilitated the movement of labour and goods. 
Guggisberg also put in place measures to lubricate flow of traded goods which educed freight rates. 
Additionally, although a proposal to construct a port began in 1895, it was Guggisberg who set it in 
motion this proposal when construction of the port at Takorodi begun in 1921 and opened for 
business in 1928. Nine decades later, this port is still one of the major economic assets for Ghana. 
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suggests that the nature and pattern of development in colonial economies, and, 
consequently, what was inherited at independence, is a function of both the nature of 
the economic system as well as the nature and commitment of the state administrative 
machinery. Nevertheless, this does not account for the nature of politics involved in 
administration, nor does it address the context and conditions that underpin successful 
administrative strategies. 
Although Southern Africa did hamper the development of Northern Rhodesian 
manufacturing through its harmful “backwash” effects, its presence as a large market 
and technologically-advanced region could have, through “spread” effects, potentially 
profited and complemented the Northern Rhodesian colonial government’s efforts, if 
there had been any real ones, to develop domestic industry (Young, 1973: 10-12), but 
as Hirschman (1958:187-189) reminds us, such spread effects in isolation are not a 
condition for success, it is how well they are used to reinforce local strategies for 
industrial development. As demonstrated by the DSP from the previous chapter, this 
requires decisive and strategic development policy and state intervention, while the 
Linkage-Agency framework would ask for which agents would position themselves, 
by inducement from the state or from their own motivation, to exploit such spread 
effects. 
In anticipation of sketching Zambia’s post-Independence system of accumulation, the 
brief overview of the pre-Independence polity discussed above should be kept in mind, 
because nationalism and Independence did not automatically lead to, nor imply, 
alignment with indigenous interests, themselves subject to definition and contestation. 
In particular, the cleavage between an organised (mineworkers) labour force and the 
African politicians strengthened during the post-Independence development era, 
especially the first 27 years of broadly state-led development. The nature of industrial 
development is the topic of the next chapter. Nor did interventionism in isolation 
                                                 
Guggisberg himself is recorded to have fondly intimated revising the education system in order to 
educate more indigenous people: “My practical experience... during the last twenty-seven years has 
convinced me that what individuals have achieved, in spite of ill-selected systems of education, can 
be achieved by the race generally, provided we alter our educational methods” (Guggisberg and 
Fraser, 1929). It is the construction of the Achimota school between 1924 and 1927 for which he is 
probably most fondly remembered, particularly as a contribution to enhancing education services 
for the indigenous people. 
142 
 
without capacities and appropriate institutions produce an integrated productive 
structure. 
According to Burdette (1990: 75), under the Federation, “[t]he roots for early 
differentials in industrial development lay in the interplay between the colonial 
politics of the settlers and the British Colonial Office, the workings of the imperial 
system and existing material conditions.” Under the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland, three economies – Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi – were integrated, with 
Zimbabwe, receiving (unfair) advantages over the other two. She draws contrasts in 
these territories under the Federation and argues that much of Southern Rhodesia’s 
successes in developing a reasonably integrated industrial structure have the state to 
thank. Importantly, she situates the role of socio-political forces in prodding the 
Southern Rhodesian state into action, with the state mobilising and providing finance 
for infrastructural and industrial development, mounting interventionist measures to 
protect domestic industries, while promoting development of productive capacities by 
investing in technical skills and education and other mechanisms of learning. By 
implication, the failures of both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland can also be 
attributed to the state. 
The colonial government can be an agent for industrialisation if its machinery is set 
in motion to mobilise resources and energies towards industrial development. For this 
to happen, there should be social and economic forces established to influence the 
trajectory of development policy. Northern Rhodesia’s colonial government 
essentially silenced the voices of the African population, with no regard for their 
welfare except to keep them alive as a source of cheap labour in the mines or elsewhere 
as needed. Effectively, only the white settlers could speak out and ask the state to 
cultivate the political will to devise and execute an industrial policy strategy; however, 
“[a] major reason for this lack of political will was that the settlers in Northern 
Rhodesia were not a bourgeoisie, and the mining companies and imperial powers’ 
interests were served well with territory continuing as a raw materials supplier only” 
(Burdette, 1990: 87). In qualifying this argument, Burdette demonstrates how white 
settlers emerged in Southern Rhodesia, became a local national bourgeoisie, and how 
they “formed and linked [their] economic interests to control over the state. Prominent 
Southern Rhodesian industrialists pushed the government to extend infrastructure and 
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even to establish important intermediate goods industries.” (Burdette, 1990: 91-92). 
In part, this suggests two things: first, that the interests of the white settlers were not 
aligned with developing the territory; and second, the white settlers were not an 
effective group bound by common interests while embodying considerable clout. 
I have already demonstrated how white settler interests if aligned with industrial 
development can nudge the state into action, as exemplified by the coming into 
existence of the Industrial Development Corporation in Northern Rhodesia, and many 
of its subsequent projects. On the main, it is difficult to concede that the white settlers, 
on aggregate, bound their fortunes and interests to the welfare of Northern Rhodesia, 
except in a few exceptional cases. In spite of the public purse growing during the war 
years, the colonial government ignored industrial development, nor could “[t]he 
settlers in Northern Rhodesia … force their conservative territorial administration to 
use that capital for state-sponsored industrial integration or for extending commercial 
farming” (Burdette, 1990: 95). In Northern Rhodesia, the parsimonious colonial state 
reflected the interests of the mining companies, and, to a lesser extent, the economic 
interests tied to the fortunes of the copper industry.  
In general, the development which took place in pre-Independence Zambia resulted 
from activities that followed the pattern of copper development rather than 
coordinated investments to support and promote an integrated productive structure. 
Nevertheless, the colonial state was an integral agent in this process. The state 
mobilised resources and created an environment favourable to private capital 
accumulation. Largely, the investments that underpinned pre-Independence 
developmentalism were of strategic importance to facilitate cost-effective extraction 
of copper as was the case for railways and hydro-electricity projects, but also to 
support the social and economic interests of the mining community, illustrated by 
development of food processing manufacturing concerns. Accordingly, the nature and 
pattern of industrial development that did come to life was restricted in scope and 
scale, and depended upon the technical and managerial services of the white 
community (settlers and expatriates). In addition, due to economic activities being 
narrowly-based on copper mining, the latter’s fortunes governed the viability, pace 
and scope of ancillary developments. Because copper remained virtually profitable 
right up to Independence, economic activities around it prospered as well. In short, 
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the lack of meaningful industrialisation – that is, industrial development underpinned 
by an integrated productive structure – during the reign of colonial governments 
reflected the interplay of socio-political and economic interests, with the mining 
companies’ interests being mirrored by the state. 
4.6 Preface to Zambia’s post-colonial political contradictions: a synopsis of 
the African state within the context of political economy of development 
4.6.1 Introduction 
Lessons learnt from the DSP strongly suggest that the state played a decisive role in 
(positively) influencing the scale and pace of development in (East/North-East) Asia, 
yet, on the contrary, the literature on Africa’s post-colonial development suggests that 
it is precisely the African state, in its various conceptions and manifestations, that has 
blocked broad-based development. Thus, in this sub-section, as a preface to 
considering Zambia’s post-colonial developmentalism, I examine critically the 
existing understanding and conception of the post-colonial African state in order to 
gain insights into why postcolonial African states struggled or failed (to struggle) to 
design and implement broad-based development programmes underpinned by 
structural transformation of the East Asian type.  
I begin by exploring the traditional understanding, conception and nuances of the 
nexus between the African state and African post-colonial developmentalism. I find 
that while some care has been taken to avoid grouping African countries and making 
general statements about the way in which the African state is conceived, it is often 
the case that a failure to view state-society relations as a function of a particular 
configuration of socio-political and economic interests propagates criminalisation of 
the African state. Through its political leadership and resultant interactions with 
society, the African state is seen as an enemy of progress. Firstly, one must accept that 
the pattern of resource creation and allocation results partly but significantly from the 
relative political power of groups competing for resources through the state (Khan, 
1998). 
Secondly, history provides insights into how groups competing for developmental 
resources and rights through the state have evolved. For Zambia, it is the case that at 
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the time of Independence, the virtual absence of indigenous capitalists (due to colonial 
political economy contradictions as argued above) enabled non-productive indigenous 
classes, generally through narrow party politics and the state architecture, to influence, 
although in a dysfunctional way, the developmental trajectory. Subsequently, as will 
be shown in Chapters Five and Six, evolving economic policies similar to the DSP 
type did not launch structural transformation. Instead, statist/interventionist policies 
implemented through the state in collaboration with wider society restricted 
development as developmental resources were channelled to more politically 
powerful groups. But Zambia’s history within the context of colonial policies ensured 
that such groups did not possess the required skills and competences, and possibly 
motivations, to deliver development. Hence, that developmental resources were 
allocated to unproductive classes reflected the nature of the underlying socio-political 
and economic interests. Chapter 5 picks up this thread for the Zambian post-colonial 
polity by examining the political context which governed the design and 
implementation of economic policy. 
4.6.2 The African state and development 
The post-colonial African state is often conceived as one constructed to counter social, 
political and economic dislocation inherited from colonial administration. 
Confounded by colonial politics, the post-colonial African state goes about achieving 
this goal by seeking legitimacy while exercising power and control. Often, the starting 
point of most analyses of the post-colonial African state is to track postcolonial 
development from its colonial roots. The politics of colonial development are seen to 
have created institutions and fractions of capital in response to colonial interests, but 
their usefulness for wide-ranging and widespread post-colonial development falls 
short (Gewald et al., 2008; Herbst, 2000). Firstly, colonial institutions are often 
accepted to have been narrow in scope and myopic in terms of wide-ranging 
developmental ideology, responding mainly to interactions of fractions of (foreign) 
capital and other classes of colonialists. Although this particular insight explicitly 
speaks of colonial development as a function of (evolving) socio-political and 
economic interests underpinned by varied concentrations of political power, it is 
hardly acknowledged as such. Secondly, growing discontent with colonial 
administration from within African society more generally led to the germination of 
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African politics which claimed to be able offer a better developmental alternative in 
representing the interests of the indigenous people. Accordingly, when the 
independence wave swept across sub-Saharan Africa, it is understandable that broader 
sub-Saharan African society should have had heightened expectations in terms of their 
developmental goals being met (Posner, 2005). 
Herbst (2000) tracks postcolonial state-building from its colonial roots, especially 
highlighting the ways in which the political elite through the state crystallized power. 
He focuses on the postcolonial state which sought to build the state architecture on 
principles of legitimacy and power, while taking into account the geographical 
contours and magnitudes of African countries as landscapes upon which political 
power was to be transmitted. He argues that the failure to develop adequate (in the 
postcolonial sense) and independent institutions during colonial times reflected the 
“limited ambitions of many colonial states, and the failure to establish empirical 
statehood” (Herbst, 2000: 79). Thus, when the postcolonial state embarked on the 
project of extending the state apparatus, it gave birth to political contradictions which 
favoured, or, more appropriately, were subsumed by, the interests of the political 
leadership. However, he pays little attention to how the state apparatus could be used 
by the political leadership to respond to (differential) distribution of political power 
enmeshed in African societies. Also, he does not address how societal pressure upon 
the state – socio-political and economic interaction – was translated into policy in 
practice. 
One route the political literature on Africa has taken is to understand the African state 
through the lens of African political development. In its post-independence 
conception, African politics is traced from its colonial roots and generally argued to 
have germinated in the first half of the 1940s as a reply to colonial contradictions, 
building momentum upon widespread nationalistic discourses (Allen, 1995). African 
politics is thus argued to have drawn support from across different indigenous societal 
groups. For example, on the one hand, radical politicians, though members of the 
African elite, sent a strong message of rapid decolonisation and indigenisation through 
drastic means, including riots, strikes and boycotts, relying for support upon hitherto 
subordinate groups such as women, trade unionists and labour migrants (Allen, 1995: 
303). On the other hand, a conservative stream of African politics, made up mainly of 
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African elites who represented their own interests, was ready to bargain, or 
collaborate, with erstwhile colonialists in the process of shifting and indigenising 
(political) power.  
For Allen (1995: 303-305), clientelist politics in Africa can be tracked from the first 
half of the 1950s when mass nationalism and rise of African politics combined with 
decolonisation strategies employed by imperial powers (e.g. Britain and France). 
Although initially devoted to gradual transfer and indigenisation of power, the 
imperial powers were hastened by strategies of the radicals who turned to all sorts of 
disruptive mechanisms. Consequently, as rapid decolonisation was placed on the 
agenda, local politicians were forced, within a short time, to mobilise and galvanise 
support across their societies. Subsequently, African politics was conceived in a very 
narrow sense: as establishment of political parties and processes of gaining electoral 
appeal. This led African politicians to adopt and merge binary strategies: populist-
based politics which favoured those people who already had substantial backing, 
while using clientelism as a strategy to glue the political leadership to their bases of 
local support. Power differentials translated into material and ideological differences, 
such that political alignment was now seen as a practical route to escape material 
disadvantages. In this line of thinking, resource allocation was to be conditioned by 
clientelistic relations. In the context of Africa, clientelism was argued to have 
accelerated and given birth to new forms of corruption, so much so that “[f]or those 
within the clientelist networks, loyalty to the party or its leaders was rewarded by 
access to valued resources” (Allen, 1995: 304). 
Although Allen goes to some length to explain how clientelism, in its colonial roots, 
undermined creation and establishment of institutions to design and monitor resource 
allocation, he does not explain why clientelism should necessarily have channelled 
resources to unproductive groups or individuals. For example, Allen argues that the 
creation of the one-party state in Zambia after 1970, with centralisation of power in 
the presidency, was an outcome of the overthrow of the hitherto colonially-imposed 
political system. The reformed and indigenised political system in Zambia after 1970 
meant that clientelism would thrive in an environment where multi-party democratic 
principles were suppressed. This, however, leaves unexplained why channels of 
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resource distribution should have blocked broad-based development except to retreat 
to narrow and homogenised notions of corruption as anti-developmental. 
Bayart's (2009) analysis of the state of postcolonial African politics emphasises the 
role of dependency in conditioning African politics. He builds his argument on the 
premise that power to control resources is concentrated in the hands of what he calls 
leading actors in African societies. These individuals wish to wield greater control and 
autonomy of power but use “strategies of extraversion” to command the allocation, 
distribution and utilisation of resources obtained from dependence upon an external 
environment.32 Subsequently, the external environment is seen as a resource which 
significantly influences internal political processes and capital accumulation. 
Dependence upon the external environment is understood as reflecting a particular 
configuration and alliance of interests – between foreign and a fraction of domestic 
interests. This, however, does not explain why leading actors do not see indigenous 
capital accumulation as a viable and likely best option for resource extraction if 
appropriately nurtured. Nevertheless, although Bayart agrees that the world economy, 
including Africa’s place within it, can be understood as a system, structural factors 
cannot be the only decisive factors influencing national capital accumulation as 
propagated by Immanuel Wallerstein and Andre Gunder Frank. In addition, Bayart 
contends that “social relations of production – not to mention the various cultural 
practices associated with them – are essentially related to local circumstances” 
(Bayart: xiv).33 If this insight is to be taken seriously, one must admit therefore that 
local circumstances influence the form, direction and pace of capital accumulation. 
Beginning from a premise of dependency, Bayart explains the behaviour of the state 
in Africa as a reflection of the strategy of extraversion, whereby the state is involved 
in “the creation and the capture of rent generated by dependency” (Bayart, 2009: xvii). 
But labelling capital accumulation as a function of dependency subsumes the various 
forms of dependency which must be examined closely in order to determine the degree 
by which accumulation can promote a broad-based and integrated structure of 
                                                 
32 Strategies of extraversion as are seen by Allen as clientelism. 
33 Local circumstances can be read as exact conditions under which socioeconomic interactions took 
place. For example, and particularly for Zambia, absence of local capacity and skills may have 
decisively determined what type of capital to procure and how to use it, and in much of a similar 
way this feature may have imprinted the design and execution of economic policies. 
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production. Bayart does not address why Africa developed under the model of 
dependency, nor does he unpack the particular form of dependency which explained 
Africa’s relations with the rest of the world. Bayart’s main conclusion is to label 
African politics as one plagued by politics of the belly whereby individuals gain 
political mileage via dysfunctional allocation of public resources and rights. He does 
not, however, explain how and why resource allocation should have followed a pattern 
which undermined structural transformation. It is precisely the nature of the 
interactions of the socio-political and economic interests which governed how 
resources were distributed that needs to be addressed. 
Another way in which African state literature has progressed is to examine state 
failure, particularly as an agent for development (Bates, 2008). State building and 
indigenisation of power following the breakdown of colonialism in Africa is 
notoriously understood within the context of sharing the spoils derived from 
independence. Bates (2008: 37), for example, argues that “independence represented 
the capture of the state by local political elites who then used power to accumulate 
wealth.” Narrow politics in Africa thus followed a pattern of resource distribution 
whereby the state architecture was used to attend to immediate benefits of both the 
politicians and their voters, and because “[t]he ambitions of the elites was equalled by 
the aspirations of the electorate … constituents viewed politicians as their agents 
whose job it was to bring material benefits to the local community – jobs, loans, or 
cash” (Bates, 2008: 38). To the extent that votes were traded for tangible benefits, this 
is seen as divorcing African politics from designing and implementing coordinated 
and broad-based development projects programmes, and policies. Instead, capital 
accumulation through the state answered to socio-political dynamics underpinned by 
differential distribution of rights and resources in response to differential distribution 
of political power. 
Bates launches his analysis by pointing out the dilemma faced by political leaderships 
in countering colonialism: on the one hand, African political leadership gained support 
by recourse to narrow political discourse which condemned colonialism as the primary 
cause of underdevelopment and impoverishment of indigenous people. On the other 
hand, independence itself was not mainly seen as a new beginning towards 
developmentalism championed by indigenous interests but rather no less than an end 
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in itself. Independence, it was often thought, would bequeath upon the indigenous 
people the honeypot from which they were hitherto excluded from partaking.34 How 
the honeypot would be sustained without the ‘bees’ was left out of the political 
discourse. 
What this political discourse created was a crisis of expectations which placed 
political power in the hands of the hitherto ‘forgotten’ groups. Those who championed 
the independence struggles proclaimed a political agenda which saw independence 
precisely as an end goal, while those who supported this cause did so on the 
understanding that independence would end their economic miseries. The indigenous 
political class, once endowed with power to run the affairs of the state, used and 
distributed public rights and resources to meet these expectations as a way to 
legitimise their positions in the political arena and wider society. For example, in Cote 
d’Ivoire, groups from rural areas who had vehemently supported the independence 
struggle found themselves enjoying the fruits of independence as “[s]ome had been 
appointed to the boards of state-owned corporations … [other] received prized plots 
of land in the low-density townships, where they built homes, and in the high-density 
areas where they constructed new enterprises” (Bates, 2008: 34-35). This experience 
is shared in many African states, including Zambia and Nigeria where “independence 
represented the capture of the state by local political elites who then used power to 
accumulate wealth” (Bates, 2008: 37). It entrenched a kind of developmental 
trajectory whereby the state, though at the centre of development, was used both as a 
resource and the means to enrich those who aligned themselves with the political 
leadership.  
Although Bates’ narrative does highlight the specific ways and strategies the political 
elite employed through the state to amass wealth, it does not address adequately why 
                                                 
34 Speaking at the Independence for Northern Rhodesia Conference (The Northern Rhodesia 
Constitutional Conference) held in London on 5 May 1964 which sought to settle the final details of 
the country’s transition from being the British Colony of Northern Rhodesia to full independence as 
Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia’s first president, remarked as follows:  
“When we embarked upon this struggle for independence many years ago ... We realised that 
the struggle might be long, it might be arduous and would often result in personal 
inconvenience, but we know so well, Mr Chairman, that anyone who looks for honey in the bush 
must expect the bee stings. We have been stung in the past, but we feel that the reward of the 
honey is now ours to share amongst our own people”  
Available at: http://www.itnsource.com/shotlist//ITN/1964/05/05/T05056404/?s=rhodesia 
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their activities should have failed to launch structural transformation, particularly of 
the East Asian type. Part of the reason he fails to provide such insights is because he 
overstates the degree and scale of influence differential fractions of political support 
had on the developmental trajectory. For example, he argues that political discourse 
was a game in which the incumbent and the challenger competed for votes by 
distributing a fixed stock of capital and rights. On offer to the voters by the politicians, 
therefore, were existing resources to be distributed in order to secure votes. One of the 
flaws of these schema is to view material benefits as flowing from a fixed stock of 
existing concentrations of capital. Thus, it does not address the specific form of, and 
factors behind, post-independence capital accumulation. Capital accumulation itself 
results from distribution of rights and resources, but also underpins fractions of 
interests which then establish and safeguard themselves upon it. Therefore, to argue 
that rights and resources are distributed from a fixed stock of capital is to narrow the 
complexity of interaction of interests, not least how those interests emerge and evolve. 
As for the example of Zambia, Bates (2008: 41) argued that its then ruling Party, 
UNIP, heralded a slogan, “it pays to belong to UNIP,” which sent a message that 
material benefits would flow to those who attached their support to UNIP. Bates’ 
exposition is plagued with analytical contradiction when he contends that the 
opposition stronghold was repeatedly visited by the instruments of the ruling Party to 
supply material benefits. If it were true that “[b]y refurbishing schools, grading roads, 
and distributing public monies through local development agencies, the government 
vigorously bid for votes from the heartland of the opposition”, as Bates (2008: 41) 
claims, then the heartland of the opposition should have received disproportionately 
higher benefits. Bates runs into further problems when he professes that “a well-
surfaced road, a railway, and an oil pipeline through Northern Province to the coast” 
built by the government resulted from the fact that “politicians from the Northern 
Province dominated the Central Committee [of UNIP]” (Bates, 2008: 41). Insights 
from Zambia’s development plans and understanding of Zambia’s geopolitical 
contradictions as detailed in Chapters Five and Six explain this developmental 
trajectory as a function of a multiplicity of factors, not least the mediation of external 
influences through domestic socio-political and economic interests. That is, it is not 
merely an outcome of political dynamics alone, but a response through the political 
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process and existing domestic conditions to external pressures of the time and, in 
particular, the impact of UDI. 
When political competition was brought to an end due to what appeared to be the 
natural outcome of the political dilemma politicians faced, one-party systems were 
instituted. The political game changed as political leaders, particularly the head of 
state, became more authoritarian. The arena for political competition shifted, from 
inter-party contests to intra-party competition. From an economic point of view, 
resource distribution within a single-party polity meant that incumbents could now 
distribute resources in a narrow way. The numerical superiority of citizens bore no 
influence on resource distribution as the centre of political power shifted to a narrow 
constituency of supporters within the Party, especially those who could reap direct 
benefits from manning the state architecture. 
Spoils politics, patron-client networks and neopatrimonialism are concepts used to 
explain the characteristic features of Afro-politics. Mkandawire (2015) is critical of 
the use of neopatrimonialism as a concept to explain the poor performance of African 
economies. He argues that neopatrimonialism as a universalistic notion is incapable 
of shedding light on governance in Africa as it is bereft of analytical content and 
specificity. Although “neopatrimonalism can be used to describe different styles of 
exercising authority, idiosyncratic mannerisms of certain individual leaders, and 
social practices within states,” it lacks “predictive value with respect to economic 
policy and performance” (Mkandawire, 2015: 564). In other words, identifying a 
system of governance as neopatrimonial does not provide any information or 
substance on what factors are responsible for explaining a given economic 
developmental outcome or trajectory. Mkandawire’s (2015: 572-573) critical 
reflections compel him to examine how what he terms the neopatrimonial school has 
attempted to offer explanations for causes of economic growth and structural change 
via the lens of main factors argued to impact upon growth: “fiscal policy, industrial 
strategies, macroeconomic policies, political stability, savings, and technical 
progress.”  
For governance issues, for example, as the focus is on state-society relations, 
Mkandawire’s indelible insights reveal that so loose and vacuous is the idea of 
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neopatrimonialism that its explanatory net covers a state both submerged in society 
and insulated from it. On the one hand, neopatromonialism is offered to explain how 
societal interests can capture the state in a developmentally dysfunctional way, while, 
on the other hand, the same concept is seen to provide insights into how development 
is undermined by a state which, delinked from society, squanders limited public funds. 
In Africa’s structural transformation effort, while it is generally agreed that industrial 
development is paramount, scepticism about the continent’s ability to adopt sound 
industrial policy rest on its sociocultural and political economy attributes 
(Mkandawire, 2015: 585). Postcolonial industrial policy focusing on import 
substitution industrialisation is argued by the public choice school to have failed 
largely on account of rent seeking. On the contrary, Mkandawire (2015) exposes the 
weaknesses of this scholarship by, firstly, pointing out that the public choice school 
fails to show that rent-seeking public officials designed and implemented industrial 
policy, and, secondly, “[b]eneficiaries of industrialization were not the source of the 
policies, but the product of the industrialization.” If this insight is to be profitable to 
the central theme of this thesis, it is worth building upon. First, the interests behind 
the designing of industrial policy do not always and everywhere converge with those 
benefiting from the resultant accumulation. What is clear, however, is that once a 
given fraction of capital has emerged, it hosts interests which in turn protect their 
affairs around it, whether developmentally or not. While it is possible that these 
interests in collaboration with the interests responsible for designing public policy 
could have influenced the direction and nature of accumulation, what matters for 
structural transformation is whether the emerging form of capital accumulation is 
sufficient to promote an integrated structure and pattern of production. 
Callaghy (1984) has argued that political contradictions through the state architecture 
have influenced how much foreign exchange has been earned and saved, particularly 
via installation of import controls and foreign exchange licensing, and also how 
foreign exchange has been distributed amongst competing interests. His conclusion, 
however, is to show that these policy measures are merely the cogs which enable the 
neopatrimonial wheel to move. Subsequently, such analysis is meant to suggest that 
episodes of high commodity prices, which increase foreign exchange earnings, are 
followed by unproductive allocation of resources via neopatrimonialism to the 
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detriment of productive investment and output. Mkandawire (2015) dismisses this 
view on empirical grounds, instead suggesting that commodity price booms in the 
immediate post-independence epoch in Africa were associated with substantial 
productive investment, in education and infrastructure for example, and output 
growth. Ironically, Callaghy’s view offers evidence that an effective state is able to 
influence not just the acquisition of foreign exchange but its allocation as well. This 
is consistent with the role the state played in the East Asian developmental states. 
Nevertheless, a more fruitful avenue to explore would be to question the particular 
configuration and forms of capital accumulation, rather than suggesting that the state’s 
role was dysfunctional because of neopatrimonialism. 
deGrassi (2008: 122) warns “that analysts need to avoid a priori assumptions about 
the existence of neopatrimonialism and hasty invocations of the phenomenon to 
explain … development policy outcomes without thorough documentation of the 
precise forms, characters, origins, trans formations, contestations, extent, and other 
important features of neopatrimonialism.” In addition, against the understanding that 
neopatrimonialism is heterogeneous both in cause and effect, it would be worth 
exploring how varying historical trajectories impact upon a particular configuration 
and form of neopatrimonialism. Lacking in empirical rigour, analyses which take 
neopatrimonialism as given have been accused of often being driven by “strong 
preconceptions and prejudices about African politics that are unlikely to be dispelled 
by a more accurate measurement of the phenomenon in question” (Mkandawire, 2015: 
601). 
As structural transformation in its loose sense can be seen through industrialisation, it 
is worth highlighting the reading of the literature on why African developmentalism 
is bereft of sound industrial policy. Chang (2013) notes that central to much of the 
literature which is pessimistic of Africa’s ability to implement sound industrial policy 
is the notion that pervasively parasitic politics, and associated contradictions, rule out 
industrialisation through industrial policy. In other words, as the leading view 
suggests, Africa’s political economy is incapable of permitting effective 
implementation of industrial policy. According to Chang (2013), Africa’s political 
economy contradictions which are perceived to preclude Africa’s competence to 
implement sound industrial policy can be seen from no less than three vantage points: 
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firstly, at the level of the political leadership; secondly, at the level of the bureaucratic 
officials manning the state architecture; and, thirdly, at the level of wider society. At 
the level of the political leadership, it is often argued that leaders’ greed causes them 
to pillage the economy and strip its assets. While this observation may be true of some 
post-colonial African leaders, the great diversity in both leaderships and personalities 
suggests that this is often an outlier rather than a rule.  
For Chang (2013), a particular vision a leader holds has a decisive bearing on a 
nation’s developmental trajectory, and sometimes, when industrial policy failed, it is 
because the leader’s vision was ‘wrong’. Yet, when a leader’s vision appears to be the 
right one, the ideas of those holding office in the state architecture may be different. 
Accordingly, the collision of visions between the political leadership and policy 
implementers, in addition to numerous other factors such as administrative difficulties 
and coordination deficiencies, are seen to impede effective design and application of 
sound industrial policy. Although a consensus may generally exist between the 
political leadership and the bureaucratic officials, society more generally has to be 
brought on board on the developmental and policy path of the nation. Thus, 
galvanising and patterning interests of society through the state for purposes of 
development has often been seen as an impossible endeavour in Africa. Drawing on 
Mkandawire (2012; 2015), Chang (2013) has confronted this notion and argued that 
it not only lacks adequate empirical support but also has at one time or another 
pervaded virtually every society in history, including the advanced nations. 
Accordingly, it is a matter of exploring evidence rooted in historicity to determine 
what comes first: good governance before development, or vice versa. Khan (1998: 
15) has suggested that during infancy in capitalist development, corruption is 
widespread mainly because “capitalists enjoy low legitimacy and states face excess 
demand for the rights and resources they allocate.” Nevertheless, based on the 
experiences of some Asian countries, the consequences of corruption for development 
have been varied (Khan, 1998a, 1998b, 1996). 
Khan (1998) argues that developmental outcomes underpinned by corruption are 
explained by varying degrees of political power accommodated in groups which 
compete for resources through the state. Patron-client networks are seen through the 
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examination of the interaction of the state with competing groups across society. 
Diversity of the nature of patron-client networks point to variation in the distribution 
of political power, which in turn influence the outcomes of corrupt transactions. The 
underlying presumption of Khan’s argument is that low growth was a consequence of 
“wealth [being] transferred [particularly through corruption] to relatively 
unproductive groups” (Khan, 1998: 16). Carrying this argument further, it seems 
indisputable that if a society is composed of many unproductive groups relative to 
productive ones, the likelihood of low growth is higher, especially if plagued by 
corruption. Taking this insight further, for Zambia, the indigenisation programme 
adopted by the government, whatever its motivation, allowed the state to channel 
resources more decisively to indigenous people, but this failed to take into account the 
configuration and composition of competences and capacities of indigenous interests. 
In comparison to foreign interests, independence (and subsequent political and 
economic policies) gave indigenous interests greater political power. Indigenous 
interests were not at all homogenous, although they generally shared the common 
feature of being non-capitalist in orientation, especially up to the height of Zambia’s 
post-Independence industrial development in the early 1970s. Resources through the 
state, whether by means of corruption or otherwise, were largely captured by 
unproductive groups (incompetent non-capitalist classes). 
To conclude, independence across the (African) continent placed political power in 
the hands of the political leadership, but it also gave voice to the hitherto silenced 
(indigenous) classes divided by geography, ethnicity and other social complexes. 
Inheriting the colonial state architecture, the new postcolonial African state sought 
ways in which to transform the state apparatus to make it useful for wide-ranging 
development, but this was to be pursued simultaneously with delivery of development 
to (socially and economically) fragmented interests across the African polity. The 
urgency of delivering development meant that existing institutions and concentrations 
of capital were to be relied upon, yet development underpinned by structural 
transformation begged a radical departure from policy and implementation as hitherto 
exercised. In giving voice to the hitherto suppressed (indigenous) classes, 
independence fashioned socio-political and economic interests in such a way that they 
influenced decisively how resources were to be distributed. In part, this also 
demonstrates that postcolonial politics was a response to differential power across 
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classes which reflected a particular configuration of socio-political and economic 
interests. In fact, seen through the prism of the linkage-agency approach, corruption 
through patron-client networks, neopatrimonialism, or clientelism, is merely a type of 
linkage which connects different agents to a particular form of capital accumulation. 
As a linkage, corruption, though unethical and undesirable, may bring to bear or 
promote fractions of capital through the agency of interests manning the state 
architecture and those responsible for capital accumulation. Accordingly, one must 
investigate the configuration of interests enmeshed in corruption, and how their 
interactions within existing conditions preclude broad-based development, or not. 
Thus, analysis must uncover the vested interests behind the relations of socio-political 
and economic interests in order to determine how resources were distributed and 
utilised. This calls for examining the political context under which decisions were 
made, and which economic policies were chosen, and who stood to benefit from them. 
If political power favours the productive classes, as Khan argues for the South Korean 
case, the characteristic features of Afro-politics cannot be argued to undermine 
development. Indeed, if broad-based development is underpinned by productive 
classes, building and/or enhancing a nation’s productive capacity more widely can 
increase the likelihood that resources will be placed in the hands of productive groups, 
irrespective of the character of Afro-politics.
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5 The Political Economy of Development Planning and Structural 
Transformation in the 1960s 
5.1 Introduction and background 
With Independence, Zambia needed to reconstruct the state and its policies. As Sindab 
(1984: 96) observed, “[t]o many Zambians, independence meant putting an end to 
white domination and opening up important positions throughout the society to 
Zambians, who would take charge and control their own institutions.” Yet, in doing 
so, development policy in principle and practice, both created and reflected new and 
old economic, political and ideological interests. These had profound effects on 
formulation, implementation and impact of policies in ways that varied across time, 
place and issue. Independence was political but, because Zambia’s economy relied 
upon foreign capital and labour, development policy was fashioned to promote 
economic independence. However, economic independence was conditioned by the 
nature of pre-Independence developmentalism which bound Zambia to the South for 
its own economic prosperity. Initially, and specifically within the context of 
geopolitical tensions with the white South, post-Independence developmentalism 
focused largely on cutting ties with the South. Frustrated by its own lack of technical 
and professional skills, although possessing adequate financial resources (within a 
developing country context) from copper mining wealth, Zambia had to rely on 
external assistance by hiring expatriates to support its own development. This helps 
to explain why policy documents were designed the way they were, and to what extent 
they were realised in principle and practice.  
Post-colonial African literature captured much thinking regarding the nature of post-
Independence developmentalism, frustrated by the colonial hangover (Ghai, 1973). 
On the one hand, colonialism shaped the kinds of institutions the postcolonial state 
inherited but also the initial distribution of political power upon which post-
independence leaderships championed their struggles for independence. Thus, the 
political power base upon which the democratically elected leaders drew support 
combined with, on the other hand, a vacuum of indigenous capitalists, skills and 
competences. This meant that if resource distribution answered to the pattern and 
distribution of political power (as Khan (2009, 1998b, 1998a, 1996) argued for South 
159 
 
and East Asia), then there was a higher likelihood that resources would be placed in 
the hands of unproductive groups. Lacking local capitalists and human resource 
capacity, Zambia found itself economically dependent “on foreign decision-making, 
and upon foreign resources,” which, in a fundamental way, “stunted development of 
indigenous institutions” (van Arkadie, 1973: 88). Also, it meant that the resources 
upon which indigenous interests would seek to establish themselves were likely 
inclined, if not doomed, to be unproductive. Examining the political context which 
framed development planning demonstrates a failure of the state to employ East Asia 
type industrial policy because the distribution of power favoured a particular set of 
socio-political and economic interests which were largely unproductive but consumed 
large portions of investible surplus.   
Propped by Zambia’s own understanding of development through import-substitution 
industrialisation policies within the context of geopolitical tension with the South, this 
meant erecting local industries and supporting infrastructure to diminish dependence 
upon the South. Mediated through domestic political processes, this had profound 
influences upon the direction of accumulation and establishment of (local) socio-
political and economic interests which, in practice, diminished the capacity to create 
an integrated structure of production.  
Conceptually, the group of people in charge of post-Independence Zambia’s 
developmentalism have been variously characterised. For example, Libby (1983) sees 
this group as the dominant class, while Burdette (1988) regards them as the governing 
class, with Sindab (1984: 87) viewing them as the quasi-state bureaucracy. Without 
being bogged down by conceptual debates, I will loosely and interchangeably refer to 
this group of people as the dominant, governing or ruling class. In practice, this group 
was not composed of homogenous elements; it had, at the apex, the President, with 
far-reaching and wide-ranging arbitrary powers, and then, below him, top Party and 
government officials, managing the affairs of the state architecture, specifically line 
ministries and parastatals. This group defined the national interest, or, more 
appropriately, the national interest was defined in terms of the interests of this group 
of people, and influences upon it. Nevertheless, in practice, this group of people 
collectively and in alliance with wider societal interests working through them 
conditioned the direction and pace of accumulation. 
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Having gained Independence in 1964 on 24 October, President Kaunda, reflecting 
continuities of the colonial developmental model, envisaged developmentalism led by 
private sector and foreign investment . The new black African government utilised 
revenues from buoyant copper prices and subsequent economic growth to distribute 
resources in a manner that partially reflected discontinuities from the colonial 
developmental model. That is, the government recognised the duality of the Zambian 
economy in terms of a small but advanced modern sector contrasted with a large 
expanse of rural areas far removed from any meaningful development yet 
accommodating about half the Zambian population. Thus, a substantial portion of 
public revenue was envisioned to be spent on social services and infrastructural 
developments on segments of the population and regions of the country that received 
least attention during the colonial rule. For some commentators, such expenditure 
patterns reflected the interests of the political leadership who, immediately after 
Independence, had a weak economic and political base (Sindab, 1984; Szeftel, 1982).  
In the beginning, the new black government also imagined that foreign investment 
and private sector would be the instrument to expand and deepen the pace and 
direction of development of productive economic activities. Not only was this initially 
seen as important in crafting a high growth developmental model, but also as a 
mechanism to enable the government to “broaden the base of [the] economy thus 
giving more people a chance to participate in it” (Cohn and Port, 1968: 341). In the 
meantime, the colonial legacy ensured that not only was there absence of an 
indigenous capitalist class to support post-Independence development, but that, by 
Independence, there was a chronic deficiency of local/indigenous personnel to staff 
the state structures. Consequently, the post-Independence state was forced to rely on 
foreign staff (or, equivalently, expatriates) to assist in value creation. However, this 
strategy, with additional roots in external scholarship proved to have considerable 
impact on reinforcing the inherited patterns of accumulation, with far-reaching socio-
political and economic consequences. In the end, the development strategy of the state, 
and agents lodged within it, foreign and indigenous, in alliance with capital, ensured 
that accumulation remained restricted and narrow, far removed from creating a more 
integrated and expansive structure of production. 
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Less than half a decade into Independence, disgruntled by the sheer failure of the 
private sector to catalyse growth and development, the President announced in April 
1968 in the so-called Mulungushi speech a series of economic reforms, passionately 
remembered as Mulungushi reforms, that private sector, foreign investment led 
developmentalism had not only failed to produce the redistributive results envisioned 
under self-rule, but had in fact blocked the economic progress of indigenous 
Zambians. Consequently, the Mulungushi reforms were seen as the mechanisms not 
only to broaden the economic base but to indigenise capital and subsequent 
accumulation. The government was to be the main economic agent for development 
through its participation in big business, while indigenous Zambians, bound by 
identification to the country and its progress, would be privileged both in promotion 
of labour and capital. In addition, expatriation of profits was to be limited in order to 
ensure that savings would accumulate and propel further development efforts. 
The Mulungushi reforms were interpreted by many as a reflection of discontinuities 
of the colonial developmental model; they marked a phase which leaned Zambia in 
favour of socialist development policy mainly on grounds of expansion of the state 
sector through ‘parastatalisation’ of capital, while providing consumption and 
production subsidies through the redistributive role of the state (Cohn and Port, 1968). 
However, some authors saw the Zambian economy during the Kaunda era as one led 
by state capitalism rather than pure socialist development, which also left substantial 
space for the private sector, hence qualifying as a mixed economy (Turok, 1989, 
1979a). Whatever the labelling, the Zambian economy at the announcement and 
implementation of the Mulungushi reforms did represent a departure from colonial 
developmentalism, giving the state a broader and more direct role in the economy. It 
will be shown in Chapter Six that ‘parastatalisation’ of capital did not yield the result 
of driving structural transformation, in part, because of the accumulation model of 
takeovers and subsequent expansion and deepening of existing economic strengths. 
But, in this chapter, I will show that immediate post-Independence developmentalism 
remained narrow and restricted because it reflected continuity with the strategy to 
strengthen the copper sector as the core physical capital base of the colonial legacy. 
Chapter Four has explored succinctly colonial development policy which promoted 
the creation and expansion of a copper-complex system of accumulation, underpinned 
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largely by suppression of indigenous African society in favour of white settler 
interests and private capital. Specifically, as Rothchild (1984: 153) also observed, 
“[c]olonial policies also resulted in widened gaps between subregions because of the 
way they skewed the distribution of public resources and opportunities. By 
distributing social amenities (health care, education, roads, and so forth) as well as 
loans, grants, and scholarships unequally between the relatively advantaged and 
relatively disadvantaged, colonial administrators accentuated the imbalances resulting 
from the uneven spread of modernity.” In addition, Chapter Four also argued that 
public administration and subsequent development reflected the interplay of 
competing interests of capital and segmented and racially-based labour through the 
state. This socio-economic complex was reflected in the latter part of Chapter Four 
which discussed, though briefly, the African state in the context of postcolonial 
political economy. It sought to examine in what ways the postcolonial state has been 
understood either as an agent for progress or an obstacle to broad-based development. 
While the developmental states promoted structural transformation, the African state 
literature has argued that policy failure in Africa resulted from the role of the state in 
development. However, this is problematic because it fails to consider the distribution 
of political power across the wider African societies, and why this, rather than the 
state per se, may have hampered structural transformation. If the state is seen as a 
reflection of societal interests, then the state through its policies and programmes also 
reflects the differential distribution of political power of these interests. 
In this chapter, I trace post-Independence development policies within the context of 
development planning, to gain insights on the attitudes concerning development by 
examining the allocation of public resources and, subsequently, the nature of 
development resulting from these patterns of expenditure. But, first, I examine briefly 
the political context under which development planning was exercised. I then move 
on to explore the kinds of projects and programmes which underpinned capital 
accumulation in the post-Independence context under the tutelage of the indigenous 
political leadership. In the next chapter, I will examine in what ways this material base 
was sustained in the 1970s, also through the lens of development planning. The last 
chapter (Chapter Seven) wraps up the broader argument around the system of 
accumulation by pointing out, though briefly and for further inquiry, the institutional 
context and socio-political interests which became entrenched in the physical 
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economic base, and how they interacted or acted to protect themselves (and, by 
implication, a particular configuration of physical capital), subsequently restricting or 
blocking structural transformation. Overall, this thesis sees the system of 
accumulation as the creation and sustenance of a restricted economic base (one which 
precluded structural transformation) by a particular configuration of socio-political 
and economic interests. Thus, this chapter and the next examine how a given 
configuration of physical capital came to exist through the lens of development 
planning, but Chapter Seven will explore how the state’s mediation, or, more 
appropriately, response to, geopolitical and internal contradictions, in alliance with 
wide-ranging socio-political and economic interests, perpetuated the preclusion of 
structural transformation. It will be shown in this chapter, and in the subsequent 
chapters, that the state’s response to geopolitical and domestic contradictions drove 
the Zambian economy into dependence upon a foreign-exchange oriented, and 
therefore, copper-dependent, system of accumulation, which did create accumulation 
outside of copper, but kept the structure of production restricted because it remained 
disturbingly dependent upon the export of copper. 
In questioning in what ways post-Independence development policy promoted 
economic growth underpinned by structural transformation, I note the challenges the 
post-Independence state had to deal with. Following Groth and Wade (1984) and 
insights from Chapter Four, I contend that allocation of public resources cannot be 
separated from the nature of the political system of a given country; thus, public 
resource allocation and distribution of income must be seen as outcomes of political 
economy processes rather than the interplay of purely technical and economic factors 
suggested by the computation of total factor productivity within models which make 
use of the neoclassical production function to explain the distribution of income and 
economic growth.  
I argue that development planning as the instrument for resource allocation aimed at 
promoting growth and balanced development failed to achieve the objective of 
structural transformation partly but crucially because the assumptions upon which it 
was built served to reinforce the inherited (material) system of accumulation rather 
than to alter it. Development planning itself is understood, in part, as reflecting and 
promoting the “value judgements” of the political leadership (Katona, 1982: 12), but 
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also partly as the mechanism of the state to process the demands made upon it 
(Rothchild, 1984). Further, I find that although the economic reforms represented a 
departure in economic management and the role of the state within it, the economic 
base upon which developmentalism was erected, and which played as an arena for 
political discourse and conflict, remained restricted and reliant upon foreign expertise 
and capital in ways which prevented diffusion of spread effects, and germination of 
radical ideas necessary for structural transformation. 
Thus, in this chapter, I give an overview of the pattern of Zambia’s post-Independence 
development, exploring the broad macroeconomic statistical aggregates such as 
composition of GDP, employment, and trade balance to sketch the structure of the 
economy. Gleaning from the First National Development Plan (FNDP), it will be 
shown that resource mobilisation and allocation perpetuated and consolidated an 
urban-biased system of accumulation which was predisposed to prevent, and preclude, 
wide-ranging structural transformation. The system of accumulation itself is 
understood in terms of the processes and institutional mechanisms as an arena for a 
particular configuration of socio-political and economic interests which led to 
lopsided developmentalism. This understanding, and the analytical framework of the 
thesis, has profited from van Arkadie's (1973: 93, own emphasis) instructive 
conceptual framework which suggests that “[t]he economic pattern of dependence, 
which survived the demise of the political system of colonialism, must be understood 
as a system, the various parts of which reinforced each other, the meaning of which 
was not to be understood by isolating one aspect from the whole.” But van Arkadie’s 
conceptual viewpoint leaves to analysts to decide, under unique politico-economic 
circumstances, which aspects of the system are decisive. For Zambia, I argue that the 
system is made up of a particular configuration of socio-political and economic 
interests whose interaction determine the nature, pace and direction of accumulation. 
It is imperative first to understand the kind of physical capital base underpinning the 
Zambian economy, and development planning will help to locate the initial post-
Independence development impulse and forces behind it.  
This section is followed by an examination of the structure of the Zambian economy 
at Independence, before exploring the political climate which governed development 
planning in the immediate post-Independence period. The dominance of copper is 
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immediately apparent, in its contribution to GDP, exports and government revenue. 
The private sector dominated the Zambian economy and was the largest employer at 
Independence. I then move on to trace development planning in the post-colonial era. 
In its infancy, post-colonial development planning was largely informed and 
influenced by external consultants who, just before Independence, carried out a series 
of surveys. Proceeding on the presumption that development plans help to discern the 
attitudes and ideology of the leadership, I find that a strong commitment to even out 
development and growth occupied the minds of the political leadership, yet, in 
examining the FNDP in the subsection which follows, I find that sufficient room must 
be left within the plans for changing circumstances. While the FNDP had anticipated 
a substantial role for the private sector, the threat upon the Zambian economy from 
geopolitical tensions diverted attention and resources, substantially altering the course 
of action taken in implementation. Subsequently, the Zambian state embarked on a 
national project to delink from the South, by redirecting trade routes and installing 
local industries to replace imports, largely done to attain self-sufficiency. Far from 
promoting development through structural transformation, the Zambian government 
installed piecemeal uncoordinated development projects, with limiting scope for an 
integrated structure of production. This pattern of development followed from an 
interplay of a range of factors, among them: a limited and restricted understanding of 
structural transformation as found in the FNDP; a particular form of dependence upon 
foreign labour and capital; and institutional weaknesses to oversee development based 
on structural transformation. 
As part of a system, this reflected a particular configuration of socio-political and 
economic interests. An assessment of the performance of the FNDP is then carried 
out. Fortuitous circumstances in world copper prices explained much of Zambia’s 
growth and development during the FNDP. I then move on to assess select 
developments in select economic activities and sectors, ranging over trade, labour and 
localisation policies, and then mining, manufacturing and, energy and transport. I find 
that developments remained narrow in scope, partly but crucially following from the 
given intellectual understanding of development and structural transformation, 
including, as argued here, from the political context under which development policy 
was designed and applied. This is to show the specific aspects of capital accumulation 
that resulted from the interplay of socio-political and economic interests. 
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In the latter part of Chapter Six, I will give particular attention to the manufacturing 
sector to detail the nature and form of post-Independence industrialisation. I find that 
the manufacturing sector developed by following rather than altering the market since 
much of the industrial development took place in sectors which served the interests of 
the dominant classes. It reflected the transfer of resources and rights to a particular 
configuration of socio-political and economic interests. This feature, combined with 
the existing conditions, in particular the skills and competences of society, served to 
reproduce a kind of industrial development that was bereft of acquisition of higher 
level technologies. 
Both Martin (1972: 41) and Seidman (1974a, 1974b) were optimistic about Zambia’s 
prospects for development given the enormous wealth concentrated in the copper 
mining industry bequeathed upon the post-Independence government. For Martin 
(1972: 41), the centrality of copper to Zambia’s developmentalism was seen by the 
extent to which it generated incomes, foreign exchange and government revenue. 
Sadly, the “financial shortages (of domestic savings for investment and of foreign 
currency to pay for the imports needed by investment) which had crippled so many 
development programmes in newly independent countries or restricted them to modest 
scope” (Martin, 1972: 41), that had been absent in the Zambian economy immediately 
after its Independence, became a factor of increasing concern only about a decade 
after Independence. For Zambia, these shortages in finance for development after the 
mid-1970s led to an economic crisis which lasted many more decades. I argue that the 
inability of the Zambian state to use copper resources to bring structural change to 
bear is precisely because of the failure to escape the colonial inheritance that 
privileged interests of socioeconomic and political institutions fashioned to 
concentrate economic activity around the copper industry. The way in which the post-
Independence system of accumulation proceeded deepened economic activity and 
dependence upon copper mining rather than taking a form that would spread economic 




5.2 The Situation in the year of Independence, 1964 
By Independence, the Zambian economy had a sophisticated mining sector, and a 
small industrial sector mainly catering to the needs of the mining sector and urban 
population. The dominance of the mining sector over manufacturing is immediately 
apparent. Mining accounted for over half of the GDP, while manufacturing only 6 
percent. Agriculture, as discussed in Chapter Four, was extremely underdeveloped 
during colonial rule, accounting for only 4.2 percent of GDP (See Table 5-1 Gross 
Domestic Product, 1964 (£'m), below). 
Table 5-1 Gross Domestic Product, 1964 (£'m) 
 
1964 % of GDP 
(i) INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN: 
  
(a) Agriculture 9.1 4.2 
(b) Mining  118.8 54.4 
( c) Manufacturing 13.1 6.0 
(d) Construction 10.2 4.7 
( e) Commerce 22.5 10.3 
(f) Transport 10.3 4.7 
(g) Services 34.5 15.8 
Total 218.5 100.0 
Source: FNDP, Table II, p6 
For the manufacturing sector, Food, Beverages and Tobacco combined to account for 
over half of the sector’s Gross Output. This suggests the lopsided development of 
industrialisation in favour of these subsectors. However, it worth recognising, as 
Chapter Four hinted, the engineering subsectors of the manufacturing sector were 
developed to cater to the world-class copper mining sector, which may help explain 
why metal and machinery accounted for a substantial proportion of about 18 percent 
and 24 percent of manufacturing gross output and value added, respectively (See 













% of total 
VA 
Mining and quarrying 154.4 100.0 118.8 100 
Manufacturing 33.8 100.0 13.1 100.0 
Food 11.6 34.3 2.1 16.0 
Beverages and Tobacco 6.2 18.3 2.8 21.4 
Textiles and Clothing 1.6 4.7 0.6 4.6 
Wood and Furniture 2.3 6.8 1.0 7.6 
Paper and Printing 1.3 3.8 0.7 5.3 
Rubber and Chemicals 1.5 4.4 0.7 5.3 
Non-metallic Minerals 3.2 9.5 1.8 13.7 
Metal and Machinery 5.9 17.5 3.2 24.4 
Other 0.2 0.6 0.2 1.5 
Construction 25.6 100.0 10.2 100.0 
Electricity and Water 10.6 100.0 3.4 100.0 
Source: FNDP, Table IV, p6 
Productive imports were biased in favour of investment/capital goods, especially for 
the mining sector given the nature and form of pre-Independence Zambian 
development. ‘Raw Materials and Semi-finished Products’ accounted for almost a 
quarter of all imports while ‘Plant and Machinery, Transport Equipment’ appropriated 
13.4 percent of total foreign exchange demand (See Table 5-3 Imports and exports, 
1964, below). This must be kept in mind as part of the material/economic base of the 
inherited system of accumulation. 
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Table 5-3 Imports and exports, 1964 
Imports (c.i.f.) (£'m), 1964 Exports (£'m) 
 
1964 % of 
Total 
 
1964 % of 
Total 
Animal, Vegetable Food 
Products: 
 I. Animal and 
Fisheries 
0.4             
0.2  
Unprocessed             
1.0  




3.1             
1.8  
Processed             
4.0  
            
2.9  
III. Minerals 162.1           
92.2  
Energy             
4.8  
            
3.5  
IV. Others 8.3             
4.7  
Raw Materials and Semi-
finished products 
          
33.3  
          
24.3  
V. Tourism 1.9             
1.1  
Plant and Machinery, Transport 
Equipment 
          
18.4  




175.8         
100.0  
Textiles and Leather           
10.8  
            
7.9  
 
Other Goods           
10.5  
            
7.7  
Services           
22.4  
          
16.4  
Transfers Abroad           
31.8  
          
23.2  
Total Foreign Exchange 
Demand 
        
137.0  
        
100.0  
Source: FNDP, extracts from Tables VII and VIII, p7 
To afford these imports, copper exports were indispensable, accounting for about 92 
percent of total foreign exchange supply. This suggests the dependence of imports (for 
all sectors) on exports of copper. However, because imports themselves, especially of 
investment goods, were important to promote and sustain mineral development, it can 
be argued that copper exports were crucial for the mineral development as well as 
continued supply of imports. It is thus not difficult to speculate that (profitable) copper 
mining would be conditional on importation of crucial capital goods for the mining 
sector. In other words, a virtuous circle of imports-exports was crucial for the 
sustenance of the existing system of accumulation. 
The private sector bias of the Zambian economy in the year of Independence can also 
be seen in the composition of salaried employment by type of employer and also by 
source for capital investment. More than 81 percent of salaried employment was 
accounted for by the private sector, with the remainder taken up by the public sector. 
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Table 5-4 Salaried Employment ('000), 1964 
 
Numbers ('000) % of Total 
Salaried Employment  
  
Public Sector 50 18.6 
Private Sector 218.7 81.4 
Total 268.7 100 
Source: FNDP, Table IX, p7 
Whereas during the years of the Federation, the private sector accounted for 57.7 
percent of total capital investment, in the year of Independence, that share had risen 
to 65.6 percent. This evidences the substantial role the private sector played in 
Zambia’s development. 
Table 5-5 Total Capital Investment, 1954-1964 
 
1954-1964  1964 
 
£'m % £'m % 
Public Sector 180.4 42.3 13.2 34.6 
Private sector 245.7 57.7 24.9 65.4 
Total 426.1 100.0 38.1 100.0 
Source: FNDP, Table II, p12 
In fact, institutional weaknesses in the post-Independence era were not merely seen in 
terms of organisational structure of the state, but also in terms of the colonial legacy 
which ensured that Zambian skills had by Independence not developed to sufficient 
scale and magnitude. “[S]igns of overstrain in the administration,” argued Hall (1969: 
118-119), were being felt around the time of Independence when “more than half of 
the colonial civil servants had taken pensions and departed in 1964,” such that, “[o]f 
2,500 graduate posts in the civil service at independence only 200 were filled by 
Africans — many of them non-Zambians; 7,000 jobs calling for school certificate, 
more than 6,000 were being done by whites.” 
To summarise, in general, the inherited structure of production was such that the 
Zambian economy was dominated by copper mining which also supported 
employment and development elsewhere. Colonial development also ensured and 
promoted a crucial role for the private sector which dominated both employment and 
development through capital investment and associated linkages. 
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It is worth spending some time to discuss the nature of dependence of Zambia’s 
economy upon the South, and how geopolitical tensions recalibrated Zambia’s 
understanding both of international relations and developmentalism. Before 
discussing the development plans and developments they brought about, a brief 
discussion is in order of the implication of Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence (UDI) on Zambia’s developmentalism. 
5.3 The immediate post-Independence political history of Zambia 
The underlying theme of this thesis is that structural transformation, or, more broadly, 
development, is underpinned by a particular configuration of socio-political and 
economic interests. If successfully pursued, structural transformation is applied 
through sound economic policy via the agency of competent and skilled interests 
(productive groups). As this thesis has sought to locate the role of the state in the 
interplay of these interests, it is imperative then to examine the Zambian state through 
the polity. In part, this is to explore the political context within which resources were 
created and distributed, and policies were designed and implemented. Indeed, one 
cannot separate Zambia’s economic from its political history. To understand the 
politics, one must also understand the economics, and vice-versa. State-society 
relations in the political and economic spheres must be understood from how the state 
is itself politically constituted, including its political vision, and finally, how political 
structures are designed in a way to influence the process (and direction) of 
accumulation. 
Zambia’s political history is normally divided into three roughly distinct episodes—
The First Republic (1964-1972), The Second Republic (1973-1991), and finally, The 
Third Republic (1991-present) (Larmer, 2016, 2007). These distinctions are based on 
the political system in place, defined in terms of multi-party politics or otherwise. For 
the First Republic, multi-party democracy was at the heart of politics, although 
dominated by the United National Independence Party (UNIP). The Second Republic 
ushered in a one-party participatory democracy, with political candidates selected 
from within UNIP as the only legitimate Party. The Third Republic reflects the re-
introduction of multi-party democracy. 
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Although Zambia is anthropologically reported to have had 73 tribes, on the political 
front, these tribal divisions were immaterial in numerical terms. Instead, many tribes 
identified with and aligned themselves with one regional dominant tribe. Thus, “four 
major languages” became “common languages for different parts of the country: 
Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga and Lozi” (Roberts, 1976: 241). Political classes were largely 
divided along the lines of these tribal affiliations, and that is why the rallying-cry “One 
Zambia One Nation” was used to stitch the nation together, for a common purpose of 
nationalism and development. The location of the copper mines in the ‘Northern part’ 
of the country, and through colonial economics, ensured that over half its workers 
came from the Northern region, predominantly Bemba-speaking. UNIP’s support 
from the Copperbelt was grounded in Bemba-speaking voters, so that “the economic 
heart of the country was dominated by Bemba-speakers from the north-east” Roberts 
(1976: 241). Thus, it emerged that while UNIP was regarded as mainly a ‘Bemba’ 
party, ANC, with a large following from the south, was chiefly thought of as a ‘Tonga’ 
party. 
On the whole, differential distribution of political power along regional and sectoral 
divisions defined the contours and influenced the rules of the political game that the 
Zambian political leadership was forced to play. The party which led Zambia 
successfully to Independence was UNIP, headed by Kenneth Kaunda, who then 
became Zambia’s first President. From 1964 to 1972, Zambia’s polity was adorned 
with multi-party politics, with this period affectionately called Zambia’s First 
Republic. At the time of Independence, UNIP had substantial support across the 
country except in two regions – Southern and Western provinces – which served as 
the opposition’s support centres (Larmer, 2016; Macola, 2010; Bates, 2008). Although 
the UNIP government took control of Zambia at Independence, it was threatened not 
just by strong opposition from African National Congress (ANC), but also by its own 
intra-party divisions which reflected a contest of leadership foresight and ideals within 
the nationalist camp. 
The traditional African literature casts a shadow of doubt on Afro-politics in 
delivering development, condemning it to nothing more than a mask of patron-client 
networks. In this framing, the opposition’s agenda was focused only on taking over 
the state architecture for personal gain through corruption and patronage despite the 
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political rhetoric of economic progress. Macola (2010: 95), however, suggests that 
detailed and careful studies, as with his example of Harry Nkumbula’s biography, 
uncover the folly of reducing post-independence Afro-politics to a model of patron-
client networks which aims only to define public resource distribution in terms of 
patronage. Nkumbula’s political activities through the agency of the ANC presents 
the opposition as an ideological alternative to UNIP. While UNIP had fashioned socio-
political and economic discourses in terms developmentalism spearheaded by a strong 
state, the ANC showcased its ideology in terms of liberal principles.  
Larmer (2016) shows convincingly the fragile beginnings of UNIP at the time of 
Independence, divided along regional and ideological lines. Against the inherited 
structure of production, existing material/economic and social conditions, these 
divisions conditioned not just the political game, but also the design and 
implementation of economic policy. On the political front, the nationalist movement 
during colonial times was not to be understood as a unified force against imperialist 
authority. Rather, one must account for disparate interests in the nationalist movement 
just before Zambia’s Independence. Macola's (2010) seminal work on Central African 
nationalism focuses on Zambia’s towering political opposition figure, Harry 
Mwaanga Nkumbula, whose voice had been hitherto undermined by mainstream 
political histories of Zambia. Nkumbula’s biography, as Macola presents, uncovers 
the fragility of UNIP as well as the regional interests which divorced themselves from 
UNIP in favour of Nkumbula’s party. 
Zambia’s First Republic sought to galvanise interests through the rallying mantra of 
‘One Zambia, One Nation’. As such, traditional political analysis holds that the First 
Republic reflected a period of political unity, with an agenda for economic progress 
(Turok, 1979). Government development projects and large-scale social service 
spending are usually taken as evidence of legitimising the state, attending to the 
expectations of post-Independence wide-ranging interests. Indeed, if this were the 
case, it becomes difficult to see the actual influences which drastically shifted the 
political landscape culminating in a one-party state. Larmer (2006; 2007) has been 
critical of this conventional view, placing the state’s failings to meet popular 
expectations at the centre of the political conflicts and contestations. Despite the 
expansive development spending undertaken by the government (see Sections 5.7 and 
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5.8 below), the state fell short of meeting the expectations of various sections of 
society, resulting in political tensions. One must locate which sections of society were 
included or excluded from development spending undertaken by the state. During 
boom years, development spending was mired by sectional and sectoral biases which 
created political tensions. Gertzel et al. (1984: 7-8), although recognising the tribal 
conflicts in politics, are sceptical over reducing political tension to ‘tribalism’. Rather, 
they view ‘sectionalism’ as a more apposite label capable of explaining the uneven 
development. They argue that the “competition for scarce resources between interests 
… reflected the regional or provincial cleavages … the diversity of interests in Zambia 
beyond those relating simply to the ethnic group, and especially regionalism” (Gertzel 
et al.,1984: 7-8). 
When it became clear to UNIP that the southern and western regions were firmly in 
the hands of the opposition ANC, it was incumbent upon UNIP to make fresh attempts 
to acquire support from these regions. The strategy employed by UNIP was to use 
existing resources not so much to create wealth but to ‘purchase’ loyalty. For example, 
although the Southern Province African Farming Improvement Fund was instituted to 
improve agricultural production and productivity in the region, it was seen as a 
mechanism “to buy influence and support through distribution of spoils” (Larmer, 
2016: 55). In practice, however, funds for this agricultural programme were pocketed 
by national and regional political leaders, revealing the flaws in design, motivation 
and implementation of the programme itself. When it was unearthed that the 
agricultural programme had failed on account of corruption, there were devastating 
political consequences for UNIP’s sought for unity, which eventually catalysed the 
formation of the United Progressive Party (UPP), as an offshoot of UNIP, representing 
a departure of gathering disenchanted interests. In this way, political contradictions 
did influence the way in which resources would be distributed and utilised, not on the 
basis of creating and spreading wealth underpinned by structural transformation, but 
on political expediency. 
Divisions within UNIP were reflected in the way in which top political figures 
behaved within UNIP and, after their departure from the Party, in becoming its 
strongest critics. Their actions sought to undermine the legitimacy of the incumbent 
Party mainly by appealing to hitherto ‘forgotten’ groups and regions. This led the 
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ruling Party to respond through policing and legislation. By January 1966, a prominent 
political figure, Nalumino Mundia, who then served as Minister of Labour, was laid 
off due to revelations that he had involved himself in corrupt practices in the allocation 
of state loans. Meanwhile, in 1966, the Lozi-speaking politicians represented in 
parliament formed a party, United Party (UP), in order more meaningfully to represent 
impoverished Western region, which had particularly come under economic strain 
following UDI. After his July 1966 dismissal from UNIP membership, Mundia went 
on to head the UP which had emerged two years earlier being founded by ex-UNIP 
and ex-ANC members. At first, Mundia, hailing from the western region, attempted 
to convince people from there that UNIP did not serve their interests. By early 1968, 
however, Mundia’s political activities turned to the Copperbelt, which led to violent 
clashes across politically-divided groups, forcing President Kaunda to prohibit UP 
from political activity, while arresting its top leadership including Mundia. Indeed, 
violent clashes between UP and UNIP in 1968, seen as attempts to counter the 
superiority of the Bemba in the Copperbelt, led to six homicides and, consequently, 
UP was outlawed from political participation, eventually forcing its members to align 
with ANC. 
When general elections were held in December 1968, the ANC strategy of 
assimilating ex-UP members paid high dividends, such that ANC increased twofold 
its members of parliament. In addition to its southern and central strongholds, its 
support from the western region skyrocketed. In fact, growing factionalism within 
UNIP jeopardised the broader unity Kaunda had sought across sections of Zambian 
society (Macola, 2010; Larmer, 2007; Gertzel et al., 1984; Martin, 1972). Seen 
through the lenses of unity, legitimation and populism, one can perceive the economic 
reforms – both April 1968 Mulungushi reforms and August 1969 Matero reforms – as 
a wave of new energy meant to galvanise interests and legitimise political leadership 
within the context of a disenchanted population more generally. In short, the reforms 
took place within the context of political contradictions, suggesting that “short-term 
political factors must have influenced the decision” (Martin, 1972: 162). 
Bringing political unity while aiming to meet expectations of different regional 
interest groups led President Kaunda to seek a balanced representation in Cabinet of 
these interests. Thus, in August 1967, the first UNIP central committee elections since 
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Independence were held, with Kaunda emerging uncontested as Party President, while 
virtually all lower ranking posts were being contested. Popularity and regional/tribal 
alliances were the basis upon which delegates were elected. In contesting the position 
of the Vice-Presidency of the Party, regional alliances defined who would be 
victorious: Reuben Kamanga, who had been Vice-President of UNIP even before 
Independence, hailed from the Eastern province, sought to form a pact with all other 
regions except the Northern region from which Simon Kapwepwe, the contender, 
originated. However, Kapwepwe made a strategic association with the Southern 
region and ended up winning the Vice-Presidency of the Party. A similar result is 
reported in lower ranks, but ultimately, the Northern and Southern tribes won the 
majority of seats, and went on to be representatives in Cabinet, with Kapwepwe as 
Vice President responsible for planning and development. The intra-party 
contestations are important as they reflect the strenuous political climate based on 
tribal or regional contradictions under which Kaunda operated and sought to legitimise 
himself. 
Political contradictions, based on meeting popular expectations while seeking 
legitimacy of the Party and the government in the face of party political opposition, 
translated into interference with the running of the state architecture in ways which 
hindered efficient delivery of services. This was the case mainly because the primary 
interests being served, or those absorbing the resources being distributed, lacked the 
requisite skills and competences. For instance, civil service professionalism was 
undermined by the expectations resulting from nationalist movements and the 
practices of the Party and government to attend to these expectations. Employment in 
the civil service was interpreted as a way to reward supporters of the Independence 
movement, whether or not they possessed the qualifications, which they did not in 
most cases. Musakanya, an elite technocrat, “appointed … in April 1965” as “the first 
Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of the Civil Service”, bemoaned the state of affairs 
vis-à-vis political infringement upon what was supposed to be a professional and 
independent civil service (Larmer, 2010: 34). 
Musakanya noted that: 
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“I was not aware that there were a lot of people both in the Civil Service 
and outside who had […] invested in the change and now expected 
reward in terms of positions outside the Civil Service criteria. They in 
fact assumed that at the advent of political change—Independence—they 
were the public interest … Furthermore since at the time an opposition 
party ANC existed the professed impartiality of the Civil Service became 
a sore point to UNIP, who feared that if ANC was not seen by the people 
as vanquished and had no power to give favours, it could reorganize to 
give them a serious challenge at the next elections. Regularly I received 
reports and requests from Ministers that such and such a Civil Servant 
was ANC and must be dismissed or not promoted. Civil service 
regulations could not however entertain such requests” (Larmer, 2010: 
35-36, quoting Musakanya) 
Through such interference, the civil service came to be seen as an instrument of the 
Party, brought under the control of the Party and serving as a benefit to the Party, and, 
by implication, an instrument to weaken political opposition. In serving political 
expediency, the running of the state architecture worked to serve the interests of the 
political leadership. Thus, the political leadership had now to attend to the needs of 
civil servants in order to reinforce their own legitimacy. Nevertheless, the Party itself 
was not a unified force, and, failure of the civil service to reward proportionately the 
Party’s members drew a cleavage between them on ethno-regional lines. For instance:  
“the consequent prominence of Bemba speakers in UNIP led them to 
expect ‘their party to deliver state and parastatal appointments to their 
leaders and themselves, state resources and economic development to 
their communities. However, this was perceived by other UNIP leaders, 
also under pressure to deliver ‘development’ to their areas of origin, as 
a threat to their political survival. Movements such as ‘Unity in the East’ 
were the inevitable result” (Larmer, 2016: 89). 
This demonstrates that while the political contradictions insulated the opposition from 
accessing rewards through jobs, those within the ruling Party were themselves not 
fully attended to given limited resources and jobs. This served to widen the fractures 
within the ruling Party, and to leave susceptible the state apparatus to patronage and 
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corruption as mechanisms to further the interests of those charged with the 
responsibility to design and promote economic policy through the state. 
Moreover, regional conflicts within UNIP, particularly between the Northern and 
Eastern supporters, threatened to tear UNIP apart, with the President responding by 
concentrating more power within the Party, mainstreaming it into the government, or 
more appropriately, submitting the state structures to the ruling Party, particularly 
when “Ministers of State” were appointed “to UNIP’s headquarters in 1969” (Larmer, 
2010: 45). Simon Kapwepwe, the Vice President, and also a well-known Bemba-
speaking leader, complained bitterly of being relegated to the fringes, announcing in 
1969 that he would step down, but only doing so a year later. By 1969, however, 
Bemba power within UNIP had rapidly diminished, particularly when the President 
effectively cut back on numbers of Bemba peoples in Cabinet, while increasingly 
forging stronger bonds with supporters from the East. 
Major economic changes during the fledgling years of Zambia’s Independence have 
been interpreted as functions of political expediency. For example, nationalisation, 
more generally, in its hurried form and flawed design, has been seen as an outcome of 
political engineering rather than carefully designed economic policy aimed at 
restructuring the economy, despite the political rhetoric to this effect. Martin (1972: 
160-162) reports that even before the August 1969 Matero reforms, Zambia faced a 
“real … political crisis” with Kaunda’s popularity showing signs of waning, especially 
in the December 1968 general elections, when he lost the Western and Southern 
regions to Harry Nkumbula of the ANC. The immediate period after the elections saw 
the government’s stance against opposition take a drastic turn, with increasing use of 
state machinery to reward UNIP support and to penalise opposition. About two weeks 
after the 11 August 1969 Matero reforms, Simon Kapwepwe tendered his resignation 
as Vice President. Following these events, Kaunda seemed more resolute, and 
proceeded to dissolve the UNIP central committee, the source of many of the intra-
party conflicts, on the basis that a new Party constitution was being prepared. 
In August 1971, Kapwepwe re-emerged as the leader of the new party, United 
Progressive Party (UPP), fuelled by support from sections of society that felt left out 
during the boom years. Coincidentally, and causally, the growth of UPP was premised 
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on opposition to increasing unemployment, mainly a reflection of reduced investment 
around 1970, but also the practice of politics that elevated patronage and allegiance 
within the ruling Party. While such political practices helped crystallise support for 
the presidency, regions left out grew increasingly disenchanted. In other words, 
growing opposition reflected embitterment with both the kinds of economics and 
politics the state had put in place. 
Ultimately, the formation of the one-party state is seen as the culmination of political 
conflict, a response to growing conflict based on lines of political party affiliation, and 
hence a way to quell dissidence while supposedly forging unity. Reports of repression 
were rife, with UPP supporters indefinitely detained without trial or proper legal 
representation; by the first quarter of 1972, Kapwepwe and his supporters were 
remanded indefinitely. Meanwhile, in February 1972, the one-party state was born, 
having been approved by Parliamentary legislation. Kapwepwe and some of his 
supporters were released in the first quarter of 1973, when the political scene had taken 
on an entirely new shape under a one-party state 
Essentially, the First Republic was not furnished by a particularly unified political 
vision, it was punctuated by opposition and the state’s responses to it. The failure to 
address developmentalism more broadly, and rural development in particular, 
including practices of incessantly mixing politics and economics, rewarding with 
economics those in favour of the ruling Party, created an atmosphere for opposition 
to emerge and thrive. However, in the interest of political survival, although 
rhetorically justified by an economic vision, restraining dissidence through coercive 
means became routine, itself exposing the fragility/weaknesses of the state 
apparatus/institutions and legal framework of governance. When political 
contradictions were mediated through resource distribution, the interests being served 
reflected the broader goal of political survival for the political leadership rather than 
a politically-driven attempt to pursue development underpinned by structural 
transformation. As will be seen below, this concentrated resources in the existing 
pillars of the economy concentrated around the copper sector. 
While opposition political parties had been buried via the one-party state, intra-party 
competition within UNIP was still alive and well. In December 1973, UNIP held its 
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first elections, re-electing Kaunda as the leader, but not unanimously, given that one-
fifth of the total votes were cast against him. But the ruling Party crystallised power 
even further by embedding within the constitution UNIP’s National Executive 
Committee as governing and overseeing national political development. Effectively, 
this removed power from ministries and the Cabinet and placed it under Party control. 
Larmer (2007) explains that Kaunda’s consolidation of power within UNIP, choking 
off opposition by instituting the one-party state politics, was partly deceitfully 
rationalised by Zambia’s geopolitics. Falsely accusing UPP of “receiving military 
support from Zambia’s enemies”, Kaunda outlawed the party (Larmer, 2007: 49). 
Interpreting the 1973 elections and political practices punctuated by repression 
towards the end of the 1970s, Gertzel (1984: 91) argues that UNIP had lost the support 
of mineworkers, its traditional supporters on the Copperbelt, but also lost support of 
the urban labour class. On the Copperbelt alone, numbers of UNIP members declined 
drastically, to a point where local UNIP structures remained vacant. 
In the interest of what was reported as efforts at unification, former opposition 
members, particularly UPP which had covert structures still in place, would be 
persuaded to be mainstreamed into UNIP. Once examined properly, this appeared to 
have been a strategy by UNIP to extinguish completely, although in a civil manner 
rather than coercively, all underground flames of opposition. Musonda Chambeshi, a 
towering UPP supporter and leader, participated and won by-elections held in Roan, 
a mine residence. However, when he openly criticized the government as having 
contributed to the deterioration of living standards due to rising costs of living, he was 
promptly removed from UNIP and parliament on trumped up   charges of suspicion 
to supplant the President. 
By 1978, the President, under growing opposition and increasing potential to be 
unseated, particularly by Kapwepwe, strongly influenced the enshrinement within the 
Constitution of a prohibition clause which prevented presidential contestations. 
Following this development, Kaunda was unopposed in the 1978 elections. Yet this 
did not halt opposition; in fact, it served to make more volatile and less cohesive the 
glue that sought to bind Zambia’s politics together. While most of the 1970s appeared 
to have established a peaceful political system, it was towards the end of the 1970s 
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that a sharp rise in opposition within and outside UNIP emerged which, to the surprise 
of many, culminated in a coup attempt in 1980 (Larmer, 2016). More generally, the 
heightened opposition in the latter half of the 1970s reflected the broader economic 
contradictions Zambia faced which witnessed declining profitability of Zambia’s 
economic heart, the mining sector. These economic problems were widespread across 
many sectors which had developed on the assumption of a thriving copper sector. 
The political history of Zambia demonstrates that differential distribution of power 
reflected regional and ideological divides. The common denominator, however, 
remained the heightened expectations the independence wave had brought across 
different societal groups, and the (narrow) manifestos the nationalist leadership 
promoted. As the latter part of Chapter Four argued, Independence was interpreted 
almost as an end in itself in that indigenous people pinned their hopes for prosperity 
upon it. Behind the support which legitimised the political power of the political 
leadership were expectations from across society. The extent to which these 
expectations were met within a given time-frame determined the distribution, intensity 
and scale of support of the political leadership. “The tensions that tore UNIP apart,” 
argues Larmer (2016: 54), “were not simply based on elite competition for state-based 
spoils; they reflected, at a stage removed, the widespread frustrations amongst 
Zambians regarding the perceived failure of UNIP to address their poverty and 
redistribute wealth.” Subsequently, institution of the one-party state in 1972 was 
aimed at silencing opposition which only served to preserve the head of state while 
intensifying competition at lower levels. The opposition, in aggregate, presented itself 
as a formidable force and alternative platform upon which these frustrations would be 
translated into political support, hence threatening the legitimacy of the incumbent 
political leadership. 
Overall, the political context under which economic decisions were designed and 
applied was largely incongruent with conditions which would have served 
development based upon structural transformation. While, as will be seen below, the 
state did possess and apply the interventionist economic policy instruments of the East 
Asian type, the political context, reflected in a particular of configuration of socio-
political and economic interests, demonstrates that the policy landscape was often 
responsive to political events, undermining the capacity of the state to pursue broad-
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based developmental programmes and policies. Industrial and other developmental 
projects, programmes and policies by type and location answered to political 
contradictions. The nature of political authority was such that political complexes 
influenced more generally not just the direction of accumulation but also who would 
be responsible for it. Thus, given post-Independence expectations, and political 
expediency based upon political legitimacy and survival, this raises questions over 
whether it was politically possible for the Zambian state, within the framework of 
existing conditions, to pursue DSP-type structural change. 
The next section shifts focus to understand the geopolitical influences upon Zambia’s 
system of accumulation within the context of UDI. It aims to show how UDI affected 
the kinds of economic policies Zambia put in place. It must be noted that these 
decisions were made amidst the political contradictions previously mentioned. 
5.4 Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and Zambian 
developmentalism 
When Rhodesia declared a UDI on 11 November 1965, Britain responded by 
mobilising international support to mount sanctions against Rhodesia. However, 
participating in sanctions against Rhodesia was interpreted by the Zambian leadership 
as not in the interest of the Zambian economy. Kaunda preferred military action, but 
Britain was resolved to use the option of political and economic sanctions. The 
particular form of dependence of the Zambian economy upon Rhodesia sheds light on 
why the Zambian leadership did not view sanctions as the best strategy to oust the 
Smith regime.  
The Kariba Dam, which had been developed as a strategic resource for Southern 
Rhodesia during the Federation, was under the firm control of the south. It “supplied 
virtually all the power for Zambia and had its generators on the south bank” (Hall, 
1969: 113). If Rhodesia would have cut off electricity supply to Zambia, virtually all 
of Zambia’s economic activity would have come to a halt. Electricity was needed to 
ensure mining production remained undisrupted. With only two days of no electricity, 
the copper mines would have undoubtedly flooded. Such was the importance of 
electricity to Zambia’s economy. 
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Another feature of Zambia’s dependence upon Rhodesia and, hence, an additional 
variable which supported the Zambian government’s lack of support of sanctions, was 
the trade route through Rhodesia, particularly the railway from the Copperbelt to 
Livingstone and then through Rhodesia to the port at Beira in Mozambique. In excess 
of a quarter of all imports, including coal from Wankie colliery in Rhodesia were 
transported through this route. Virtually all copper exports were transported through 
this route. Subsequently, the government began to see self-sufficiency as the only 
viable policy option to redress the dependence upon Rhodesia. Serious local coal 
developments started at Nkandabwe, although the coal from Wankie was of superior 
quality. In fact, the government of Zambia was so much in a hurry to self-supply that 
the coal project at Siankandoba which would have produced coal of superior quality 
was provisionally abandoned because it would have taken longer to develop. The 
government and the mining companies went into equal-shares partnership, with 
mining companies providing technical input. The Siankadoba project was to be 
developed under exclusive Government ownership, with a French firm contracted to 
carry out works on the plant. This demonstrates the scale of government involvement 
in developmentalism, even before the 1968-1969 economic reforms were 
implemented. For Hall (1969: 113), “[t]he entry into coal-mining was entirely a 
Zambian initiative.” Good or bad, this development was hurried by the geopolitical 
tensions UDI created, but in practice, coal-mining development only served to 
strengthen Zambia’s dependence upon copper. To the extent that copper remained 
profitable, so too would coal-mining. 
Indeed, Zambia had known that sanctions against Rhodesia were in a way sanctions 
against itself, since this would inevitably disrupt economic activity. In December 
1965, oil to Rhodesia, and implicitly Zambia, was choked off when supplies from 
Beira were cut off. The Zambian government reacted in two ways; first, oil was 
airlifted into Zambia at an enormous cost. Second, Zambia had to turn to its northern 
neighbour—Tanzania—importing oil through Dar-es-Salaam port and then travelling 
down a gravel road over a distance of over 2400 kilometres. It would take about three 
years before in 1968 an Italian firm completed the construction of an oil pipeline from 
Dar-es-Salaam to the Copperbelt. 
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Importantly for Zambia, the only way to secure the much-needed government revenue 
was to get the copper out of the country. To do this under the system of sanctions 
imposed on Rhodesia, copper was allowed to go south to Beira, but the Zambian 
authorities also preferred to look to other neighbours. Hence, the formula applied by 
the government was to transport about 50 percent to Beira via Southern Rhodesia, 
around 25 percent on the Benguela railway via Angola and Congo to Lobito port in 
Angola, with the rest via road haulage to Dar-es-Salaam port. The government’s 
decision to seek alternative trade routes is rooted in its attempt to minimise its 
dependence on the South, thereby minimising risk of disruption. This would 
eventually pay-off when Smith, in 1973, fearing rebel attacks from Zambia, closed off 
his border to dislocate Zambia’s transportation of goods except for copper. By that 
time, the road north to Dar-es-Salaam had been upgraded into a modern highway, 
using funds from the international aid community. Consequently, the Zambian 
government opted for trade routes to Dar-es-Salaam and Lobito. By 1971, imports 
from southern Rhodesia were only 5 percent (made up of mainly electricity and coke 
supply charges), falling from 40 percent in 1964 to 20 percent in 1966 (Larmer, 2007; 
Roberts, 1976; Martin, 1972). Imports from South Africa dropped by half to around 
11 percent between 1964 and 1973. Although decisive state policy on trade and 
industrial development with respect to import-substitution and efforts to secure 
alternative trade links, these policies were shaped by regional political tensions, 
especially between Zambia and its southern neighbour, but also by marked influences 
of the global community. 
Zambia was eventually able to supply all its coal needs despite the shutdown of the 
Nkandabwe operation in 1969. By 1972, a hydro-electric power plant at Kafue was 
commissioned for operations which a company from Yugoslavia had built. This 
reduced electricity imports from Rhodesia to only about 33 percent. But by 1976, a 
further hydro-electric power plant north of Zambezi at Kariba was constructed by an 
Italian company. Hence, it took Zambia eleven years from UDI to self-supply its 
power (including electricity) demands. 
The alternative railway link from the Copperbelt to Dar-es-Salaam had been met with 
opposition by the West, but the People’s Republic of China, hoping to expand their 
stake in African trade, expressed real interest when they surveyed the project by 1968, 
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began works in 1970 at Dar-es-Salaam and completed the works at the Copperbelt in 
1975. China was strategic in carrying out this project worth by then about £167 
million, whose repayment would be shared equally between Zambia and Tanzania. 
There is a lesson to learn here, especially in how form of aid itself may have hindered 
local manufacturing. China had intended to aid its infant industries to access African 
markets, and because it could not offer cash loans, it set out to provide half of this loan 
in terms of equipment (rails and railways sleepers etc.) from its own industries, with 
the remainder comprising mainly of African labour bill and other material for 
construction from within Africa. Overall, however, both Zambia and Tanzania would 
pay back the loan over three decades beginning in 1983. China took the sixth position 
of Zambia’s trading partners by 1970. China negotiated with both Zambia and 
Tanzania to purchase goods from China worth about £56 million in local currency 
over a seven-year period up to 1977 since the African labour bill and cost of other 
material for construction needed to be disbursed in local currency. For Zambia, this 
meant a commitment of about £4 million worth of goods every year between 1970 
and 1977 to flood the Zambian market. Whatever the merits of the Chinese-funded 
projects, the purchase of Chinese goods for a certain period up to a certain amount, as 
one of the conditions of repayment, guarantees and grants the Chinese goods access 
to the Zambian market, partly eating into market share of Zambian goods on its own 
domestic markets. 
The tale of Zambia’s success in delinking itself from its southern neighbour(s) has 
profound consequences for understanding the political economy of Zambia’s 
developmentalism. First, although this has been repeatedly pointed out, the 
infrastructure supporting Zambia’s trade pattern and structure were primarily created 
to propagate a deliberately defined system of accumulation around the copper 
complex. By confronting the pattern of trade-supporting infrastructure, Zambia was 
not necessarily speaking to, for purposes of structural transformation, the system of 
accumulation around the copper complex itself. What the Zambian state did do was 
to seek alternative trade routes, mainly for the transportation of copper, and partly 
self-supply inputs to copper (energy etc.) that it previously imported. In doing this, 
the state perpetuated rather than addressed the underlying system of accumulation that 
prevented structural change. Of course one might suggest that the same infrastructure 
(transport, energy etc.) that supported copper production would also have fed into a 
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diversified production structure, but the extent to which this could possibly be realised 
depended on the extent and intensity of fiscal linkages, including what was going on 
with industry. Chang (2003, 2002, 1994) approaches structural change as a product of 
coordinated efforts and investments across sectors. The extent to which there was 
minimal coordination across sectors (including particularly with agriculture and 
industry) could help explain why industrial development and structural change was 
hindered by the state’s response of promoting accumulation that served the interests 
of the copper complex. 
Citing a UN study, Lanning and Mueller (1979: 202-203) contend that the costs of 
sanctions on Zambia’s economy were enormous, with limited compensation: “the cost 
of sanctions to Zambia from 1965 to 1977 [were] between $750 and $800m. To offset 
this Zambia received aid of only $100m. in the same period … despite promises of 
assistance from Britain.” 
Nevertheless, UDI cultivated a culture of self-sufficiency, which encouraged the 
Zambian state through interventionism to erect import-substituting enterprises while 
restricting imports from Rhodesia. Yet, despite favourable economic circumstances 
and heightened economic activity, Zambia’s inheritance of socio-economic interests 
ensured that “most of the profits generated by this boom were flowing out of the 
country, together with large amounts of capital. Most of the companies in Zambia 
were either subsidiaries or closely linked to Rhodesian and South African companies; 
and their policy was to remit as much profit and capital as quickly as they could. 
Estimates show that remittances by non-mining companies increased by 84 per cent 
in 1966 and a further 15 per cent in 1967” (Lanning and Mueller, 1979: 203). 
In the hands and under the control of foreign private interests, capital funds for 
development benefited foreign private capital. This must be kept in mind when in 
Chapter Six a discussion on the Mulungushi reforms will be made. Commercial banks 
tended to favour foreign capital because of its capacity to pay back, and as good 
lenders, the latter enjoyed large awards of local loans which, however, were largely 
exported once they were processed into profits. The extent of capture by foreign 
interests of the banking sector is seen by the scale of commercial bank advances made 
between 1965 and 1967; “commercial bank advances increased 94 per cent in 
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December 1965, a further 16 per cent in 1966, and 76 percent in 1967” (Lanning and 
Mueller, 1979: 203). Not only did these interests limit the scope for structural 
transformation but they robbed the Zambian economy of investible surplus. 
Importantly, however, their scope of economic activity remained restricted within the 
confines of physical accumulation as dictated by the nature and strength of the market. 
Judging by the state’s response, as will be shown in the Mulungushi economic reforms 
in Chapter Six, the state confrontation of these contradictions failed to accurately 
diagnose the underlying developmental problems and, thus, suggested remedies which 
did not redress and reorient the form of physical accumulation. Instead, the state 
sought to replace with indigenous interests, local interests which had lodged 
themselves within a restricted structure of production. The nature of socio-political 
and economic interests did influence the direction and agenda of public opinion, 
shifting government policy in non-developmental directions. 
5.5 Emergency Development Plan (EDP), Transitional Development Plan 
(TDP), and external influence, 1964-1966 
The post-Independence state created development plans as the blueprint documents to 
guide national development. However, the history of post-Independence development 
planning helps to explain why the plans were designed the way they were. The post-
Independence development objectives were influenced by external consultants, 
specifically those commissioned by the United Nations (UN), which had carried out a 
series of studies to understand the wide-ranging nature of the Zambian economy and 
to make recommendations for development. Subsequently, post-Independence 
development planning relied heavily on the development thought of these consultants, 
and, as I will argue below, this did not address the institutional arrangement for 
executing broad-based development. 
Recall that the ten-year plan for the period 1947 to 1956 (and its revised edition) was 
the main instrument to guide resource programming under colonial rule. It was argued 
in Chapter Four how initial allocation for socioeconomic development for the African 
population in the ten-year plan was overturned by white settler interests. For Chileshe 
(1986: 59), it “was an uncoordinated affair … characterized by a strong bias for sector 
development and in particular, those sectors under European and expatriate control.” 
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In other words, resource allocation reflected the interests of the white setter 
community. Thus, in affirming balanced growth and the national interest, it was the 
task of the post-Independence leadership to reflect in development planning a more 
rounded reflection of the interests of Zambian society. 
Following the breakdown of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, development 
planning for the envisioned independent Zambian state begged assistance from the 
United Nations and its sister agencies to choreograph a development plan.35 
Consequently, the first post-Independence pseudo-development plan was the 
Emergency Development Plan (EDP) which was seen as a preface to the slightly more 
detailed Transitional Development Plan (TDP). Both EDP and TDP profited from the 
reports of the UN agencies, especially the ECA/FAO Report, commonly known as the 
Seers Report, deriving this name from Professor Dudley Seers as the Report leader. 
The TDP was envisioned to cover only an eighteen-month period from January 1965 
to June 1965.  
While the TDP was crucial for formalising and documenting many of the 
socioeconomic problems the post-Independence Zambian state was to confront, it 
facilitated continuities of the inherited material system of accumulation and bound the 
state to it. It did so by amalgamating and incorporating within it colonial public 
expenditure programmes and also expanding the administrative scope of the newly-
independent state. In practice, this meant allocating over 40 percent of the plan 
resource envelope to projects “being carried over for completion” (Chileshe, 1986: 
60; Katona, 1982). Also, substantial resources of the TDP were committed to 
strengthening the administrative architecture of the state, for example allocating £5.3 
million to the Office of the President only while health services and social 
                                                 
35 Chileshe (1986: 59) notes that “[e]ach [UN sister] agency offered help in its field. The United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) stressed aspects of education; 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) placed emphasis on 
communication infrastructure. The joint team of the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa (ECA) and the Food Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) covered a much 
wider field. Its terms of reference included planning for a broad framework for social and economic 
development and to devising suitable development policies.” 
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development received a mere £610,000 and £560,000, respectively, a feature which 
was acknowledged as “a conscious element of the Plan” (Katona, 1982: 13).36 





1.0 From EDP 19.3 42.0% of total TDP 
2.0 "A" projects 17.2 Projects to start after completion of 
financial procedures and agreements 
2.1 *Administrative 
apparatus of government 
6.1 35.6% of “A” projects total 
2.2 *Education 4.4 25.7% of “A” projects total 
2.3 *Transport and 
communication 
3.6 21% of “A” projects total 
2.4 *Agriculture 1.9 11.1% of “A” projects total 
2.5 *Mines and Industries 0.2 1.2% of “A” projects total 
2.6 *All other 0.9 5.5% of “A” projects total 
3.0 "B" projects 9.4 Conditionally approved projects, 
pending availability of local capacity and 
materials, appropriately trained and 
qualified human resource 
4.0 Total planned TDP expenditure 45.9 approximately equal to K90 million  
5.0 Delayed projects 10 
 
Source: Author’s own construction, Table created from Katona (1982: 12-13) and 
Chileshe (1986: 60) 
That mines and industries received only 1.2 percent of the plan allocation reflected 
government’s policy to leave to the private sector capital development of these core 
sectors. Agriculture’s share of public resources also did not increase to a considerable 
level with Independence. “For how else, could one explain the low priority given to 
agriculture and the rural sector”, questions Chileshe (1986: 60), “except that revenues 
from copper continued to comfortably cushion the economy” such that “it is usual to 
justify such action on the basis of paying more weight on the propulsive force of the 
mining sector than that of other sectors.” 
                                                 
36 Katona (1982) also records the TDP as mentioning that “for the first phase of the post-
independence drive there are some sectors – health is one and housing, for example, another – 
which have, up to a point, to manage as best as they can … Their turn, according to Government 
policy, will come later.” 
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Further, the TDP promoted uneven line-of-rail biased development, as did previous 
colonial public expenditure programmes. For example, in social services, out of 5,000 
planned urban houses, 2,500 houses went to the Copperbelt and 1,250 houses to 
Lusaka. Although the TDP allocation to housing was small, it did go a long way in 
building 3,500 houses annually which, although only half of what was recommended 
by the Seers Report, did represent commitment by the independent Zambian state to 
increase provision of social services to the indigenous population, albeit in favour of 
urban interests. 
The TDP did represent a minor departure from colonial public expenditure 
programmes by allocating some amounts to non-productive sectors, although these 
were considerably meagre in comparison to what would be required to upscale the 
standard of living. In considerable measure, however, the expansion of the state 
architecture by way of allocating to the state more resources for building 
administrative capacity represented building the post-Independence state upon an 
inherited and restricted material system of accumulation. 
Indeed, much of the thought and scholarship in development planning for Zambia did 
not originate within the indigenous post-Independence government. This is perhaps 
understandable given that “at independence … President Kaunda and his colleagues 
had been in office for less than two years and had next to no experience of operating 
a governmental system on a national scale” (Tordoff, 1980b: 7).37 It suggests a lack 
of capacity within the new Zambian leadership to design home-grown policies for 
structural transformation based developmentalism. In fact, the recommendations that 
were taken on board and which consumed substantial public resources were designed 
to strengthen rather than alter the inherited structure of production. The 
UN/ECA/FAO report stressed the importance of bridging rural-urban gap, while 
creating employment to raise living standards (United Nations. Economic 
                                                 
37 During the London talks discussing Rhodesia’s UDI, Hall (1969: 112) reflected on the new Zambian 
leadership’s reliance upon white advisors and, the former’s failure to discern international relations 
and government administration: “A clear understanding that Britain would rely entirely on sanctions 
against Rhodesia had come very slowly to the Cabinet at Lusaka. In June 1965, while in London for 
the Commonwealth Conference, Kaunda again offered his country as military base — a sign that 
Zambia did not grasp the realities of British politics. A certain lack of sophistication was 
understandable, for neither Kaunda not his colleagues had held government office until 1963; their 
white advisors tended to be idealistic liberals capable of wishful thinking.” 
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Commission for Africa and Food and Agriculture Organisation, 1964: 13). These 
goals were reflected as objectives within the TDP. That these views were captured in 
government documents is taken as evidence of the attitudes and political objectives of 
the new leaders (Sindab, 1984; Katona, 1982: 12). To pursue these objectives, the 
report emphasised that Zambians should take charge of their own institutions and 
condition their own affairs. Yet, one of the most important observations the report 
made was the alarming absence of indigenous human resources to staff the state 
structures: “In no area is Zambia’s heritage of imbalance and contrast so marked as in 
the field of human development … It is not too much to say that Zambia in terms of 
high level manpower is one of the least educated countries in a most under-educated 
continent” (United Nations. Economic Commission for Africa and Food and 
Agriculture Organisation, 1964: 91). Consequently, the report endorsed the utilisation 
of foreign experts to supplement the operations of the state architecture: “The non-
Africans in Zambia represent the main source of skilled and educated manpower … 
Since the non-African[s] possess much of the skill and education at present lacked by 
many Africans, they form a very important, though small section of the labor force … 
The important economic role of the non-African who has contributed a great deal to 
the economic development of Zambia in the past, can be expected to continue in the 
future. Zambia will remain in home of many non-Africans … [T]heir skills and 
experience are badly needed” (United Nations. Economic Commission for Africa and 
Food and Agriculture Organisation, 1964: 93, 98). In order to create a pool of educated 
Zambians, the report privileged extension of secondary school facilities over technical 
and vocational skills, but either way, given the dearth of Zambian teachers, this meant 
importing foreign teachers. 
These recommendations were taken on by the new political leadership without any 
opposition. van Arkadie (1973: 98) notes that advice from the UN commission to 
Zambia’s post-Independence state “emphasise[d] …growth and structural change 
conceived in terms of change in the industrial structure,” yet, “paradox[ically] [and in 
practice] … adopting policies aimed to transform the industrial structure through 
mobilisation of foreign capital, the introduction of modern technology and the hiring 
of foreign management, [created] a new pattern of dependence.” A lack of opposition 
by the post-Independence African state to these policies, and a failure to explore 
alternative thought, is explained by van Arkadie by referring to priority setting and 
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preoccupation of the post-Independence state: “The initial tasks facing the political 
leadership revolved around meeting the difficult challenge of taking over and staffing 
the colonial state. The mechanics of the transfer, plus the need to expand the 
educational system, were of highest priority” (van Arkadie, 1973: 98). This suggests 
that the foundation for structural transformation through local capacity was not only 
weak, but it was something to be learnt and executed over time. 
Similarly, Sindab, 1984 (99-100) was critical of UN recommendations and the way in 
which they were readily adopted without questioning their relevance for the post-
Independence socioeconomic conditions; she argued that “no evidence exists that the 
new rulers explored alternative means of producing an indigenous source of skilled 
labor by establishing a system which would produce skills in a short period of time 
and shorten dependency on expatriates”, while insisting that the “social and economic 
impact[s]” of hiring expatriates “were not discussed at all.” Sindab also suggested that 
expansion of secondary school facilities would enable the political leadership to reap 
large political dividends hence it is easy to see why they did not oppose such a policy 
move. While Sindab is correct in her analysis, she does not establish the inherited 
institutional mechanism and dynamic as the underlying explanatory factor which 
muted debate, dialogue and alternative thought. Within the context of the inherited 
institutional structures and powers, once a decision had been made by the political 
leadership, specifically, the President, there was no room to entertain alternative 
thought. 
Appendix 5.1 shows actual educational attainment by race and occupation, which 
demonstrates the scale of influence of, and dependence upon, expatriates even by 
1966. In nominal terms, and in total, expatriates only accounted for 12 percent of total 
employment, but such aggregate statistics hide the variations across sectors, and 
nature of employment occupied by expatriates. Expatriates were active in top 
positions in virtually all areas of the economy, especially in profession/technical-
intensive occupations. For example, all of the 327 electrical and mechanical engineers 
were expatriates, while 99.8 percent of the 498 mining technicians were expatriates. 
Possessing the lowest education, Africans were relegated to low-paying jobs, hence 
in some way perpetuating race-based wage discrimination. Also, as Sindab (1984: 
101) wondered, “[t]here was no justification for maintaining many of the 
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underqualified settlers in their positions when Africans were being denied 
opportunities because of their lack of education.” It is worth mentioning, however, 
that the deployment of the expatriates’ skills was not fashioned to counter the structure 
of production but rather to maintain and strengthen the existing pillars of the economy. 
Consequently, the interests of expatriates became firmly bound to a particular physical 
economic base which supported their livelihoods. 
Reflections on statistics illustrating the stock of skills and education prevailing in 
Zambia during the nascent years post-Independence do not say much about the 
economy except to highlight the deficiency of skills as experienced by the Zambian 
economy. What is more important and useful for this thesis is to uncover how this 
impacted upon national development policy making and implementation. 
The UN/ECA/FAO report’s recommendation to make use of expatriates for post-
Independence development was based on the assumption that, left to themselves, the 
Africans did not possess the capacity to manage their own affairs. Consequently, the 
report fiercely made a case for expatriates: “The economy will need at the very least, 
the present number of non-Africans until 1970. Unless this number is maintained, 
growth may fall short of objectives” (United Nations. Economic Commission for 
Africa and Food and Agriculture Organisation, 1964: 117), without mentioning how 
they should be used to assist Zambia to attain an integrated structure of production. 
The political ramifications of hiring expatriates were immense, but their skills, as 
suggested by external consultants, were gravely needed, especially to give meaning to 
Independence, and, hence, rationalise the political power of the new African leaders. 
Political populism and its contests which arose remained restricted in scope because 
they served to counter the race-based income gaps, while strategizing on replacing 
expatriates with Africans without due regard to how such motivations would in reality 
fail to deal with a lack of structural transformation as the underlying problem for 
Zambia’s economy. 
This discussion on expatriates is important because it serves to support the argument 
that absence of local skills and therefore dependence upon expatriates right from the 
beginning kept the production structure narrow, while limiting accompanying political 
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discourse. The presence of expatriates had far-reaching consequences for the 
understanding of development and, measure of living standards and progress. 
Importantly, these contradictions all played out to deflect efforts away from structural 
transformation, partly by limiting and narrowing accumulation and the political 
discourse around it. 
Shortages of skilled and educated personnel led to competitive behaviour among 
employers, offering a myriad of incentives to attract and retain workers. But the acute 
shortages in skills meant that employers did little to influence the growth of labour 
supply nor to alter the distribution of skills. Whilst competitive practices by employers 
pushed wages upwards, the government also contributed to this upward wage pressure 
as an instrument to reward political support. 
Although economic growth was reasonably high in the first half-decade post-
Independence, Jolly (1971) argues that it should have been higher if there was a higher 
stock of skills and education. Lack of structural change and distorted growth, although 
seemingly quantitatively impressive, can also be explained in terms of the dearth of 
skilled personnel. On the one hand, a deficit in skills can permeate the domains of 
quality, quantity, and cost of production. Jolly (1971: 46) pointed to “unskilled 
operation and inadequate maintenance” as limiting the potential output from a capital 
stock. The rapid depreciation of agricultural vehicles and other equipment are seen to 
largely be explained by a deficit in maintenance and operational skills. But also, within 
the mining sector, inappropriate utilisation of machinery and other productive 
equipment curtailed the machine lifespan by about 60 percent and— “reduced the 
expected life of some underground machinery from 10 to 4 years” (Jolly, 1971: 47). 
On the other hand, shortages of skills impacted upon the structure of the economy and 
consequently the pattern of growth. By allocating skilled personnel in urban centres, 
this robbed rural areas of skills necessary to support growth. Hence, geographical 
regional development disparities were reinforced by the deployment and utilisation of 
skilled personnel. At the level of programme and project implementation, urban 
projects, when compared to rural projects, often received more funding and skilled 
personnel, and were finalised in a shorter space of time. But this is not to say skills 
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shortages were the main drivers of such regional differences, but rather that they 
served to reinforce and aggravate an already harrowing situation. 
Due to skills deficits, it was necessary to rely upon expatriates, hence by importing 
skilled and trained personnel as expatriates, Zambians also imported the lifestyles and 
patterns of living of these people. This importation of skills should also be considered 
as perpetuation of pre-Independence standards of work and productivity since, in part, 
after Independence, retaining foreign experts could also be seen as importing their 
skills. Expatriates were paid handsomely—23 times more than Zambia’s per capita 
income, and about tenfold more than people of similar skills in advanced nations—
and these incomes financed lavish lifestyles. Arguably, the black African dominant 
class viewed the expatriate class with envy and, consequently, the former formed their 
own lifestyle expectations from the latter. That is, development (economic progress) 
in terms of living standards came to be defined by consumption patterns of the white 
settler and expatriate community. In seeing this as a result of skills shortages, one must 
reflect on why expatriates needed to be imported in the first place. 
However, these contradictions of skills and education on the Zambian economy must 
not be viewed in isolation. As part of a broader system, they impacted on development 
policy and, subsequently, the nature of the post-Independence system which created a 
restricted form of capital accumulation. 
5.6 Ideology and developmentalism under the First National Development 
Plan, 1966-1970 
In the introduction of the Zambia’s 1966-1970 First National Development Plan 
(FNDP),38 President Kaunda commented that it was “tangible proof of my, and my 
Government’s, intention to provide increased prosperity and higher standards of living 
for every Zambian citizen no matter whether he lives in an urban or rural area.” Within 
the FNDP, and reflecting the lopsided urban-biased inherited economy, “greater 
emphasis [was to be] placed on the rural areas than ever before.” Kaunda’s intentions 
were clear: even development was of prime importance, but structural transformation 
                                                 
38 Kaunda’s views are captured in the introduction of the FNDP pages v-vi 
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particularly through industrialisation was the essential mechanism through which 
broad-based developmentalism would be pursued. 
Kaunda recognised Zambia’s economic and social structure as one that reflected the 
nature of colonial administration which restricted social and economic development 
to only a few privileged white residents much to the detriment of the native population. 
As Chapter Four touched upon, so low were indigenous education levels that only 
about 100 black Zambians had attained university education by Independence. For 
Kaunda, this meant that “only a handful of people had anything like sufficient training 
to enable them to take their place in the service of the Government.” In Chapter Four 
it was shown that Zambia’s transport system and infrastructure were skewed towards 
the South, and that this was an outcome of the interplay of the state and societal 
interests. Thus, not only did this reflect dependence upon the South, it also reflected 
the socio-political and economic interests that underlay the Zambian economy. For 
example, that “all … supplies of petrol and oil came … by the southern route as did 
the coal for [the] mining industry”, meant that there were interests entrenched in 
businesses and government which were served by this arrangement. Kaunda also 
recognised that not only was the Zambian economy linked to the South by supplies of 
inputs to Zambia’s productive sectors, but also by provision from the South of even 
basic manufactured daily-use consumer goods. Historically, as developed in Chapter 
Four, infrastructural development was skewed to serve the interests of the economic 
and political base within Zambia but bound to the South. 
The trajectory of the post-Independence system of accumulation could already be 
gleaned from Kaunda’s remarks that developmentalism from then would be “a frontal 
attack on these inherited structures.” For example, that it was undesirable to import 
consumer goods was clear, but for whom was not something that was adequately 
incorporated into development planning aimed at evening out prosperity. Kaunda 
himself saw “structural in the transport sector” in a restricted sense, as the rerouting 
of transport and trade links from the South towards East Africa through development 
of road and railway infrastructure “linking Zambia and Tanzania.” In what ways, and 
through which institutional mechanisms, this is meant to foster and augment 
development of a productive and integrated economic structure is unsatisfactorily 
explored. Simply providing funds for development of a project, as DSP argues, does 
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not account for success; other equally important mechanisms for utilising 
economically such funds and erecting with them a competitive and integrated 
productive structure are fundamental for structural transformation. This involves 
transformation of the state institutional structures. 
Further, the values and interests of the post-Independence political leadership can be 
extracted from Kaunda’s remarks: “A constant preoccupation of my Government is 
the disparity in the standard of living between the rural masses and the comparatively 
limited urban and industrial sector.” Kaunda was clearly concerned about the 
economic and social disadvantages of the rural population. Consequently, providing 
more funds for investment in less privileged areas would be seen as an effort to 
confront the polarity of developmentalism. 
In this thesis, I interpret the post-Independence Zambia’s system of accumulation as 
a restricted response to inherited structures through reorganisation rather than 
transformation of the institutional structures which would have been required to foster 
broad-based developmental structural transformation of the economy. As a system of 
accumulation, developmentalism is seen as the interaction of interests lodged in the 
state and society, and the material base underpinning this interaction. 
5.7 The First National Development Plan, 1966-1970 
The FNDP was conceived as a documentation of strategies, “a statement of intention”, 
to confront the contradictions of colonial developmentalism. “A new chapter began to 
emerge with the preparations for Zambia’s First National Development Plan,” argues 
Chileshe (1986: 60), “a definite departure from previous patterns, not so much in terms 
of mechanisms to be used, but rather in terms of the objectives sought.” In Chapter 
Four, it was shown that prior to Zambia’s joining of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland in 1953, the socio-political and economic interests which underpinned 
developmentalism ensured that favourable living standards and conditions were 
developed for the white settlers, with almost complete disregard for Africans. But it 
was the ten-year membership in the Federation up to 1963 which reinforced and 
strengthened a system of accumulation that pillaged the Zambian economy of 
investable surplus. Up to £70 million of revenue and foreign exchange is estimated to 
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have accrued to Southern Rhodesia from the wealth created within Northern Rhodesia 
(Zambia Office of National Development and Planning, 1966: 1). 
In addition, the limited industrial development which had taken place in Zambia, 
especially during the Federation, was considerably based upon protection and 
advancement of economic interests of the South. “Such industries as existed at 
Independence,” argued the Zambia Office of National Development and Planning 
(1966: 1) in the FNDP, “were often subsidiaries of Rhodesian firms and while an 
important market exists for the product of these manufacturing industries, such 
development as had occurred in Zambia [had] been necessarily … a by-product to 
operations whose primary financial and managerial interests [were] in Rhodesia.” 
Although the FNDP was in many ways a more guided approach to confront the 
contradictions of the colonial legacy, the South-based economic interests were well 
entrenched in the Zambian economy by Independence, and, because the preoccupation 
of the post-Independence leadership was aimed at displacing these economic interests, 
the response was restricted in scope and imagination. Developmentalism did not see 
structural transformation in its wider context. Besides, the geopolitical tension with 
the South placed urgency upon the Zambian leadership to see the South as a hostile 
economic partner. Hence, in this sense, diverting trade away from the South restricted 
developmentalism because progress towards structural transformation came to be seen 
in terms of recalibrating the economy away from the South. An example above has 
already been given in terms of how Kaunda interpreted structural change of the 
transport sector as the redirection of transport infrastructure and trade in favour of East 
Africa. 
Acknowledging the difficulty of using the existing industries to order the affairs of 
development, in the FNDP, the Zambia Office of National Development and Planning 
(1966: 1) contended that “it is hard to persuade such firms to find new sources of 
imports and use new trade routes” because they were bound to the South and hence 
“an extrapolation of the economy of another country.” Consequently, structural 
transformation came to be envisioned and defined in terms of “utilisation of local 
materials, the training of local people, and the orientation of industrial production to 
specifically Zambian needs … established from scratch.” Industrial production and 
development was to be restricted to what was required by Zambians, such that despite 
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acknowledging the rural-urban divide, it was never fully explored which sections of 
Zambian society would be served by such development, and whether structural 
transformation would be better served by the kinds of investments to be undertaken 
as substitutes of capital tied to Rhodesia. Instead, erecting new businesses which 
would source their inputs (and other imports) from elsewhere other than the South 
would be an index of economic progress. In fact, it will be shown below that this is 
precisely how industrial development progressed. In addition, it must be emphasised 
that viewing developmentalism this way reflected the values and interests of the 
political leadership but, in practice, progressing this way added to Zambian society a 
class of socio-political and economic interests which came to depend upon the 
material base erected out of the values of the governing class. 
The inherited economy ensured that too few Zambians were educated or had gained 
vocational skills limiting the developmental options for the post-Independence 
leadership. Consequently, it was argued in the FNDP that Zambia would need to bank 
on the managerial and technical services of expatriates. Nevertheless, the government 
had hoped that replacing these expatriates with Zambians would establish a local cadre 
of agents for development. However, expatriates were not only expensive to hire but 
their salaries and way of life became the standard upon which emerging Zambians 
viewed their own progress (Sindab, 1984). In other words, Zambians substituting 
these expatriates became a concentration of interests which accepted a lifestyle at least 
as good as the expatriates they replaced. Such hiring practices were unsuitable for 
local conditions because resources meant for development elsewhere were 
increasingly captured by this concentration of interests. 
Further, the FNDP prioritised and rationalised the development of certain projects on 
the basis of endowment and by labelling them strategic. These included rerouting 
communication channels for national security and “increased self-sufficiency in 
certain strategic supplies such as cement, iron and steel, and fertiliser”, as well as 
“rapid development of independent sources of energy (electricity, coal and oil) and 
also “greatly diversified sources of supplies of raw material and consumer goods” 
(Zambia Office of National Development and Planning, 1966: 3). Clearly, the political 
leadership through the development plans determined the direction of accumulation 
but less so the specific form this accumulation would take and how this would 
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recalibrate the economy towards sustained structural change. That accumulation 
should proceed that way can be interpreted as a political interest given the weak 
political and economic base of the post-Independence leadership (Sindab, 1984), but 
it also created and/or extended a material base which acted as site of concentration of 
other interests. Also, such developments were part of the wider copper-complex 
because they were pursued on the basis of their importance to the development of the 
copper industry. 
For industrial diversification, the strategy of import-substitution was chosen such that 
“manufacturing in Zambia those products which are feasible as substitutes for 
imported products” was the basis upon which industrial development would be 
pursued. In practice, the FNDP prioritised “firstly … largescale industries, [such as] 
nitrogenous fertiliser, and sugar”, and then, “secondly … a range of consumer goods 
[previously] imported.” While the ideas of the political leadership may have restricted 
the direction of accumulation and choice of industrial projects to those that only served 
their own interests and those of the urban salaried class, the thought behind the 
choosing of industrial projects was to a large extent influenced by geopolitical 
tensions with the South within the context of UDI. The declaration of independence 
unilaterally by Rhodesia from Britain in 1965 threatened Zambia’s own economic 
development prospects (Burdette, 1988; Chileshe, 1986; Martin, 1972). It is worth 
mentioning that the response to UDI drew the Zambian economy into a system of 
accumulation which precluded structural transformation. “The manufacturing sector 
at the time concentrated on import substitution,” argued Chileshe (1986: 62), “because 
of the need to cope with the effects of the UDI.” By threatening supplies of food, 
inputs for industry and other essential imports, UDI forced the Zambian leadership to 
use import-substitution policy in a restricted manner – replacing with local production 
goods previously imported, especially those originating from the South.  
Fry (1980: 46) argued that UDI enabled the Zambian government to erect barriers to 
block imports from Rhodesia, a strategy which eventually assisted Zambia to create 
its own industries: “UDI, by excluding Rhodesian products from the Zambian market, 
granted infant Zambian industries some protection from their main rivals (this may 
help to explain why the manufacturing sector performed better than FNDP 
predicted).” This suggests that the intervention of the state in restricting certain 
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imports was effective in aiding the creation and expansion of local industries. 
However, it leaves unexplained what kinds of industries were created, both in terms 
of technology and type of output. Also it does not address which agents within 
Zambian industries were responsible for, and benefitted from, accumulation. 
Fundamentally, the creation of industries did not follow from a policy which sought 
coordinated investments to underpin an integrated production structure. As Chileshe 
(1986: 62) further argued, “[t]he pattern of import substitution or industrialization that 
emerged in the Zambian context … due to pressure brought to bear on the economy 
as a direct consequence of UDI … failed to provide for maximization of backward 
and forward linkages in the economy. Production by the respective industries also did 
not provide for horizontal and vertical integration.” Within the context of absence of 
local skills, part of the outcome of UDI was a particular form of accumulation which 
bound the Zambian economy deeper into dependence upon foreign capital and skills 
(van Arkadie, 1973). 
Although this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven, it is worth mentioning 
here that the interests lodged in the state architecture which formulated and 
implemented these development plans and projects did disproportionately benefit 
from these developments relative to the larger disadvantaged population (Bomsel, 
1992). 
The FNDP’s objective aimed at promoting diversification of the economy was the first 
of the eight main objectives, but was itself constrained by its own construction. It read 
as follows: 
“To diversify the economy so that the copper industry is not the only main employer 
in the economy, and so that a greater proportion of domestic demand is satisfied by 
domestic production from a large industrial base” (Zambia Office of National 
Development and Planning, 1966: 5). 
This objective seems to suggest that diversification was aimed less to promote an 
integrated structure of production than to provide employment and meet local demand 
skewed in favour of the urbanised and salaried population. To stretch the argument 
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further, it can be suggested that the political leadership charged with giving inspiration 
and direction, and the bureaucratic class responsible for formulating and 
implementing, development policy, expressed their values and interests in the plan, 
particularly in terms of the ways in which they understood development. Therefore, 
progress on diversification came to be seen in terms of growth of value of industrial 
output and employment figures. As the FNDP noted, “[t]he aim of diversifying the 
economy … means rather faster rates of growth for the sectors of the economy other 
than mining” (Zambia Office of National Development and Planning, 1966: 5). Yet, 
“for the great majority of African political elite in Zambia … development meant 
schools, clinics, shoes for the people, and so forth”, reflecting the themes of the 
political discourse influenced by the African-European value conflict, “primarily 
concerning nationalism and development” (Scarritt, 1971: 41). This suggests the 
pervasive influence of Europeans on the post-Independence political discourse; 
African political leaders thus were focused more on quenching the conflict which 
arose when comparisons were made on living standards between whites and blacks. 
Consequently, development policy was aimed at sustaining the existing physical 
economic base while making efforts to redistribute national wealth by provision of 
social services. 
In its assessment of the scope for industrial development in Zambia, the FNDP decries 
developmentalism under the Federation which is seen as having favoured the South at 
the expense of Zambia: “Under Federation capital-formation generated by income 
from the proceeds of copper mining in the then Northern Rhodesia was used to assist 
and encourage the creation of secondary industries in Southern Rhodesia, as a 
conscious economic policy. The market for these secondary industries depended, and 
still depends, heavily on Zambia and Malawi” (Zambia Office of National 
Development and Planning, 1966: 33). Consequently, import-substitution as the 
policy basis for industrialising Zambia was set in motion mainly to replace South-
based imports, without necessarily questioning whether such industries would fit local 
post-Independence conditions aimed at altering the inherited pattern/structure of 
production. In addition, although in part understandable due to Zambia’s appalling 
human resource situation at Independence, little thought went into determining what 
locally-based institutional mechanisms would ensure that adequate learning of foreign 
technology took place in Zambia. Instead, the imagination and scope for 
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industrialisation was restricted by the political leadership’s preoccupation to replace 
goods from the South with locally-produced ones. 
The post-Independence Zambian state restricted its role in the economy to one of 
“provid[ing] encouragement and assistance to the private industrial sector and in 
certain cases, to undertake direct responsibilities in establishing new industries” 
(Zambia Office of National Development and Planning, 1966: 33). Consequently, 
public capital investment was seen as a way to stimulate industrial activity via its 
upward pressure on incomes, and, subsequently, increased demand for a range of 
consumer goods including food items. Industrial development was restricted by the 
imagination of the FNDP in that it was to be used as a vehicle to reduce imports of 
consumer goods rather than the means to create an integrated structure of production. 
“Massive capital investments”, affirmed the Zambia Office of National Development 
and Planning (1966: 33) in the FNDP, “[would] generate increased incomes and 
markets for food supplies and consumer goods. It is here that industrial development 
will play an important part in preventing a rapid expansion of imports of consumer as 
opposed to capital goods or raw materials.” In other words, industrial development 
was seen as one which was to be skewed in favour of the existing pattern of demand. 
Hence, in DSP language, the Zambian state followed the market rather than led it. 
This must be contrasted with the DSP experiences covered in Chapter Three, and 
particularly the experience of Taiwan as argued by Wade (1990) in his governing the 
market schema, wherein the Taiwanese state in several instances is seen to have led 
rather than followed the market. 
The Zambia Office of National Development and Planning (1966: 33) in the FNDP 
goes further by arguing that making locally consumer goods previously imported from 
the South was the overarching goal of industrial development: “the aim of the 
industrial programme to increase progressively output for consumer goods especially 
those at present imported from Rhodesia and South Africa so as to obtain a substantial 
degree of self-sufficiency between 1970-1975.” Yet, as Chapter Four demonstrated, 
especially as argued by Baldwin (1966: 184) for the pre-Independence Zambian 
economy, the imports from the South served a very small section of society composed 
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mainly of Europeans.39 Baldwin also argued that such expenditure habits were a direct 
result of the way in which the Zambian economy developed, particularly the copper 
production-induced income inequality, which concentrated and confined income to a 
very small section of the population and overall keeping low the ratio of total wages 
to gross output; this inhibited industrial development by constricting the level of 
demand. Thus, industrial development which focused on locally producing previously 
imported goods did not account for whom these goods were imported and whether 
producing them locally would fit local requirements for structural transformation. 
Consequently, and as will be developed further below, such industrial development 
would serve more to strengthen than alter the inherited distorted pattern of production. 
The main departure from the colonial legacy was simply that previously imported 
goods were to be produced locally. However, the perpetuation of the inherited system 
of accumulation is seen in the continued dependence upon copper because of the high 
import content and absence of export capacity of local production, as well as the kinds 
of interests served by industrialisation which lodged themselves mainly in the non-
productive state administrative architecture. These points are worth mentioning here 
but they are developed in more detail below. 
It was, however, made clear within the FNDP that geopolitical considerations had 
fundamentally influenced the way in which industrialisation was conceived and 
pursued. Given the political tension following UDI, which are discussed in detail 
below, the Zambian state placed self-sufficiency at the centre of industrial 
development. The kinds of largescale infrastructural projects redirecting Zambia’s 
trade routes particularly following UDI were aimed more at altering the sources of 
inputs rather than the altering the domestic structure of local production. Local 
production, interpreted as industrial development, did result from this endeavour but, 
in practice, it was meant to reinforce the physical economic base upon which the 
Zambian economy was built. Infrastructural developments to reroute Zambia’s trade, 
for example, led to an expansion in the construction sector which in turn, in the face 
of geopolitical tensions with the South, caused the government to see “self-sufficiency 
                                                 
39 Baldwin (1966: 184) argued that “[t]he highly paid European sector followed an expenditure 
pattern similar to that found in rich, developed countries. Yet the local demand by Europeans for 
many of the items in the budgets was too small to support local industry. The import content of 
consumption expenditure by Europeans was therefore high. Africans, on the other hand, did not 
possess the spending power needed to follow the European spending pattern.” 
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in cement” as an urgent matter. Further, “energy requirements”, given rapid post-
Independence expansion and mineral development, compelled the state to seek 
“establishment of a pipeline from the Indian Ocean, also because “[p]olitical 
considerations alone necessitate[d] means of supply of petroleum products on which 
Zambia [could] rely in all circumstances” (Zambia Office of National Development 
and Planning, 1966: 33). 
Additionally, the FNDP, reflecting on the impact of geopolitical tension with the 
South, prioritised certain development projects on the basis of national importance. 
On careful investigation, it appears these projects were aimed to sustain the existing 
physical economic base of the system of accumulation. Viewed differently, it can be 
argued that circumstances such as UDI which threatened the material base of the 
dominant interests (in this case, those of the political leadership and their advisers) 
caused them to order development and prioritise projects which conserved the 
economic base supporting them. This inhibited structural transformation by 
reinforcing the inherited structure of production while binding the dominant interests 
to the restricted material/economic base upon which Zambia’s economy was built. 
The FNDP succinctly captures the political necessity underpinning the choice of 
industrial projects: 
“The Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Southern Rhodesia clearly indicated 
Zambia could no longer be dependent upon the supplies of basic industrial materials 
from sources in Southern Africa. This has elevated the iron and steel, the fertiliser and 
oil pipeline into matters of national importance. Adequate capital funds have been 
provided in the public sector for the two projects. The oil pipeline which should be in 
operation in 1969, will be carried out by private interests at a cost approximately £20 




The fifteen major industrial projects at the beginning of the FNDP are given in the 
Table 5-7 Fifteen Major FNDP Industrial Projects, below: 
Table 5-7 Fifteen Major FNDP Industrial Projects 
  Name of industrial project Status (and comment) at beginning of FNDP 
1 Salt glazed pipes Already being implemented 
2 Brick factory 
3 Sugar industry 
4 Chilanga cement section 
  
5 Ndola cement Machinery or plant is about to or already ordered. 
6 Textile industry 
7 Bag manufacturing and sacking 
industry 
8 Oil pipeline 
  
9 Nitrogenous fertiliser factory Receiving high priority and to be implemented as soon as possible. 
10 Iron and steel project 
11 Explosives project 
  
12 Pulp and paper industry To be deferred to 1970 onwards pending expansion in education and 
literacy, and industrial packaging demand 
13 Coal project deposits of good quality coal discovered.  
14-
15 
Not specified Pending demand and supply factors for the date of their 
implementation. 
Source: FNDP, p35 
Another way in which industrial development was restricted in imagination was the 
way in which the FNDP emphasised the requirement for local raw materials to feed 
into new industrial projects. Essentially, this meant that absence of raw materials 
would deprioritise an industrial project requiring them. For example, the development 
of the iron and steel industry was in 1966 an optimistic endeavour because of the 
discovery of good quality coal and research and development dedicated to 
investigating the state of iron ore deposits. The idea of availability of local raw 
material defining and influencing the emergence of industrial projects proved crucial 
for the FNDP. For instance, the salt glazed pipe and brick factory already being 
implemented at the beginning of the FNDP relied on clay deposits in Kitwe. This 
marks a crucial departure from the way industrialisation in the DSP was imagined. 
207 
 
For South Korea, absence of local ore and the existence of a highly competitive nearby 
competitor, Japan, did not prohibit the iron and steel industry from emerging and 
flourishing. This suggests that industrialisation can be pursued through wide-ranging 
mixes of strategies and coordinated projects profiting from economies of scope and 
spread effects (Chang, 1994; Amsden, 1989). 
To ensure growth of non-mining sectors, the FNDP aimed at increasing capital 
investment as a proportion of GDP. During the TDP, in 1965, this share was increased 
to 20 percent, but was less than the 36 percent peak attained in 1957. However, the 
FNDP had anticipated a reversal in the relative roles of the private and public sectors 
in terms of contribution to total investment. Whereas in the Independence year the 
private sector accounted for 65.6 percent of total investment with the public sector 
assuming the remainder, the FNDP envisaged an increased role of the government in 
that 65.7 percent of total capital investment was expected to come from the public 
sector. Nevertheless, the details of public investment reveal that the expenditure 
patterns were aimed at building a local economic base which would reinforce and 
deepen the inherited material base of the system of accumulation. For example, 
infrastructure and transport were favoured over agriculture and land. Additionally, 
although the mines received a token amount of about £6m, development of other 
sectors was fashioned to support mineral development: for instance, owing to the fact 
that the mines absorbed well over two-thirds of the country’s total electricity 
consumption, electricity development which received an allocation of over £26 










% of grand 
total 
I. INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRANSPORT 
Housing and Construction 43.158 40.0 15.3 
Roads 34.881 32.3 12.4 
Railways 9.752 9.0 3.5 
Aerodromes 7.549 7.0 2.7 
Telecommunications 6.460 6.0 2.3 
Meteorology 0.374 0.3 0.1 
Supporting Services 5.655 5.2 2.0 
Sub-total 107.829 100.0 38.3 
II. AGRICULTURE AND LANDS 
Crop and Livestock 34.486 79.3 12.2 
Forestry 1.341 3.1 0.5 
Game and Fisheries 3.312 7.6 1.2 
Research 2.786 6.4 1.0 
Other 1.583 3.6 0.6 
Sub-total 43.508 100.0 15.4 
III. INDUSTRY AND MINES 
Industrial Development 25.029 41.4 8.9 
Mines 6.057 10.0 2.1 
Tourism  2.731 4.5 1.0 
Electriciy 26.686 44.1 9.5 
Sub-total 60.503 100.0 21.5 
IV. SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
Health  9.226 18.1 3.3 
Education 39.767 77.9 14.1 
Labour and Social Welfare 2.070 4.1 0.7 
Sub-total 51.063 100.0 18.1 
V. OTHER 
Office of the President 14.741 77.8 5.2 
Secretary to the Cabinet 0.554 2.9 0.2 
Office of National Development and Planning 0.605 3.2 0.2 
Foreign Affairs 0.310 1.6 0.1 
Justice 0.410 2.2 0.1 
National Assembly 0.271 1.4 0.1 
Home Affairs 1.550 8.2 0.5 
Finance 0.507 2.7 0.2 
Sub-total 18.948 100.0 6.7 
Grand Total 281.851 
 
100.0 
Source: FNDP Table III, p12 
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During the FNDP, rural development, conditional upon absorptive capacity of the 
rural areas, was to be “achieved principally through activities in the Agricultural and 
Lands Sector – through raising the productivity of the individual and through the 
introduction of State-managed enterprises” (Zambia Office of National Development 
and Planning, 1966: 7). In addition, rural development was envisioned to be supported 
by a particular form of agriculture-based manufacturing development which, with the 
benefit of hindsight, did not come to fruition despite rapid industrialisation by the end 
of the FNDP. To redress the rural-urban imbalance, rural areas were expected to 
receive total capital investment of £179 million between 1966 and 1970, £76 million 
larger than the £103 million allocated to urban areas. Because the geographical 
location of the capital project determined whether it would be regarded as rural or 
urban, the FNDP recognised the difficulty this imposed in practice. While the Kafue 
Hydro-Electric Scheme, one of the single largest capital projects, was regarded as 
rural-based, its benefits were to be captured disproportionately more by urban 
development. In other words, rural development by resource allocation did not 
adequately confront the rural-urban disparity both in design and in practice. 
Additionally, the level of public investment for ‘Agriculture and Lands’ was only 15.4 
percent of the total public investment FNDP, a proportion equivalent to ‘Housing and 
Construction’ urban-biased projects. 
To finance economic development during the FNDP, the Zambian government relied 
on domestic resources, particularly revenue from the copper sector. The composition 
of recurrent revenue as below substantiates this. 
Table 5-9 Total recurrent revenues, 1965-66 and projections for 1966-1970 
 
1965-66 1966-70 
Income Tax: £'m % of Total £'m % of 
Total 
(a) Copper companies 26.5 24.8 131.4 25.0 
(b) Personal and other companies 13.5 12.6 58.8 11.2 
Customs and Excise 12.4 11.6 65.9 12.6 
Mineral Royalties and Export Taxes 41.2 38.5 193.9 36.9 
Other 13.4 12.5 74.8 14.3 
Total 107 100.0 524.8 100.0 
Source: FNDP Table V, p14 
210 
 
Just at the beginning of the FNDP, copper-based revenue accounted for over 63 
percent of total recurrent revenue, a share which the government roughly intended to 
maintain right up the end of the FNDP. By implication, revenue for the state from 
non-mining activities was less important not just in its direct contribution to state 
coffers but that the economic activities on which they were based depended heavily 
on the profitable operations of the copper sector. 
The FNDP did recognise absence of Zambian entrepreneurs, and presence of 
expatriate-owned and -run business interests. Thus, to create a cadre of indigenous-
owned and managed businesses, the Zambian state opted to provide loans through its 
Loan Capital Programme to local entrepreneurs. This represented a departure from 
colonial administration, and a decisive effort to confront and alter the colonial legacy. 
While this move was commendable, little attention was paid to the institutional 
mechanisms and systems to ensure that once funds were provided to kick-start 
indigenous-owned and -controlled businesses, default rates were kept to a minimum. 
Such mechanisms would have ensured that local entrepreneurs were given adequate 
training in business management skills while creating an environment through state 
intervention to safeguard and promote the interests of these businesses. However, 
because the FNDP argued that “[t]raining for industry is more efficiently carried out 
within the industry itself, and not by external Government-sponsored training 
institutes” (Zambia Office of National Development and Planning, 1966: 34), it 
confined such training only to those within the existing businesses. The post-
Independence Zambian government opted for a policy to change the attitudes of 
foreign capitalists aimed at promotion of acquisition of skills by more Zambians in 
existing businesses while ensuring also that Zambian workers progressed in the ranks 
and hierarchy of the existing companies. Consequently, the state vowed to assist 
companies offering training opportunities for Zambians. 
1971 stood as the gap between the completion of the FNDP and start of the SNDP. 
During this year, the government committed capital expenditure amounting to K172.6 
million as “consolidation of the gains already achieved by the country” (Ministry of 
Development Planning and National Guidance, 1971: vii). Therefore, no major 
development projects to broaden efforts for structural transformation were pursued 
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during this period; instead public expenditure implied reinforcement of the existing 
system of accumulation. 
5.8 Performance of the economy and selected developments during the FNDP, 
1966-1970 
Development projects pursued during the fledgling post-Independence years 
deepened the inherited system of accumulation which depended upon the prosperity 
of the copper industry. Structural transformation was hindered by the kinds and nature 
of developmental projects the state pursued. First, these developmental projects 
strengthened Zambia’s inherited system of accumulation, binding it to external events 
and a fortuitous copper industry, which, in practice, and with the benefit of hindsight, 
weakened the trajectory of the Zambian economy. The economic growth that did take 
place reflected the economic boom which enabled the Zambian state to afford a series 
of developmental projects, but this growth did not imply strengthening of the economy 
via an integrated structure of production but, rather, it implied localisation of interests 
which were hitherto imported. 
Between 1965-1970, Zambia witnessed substantial economic growth. In real terms, 
the economy grew by 83 percent during this period, representing an annual rate of 
growth of over 10 percent. The SNDP acknowledged that “[a]bout half of this growth 
in real GDP resulted from very favourable terms of trade which the economy enjoyed 
due to high copper prices” (Ministry of Development Planning and National 
Guidance, 1971: 1). Such favourable economic circumstances in the copper sector 
enabled the country to afford wide-ranging economic and social infrastructural 
development projects and programmes. During the colonial era, particularly the five 
years just before Independence (1960-1964), annual public expenditure averaged 
around K92 million, just slightly over one fifth of GDP. Between 1967 and 1968, the 
pre-Independence amount was dwarfed when 38 percent of GDP amounting to K362 
million was spent as public investment. This impressive record appears to lend 








% of total 
1. Source of Revenue: 
  
(a) Income Tax, Mineral Royalties and Copper Export 
Tax 
1136 63.8 
(b) Customs and Excise  227 12.7 
( c) Other 193 10.8 
Sub-total 1556 87.4 
2. Capital Resources 
  
(a) Domestic loans 78 4.4 
(b) External Loans and Aid 105 5.9 
( c) Others 42 2.4 
Sub-total 225 12.6 
 
Grand Total 1781 100.0 
Source: FNDP 
Government resources during FNDP demonstrate the predominance of copper-based 
and -induced activities. From the total of K1,556 million of total revenue resources, 
copper-based and -induced activities in the form of mineral royalties, export tax and 
income tax, including a portion of customs and excise tax, constituted well above two 
thirds of total government resources. While the SNDP envisaged diversification in the 
sources of government revenues, particularly on account of expansion of productive 
activities which witnessed customs and excise share in total resources rise from 9 
percent in 1966 to 16 percent in 1970, the economic activities underpinning this source 
of revenue remained totally tied to the fortunes of the copper industry. 
Substantial progress had been made in education by the end of the FNDP, this marking 
a critical departure from the situation at Independence. By Independence, only 100 
and 1,200 Zambians boasted university degrees and secondary school education, 
respectively. By 1970, an additional 6,000 Zambians held secondary school 
certificates, with 1,200 students registered at the University of Zambia. These 
improvements, though praiseworthy, were far from what was required to effectively 
indigenise labour. Nevertheless, the growth in secondary education, though a 
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profitable political move, can be seen to reflect the advice given by UN consultants to 
the Zambian post-Independence government. 
Further, the indigenous government’s commitment to its people is evidenced by 
examining employment figures. While salaried employment remained generally 
unchanged between 1954 and 1964 at about 267,000 workers, by 1970, 390,000 
salaried jobs existed, representing 46 percent growth of wage employment. 
In 1969, physical national output underperformed but the rise in copper prices in the 
same year worked as a counterweight. However, in 1970, following two major events 
(the Mufulira mine disaster and the 1969 deflationary budget), Zambia’s economy 
contracted by about three percent. Overall, the economy of Zambia grew by about 
10.6 percent per annum owing to favourable copper prices rather than physical 
accumulation despite wide-ranging economic and social infrastructural development. 
This reflected the country’s continued dependence upon the copper sector, and in the 
language in this thesis, reliance upon the inherited system of accumulation. The 
dependence upon copper is seen also particularly from the assumptions underlying the 
projections. For instance, the FNDP estimates assumed that copper prices would 
remain stable throughout the period, averaging around £300, yet so favourable were 
terms of trade that between mid-1969 and mid-1970s alone, copper prices averaged 
K1,038 (roughly over £700) per metric ton. This fortuitous condition imposed by 
external circumstances cushioned the in-country production difficulties faced by 
Zambia. In 1970, the collapse of a mine at Mufulira, frequently referred to as the 
Mufulira mine disaster, caused some 89 deaths of mineworkers, but it also reduced 
copper production for the country by between one sixth and one fifth, since the 
Mufulira mine made an annual contribution of about 190,000 tonnes (Curry, 1989: 
324; Burdette, 1984: 37). 
Discounting the impact on the economy from favourable copper prices, the SNDP 
argued that “rapid increases in manufacturing would have been offset by falls in 
mining and agriculture”, which reduced annual GDP growth and physical output from 
the actual realised average rate of 10.6 percent to only 6 percent for the 1966 to 1970 
period, considerably lower than the 11.7 percent FNDP target (Ministry of 
Development Planning and National Guidance, 1971: 2). Copper price increases 
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explained much of Zambia’s impressive economic record during the first seven years 
post-Independence, but the developments which took place outside of copper mining, 
those which the governing class had hoped would launch the economy into self-
sufficiency and underpin subsequent economic development, such as infrastructural 
and industrial development, tied the Zambian economy tighter to the fortunes of the 
copper industry and external conditions influencing the demand for copper in 
particular. This is seen in the kinds of development projects and choice of technology 
adopted as specific features and forms of development. However, the role of agents in 
development is seen in who made the decisions regarding project choice, its physical 
location and what kind of technology to use, and whether these decisions depart from, 
or are integrated into, the national development agenda. These latter issues are 
explored in more detail below. 
Even if removing the effect of favourable terms of trade, the SNDP regarded Zambia’s 
economic performance under FNDP as satisfactory because whatever developments 
took place, these must be placed within the broader context of three main challenges: 
firstly, the disturbingly low levels of education for the indigenous population; 
secondly, geopolitical contradictions brought in by UDI; and, thirdly, subsequent 
difficulties in transport during the expansion and redirection of trade routes. 
Addressing these challenges is seen to have diverted resources away from productive 
accumulation. Nevertheless, on aggregate, real gross fixed capital formation as a 
proportion of GDP increased consistently from 16.3 percent in 1964 to a period peak 
of 27.8 percent achieved in 1970. This is taken, by the SNDP or, more appropriately, 
the political (and economic) leadership, as “indicative of the fact that the country [was] 
introducing structural changes in her investment patterns that are essential for 
promoting sustained social and economic development” (Ministry of Development 
Planning and National Guidance, 1971: 3). However, this represents a restricted 
understanding of structural change because insufficient attention had been given to 
the detail of the developmental projects pursued, including how these fitted into an 
integrated structure of production. It is not enough to presuppose structural change 
because the state evidenced its commitment to structural change by doling out public 
resources, particularly via raising its share of investment in GDP. Making 
developmental resources available is only one aspect of structural change as 
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demonstrated by the DSP. It is what is done with these resources to create and promote 
an integrated structure of production which matters for structural transformation. 
During the FNDP period, the 22 percent hike in wages following the Brown 
Commission in the Mining Industry gave rise to a series of wage increases in other 
sectors. Consequently, by 1967, the result was that real wages climbed faster than was 
planned during the formulation of the FNDP. That real private consumption increased 
by 21 percent between 1966 and 1967 evidences the upward trend in wages. Although 
this is developed in more detail below, it is worth mentioning that the series of wage 
increases which resulted from the Brown Commission’s recommendations in 1966 
were born out of the political interplay of three agents: (mining) labour, the state and 
private capital (in mining).  
Larmer (2007, 2005) sees the sequence of events around the Brown Commission of 
Inquiry as largely a function of expectations. The pre-colonial government 
subordinated mining labour to the interests of private mining capital as reflected in 
state legislation and action against labour movements (Roberts, 1976). From their 
vantage point, and measured against their expectations, it did not augur well for the 
African mineworkers that no substantial improvements in their lifestyles and work 
conditions took place in the first two years after Independence. They had hoped 
Independence would bring discontinuities to what they perceived as oppression and 
exploitation during the colonial regime, but their actions post-Independence to secure 
higher wages only brought them into conflict with both mining capital and the state. 
Because the state depended heavily upon mines for public revenue, uninterrupted 
operations of copper mines was in the best interest of the state. The industrial actions 
of labour threatened the financial position of the state, particularly in the event of a 
disruption in production. Consequently, before the Brown Commission of Inquiry into 
the affairs of the mining industry, the state relied on a series of strategies to resist 
demands of labour, but this only heightened labour’s militancy and, according to 
Larmer (2007, 2005), it was only when the state ran out of non-violent options that 
the Brown Commission was constituted and its recommendations endorsed. 
Although it may seem that the state submitted to the interests of labour, it is more 
apposite to see this as the governing class safeguarding their own interests in the 
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existing system of accumulation. Firstly, awarding labour increases was against the 
developmental recommendations of the Seers Report which argued that only one of 
two things could the Zambian state afford given the existing resource basket: increases 
in employment while keeping wages roughly constant, or increases in wages, while 
keeping employment levels stagnant. Instead, the interplay of the state, capital and 
labour forced the Zambian state to increase both employment and wages. Secondly, 
awarding wage increases bound more developmental resources to the existing system 
of accumulation. In other words, structural transformation was increasingly inhibited 
by the particular interplay of the state, labour and capital, which concentrated 
resources in the existing material base, and, in parallel, limited the scope of politics. 
On the latter, the state-labour conflict created an opportunity for opposition political 
parties to launch their manifestos which focused on improving the affairs of labour, 
albeit within the framework of the existing material base. 
Nevertheless, by 1968, real private consumption began its downward trend right up to 
the end of 1969, before rising from 1969 to 1970 by 5.3 percent, although overall 
leaving the 1970 level 17 percent lower than its planned figure. The declining real 
private consumption in 1968 and 1969 resulted from a combination of three factors: 
firstly, wage freezes in 1968 and 1969; secondly, deflationary budget in 1969; and, 
thirdly, increased personal remittances abroad, rising by more than a factor of two 
from K11.3 million in 1967 to K26.7 million in 1968, and then doubling again to 
K54.4 million in 1969. It is worth mentioning that in part this rapid expatriation of 
funds outside of Zambia resulted from failure of interests of foreign private capital 
and labour to bind their commitment to the development of the country. Independence 
brought uncertainty to foreign-owned enterprises, but this disquieting outlook was 
further shaken by the economic reforms which were interpreted to having brought the 
state and foreign private capital into opposition. Consequently, foreign private capital 
(and labour) safeguarded their interests by remitting increasing portions of the 
surpluses they created in Zambia. Also, after restrictive policies on remittances 
between Independence and 1968, the series, and specific configuration, of economic 




In real terms, government consumption expenditure grew by 17 percent per year 
between 1964 and 1968, before plateauing in 1969 and 1970. That the 1969 
government expenditure figure was virtually unchanged by 1970, largely reflected the 
effectiveness of the deflationary budget of 1969. 
Table 5-11 Real public and private (excluding subsistence) consumption (K' million), 1964-1970 
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105.8  
        
111.1  
        
109.2  
        
109.2  
Source: SNDP Tables 3 and 4, p3 
To support the government’s statement on diversification of the economy, the SNDP 
noted the establishment of new industries, and the growth of manufacturing, reaching 
a period peak of 17 percent per year by 1969. The details of these industrial projects, 
including the specific form of industrial growth, did not inform the SNDP on its 
statement on structural transformation. As will be seen below, contrary to the SNDP’s 
claim “that the FNDP … made a good beginning in reducing the dependence of the 
national economy on copper” (Ministry of Development Planning and National 
Guidance, 1971: 4), the developments during the FNDP did deepen the economy’s 
dependence upon copper. In part, the restricted understanding of structural 
transformation, punctuated by geopolitical and internal contradictions, restricted the 
formulation of wide-ranging policies and creation of broad-based institutional 
arrangements to underpin resource allocation. 
Government expenditure is lauded by the SNDP as having assisted accumulation by 
creating new or expanding existing assets. Departing from the frugal colonial 
government, the new government after Independence embarked on a range of 
developmental projects which were reflected in investment expenditure. In 1965, less 
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than a year after Independence, the share of central government in gross fixed capital 
formation was around 19 percent, but during the FNDP period, this share ranged 
between 26 percent and 30 percent. For the SNDP this evidences the larger role of the 
state in investment throughout the Zambian economy. Expenditure in gross fixed 
capital formation increased from K53 million to K 91 million for 1966 and 1970, 
respectively, giving a period average of about K71 million per annum from a 
cumulative total of K355 million. 
The government also doled out other funds in form of loans amounting to K209 
million for the period 1966-1969 to local authorities, state enterprises and local 
entrepreneurs, which represented an indirect contribution of the state to capital 
formation in the Zambian economy. From K 26 million for 1965, loans given out by 
the state increased to an average of K52 per year between 1966 and 1969. However, 
the performance of these loans demonstrates that giving out money without creating 
capacity and a framework to monitor, coordinate and promote investment can lead to 
a deadweight loss (wastage). See the case of the Credit Organisation of Zambia (COZ) 
below. 
The SNDP notes that the implementation of the FNDP called the state into action, to 
extend its range of administrative structures in order to ensure that targets were 
pursued with soundness of organisational arrangements. Consequently, this 
restructuring through expansion and extension of the state administrative structures 
slowed down the growth of government expenditure on goods and services. Despite 
the expenditure on goods and services increasing to K120 million in 1970 from K74 
million in 1965, the share of this variable in total expenditure dropped to just under 
30 percent from 37.6 percent during the FNDP period. Indeed, the immediate post-
Independence episode placed urgency on the state to build its administrative capacity, 
both to deliver and manage development. During this period, inflation eroded money 
incomes of salaried workers including civil servants. While the Brown Commission 
had sparked wage increases in the productive sector, it was the Report of the 
Commission on the Grading, Structure and Salaries (commonly referred to as the 
Whelan Report) which catalysed a steep rise in the civil service salaries and personal 
emoluments. Workers of the central government appropriate about K40 million in 
salaries in 1965, with modest increase of K2 million by 1966. However, the steep 
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increase to K59 million in 1967 and then K70 million in 1970 reflected partly the 
expansion of government employment but mainly the increases in the wage bill 
following the Whelan Report. What these developments in the civil service did was 
not bind the state functionaries in terms of resources and operations to the existing 
economic base. This disabled the freeing up resources for, and commitment to, 
development elsewhere. Thus, the interests of salaried civil service workers were 
entrenched in the state structures and their subsequent actions, reflected in the 
recurrent expenditure share of public expenditure, could be interpreted as 
safeguarding their own interests at the expense of freeing up developmental resources. 
5.8.1 Performance of foreign trade 
The composition of exports reflects the dependence of the Zambian economy on 
copper. Throughout the FNDP period, copper supplied over 90 percent of Zambia’s 
annual foreign exchange earnings. Fortuitous terms of trade due to favourable copper 
prices led to rising export receipts for Zambia, which in turn accounted for the export 
surplus throughout the FNDP period as shown in the Table 5-12 Exports and Imports: 
1966-70 (in K' million current prices), below. 
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Table 5-12 Exports and Imports: 1966-70 (in K' million current prices) 
Year Exports Imports Trade Balance 






1967 470.0 -4.7 306.3 24.5 163.7 
1968 544.4 15.8 325.2 6.2 219.2 
1969 766.5 40.8 311.8 -4.1 454.7 
1970 714.8 -6.7 358.5 15.0 356.3 
Source: SNDP Table 8, p7 
The SNDP notes the steep rise in imports from 1966 to 1967 to the order of almost 25 
percent as a result of wage increases following the Brown Commission which 
instigated wide-scale salary increases. The 1969 contractionary budget implemented 
via credit restrictions and other regulatory measures targeted at arresting inflation40 
did allow the trade balance to balloon, hence causing foreign exchange reserves to 
swell. Nevertheless, reflecting the nature of interests which lodged themselves in the 
economic base of the copper-complex, specifically foreign capitalists and labour, the 
age of the FNDP was marked by “substantial increase in the invisible payment 
obligations abroad which ate into the considerable surpluses on external trade” 
(Ministry of Development Planning and National Guidance, 1971: 7). The 1969 
deflationary budget coincided with soaring copper prices which raised foreign 
exchange earnings by more than two thirds from the 1968 figure. Until the end of the 
third quarter of 1970, foreign exchange earnings were expanding, before they dropped 
again following a decline in world copper prices. 
In addition to its own resources for development finance, the Zambian government 
also made use of external sources of finance throughout the FNDP except for the last 
year. A total of value of K125 million in foreign loans had been acquired; many of the 
loans were to be paid back in ten to fifteen years. Loan financing was earmarked for 
productive development financing, particularly for infrastructural developments such 
as roads upgrading and expansion, oil pipeline, energy project and establishment of 
                                                 
40 On the fiscal side, contraction of government expenditure reduced capital expenditure to K156 
million in 1969 from K193 million in 1968. From the monetary side, in alignment with economic 
reforms, the magnitude and beneficiaries of bank credit were restricted from 1968. 
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education facilities. Importantly, these developments must be seen as strengthening 
the inherited system of accumulation by localisation of interests, although with scope 
for structural change if used properly. 
By the end of the FNDP, economic policy change led the government to purchase 
controlling shares in the copper mines. Although acquiring controlling interests meant 
that foreign exchange leakages out of Zambia would rise due to settlement obligations 
on purchased shares, the Zambian government was convinced that acquiring 
controlling interests in the copper mines would curtail export of foreign exchange 
earnings which in turn would more than compensate the foreign exchange leakages. 
In a sense, acquisition of controlling interests in the copper mines was partly aimed at 
ensuring that foreign exchange earned from copper exports would remain within the 
country to finance national development. In hindsight, and in principle, this view was 
based on the assumption that copper mining would remain profitable, and, therefore, 
a net benefit to shareholders. 
5.8.2 Employment, wages and productivity during the FNDP 
The expansion of employment experienced during the FNDP which brought total 
employment to 390,000 by December 1970 from the June 1966 figure of 313,000, 
represented an increase of about 24 percent, or a fifth less in jobs increase than had 
been targeted by the FNDP. The public sector accounted for 45.8 percent of the 77,000 
jobs growth which took place between 1966 and 1970, while for the same period, the 
private sector only achieved 15.7 percent. This trend reflects the expansion of the state 
administrative machinery and state-sponsored infrastructural developments, but also 
the limited growth in productive output by the private sector. Also, this pattern helps 
to sustain the argument that the particular form of development experienced during 
these years reflected localised interests in the state sector and choked the rest of the 
economy of investible surplus. Martin (1972) was critical of this trend, arguing that 
despite its advantage of reducing unemployment and fulfilling a social role, it would 
be difficult to resolve the employment dilemma through expansion of the civil service. 
Besides, given attractive pay packages and other conditions of work, particularly those 
reflecting continuities of the colonial legacy which awarded “civil servants with 
subsidised housing … [this strategy] greatly increase[d] the burden the civil service 
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place[d] on the economy” (Martin, 1972: 220). By the end of 1970, the Services and 
the Construction sectors were the two top largest employers while the electricity and 
water sectors accounted for the least employment. 
 
Table 5-13 Wage Employment by Industry, December 1970 
Industrial Division Numbers % of total 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries          34,600  8.9 
Mining and Quarrying          64,100  16.4 
Manufacturing          36,300  9.3 
Construction          73,800  18.9 
Electricity, Water etc.            3,200  0.8 
Commerce          32,500  8.3 
Transport and Communications          23,100  5.9 
Services (Excluding domestic)          87,200  22.4 
Domestic Services          35,000  9.0 
All industries       389,800  100.0 
Source: SNDP Table 9, p9 
Because the fledgling post-Independence years were marked by a substantial presence 
and use of non-indigenous labour, it is worth viewing the composition of employment 
on the basis of whether labour was indigenous or not. While total African employment 
was trending up in both absolute and relative means, non-African employment 
(mainly white/European) was on a consistent decline as shown in the Table 5-14 Wage 
employment by African or otherwise, 1960, 1964, 1966 and 1970, below. The share 
of total non-African employment in total employment declined from about 12 percent 
in 1960 to only about 7 percent in ten years, with total employment growing in 
absolute terms by over 38 percent during the same period. Partly explaining this 
decline was the localisation of labour and employment by deliberate policy, and partly 





Table 5-14 Wage employment by African or otherwise, 1960, 1964, 1966 and 1970 
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total 
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325,200  
       
100.0  




Source: Adapted from SND Table 10, p10 
Meanwhile, as wage pressures following labour-capital conflict in the mining sector, 
mediated by the state, led to rising wages for mainly African mineworkers, this sent a 
ripple effect throughout the rest of the economy as wages in the non-mining sectors 
also went up. Again, this must be seen as labour protecting and promoting its own 
interests with concessions made by the state seen as merely reflecting this. Despite 
rapid wages in the non-mining sector, by 1970 the mining sector paid the highest 
average wages, with Agriculture and Domestic Services taking the bottom two places 
in terms of level of average wages by sector. However, the gains made by labour 
concentrated power and resources in the existing economic base, and this is seen in 
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the way the state responded, particularly in terms of resource distribution and, 
subsequently, economic policy change focused on renovation and consolidation of 
existing assets. Within four years of Independence, the total wage bill had increased 





Table 5-15 Annual Kwacha Wages of African Employees by Sectors: 1964, 1966 and 1970 
 
Percentage increase 
Sector 1964 1966 1970 1966-70 1964-70 
Mining and Quarrying 732 934 1,555 66.5 112.4 
Transport and Communications 482 688 1,034* 50.3 114.5 
Commerce 388 447 795 77.9 104.9 
Services (excluding domestic) 392 526 794 51.0 102.6 
Construction 286 332 533 60.5 86.4 
Manufacturing 406 484 802 65.7 97.5 
Electricity and Water 320 573 927 61.8 189.7 
Agriculture 176 190 348 83.2 97.7 
Domestic Services 196 248 280 12.9 42.9 
*For the year 1969 
Source: SNDP Table 11, p11 
In addition, it is difficult to interpret progress of salaried workers as reflecting the 
national interest since higher salaries in the context of post-Independence Zambian 
society “represents a victory for the fortunate minority Zambians with jobs over the 
less fortunate” (Martin, 1972: 220). Further, expansion of employment and 
infrastructural development put pressure on the economy to provide decent housing, 
but to demonstrate the state’s response to this challenge as a reflection of the interests 
of the salaried workers mainly resident in the urbanised and more developed areas of 
the country “[i]t has been estimated … that something in the tune of K118 million was 
spent on civil service housing during the First National Development Plan period 
1966-1970 – four times as much as the Government allocated to low-cost housing for 
the rest of the population” (Martin, 1972: 224, footnote 1). 
Steep increases in African wages across all sectors represented the narrow notion of 
development policy and political discourse. Representing the nature of colonial 
administration, as explored in Chapter Four, white settlers (loosely referred to as 
expatriates in the post-Independence epoch) appropriated a larger portion of national 
income, which reflected in the dual wage structure, with African workers receiving 
substantially lower wages. In part, the dual wage structure during the era of colonial 
administration reflected superior skills and experience of white settlers, but also the 
attitudes and legislation of the colonial government. However, with Independence, 
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African workers expected their working conditions, especially their wages, to 
improve, while changed political attitudes and administration of the new black 
leadership, having won support of the African workers, vowed to destroy colour-based 
discrimination both in wages and employment patterns. The interplay of these 
expectations, the colonial legacy and political discourse ensured that improvements in 
working conditions were to be based upon the standard set by white workers (Sindab, 
1984). That is, wage structures and lifestyles of expatriate workers became the 
standard against which improvements for African workers would be measured, with 
a view to convergence in wages over time by deliberately permitting faster wage 
increases for African workers.41 By integrating this view of progress for African 
workers, development policy departed from what would be suitable for local 
conditions. Note that the high salaries paid to white workers were not only an incentive 
for them to see and seek opportunity in Africa, but, in 1963, for example, they “were 
among the highest in the world” (Martin, 1972: 38). In the year of Independence, the 
average wage of an African was about a ninth of the average wage paid to the 
expatriate. By 1970, reflecting that African wages accelerated faster than expatriate 
wages, on average, an expatriate received only six times more than an African worker. 
This is certainly proof of progress in ending racially-based wage discrimination, but 
that expatriates continued to receive substantially more than Africans reflected their 
superior administrative, management, and professional experience and skills (Sindab, 
1984). The average total for all sectors shows that African workers increased their 
money earnings by a factor greater than two, while expatriate workers by only about 
55 percent. Despite rising prices, salaried Zambians may have witnessed a marginal 
                                                 
41 Generally reflecting on the magnitude of earnings of, and the lifestyle these wages could afford 
for, white settlers, Martin (1972: 39) reports that in 1963 “a European artisan on the mines earned 
something like £150 a month in basic pay, together with generous leave entitlements and other 
benefits. He lived in a subsidised house – comfortable suburban villa with an extensive garden – and 
he sent his children to an exclusive school with all modern facilities that had been heavily subsidised 
by the Federal Government. He employed two or three African servants whose wages made only a 
small hole in his own pay packet. He himself certainly possessed a new car and his wife very 
probably drove another. His social life revolved around the racially exclusive mine club and the golf 
club with its beautiful watered course and luxurious clubhouse.” Although aspirations and attitudes 
towards progress in the post-Independence era were formed around such lifestyles, it must be 
mentioned that such a lifestyle could certainly hardly be the basis upon which development policy 
suitable for local conditions would be erected. Progress measured on an emulative basis of such a 
lifestyle would not only represent misallocation of scarce resources, it would also plant the country 
deeper into a narrow notion of development and the economic base underpinning it. 
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improvement in their standard of living on account of the fact that between 1964 and 
1970, their real earnings rose annually by around eight percent.  
Partly to circumvent the effect on inflation of rising wages, in August 1969, the 
Government instituted a wage freeze, and then for 1970, wage growth was capped at 
5 percent. Revisions on wages, according to the government, would be informed by 
labour productivity gains and progress in diminishing the rural-urban income gap. 
But the gains achieved in wages growth were almost wiped out by the end of the 
FNDP. For example, the wholesale price index for consumption goods rose by 22.6 
percent between 1966 and 1968. These developments must be kept in mind when 
discussions roll out below on state-labour relations. While salaried workers housed 
within the existing economic base acted to protect and advance their interests, rising 
prices kept their wage increases modest enough to ill-afford substantial improvements 
in lifestyles as they had anticipated which in turn fertilised further state-labour conflict 
within the context of state-owned enterprises, while also limiting the scope of politics. 
As will be developed below, particularly when developmental resources became 
scarce, political discourse focused instead on the agenda of advancing/safeguarding 
the interests of salaried urbanised workers and business elites (Scott, 1978; Sklar, 
1975) framed as consolidation and renovation of the existing economic base rather 
than structural transformation to broaden the economic base, although with occasional 
rhetoric on rural development. 
5.8.3 Training and, localisation of labour and skills 
For technical and vocational jobs, the apprenticeship arrangement was the only 
systemic technique used at the time of Independence, and this represented an aspect 
of continuity of the colonial era. The sustainability of this system depended upon a 
reasonable pool of already appropriately educated and trained personnel to pass on the 
skills to apprentices. When Zambia’s immediate post-Independence years were 
plagued by mass departure of skilled expatriates, the Zambian Government was 
compelled to abandon the apprenticeship scheme as the technique for expanding trade 
and vocational training and skills. Consequently, the Commission for Technical 
Education and Vocational Training was established in 1968 as the vehicle to develop 
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and drive local trade and vocational skills. By 1971, several Zambians to the order of 
2,911 had been enrolled in technical institutions. See Table 5-16 Annual Kwacha 





Table 5-16 Annual Kwacha Wages of African Employees by Sectors: 1964, 1966 and 1970 
Enrolment in Technical Institutions, 1971 
Category Enrolments 
Technological 473 
Trades Training 1,362 
Applied Arts and Commerce 842 
Technical Teacher Training 60 
Nkumbi International College 174 
Total            2,911  
Source: SNDP Table 13, p13 
The exodus of expatriates inhibited in some important ways the germination of 
manpower with wide-ranging skills to underpin a more integrated structure of 
production. Firstly, the departure of expatriates placed an urgent need upon the 
Zambian authorities to seek local skills to fill the vacuum. In doing this, public 
financial and human resources dedicated to developing local skills to fill the vacancies 
did not directly confront the existing system of accumulation; instead, these 
developments served to strengthen it by manning the existing institutions 
underpinning the Zambian economy. Secondly, such skill-development facilities were 
developed with the existing economic base in mind, so that graduates of such training 
would quickly find employment in existing enterprises. This not only served to 
strengthen the existing system of accumulation but it also reflected the limited and 
myopic imagination of what kind of development was to be underpinned by structural 
transformation. Even if structural transformation is seen in its narrow notion of 
industrial development, skills development and capacity building must have foresight 
and hence must anticipate an integrated structure of production. Because the process 
of catching up requires learning foreign technology, such learning should not be 
restricted by the existing economic base. Indeed, the DSP account evidences this. For 
example, Amsden (1989: 302) explores the detail of foresight of the South Korean 
industrial development agenda, particularly in terms of skills development: she notes 
that “[e]ven before operations had commenced, 597 POSCO personnel had received 
training on or off the job in Japan and Austria in total of eleven fields, among them 
iron-making and steel-making. This afforded a tremendous accumulation of 
experience and know-how and set a precedent for the overseas training that continues 
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today.” For South Korea, not only did foresight allow wide-ranging skills to develop 
in order to promote learning of yet to exist foreign technology, it also permitted 
continuous development of skills and experience over time to support and promote an 
integrated pattern of production. 
Overall, progress for Zambian workers was not only seen in terms of creation of new 
employment, but also in replacing expatriate workers. In common parlance, this was 
regarded as Zambianisation of labour. To accelerate Zambianisation of labour at a 
national level, the state put three committees in place in 1968: the Zambianisation 
Committee for the Mining Industry; the Zambianisation Committee for the Private 
Sector; and the Zambianisation Committee for the Civil Service. By the end of the 
first quarter of 1971, substantial progress had been made to localise labour. For the 
central government for example, the share of Zambians in all positions rose to 83.7 
percent in March 1971 from 70.8 percent in 1966. However, progress for Zambians 
in professional level categories of employment in central government remained 
virtually static and low, in part reflecting the low levels of education. The largest gains 
for Zambians within the central government categories were seen in the 
Administrative and Executive category. 
Table 5-17 Zambianisation in Central Government 
Categories of Employment Percentage of Zambians employed 
1966 1971 (March) 
Professional 17.6 17.7 
Administrative and Executive 46.5 87.4 
Technical 45.4 67.2 
Teachers 82.9 83.7 
All Categories 70.8 83.7 
Source: SNDP Table 14, p13 
While in December 1964 only 704 Zambians held jobs that expatriates could do, that 
number had increased to 4,661 be the end of 1970. Also, for example, the total number 
of expatriates in the mines reduced to 3,774 in December 1970 from 7,621 in 
December 1964 (Ministry of Development Planning and National Guidance, 1971: 
13). However, Tordoff (1980: 7) points to administrative and institutional weaknesses 
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in the immediate post-Independence half-decade, mainly on account of a failure for 
suitable institutions to emerge following the contradictions of the colonial legacy, but 
also contends that a lack of adequate education, particularly in the state architecture, 
hampered the effectiveness of the state: “An unusual feature of the Zambian situation 
at independence was that those who, through the policy of Zambianisation, were 
promoted rapidly to senior posts in the civil service, tended on aggregate to be less 
well educated than political leaders who became Cabinet Ministers.” 
These statistics on Zambianising labour add voice to the view that development policy 
in the immediate post-Independence epoch became constrained by the existing 
physical/material base. Because there were virtually insignificant African (Zambian) 
businessmen during the implementation of the FNDP, progress for Zambians as a 
feature of development was seen largely in terms of progress of labour. Limited actual 
new employment had been created despite unprecedented increase in public 
expenditure. Consequently, progress of African labour was partially seen in terms of 
the rate at which expatriates were substituted by Zambian workers. However, such 
dynamics took place within the existing system of accumulation, and hence only 
served to localise interests on virtually the same core material base. That is, Zambian 
labour made progress within a limited space confined by the existing physical 
economic base. 
5.8.4 Mining developments 
Between 1965 and 1970, copper production increased by 1.4 percent to 684.7 metric 
tonnes. This represented a low output growth of 0.3 percent per year, but coupled with 
the fact that employment in the copper industry increased by 4.5 percent, it meant a 
modest decline in the productivity of labour. In fact, the Mufulira mine disaster 
already discussed did contribute substantially to the drop in copper output when, in its 
wake, at least a sixth of copper was taken out overnight. However, that employment 
in the Mining and Quarrying sector increased by a tenth implied that copper-induced 
non-copper mining industries experienced a larger expansion in employment. Indeed, 
although such an expansion evidences growth of non-copper mining activities, it was 
the presence of copper mining that induced and sustained such growth. For example, 
the establishment of the coal industry accounted for part of this growth in employment 
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in overall Mining and Quarrying sector, but it was the copper sector within the context 
of geopolitical contradictions with the South which necessitated such a development. 
In other words, it did not represent broadly-viewed diversification of economic 
activities because at the heart of it, such growth could only be sustained to the extent 
that copper mining remained profitable. In effect, developments outside of copper 
planted the Zambian economy deeper into its fortunes. Supporting this argument, and 
demonstrating the pre-eminence of copper to Zambia’s immediate post-Independence 
period, is the characteristic that while by 1965 copper contributed 42 percent to GDP, 
dropping to 40 percent in 1967, favourable copper prices, which financed non-copper 
developments elsewhere, ensured that by 1969, copper shares in GDP had risen to 49 
percent. 
Despite efforts by the government to promote developments in the copper industry 
through revisions of the tax system and putting in place additional laws to regulate 
mining operations, no substantial injection of foreign capital into the mines took place. 
Such features restricted government policy in the copper industry to emphasise 
maximisation of extraction of surplus for the state in form of mineral royalties and 
other taxes, without acting as a disincentive for mineral development. As the previous 
tax system relied on sales of copper without taking into account the costs of 
production, changes were made in the tax system to ensure that costs including capital 
costs were first subtracted from profits before the government could claim revenue. 
These changes, however, did not stimulate substantial mineral development; instead, 
as will be developed below, the system of accumulation, which led to nationalisation 
of the copper mines, only deepened development policy into the fortunes of the copper 
sector. When copper prices declined and costs of production rose, copper production 
not only became unprofitable but it was also a net drain on the state coffers. 
Indeed, it was the fortuitous rise in demand for copper on the world market which kept 
copper prices high such that a lack of productivity growth in the copper industry was 
more than offset by the profitability of producing and exporting copper. Despite the 
SNDP concession that “[i]t is obvious from these figures that the price of copper was 
as much an important influence as increased development in other sectors of the 
economy” (Ministry of Development Planning and National Guidance, 1971: 18), it 
is even more clear that without the lucky break in copper prices, financing 
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developments in other sectors would have had to depend on external rather than 
domestic sources. Importantly, however, is to assess to what extent increased 
developments in other sectors promoted or restricted structural transformation. In part, 
this is seen in the form of industrial and infrastructural development as the basis for 
formation of an integrated, yet independent-of-copper, structure of production. 
Independent-of-copper here is seen in its broader sense, which implies the 
amalgamation of direct (material flows) and indirect (fiscal linkages, sectoral 
productive linkages, foreign exchange capacity and allocations etc.) links between 
copper developments and the rest of the economy. But, as will be shown, the particular 
configuration of interests lodged in the material base bequeathed upon the 
Independent Zambian economy by the colonial era functioned in a way which 
deepened the dependence of the Zambian economy on profitability of copper. In large 
part, accounting for this particular functioning and configuration of the state was the 
institutional establishment and expansion of the post-Independence state and its 
relation to capital within the context of a given stock of existing local skills and human 
resource capacity. The expansion of the Zambian state was seen as a necessity in order 
to deliver development, but it did so against a backdrop of chronic shortages of local 
human resource capacity. 
In sum, limited mineral developments took place, while favourable copper prices and 
non-technical conditions surrounding its extraction and export such as transport costs, 
did make copper mining a highly lucrative undertaking. This helped the government 
expand its expenditure capacity and, subsequently, to finance a range of development 
projects. 
5.8.5 Manufacturing sector developments and Zambia’s form of 
industrialisation 
The reason behind the promotion of industrial development during the FNDP has 
already been discussed. In part, the geopolitical contradictions and the nature of 
interests of the political leadership saw urgency in the development of industries to 
replace imports, mainly in light industries in the food, beverages and tobacco 
subsector. In total, the government alone spent about K95 million Kwacha on 
industrial development projects which must be seen in context if compared to K118 
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million it spent on housing for civil servants alone during the FNDP. Good or bad, 
this raises questions over government commitment to industrial development or, more 
exactly, demonstrates the strength of the interests lodged in the state’s civil service. 
Thus, including their salaries and other benefits, civil servants alone appropriated so 
large a share of the national pie that it dwarfed the committed resources for industrial 
development. As will be developed, this pattern of resource allocation reflected the 
nature of the system of accumulation — the material base underpinning it and the 
nature of interests which were bound to it. 
The FNDP and SNDP mantra of meeting prevailing local demand by local production 
restricted industrial development to the needs of the salaried workers, whether in the 
state sector, the Party or private enterprises. Thus, industrial development as 
experienced in Zambia during the immediate post-Independence era departed from 
the DSP experience in a fundamental way. As Amsden (1989: 69) argued, the state 
under Park ensured “increasingly [that] exports [were] compulsory rather than a 
choice for the private sector”, such that expansion of exports was explained more by 
“pressure rather than [by] subsidies.” Eventually, for South Korea, it was “[e]xports 
of labor-intensive manufactures [which] began to eat away … the cancer of 
underemployment” (Amsden, 1989: 72).  
Both the Zambian and South Korean industries profited from government support, but 
the motive and specific configuration of such support differed in a fundamental way. 
For Zambia, administrative and price restrictions on imports and government-
sponsored production subsidies were used to promote growth of local-market-oriented 
industries, while the South Korean government did so to encourage and nurture net 
exporting businesses. In addition, government support, for the case of South Korea, 
was conditional on good performance, particularly in meeting strict export targets. 
Although “[g]ood performance [was] evaluated in terms of production and operations 
management rather than financial indicators”, the pressure from the state via 
government bureaucrats on business managers to export aided the development of 
competitive capacity through innovation of systems and operations (Amsden, 1989: 
16). Zambia, on the other hand, lacked competitive capacity and foresight, and instead 
restricted industrial development to the local market, dominated mainly by urban 
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salaried elites, with obvious political implications for employment and provision of 
subsidies for production and consumption.  
Wade (1990: 139), in a similar light as Amsden, adds voice to the role of the state in 
aiding exports through export incentives. For example, by creating export processing 
zones, the Taiwanese state compelled firms operating within them “to export all of 
their production in return for enjoying duty- and tax-free imported inputs, good 
infrastructure facilities, and simplified administrative procedures for trade and 
remittances” (Wade, 1990b: 139). Overall, to encourage exports even in a 
considerably protected industrial environment, the Taiwanese state relied on a mix of 
methods and strategies, among them, the establishment of export processing zones, 
tariff rebates, nontariff barriers, export tax incentives, export credits, export cartels 
export quality inspection, export marketing, export awards and foreign exchange 
allocations and, to some extent, exchange rate management. Hence, it is imprudent to 
view government intervention itself as inherently bad without assessing its detail and 
motive, and not least the underlying physical economic base and interests it promotes. 
Nevertheless, the Zambian economy did experience substantial aggregate industrial 
development, exceeding some expectations of the FNDP in certain indicators such as 
gross output (Fry, 1980). 
Table 5-18 Plan Targets and Achievements 




Gross output (K million) 227.3 235 
Value added (K million) 90.5 90 
Employment 40,000 36,300* 
GDP growth per rate per year 14% 17% 
Total wages and salaries (K million) 29.1 39.0 
*This figure is for December 1970 
Source: SNDP Table 17, p19 
The detail of industrial development during the FNDP can be gleaned from the SNDP 
which lists twelve large-scale manufacturing projects. These are: The Zambia Clay 
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Industries, located in Kitwe which started production in 1969, was producing 6,200 
tons of salt-glazed clay pipes and 2.7 million bricks per year; Zambia Sugar company 
which began operations in 1968 annually produced about 45,000 tonnes of raw sugar; 
INDECO Milling Ltd, established in in 1968, producing annually, 40,000 tonnes and 
5,000 tonnes of mealie meal and bran, respectively; expansion of the Lusaka Brewery 
annual capacity in 1968 to 200 million bottles of beer; Truck Assembly plant at 
Luanshya with an assembly capacity of 20 trucks per month; expansion of Chilanga 
Cement Ltd. capacity in 1969 to 500,000 tonnes of cement per year; Dunlop Zambia 
Ltd. which began operations in 1969 in Ndola, had an annual capacity of 100,000 
tyres; Kafue Textiles Ltd., established in 1970, providing 1,000 jobs and producing 
an annual capacity of 12.5 million metres of textile fabrics; Kabwe Industrial Fabrics 
Ltd., with an annual capacity of 5 million gunny and 1.3 million of hessian cloth was 
established in 1970; Nitrogen Chemicals Ltd. in Kafue with an annual capacity of 
75,000 tonnes of fertilisers and blasting compounds rolled out operations in 1970; in 
June 1970, Kafironda explosives started operations with an annual capacity of 7,000 
explosives; Mwinilunga Fruit Canning Factory, an enterprise of Rucom Industries, 
started operations in 1970 with an annual capacity of 300 tonnes of pineapples. 
Further, the rerouting of trade which led to the establishment of Tazama Oil Pipeline 
in August 1968 induced “the establishment of Zambia’s first oil refinery, the Indeni 
Petroleum Refinery in Ndola, with a capacity of 650,000 tonnes of crude oil per 
annum” (Ministry of Development Planning and National Guidance, 1971: 20). A 
number of additional industries which emerged during the FNDP were materially 
directly related to the copper industry, and a case in point was the Metal Fabricators 
of Zambia at Luanshya, a mining town in the Copperbelt, which had a capacity of 
1,500 tonnes of copper wires and cable including some 200 tonnes of aluminium 
cable. These developments, though laudable, clenched the Zambian economy to the 
core of accumulation – the copper industry. Importantly, however, listing these 
developments here helps to identify the specifics and detail of the physical 
accumulation the post-Independence Zambian economy experienced. Analytically, 
the kinds of industrial projects which underpinned physical accumulation of capital 
are seen to be of a narrow base, particularly is measured against the experiences of the 
Developmental States discussed in Chapter Three. 
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Industrial development ensured that the total number of establishments rose by about 
30 percent to 535 in 1969 from 412 in 1965. The highest concentration of industries 
by category was observed in the ‘Metal-working’ subsector, accounting for almost a 
third of total establishments in 1969, followed by ‘Leather and footwear’, with 




Table 5-19 Number of Industrial Establishments in Zambia 
Category 1965 % of total 
establishments, 
1965 






Food industries 64 15.5 65 12.1 1.6 
Beverages 27 6.6 7 1.3 -74.1 
Tobacco manufacturing 2 0.5 1 0.2 -50.0 
Textiles 68 16.5 101 18.9 48.5 
Leather and footwear 2 0.5 4 0.7 100.0 
Timber 40 9.7 43 8.0 7.5 
Paper, pulp, cartons 6 1.5 12 2.2 100.0 
Printing and publishing 19 4.6 23 4.3 21.1 
Chemicals 15 3.6 28 5.2 86.7 
Petroleum and coal derivatives 1 0.2 2 0.4 100.0 
Rubber products 9 2.2 11 2.1 22.2 
Glass and china 1 0.2 1 0.2 0.0 
Plastics 2 0.5 13 2.4 550.0 
Building materials 51 12.4 36 6.7 -29.4 
Non-ferrous metals 2 0.5 3 0.6 50.0 
Metal-working 98 23.8 171 32.0 74.5 
Others 5 1.2 14 2.6 180.0 
Total 412 100.0 535 100.0 29.9 
Source: Adapted from SDNP Table 18, p20 
Although this is developed in more detail below, it is worth mentioning that direct 
state participation in production was achieved via two state agencies – INDECO for 
large-scale and medium enterprises and Rucom for small-scale rural and agro-related 
industries. It is through these state agencies that a number of industrial units saw the 
light of day. 
Chapter Seven will detail the particular nature of post-Independence industrial 
development and capital accumulation. It will be shown that relying on foreign capital, 
management and administration, led to remarkable capital accumulation but its 
particular configuration drew the Zambian form of industrial development deeper into 
dependence upon the fortunes of the copper sector. In fact, while political vices such 
as graft, the spoils-based political system and corruption became increasingly 
prevalent (Szeftel, 1982, 1980), they did so within a restricted structure of production, 
consequently limiting the political discourse and remedial measures. If placing this 
within the entire schema of the thesis which sees developmentalism within the context 
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of a system of accumulation, such actions can be interpreted as relations of interests 
and exchange taking place within bounds as permitted by the underlying configuration 
of physical accumulation. 
5.8.6 Developments in the energy and transport sectors 
The FNDP regarded self-sufficiency in energy as a matter of urgency. By the end of 
the FNDP, K75 million was spent as capital expenditure, an amount well over a third 
above what was planned. A number of small hydro-electric schemes dotted across the 
country developed during the FNDP which supplied individually between 1.2 MW 
and 60 MW of energy, although it was the first stage of Kafue Hydro-electric Scheme 
with installed capacity of 600 MW which gobbled up a large chunk of, and ballooned, 
the capital expenditure. At the end of the FNDP it was decided that developments at 
the Kariba North Bank Hydro-electric Scheme would be carried out and be completed 
by 1974, costing over K53 million.  
To demonstrate that developments in the energy sector bound the Zambian economy 
to the copper sector, the copper mines alone at that time consumed about 80 percent 
of Zambia’s power. During the FNDP, total national consumption of electricity in 
Zambia grew by 6.2 percent per year to 3,958 kWh in 1970. Threatened by the UDI 
experience, energy provision was important to the Zambian government because it 
was the lifeblood of the copper sector, the backbone of the Zambian economy. Thus, 
this suggests that the direction of developmental resources was tied to capital projects 
which directly supported the development of the copper sector. 
For transport, the system of accumulation under colonial administration, defined 
generally in terms of the development of copper mines, and Zambia’s place within the 
South, ensured that major trade routes and transport (and other) infrastructure 
underpinning them were sufficiently developed along a narrow region relative to the 
large expanse of land of the country. The restricted infrastructural development which 
came to be known as the line-of-rail region was home to about 95 percent of the urban 
population and around 25 percent of the total population by 1969. This region 
represented the economic centre of the country, linked to the rest of the world via 
roads and railways to major Southern African ports on the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. 
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The FNDP embarked on upgrading and extension of road networks from 1,322 
kilometre of paved roads in 1964 to about 3,000 kilometres in 1971, although these 
were aimed at improving and enabling trade and commerce of the existing economic 
base. Importantly, this discussion helps to understand what copper windfalls were 
spent on in the immediate post-Independence era, and whether and in what ways such 
expenditure enabled or hampered structural transformation. By the end of 1971, a total 
of K104 million was spent on upgrading existing roads, as well as on some new dirt 
roads; this figure was over 9 percent more than spent by government on industrial 
development. Parallel to development of roads, the total number of registered 
automobiles rose to 99,609 in 1970 from 65,690 in 1965, and facilitating movement 
of people, public transportation also ballooned with the number of operators rising by 
about 250 percent from 222 operators during the same period. 
On closer inspection, about 50 percent of the additional road length was accounted for 
by the Great North Road (822km) to Tanzania towards the port at Dar-es-Salaam, one 
of the most important facilities induced by rerouting of trade. The geopolitical tension 
created by UDI did indeed affect the way in which development would be conceived, 
and the rerouting of trade, and development of infrastructure to facilitate this, were 
not just a reflection of relations with the South but a glimpse in the thought and 
understanding of development by the post-Independence leadership. Indeed, the 
developments in transport which followed UDI, although with rhetoric of self-
sufficiency, inflated transport costs denied development elsewhere by appropriating 
scarce public resources and planted deeper the Zambian economy to the circumstances 
and conditions of the copper sector. For example, following UDI, K10 million out of 
the public cake was sliced out by Zambia Railways in establishing a railway workshop 
at Kabwe which began its operations in 1971. The SNDP recognised the difficulties 
of building road infrastructure to facilitate trade redirection when in fact existing 
railway routes to the South would have achieved the same thing except at lower cost 
and smaller burden on the foreign exchange reserves.  
Viewed more broadly, in part, UDI served to conceive development as self-
sufficiency, but its understanding was restricted because self-sufficiency meant being 
able to localise economic interests in Zambia that were hitherto imported from the 
South. In the transport sector, firstly, this meant finding alternative trade routes, and, 
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secondly, it meant linking UDI-induced economic activities through new transport 
facilities to the core economic centre. For example, coal previously imported from the 
South was to be replaced by local coal, yet developments of local coal preceded 
transport developments. Hence, public resources needed to be provided not only for 
development of import-substituting industries but also transport infrastructure to 
facilitate transiting of these products to the core economic base along the line-of-rail. 
The SNDP reported that “the construction of a railway line from Choma to Maamba 
Colliery, which [was] scheduled to be completed in 1972, [would] reduce transport 
costs considerably for coal, which [was being] being transported by road to Batoka 
railway station and from there to the main consumer centres in the Copperbelt” 
(Ministry of Development Planning and National Guidance, 1971: 22). Zambian 
mines during the colonial era and immediately after Independence before UDI 
depended on imported coal from (Southern) Rhodesia. When UDI came into effect, 
coal supplies were cut short and this disrupted production of copper. It is against this 
background that the urgency of localisation of coal production must be seen. In other 
words, reliance upon copper placed urgency on creating local capital when 
geopolitical tensions endangered the smooth operations of copper mining. 
5.9 Conclusion 
By the early 1970s, Zambia had made significant strides in promoting economic 
development. Political independence gave the newly independent Zambian leadership 
the power to use the state apparatus to encourage accumulation, but the colonial 
legacy, particularly one which ensured that no indigenous economic interests and 
capacity developed, threw challenges at the state, which not only caused it great 
difficulty in realising broad-based development, but also supplanted the development 
of local institutions to promote structural transformation. Using existing capacities, 
while facing the threat of geopolitical tensions, and profiting from advice of 
international consultants, the new Zambian government embarked on a number of 
developmental projects while, at the same time, reorganising and manning the state to 
meet its developmental aspirations. Within a year of Independence, Zambia’s most 
important trading partner and neighbour, Rhodesia, declared unilateral independence 
from Britain, which caused great anger for the international community as to impose 
sanctions. The Zambian government was forced to accept its participation in 
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sanctions, and this caused great anguish for the Zambian economy because crucial 
supplies for Zambian industry, particularly for the copper mines, were disrupted. As 
a matter of principle, and in the national interest, the Zambian government put in place 
measures to delink from the South (Chileshe, 1986; Roberts, 1976; Hall, 1969). 
Consequently, a strategy of self-sufficiency and a programme of infrastructural 
development to divorce from the South defined development policy more broadly. 
Assisted by substantial windfalls from favourable copper prices, the post-
Independence government could afford virtually all its development projects. Public 
expenditure increased substantially, reflecting the commitment of the state to its 
developmental aspirations. Importantly, in terms of policy, a series of measures, such 
as erecting trade barriers and provision of credit and finance for local industry, were 
used by the state effectively to create local physical capital. From this vantage, the 
Zambian state acted effectively developmentally, but the kinds of economic projects 
it created remained restricted in scope because they were tied, directly or indirectly, 
to the continued profitability of the copper mines. Dependence upon foreign skills and 
capital in the manner as was experienced during the immediate post-Independence 
period created a physical economic base which robbed the Zambian economy from 
benefiting from a system of physical accumulation integrated by substantial flows 
between industries and sectors. 
Developmental progress thus was seen in terms of successes achieved in building up 
local infrastructure to support trade redirection and establishment of local economic 
interests that were previously imported. In practice, development or installation of 
local physical capital to replace imports robbed the Zambian economy of investible 
surplus necessary to create broad-based coordinated and linked investments as would 
be required for an integrated structure of production. For such local economic interests 
were organised not in order to spread productive linkages but to attain self-sufficiency 
in raw materials and inputs (e.g. coal, electricity), workshops (railway repair stores 
and engineering facilities) and infrastructure (e.g. road, railways) for copper 
development and supporting industries. Hence, diversification of the structure of 
production was constrained to the extent that economic interests that were previously 
imported were now locally established, with little or no regard for whether these 
promoted or underpinned an integrated structure of production. Considering the scale 
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and form of development the Zambian economy took, it seems apposite to suggest 
that the Zambian government failed to deal with the underlying developmental 
problem — foreign exchange dependence through copper mining. “So as 1969 began, 
it was apparent that Zambia was balanced on a knife-edge” since, as Hall (1969: 176) 
argued, “[e]verything depended on copper.” 
Primarily, in this chapter, I aimed to show the kind of physical capital (physical 
economic base) which underpinned Zambia’s post-Independence developmentalism, 
highlighting some of the major factors and features which directed the Zambian 
economy. Within the scheme of a system of accumulation, this was to show what kind 
of economic activity underpinned the socio-political interests. In Chapter Seven, I will 
argue that as socio-political interests were establishing themselves upon a restricted 
economic base, they began to act in a manner which protected and perpetuated the 
restricted configuration of capital. This raises questions for whether their actions 
should be interpreted as necessarily inimical to development. Thus, analyses which 
focus purely on the politics of development fail to account for how the political 
discourse itself remains restricted by the configuration of physical capital. Also, 
purely economic analyses, which emphasise the technicality of development, fail to 
capture the integral roles of socio-political interests in shaping the form and nature of 
physical accumulation itself. The next chapter will continue the assessment of what 
kind of physical economic base underpinned the Zambian economy during the post-
Independence period of interest to this thesis by examining whether during the Second 
National Development Plan period, 1972-1976, substantial progress had been made 
to redress the contradictions of the colonial era and the immediate post-colonial 
developments until the early 1970s. 
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6 The Political Economy of Development Planning in the 1970s 
6.1 Introduction 
Thematically, this chapter is, on the one hand, a continuation of the previous chapter. 
It seeks to understand the kind of configuration of capital in the 1970s, particularly 
through the lens of the Second National Development Plan (SNDP). Essentially, in 
this chapter, I will examine the kinds of development projects and programmes which 
underpinned the Zambian economy, as a reflection of the material base of the system 
of accumulation. I also investigate how the governing class understood structural 
transformation more broadly, and industrialisation in particular. On the other hand, I 
investigate the detail of industrial development, both in terms of policy and its 
execution in practice. 
I begin by examining broad themes within the SNDP, such as resource allocation, as 
well as performance of the economy. This is to question whether during the SNDP, 
the Zambian governing class had come to grips with the underlying problem. I find 
that development planning in the SNDP itself proceeded as did FNDP, but in the 
absence of copper revenues, industrial development was not only restricted, but 
undermined by being denied public resources. 
6.2 The SNDP and Structural Transformation 
Administratively and institutionally, policy formulation of the SNDP boasted local 
participation and involvement by enabling District Development Committees to 
suggest local development projects and programmes. These recommendations were 
reviewed for endorsement at the Provincial level by the Provincial Development 
Committees before being approved at the National Level by the National 
Development Planning Committees. The Development Planning Division of the 
Ministry of Development Planning and National Guidance made the final reviews “in 
the light of the financial resources available to the Government and a reasonable 
compromise arrived at in choosing a balanced and integrated programme of economic 
and social development over the next five years” (Ministry of Development Planning 
and National Guidance, 1971: vii). 
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In the foreword of the Second National Plan (SNDP), President Kaunda expressed 
optimism for the future hinged on “great satisfaction” of the accomplishments of the 
first seven years post-Independence (Ministry of Development Planning and National 
Guidance, 1971: iii). For Kaunda, the FNDP was meant to build wide-ranging social 
and economic infrastructure, this being the foundation for future economic and social 
development. Thus, Kaunda lauded the FNDP and development policy during that 
period for establishing wide-ranging development projects. Yet careful investigation 
reveals that economic and other infrastructural developments during the FNDP, 
though praiseworthy, did not progress to counter the structure of production by 
building an integrated pattern of production. Instead, geopolitical considerations, 
particularly with the South, compelled the Zambian state to place great emphasis 
above all else on the redirection of trade routes and establishment of local industry to 
replace goods imported from the South. This project absorbed considerable public 
resources and led to the development of industry and physical infrastructure in 
transport and communication, specifically upgrading of the road network, to facilitate 
carriage of exports and imports.  
In addition, another mega-project already underway, and to be completed, during the 
SNDP, but reflecting the redirection of trade routes resulting from geopolitical 
contradictions, was the Tanzania-Zambia Railway from Kapiri Mposhi to Dare-es-
Salaam. Although this project was conceived to catalyse economic development in 
Zambia, it was meant to serve the existing economic base, especially the 
transportation of copper, this being the dominant export commodity. In other words, 
to the extent that socioeconomic and other infrastructural development progressed to 
serve existing (socio-political and economic) interests, it reinforced dependence upon, 
and deepened, the existing system of accumulation.  
Both to serve existing economic interests and be the basis upon which to establish new 
ones, the FNDP was commended for ensuring the expansion of local power and 
energy sources. Completion of the Kafue Hydro-electric Power Scheme at the 
beginning of the SNDP was another laudable accomplishment. At the beginning of 
the SNDP, works on the Kariba North Bank Hydro-electric Power Station were 
already in operation. These developments in the power and energy sector were pursed 
in order to make Zambia “completely self-sufficient in the supply of electricity for 
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both industrial and domestic consumption” (Ministry of Development Planning and 
National Guidance, 1971: iii). 
Expansion of educational facilities, such as building at least one secondary school in 
each district, as well as critical tertiary learning institutions in urban centres were 
commendable advances. The establishment of the University of Zambia and some 
technical colleges were among the proudest achievements. But the SNDP planned to 
depart from expanding general educational facilities to focus instead on targeted skills 
in order to enable Zambians to take on skilled and semi-skilled jobs.  
Overall, economic development remained biased in favour of the line-of-rail urban 
centres, a feature which reflected continuities with the colonial legacy. The SNDP was 
conceived against this background, and its implementation as the basis to counter this 
uneven development, and rural development was selected as the weapon of choice. 
The importance of rural areas for Zambia’s economy is best captured by Kaunda’s 
sentiments which emphasised that “developing the rural areas [was] a matter of life 
and death, though [he did] not under-estimate the problems involved” (Ministry of 
Development Planning and National Guidance, 1971: iii). Consequently, as a 
statement of aspiration, rural-based projects such as rural housing, roads, credit 
facilities and health services would be prioritised over urban ones, this being the 
mechanism to address the rural-urban imbalance. The SNDP, rather than transforming 
the institutional framework of the state, relied instead on the goodwill of the 
politicians and planners in government to ensure that rural development progressed in 
the manner aspired. 
For agriculture, again, the government emphasised self-sufficiency in food crops, this 
being pursued through direct production and indirect means such as provision of 
agricultural services. Promotion of private and State production schemes as the agents 
of such development was the aim of the SNDP. A number of so-called Intensive 
Development Zones (IDZs) would be selected and promoted via earmarked public 
resources. In addition, Village Productivity and Ward Development Committees were 
legislated by the beginning of the FNDP in order to ensure local participation in 
development. A review of these institutional reforms is taken up in the next chapter, 
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but it is worth mentioning that decentralisation of planning was the central aim of 
these changes in the hope that local economic concentrations would be created. 
Departing from the FNDP, the SNDP increased its “share of capital investment outside 
Government” (Ministry of Development Planning and National Guidance, 1971: iv). 
Also, the SNDP considered itself a man-centred plan, to bring equality in Zambian 
society by emphasising rural development. 
Since investigating the absence of meaningful structural transformation in the 
immediate post-Independence state-led Zambian economy is the overarching 
objective of this thesis, it is worth examining more closely the role the SNDP placed 
on industrial development in the overall development strategy but also how it had 
hoped mineral development would support this. Industrial development was to focus 
on creation of import-substituting industries which would make use of local raw 
materials, especially those from local agriculture and mining. Hence, industrial 
development would also be pursued as a mechanism to improve rural agriculture-
based livelihoods. In particular, establishment of food processing industries would 
raise demand for agricultural products but also provide employment.  
Meanwhile, the resources to fund industrial development were to be had from the 
copper mining industry. Indeed, copper mining would continue to play an important 
role for the Zambian economy as a source of government revenue and foreign 
exchange. In addition, establishment of copper processing industries was envisaged 
to aid diversification. However, seen as part of a broader system of accumulation, it 
is difficult to see such diversification as sufficiently integral to allow for structural 
transformation. 
To fund the SNDP, the government would have required a total of K2,609 million, yet 
a shortfall of K153 million was expected from what was seen would be realistically 
raised by Central Government and external loans. The SNDP was envisaged to create 
100,000 jobs, a quarter of which would be accounted for by the manufacturing sector, 
although this relied on an average price of copper of about K740 per metric tonne 
f.o.b. and a two to three percent increase in import prices per year, while increasing 
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copper production to about 900,000 metric tonnes from the 1971 output of 645,300 
metric tonnes. 
Projections of economic growth reflected the place and importance of copper to the 
Zambian economy. By keeping the copper price at K740 per metric ton and costs of 
copper production stagnant, total Government revenue from copper was expected to 
be around K660 million, while the real GDP growth of 34.7 percent between 1971 
and 1976 was to be largely accounted for estimates of copper price and costs of copper 
production. In total, capital expenditure was estimated at K474.3 million of which 
K193.8 million was earmarked for maintaining production capacity, including 
replacement, and, for expansion of production capacity, an estimated amount of K203 
million. In administrative terms, MINDECO and other mining-related Boards, 
approved the suggested amounts to be expended on capital. To sustain the importance 
of mining to Zambia’s economy, the SNDP amount allocated as capital expenditure 
for expanding mineral development was about 46 percent higher than for the FNDP. 
Such expenditure patterns served to deepen Zambia’s inherited system of 
accumulation, whose prosperity was tied to the fortunes of the copper industry. 
The impact on mining employment from the capital expenditure was minimal, 
expecting only a 3 percent increase in jobs from 64,100 in 1972 to 66,000 in 1976. 
However, wages and salaries were expected to increase by about 8 percent, mainly on 
account of encouraging top positions, in the face of declining numbers of non-
Zambian workers in mining. 
For the manufacturing industry, the following indicators were expected at the end of 
the SNDP: 
Table 6-1 Expected outcomes of selected manufacturing sector indicators by 1976 relative to 1971 
 
1971 Figure 1976 Figure 
(expected) 
nominal increase percentage 
increase 
Gross output (K’ 
million) 
264 509 245 92.8 
Value added (K' 
million) 
100 199 99 99.0 
Employment 38,200 62,500 24,300 63.6 
Source: SNDP p35 
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Essentially, value added was anticipated to increase by 100 percent while employment 
was expected to grow by about 63 percent. However, again, the SNDP was to promote 
the strategy of import substitution since industries created through this strategy would 
“receive priority attention” (Ministry of Development Planning and National 
Guidance, 1971: 35). Industrial development was mainly being promoted to serve the 
local market, with promotion of export of manufactures as a sideshow. To the extent 
that promotion of food and other consumer goods received the highest priority, and 
taking into account the nature of income distribution existing at the time, it appears 
the nature of the market, biased in favour of a small salaried population, determined 
the development of the manufacturing sector. The SNDP’s focus on developing 
consumer-based industries reflected the planners’ views that light and more advanced 
industries were beyond the scope of Zambia’s existing human resource capacity for 
some time. 
The installation and promotion of certain industrial activities and infrastructural 
facilities before and after the SNDP was clearly based on supporting mining 
development. For example, the development of the explosives industries, cement 
production, timber and coal mining were anticipated to grow between 12 percent to 
50 percent due to increased demand induced by copper mining development. The 
political leadership was convinced that localisation of capital of mining inputs would 
both promote and sustain mineral development. In this sense, industrial development 
progressed to substitute local industries for imported products, especially for the 
mining sector. 
In addition, specific attention was given to import substitution of food products, other 
consumer goods and some intermediate and capital goods, although focusing on 
utilisation and processing of local raw materials sources from agriculture and mining. 
In this way, industrial development was tied to or, more appropriately, constrained by, 
local capacity and endowment, including extent of development of both the mining 
and agriculture sectors. The extent of industrial development achieved by the 
implementation of the SNDP determined what sort of industries would be promoted. 
However, the focus on rural development ensured that the SNDP sought 
“establishment of small-scale industries in rural areas ”(Ministry of Development 
Planning and National Guidance, 1971: 93), without due regard for whether such 
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industries would be underpinned by an integrated structure of production. The politics 
of the rural-urban gap necessitated or called upon physical location of industry in rural 
areas as an expression of government’s commitment to balanced development. 
The SNDP went some way in explaining its scope for industrial diversification based 
on import substitution. Firstly, it understood imports as composed of manufactured 
products in intermediate goods for mining and construction, and processed food items. 
Secondly, local establishment of industries to replace such imports were to be justified 
in part by size of an existing market. Thirdly, industrial development was to be 
complemented by expansion of hitherto existing industries. Taking note of rapid 
urbanisation and expected increase in demand for processed food items, the SNDP 
made it clear that local industries would help reduce food imports: “The substitution 
of processed food imports is, therefore, one of the major objectives of the 
manufacturing sector in SNDP” (Ministry of Development Planning and National 
Guidance, 1971: 93). All in all, industrial development was to be restricted by the 
existing nature and pattern of domestic demand. 
6.2.1 Major selected Industrial projects envisaged during SNDP 
Examining the objectives of the SNDP for the manufacturing sector reveals a narrow 
view of industrial development. First, industrial development was restricted by the 
pattern of domestic demand, especially with respect to imports. Imports of processed 
foods were mainly serving the interests of the small salaried population which had the 
capacity to import based on its earnings. By localising such food processing industries, 
the interests of this privileged class of the population were disproportionately well 
served. Of course, such industries would require raw materials, say from agriculture, 
hence benefiting the rural population, but such intended benefits were minimal when 
the nature of technology of the industries is taken into account. As will be shown 
below, the technology of certain industrial projects was capital intensive, diminishing 
the potential to spread productive linkages. Consequently, industrial development was 
constrained by the specific form of technology chosen. 
In terms of individual projects, there were continuities from the FNDP period since, 
in the lifetime of the FNDP, some industrial projects started or were planned for 
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implementation in the later period. A number of projects discussed below were seen 
by the SNDP as significant to promote diversification and structural transformation. 
For import substitution of food processing, meat, poultry and dairy processing would 
be encouraged across various locations of the country, including rural areas in Mongu 
and Chipata. New developments as well as modernisation and expansion of existing 
plants would underpin promotion of food processing industries. Again, this reflects 
the thinking behind capital accumulation. 
In addition, import-substitution of consumer goods was mainly aimed at expanding 
existing capacity. For example, the textiles industry was promised an expansion of 
capacity at Kafue Textiles from “12 million metres of cotton fabrics to 25 million 
metres per year of cotton-polyester and rayon fabrics” (Ministry of Development 
Planning and National Guidance, 1971: 95). Grain bags, hessian cloth production and 
a knitting plant constituted some notable SNDP projects. 
Expansion of existing tannery facilities were all part of the consumer goods 
development. Saw-mills for making railway sleepers and flooring products, as well as 
a pulp and paper industry would make use of local timber. For Fincham (1980: 306), 
“[t]he relative increase in local value-added in the basic consumer industries of food 
stuffs and clothing reflects the country’s very high rate of urbanisation and consequent 
expansion in consumer markers since independence.” But that the effective population 
was a small fraction of the urban population which was the actual market for these 
goods, supports the view that such growth was aimed at serving the dominant class. 
Data on Zambia’s industrialisation (see below) under the state’s import-substitution 
policies show that the rhythm of industrial development was dominated by consumer 
goods. One must ask whose interests were served by this pattern of industrialisation. 
Clearly, more affluent sections of the population benefited from the structure of 
production. In other words, industrial development was demand-determined. The 
problem with permitting structure of demand to influence the direction of investment 
is that it disregards the existing levels of technology if they are deficient or absent. 
Consequently, industry is compelled to apply foreign technology. The car-assembly 
plant provides an illustration of triumph of a type of demand (interests of the affluent) 
over broader considerations of what meaningful structural change required. By 1976, 
Harvey (1976: 147) was right in making the statement that “the pattern of demand 
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created by the present income distribution continues to influence the way in which 
production of goods and services develops.” 
For intermediate and capital goods, the SNDP made special emphasis on copper-
related industries in terms of their direct material contribution to copper development. 
Capacity for production of sulphuric acid was to be expanded while copper sulphates 
were to be newly produced to support the refining and leaching of copper. The 
explosives subsector at Kafironda would be expanded in order to provide the mining 
sector with all its explosives needs. The Zambia Metal Fabricators (Zamefa) factory 
at Luanshya to produce copper wires and cables was aimed at increasing existing 
output from 2,000 tons per year to 6,000. 
The Nitrogen Chemicals at Kafue would receive funds for expansion of capacity in 
order to produce more fertiliser in anticipation of higher demand in agriculture. 
Another notable INDECO-sponsored project was the glass factory at Kapiri Mposhi 
to churn out annually 20,000 metric tons of glass containers. In order to promote 
industrial development, Rucom Holdings, an INDECO subsidiary, was expected to 
install a number of projects in rural areas, the main ones being four new grain mills as 
well as extension of those already existing, about three mixing units for stockfee. 
In total, industrial development would profit from investment of fixed capital in the 
order of K250 million, and an additional K150 million of working capital assumed at 
60 percent of fixed capital. Despite large-scale public investment during the SNDP 
within the context of nationalisation and state-owned enterprises, about 70 percent of 
capital investment was expected to be provided by private capital. Thus, an Investment 
Code would be formulated to spell out incentives and guarantees to potential investors, 
since absence of private capital would cause the SNDP estimates of the manufacturing 
sector’s contribution to output and employment to fall miserably short. 
It is clear that the industrial projects proposed, both aimed at expanding existing 
capacity and creating new products, were determined by the existing production 
structure (e.g. to provide inputs for the mines) and patterns of demand (e.g. textile 
plant for cotton-polyester and rayon fabrics for higher earning people as opposed to 
cheaper cotton-fabrics). In this way, industrial development, although with some 
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limited diversification, was restricted by the material base and socio-political and 
economic interests that determined, considerably, which, and how, projects would be 
approved. 
Taking into account the absence of many educated and skilled Zambians to support 
industrial development through their labour, the SNDP embarked on continuation of 
the education policy, to increase enrolments at all levels of education. For tertiary 
education, and specifically, university education, the SNDP allocated K13.8 million, 
representing only 0.6 percent of total SNDP budgetary resources. From this 
commitment, gross enrolment was expected to double to 3,012 between 1971 and 
1976.  
6.3 Performance of the economy and selected developments during the SNDP, 
1972-1976 
6.3.1 General performance 
The performance of the SNDP was properly understood by the time the Third National 
Development Plant (TNDP) was launched in 1979, three years after the completion of 
the SNDP. By the launching of the TNDP, the FNDP and SNDP were still conceived 
as plans “to provide the basic economic and social infrastructure, initiate measures to 
diversify the agricultural and industrial base of the economy and promote self-reliance 
and self-sustained growth” (Zambia Office of the President National Commission for 
Development Planning, 1979: iii).  
Mild growth was experienced in the first ten years of Zambia’s Independence; 
between 1964 and 1970, roughly equivalent to the period during the implementation 
of the FNDP, the country grew by around 1.5 to 2 percent per annum, while the SNDP 
period performed slightly better, with the Zambian economy growing about 3.4 
percent between 1972 and 1976, although marked by wide fluctuations, ranging from 





Table 6-2 Real Average GDP Growth 




Source: UN Data (http://data.un.org/); World Development Indicators 
Table 6-3 Real annual growth of the Zambian economy, 1965-1976, below is taken 
from official statistics which the TNDP used to explain performance. Some reasonable 
growth took place between 1964 and 1975. 
Table 6-3 Real annual growth of the Zambian economy, 1965-1976 









Source: SNDP Table 1.1, p1 
Set against a population growing at about 3.2 percent, for example rising from 4.39 
million in 1971 to 5.14 million in 1972, the performance of the Zambian economy 
was unsatisfactory, with GDP per capita between 1971 and 1976 remaining virtually 
unchanged.  
The TNDP placed considerably more emphasis on external conditions — copper 
prices; geopolitical contradictions, particularly the Angolan civil war and Rhodesian 
border closure, leading to interruption of trade routes; and adverse weather conditions 
impacting on agricultural output — to explain the sluggish performance of the 
Zambian economy during the SNDP, and the immediate two years afterwards. Indeed, 
while the TNDP argued that “sluggish growth and foreign exchange difficulties” were 
“attributable mainly to disruptions caused to the country’s supply routes, oil crisis, 
world recession and the collapse of copper prices” (Zambia Office of the President 
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National Commission for Development Planning, 1979: vii), it seems a lack of 
structural transformation is at the heart of the problem. These challenges only revealed 
the depth of dependence of Zambia’s economy upon a system of accumulation which 
inhibited structural transformation, and could only be sustained by the fortunes of the 
copper sector. 
In fact, the TNDP acknowledged that “[B]esides exogenous factors, the overall growth 
of real GDP [during the SNDP] was affected by adversely by the pattern of 
investment, import of highly-capital intensive technology and certain factors of 
domestic origin” (Zambia Office of the President National Commission for 
Development Planning, 1979: 2). The pattern of investment is explained in terms of 
sectoral allocation of production-oriented and/or consumption-based fixed 
investment. While the SNDP maintained a relatively large portion of total gross fixed 
investment in GDP, standing at an annual average of 28 percent, much of this went 
into maintenance of copper mining and non-directly-productive socioeconomic 
infrastructure and services. The mining sector alone appropriated about a third of the 
economy’s total investment, while real estate and public administration combined to 
account for about 17.4 percent of total fixed investment (see Table 6-4 Sectoral 
Distribution (percentage) of Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 1966-1976, below). Even 
the 12.7 percent of gross fixed capital formation as share for ‘Transport and 
communication’ was largely spent on infrastructure aimed at supporting the 
production of copper. Meanwhile, the manufacturing sector was allocated only a tenth 
of total fixed investment. Such patterns of investment only serve to underscore and 
sustain the argument that a system of accumulation inherited from the colonial era 
persisted in the post-Independence period, but a major shift occurred only in the sense 
that the kinds of interests which lodged themselves in this system of accumulation, 
specifically those which bound the state architecture to its underlying economic base, 
ensured that policies and resultant expenditure patterns sustained this material base 
rather than alter it as would be required for structural transformation.  
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I. Directly Productive sectors: 
  
1. Mining           26.4           29.0  
2. Others           24.5           21.4  
(i) Agriculture, forestry and fisheries             6.6             5.2  
(ii) Manufacturing           10.6           10.8  
(iii) Electricity, gas and water             7.3             5.4  
II. Construction             6.4             1.7  
III. Services and Infrastructure           42.7           47.9  
(i) Transport and communication             9.3           12.7  
(ii) Wholesale and retail trade             4.3             6.5  
(iii) Real estate             6.6             9.5  
(iv) Public administration           12.8             7.9  
(v) Education             5.7             4.7  
(vi) Health             1.5             1.5  
(vii) Others             2.5             5.1  
Source: TNDP Table 1.2, p2 
In addition, productive investment led to accumulation of capital-intensive 
technology, which not only diminished the potential for direct productive linkages and 
employment generation, but also robbed the country of foreign exchange. Despite 
massive absorption of public resources by the state’s architecture, the performance of 
accumulated capital was impaired, according to the TNDP, by “weakness in the plan 
implementation machinery at both central and provincial levels; absence of properly 
appraised projects for absorbing capital funds; shortages of skilled manpower and 
managerial capacity; and policy shortcomings, such as pricing of products unrelated 
to economic costs” (Zambia Office of the President National Commission for 
Development Planning, 1979: 3). Nevertheless, these contradictions must be seen in 
terms of the nature and interaction of socioeconomic and political interests and the 
form of the economic base underlying them. 
Another way to look at the kinds of interests which lodged themselves in a restricted 
material base dominated by copper is to examine GDP in terms of its categories of 
expenditure (see Table 6-6 GDP by Kind of Economic Activity at Constant (1965) 
Prices, 1966-1976, below). Between the FNDP and SNDP periods, government 
257 
 
expenditure doubled while private consumption witnessed a mild contraction. Net 
exports of goods and services substantially contracted, and when net transfers are 
taken into account, Zambia shifts to a net borrower from being a net lender. In part, 
the latter scenario is explained by nationalisation, particularly of copper mines, and 
subsequent payments for majority shares by the state, and export of rents by minority 
shareholders in the face of political and economic uncertainty. 
 






1 Government Consumption           11.0            23.0  
2 Private final consumption           45.0            43.0  
3 Gross fixed investment           25.0            28.0  
4 Changes in stocks             2.0              3.0  
5 Net exports of goods and services           17.0              3.0  
6 GDP at market prices         100.0          100.0  
Source: TNDP Table 1.3, p3 
The dominance of copper is seen in its share in GDP, and, mainly as a source of 













Table 6-6 GDP by Kind of Economic Activity at Constant (1965) Prices, 1966-1976 
 








        711.1          783.1          842.2      995.0              2.0  3.4 
I. Mining and 
quarrying 
        291.8          221.9          202.7          232.0              4.4              3.8  
II. Non-mining 
sector 
        419.3          561.2          653.3          776.0              6.0  3.6 
1. Agriculture           97.4          106.0          118.2          142.0              1.8  3.6 
(a) Commercial           18.3            24.0            35.8            55.0   -  - 
(b) Subsistence           79.1            82.0            82.4            87.0   -  - 
2. Manufacturing           48.0            81.0            86.0          107.5              4.9              4.5  
3. Electricity, gas 
and water 
            5.4            16.2            19.8            40.5            32.0            16.0  
4. Construction           40.9            34.8            51.1            66.5   -2.8              5.5  
5. Trade           80.5            89.7            87.5          104.5              2.2              3.6  
6. Hotels and 
restaurants 




          32.8            34.6            47.5            41.5              1.3              2.4  
8. Financial 
institutions 
          10.7            15.9            18.9            17.5              8.3  -1.4 
9. Real estate           11.6            33.1            30.0            43.0            32.0              7.5  
10. Business 
services 





          64.0          107.5          137.2          158.0            10.9              2.9  
12. Import duties           14.5            21.7            23.0            17.0   -  - 




            6.7              6.5   -  - 
Source: TNDP Table 1.5, p4 
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The share of mining in total GDP declined progressively; starting at 41 percent in 
1965, dropping to 28.3 percent in 1970, then 24.1 percent in 1971, and finally to 23.3 
percent in 1976. Accounting for much of this drop had been some developments 
outside of mining, but the fluctuations, with average downwards trend in copper prices 
after 1975, were accounted for mainly by copper. As has been argued, the 
developments outside the copper sector were indirectly related to the development of 
copper mining. Meanwhile, the manufacturing sector, based on its share in GDP, 
performed comparatively well, raising its share from 6.5 percent in 1965, to 10.3 
percent in 1970, 10.2 percent in 1971 and 10.8 percent in 1976. 
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1968 1969 1970 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
I. Recurrent account 
         
1. Revenues           384.3          292.3          389.5          425.1          288.0          385.0          650.0          448.0          441.0  
(a) Mineral           245.8          176.2          235.1          231.1            56.0          108.0          324.0            59.0            12.0  
(b) Non-mineral*           138.5          116.1          154.4          194.0          232.0          277.0          326.0          389.0          429.0  
2. Expenditure           295.6          225.7          258.0          275.0          363.0          394.0          441.0          606.0          612.0  
3. Surplus (+) or deficit (-) +88.7 +66.6 +131.5 +150.1 -75.0 -9.0 +209.0 -158.0 -171.0 
II. Capital account 
         
1. Receipts             75.8            78.6            63.3            70.6            79.0          102.0          119.0          167.0          143.0  
(a) Miscellaneous capital projects             40.4            17.4            23.8            26.8            15.0            12.0            33.0            28.0            32.0  
(b) Loans, internal             23.0            14.2            16.0            22.0            15.0            41.0            28.0            38.0            58.0  
( c) Loans, external             12.4            47.0            23.5            21.8            49.0            49.0            58.0          101.0            53.0  
2. Expenditures           160.4          194.3          156.3          169.2          160.0          153.0          194.0          246.0          162.0  
3. Surplus (+) or deficit (-) -84.6 -115.7 -93.0 -98.6 -81.0 -51.0 -75.0 -79.0 -19.0 
III. Overall surplus (+) or deficit (-) +4.1 -49.1 +38.5 +51.5 -156.0 -60.0 +134.0 -237.0 -190.0 
1. Financing by Bank of Zambia                8.0   -11.9   -44.5   -45.7            53.0            31.0              2.0          158.0            60.0  
2. Financing through other sources  -12.1            60.0              6.0   -5.7          103.0            29.0  -136           79.0          130.0  
Source:  
*examples of these include income tax on non-mining companies, customs, excise, sales tax etc. 
Source: TNDP Table 1.6 p5 and Table 1.7 p6 
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On aggregate, despite actual capital expenditure being larger than planned during the 
FNDP, financial constraints on overall development planning had not yet featured. 
For the period 1966-1970, external loans accounted for only 15 percent of the capital 
account and, while the capital account had been in deficit, the surplus in the recurrent 
account more than compensated for the shortfall. Thus, an overall surplus in the sum 
of recurrent and capital accounts was experienced. 
Often, a combination of adverse external conditions (episodes of copper price decline; 
Rhodesian border closure in 1973 which disrupted transit of tradeables) and internal 
challenges (Mufulira mine disaster in 1970) are identified as having set off the SNDP 
to a difficult start. In 1971 and 1972, copper prices were generally reflective of a 
downward trend, with copper per tonne at the LME trading at K765. Fortuitously, 
average copper prices per tonne at the LME rose again in 1974 to K1,326, which led 
the balance of payments into a surplus. It is revealing that only six years after 
Independence, copper prices were so unfavourable to Zambia’s economy that foreign 
exchange difficulties were already featuring. For Turok (1979b), the frailty of the 
Zambian economy was not seen in a one-dimensional sense in terms of dependence 
upon copper, but the dependence upon copper is explained as a consequence of 
development of a system of accumulation which precluded the ability and capacity to 
forge and implement developmental goals underpinned by structural transformation. 
Turok (1979b: 71) argued that “even by 1974, before the collapse of copper prices, 
foreign exchange was becoming a serious constraint on development. The problem 
lies deep within the system itself and to have its basis in the ambiguities and lack of 
direction in national development goals and the structural contradictions this has 
caused … there is a form of state capitalism in which the interests and policies 
frequently collide to the detriment of the smooth running of the system.”  
Turok, however, places much stock on an ideal type state which has developmental 
aspirations figured out yet frustrated by an interplay of societal interests outside of it. 
But if the state is seen as a reflection of interests, then developmental projects pursued 
by the state must also be seen as satisfying/meeting a particular configuration of 




Examining the development plans reveals a state which has generally crafted and 
pursued successfully a number of developmental projects. Yet, although important 
and laudable, given the Independence scenario as initial conditions, these 
developments were far removed from conceptions of structural transformation 
spearheaded by industrialisation, as a way seek relief from dependence upon copper, 
and be the basis of an integrated structure of production. Indeed, the development 
plans themselves reveal the inadequacy in thought and execution of industrialisation 
for example, such that, even if followed to the letter, structural transformation would 
have eluded the Zambian economy. Hence, one must ask whether the development 
objectives, projects and policies crafted in the first place were in fact suitable given 
the contradictions in production, distribution and allocation of resources of the post-
Independence Zambian economy. Generally following this line of reasoning, and 
questioning the pattern of post-Independence industrialisation, Ann Seidman (1974a: 
608) asked, “should Zambia, at this stage in its development, use scarce government 
investment funds to produce private cars for the few people with high incomes? Or 
should it give priority to the production of simple tools and equipment - for example, 
animal-drawn ploughs, maize-grinding machines, bore-hole drills - to increase rural 
productivity and levels of living? Or, alternatively, should the Government invest in 
the more rapid expansion of lorries and buses, to provide cheap transport for low- 
income rural dwellers and the goods they produce and buy?”  
Her queries draw attention to questioning the adequacy of development thought and 
conception within the development plans themselves, that is, exposing the ineptitude 
of public policies themselves. Nevertheless, this does not address the underlying 
reasons as to why a set of development projects and policies must necessarily be 
pursued. She recognises this weakness in her argument by pointing out that observing 
absence of an integrated pattern of production in the manufacturing sector could very 
well “be strengthened by a thorough examination of the evidence concerning the 
extent to which the emergent class of Zambians — who have since independence 
assumed control of the civil service and the parastatals — may in fact be pursuing 
policies … in its own perceived self-interest” (Seidman, 1974a: 624, footnote 1). 
Within the context of a system of accumulation, this being the interaction of socio-
political and economic interests in a restricted economic base, the dominant role of 
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state actors is identified and the interaction of these on behalf of the state with private 
capital.  
Bomsel (1992) saw the interests within the state architecture as both inept and acting 
to preserve the existing material base upon which their interests were well served. He 
argued that, for Zambia, bad economic policies harmed the agriculture sector, and 
these policies must be traced from the people situated in the “government … who have 
devised and implemented these policies”, hence have acted to sustain the economic 
base of their interests since, “[a]s the largest employer within the country, the state 
and its employees constitute the strongest pressure group for maintaining the current 
unproductive income distribution system. Moreover, few government employees 
possess the technical and managerial abilities necessary to develop meaningful 
reforms and to rebuild the economy” (Bomsel, 1992: 78). In addition, by the beginning 
of the end of the 1970s, over 66,000 people were directly employed in the copper 
mining subsector, with an additional three million people profiting indirectly from this 
employment and business interests tied to mineral development. Thus, the 
perpetuation of a particular configuration of an economic base and interests 
underlying it can be discerned by looking at how interests get embedded within or, 
attached to, a particular material base, and how they then act to safeguard their 
interests and, therefore, the material base. Political rhetoric about employment 
creation ensured that a set of interests developed and embedded themselves within a 
restricted material base, one which combined continuities from the colonial era and 
new developments in the post-Independence era in a manner inimical to structural 
transformation.  
While rising copper prices in 1974 led the balance of payments into surplus, the 
following year and an extended period afterwards witnessed a long-lasting collapse of 
real copper prices, this suggesting a combination of external and internal conditions 
as having a determining influence upon Zambia’s development prospects. Firstly, the 
sharp decline in copper prices caused financial problems for the government both as 
the state and as majority shareholder in the copper mining interests. Government 
mineral revenue declined considerably from K324 million in 1974 to K59 million in 
1975, K12 million in 1976 and virtually nothing between 1977 and 1978. Secondly, 
although it is generally seen that post-1975 decline in copper prices was a unique and 
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decisive feature of Zambia’s developmentalism, when this is seen within the context 
of long-run trends in copper prices, the post-1975 situation appears to be in line with 
these (Tilton, 1992). Hence, while acknowledging the impact of external conditions, 
it is more apposite to examine how internal conditions responded, and how this, in 
combination with unprofitable copper mining, pushed the country’s economy further 
away from structural transformation. It is then found that the interplay of human 
resource (technical, managerial, administrative) factors, as well as politico-economic 
factors adversely impacted upon the profitability of mineral development and the 
ability of the state to alter the course of development towards structural 
transformation.  
Thus, after 1975, when terms of trade halved following the first oil shock, in addition 
to transportation difficulties and cost challenges which made copper mining 
considerably less lucrative, the political system and development policies responded 
by serving interests entrenched in a restricted economic base. Political and social vices 
such as corruption and rent seeking which proliferated were not bad for development 
in and of themselves, but because they took place within a confined structure of 
production to advance, sustain and encourage interrelationships of interests, they 
strengthened dependence upon the (distorted) existing economic base. Inefficiency, 
mismanagement and waste, including political patronage, were not the cause of the 
economic crisis, although they aggravated it, they were symptoms of deep-seated 
contradictions of a system of accumulation hostile to structural transformation. 
Given that the government sustained its consumption patterns despite declining terms 
of trade and diminished revenue base in anticipation that the decline in copper receipts 
would be short-lived (Bomsel, 1992: 69), it can be argued that the state acted to 
safeguard the existing system of accumulation. The economic crisis, as a symptom of 
the unprofitability of the copper sector, eliminated the substantial mineral revenue 
base of the state. For the recurrent segment of the government budget, mineral 
revenues were as much as 60 percent of the 1966 to 1970 FNDP period, declining to 
20 percent of the total recurrent receipts in 1972, and then increasing to 50 percent in 
1974, before falling to insignificance. Non-mineral bases of revenue thus became 
important sources of revenue for the state rising from 23.5 percent of GDP less value 
added from the mining sector to 27 percent. Sustaining existing interests by way of 
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maintaining consumption patterns required the government to solicit funds from 
external sources and, by 1975, external loans featured prominently, making them for 
the first time larger than mineral revenues. Meanwhile, recurrent expenditure 
increased more than two-fold between 1970 and 1976, corresponding to an increase 
in its share in GDP from 21 percent in 1970, to 27 percent in 1972 and a period peak 
of 34 percent in 1976. Conversely, capital expenditure declined considerably, and fell 
well below the targets set out at the launch of the SNDP by as much as 70 percent 
(Zambia Office of the President National Commission for Development Planning, 
1979: 7; see Table 1.8).  
Figure 6-1 Capital Expenditure as a Percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 1971-1977 
 
Source: Author’s own construction from data in Turok (1989: 135) 
 
The allocation of capital expenditure also showed that efforts to restructure the pattern 
of production had diminished significantly, while maintaining the existing economic 
base was of prime importance. For example, only 20 percent of capital expenditure 
was allocated to directly productive sectors (mining, manufacturing, agriculture, 
forestry, fisheries, tourism), with 26 percent going to social and community services 
(housing, community development) and a further 47 percent apportioned for economic 
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railways). Turok (1989: 135) has suggested that “[o]ne of the most important indices 
of real intentions is the scale of government capital investment.” But this leaves 
unexplained the socio-political and economic structures responsible for a lack of 
genuine commitment. If public recurrent expenditure serves as an insight into the 
kinds of activities which demonstrate genuine commitment, then it goes without 
saying, as Chapter Seven will show, the nature of interests lodged in the state 
architecture did absorb considerable resources at the expense of productive 
investment. The increase in recurrent expenditure denied investment in the productive 
sectors. The TNDP also noted that: “The shortfall in capital investment in the first 
three years of the SNDP was 25%. The consequent failures eroded government’s 
revenue potential in an ever increasing downward spiral.” (Zambia Office of the 
President National Commission for Development Planning, 1979: 18).  
In general, an upward trend in both exports and imports was experienced from 1964 
to 1976, but 1975 was the first post-Independence year to have experienced a deficit 
in the trade balance. As copper accounted for at least 90 percent of exports, the 
fluctuations in exports is explained mainly by fluctuations in exports of copper which 
in turn is determined considerably by the vicissitudes of the copper sector. From the 
middle of 1974, copper prices declined and reached K794 per tonne by 1975, from 
K1,326 in the first half of 1974. Note that in 1972, when an export surplus was 
recorded, copper prices stood at K764 per tonne, a price lower in nominal terms than 
the trade balance deficit year of 1975. This suggests that one must look elsewhere to 
explain not only the deficit in the trade balance, but the crash in the copper sector. One 
such explanation is offered by transport difficulties Zambia faced, particularly 
following the crisis of the civil war in Angola. Terms of trade began to decline in 
1969, rising briefly in 1974 before a sharp drop thereafter.  
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Figure 6-2 Exports and imports (K' million) and Terms of Trade, 1964-1976 
 
Source: Adapted from TNDP Table 1.11 
Another way to see the nature of Zambia’s system of accumulation is to examine the 
balance of payments, particularly during the immediate post-Independence era. The 
contraction of the balance of payments deficit between 1972 and 1973 from K108 
million to K8 million is mainly explained by an increase in the trade balance surplus 
by almost three times owing to favourable copper prices. Although the favourable 
trade balance situation permitted the government to redeem K147 million in ZIMCO 
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Exports Imports Terms of trade (1969=100)
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Table 6-8 Balance of payments, 1972-1976 
  
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
1 Exports f.o.b. +543.2 +733.5 +898.2 +523.1 +742.4 
 
Imports f.o.b.  +405.4 +349.4 +508.4 +599.6 +482.2 
 
Balance of Trade +137.8 +384.1 +389.6 -76.5 +260.2 
2 Investment income (net) -51.0 -77.3 -62.2 -45.0 -109.5 
3 Non-factor services (net) -121.1 -132.6 -197.7 -192.0 -166.7 
4 Unrequited transfers (net) -97.0 -80.2 -81.2 -79.0 -86.1 
5 Current account balance -122.3 +93.4 +48.5 -392.5 -102.1 
6 Capital account (net including errors and 
omissions) 
+7.3 -101.5 -29.9 +142.0 -34.1 
7 SDR allocations +7.3 - - - - 
8 Overall deficit (-) or surplus (+) -107.7 -8.1 +18.6 -250.0 -136.2 
Source: TNDP Table 1.12, p9 
In 1975, when substantial gains in foreign exchange earnings were made on account 
of favourable copper prices, the balance of payments recorded a short-lived surplus, 
since the remainder of the SNDP went into large deficits. 1975 was a decisive year for 
Zambia’s economy, the balance of payments recorded a substantial deficit in the order 
of K250 million, in spite of considerable inflow into the capital account. So bad was 
Zambia’s economic situation that in 1975, K136 million was recorded as deferred 
payment to foreign creditors, with a further K104 million the following year in 
outstanding payments. 
Explaining part of the economic problems, which came into play throughout the latter 
part of the 1970s, is Zambia’s dwindling foreign exchange reserves which had peaked 




Table 6-9 Foreign Exchange Reserves (K' million), 1970-76 
 
End 1970 End 1971 End 1976 
Gold 4.173 4.541 5.424 
SDRs 6.348 13.592 17.661 
Reserve position in IMF 13.576 13.581 - 
Foreign exchange 360.723 178.340 66.135 
Total 384.820 210.054 89.220 
Source: TNDP Table 1.13, p10 
Gross international reserves were over K384 million by the end of 1970. Foreign 
exchange reserves halved between end of 1970 and end of 1971, and sliding further 
by end of 1976 to only around K66 million. By 1976, Zambia’s foreign asset position 
indicated a net liability in the order of K115 million and, meanwhile, growing debt 
imposed a burden of foreign debt servicing which consumed about a tenth of export 
earnings. 
Drastic decline in terms of trade diverted investible surplus since “changes in terms 
of trade have an important bearing on total availability of resources for meeting the 
investment and consumption needs of the economy” (Zambia Office of the President 
National Commission for Development Planning, 1979: 1). In 1979, Kaunda reported 
that “[s]ince 1975, Zambia [was] losing, on average, more than K200 million a year 
to the rest of the world because of deterioration [of its] ‘terms of trade’” (Zambia 
Office of the President National Commission for Development Planning, 1979: iv). 
These developments were a reflection of the nature of a system of accumulation bereft 
of an integrated structure of production, relying instead on foreign exchange earnings 
as its lifeline. 
At ministerial level, reflecting the weaknesses of its assumptions, the planning and 
implementation of state development programmes was usually poorly coordinated 
across ministries. For instance, by 1972, as reflected in the Second National 
Development Plan (SNDP), while the Ministry of Finance sought ways to maximise 
mining tax revenue for the state, the Ministry of Mines, in a bid to encourage mining 
development and private capital injection, sought to reduce taxes on mines (Seidman, 
1974; 1979). These conflicting views are reflected within the same document, the 
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SNDP, and from them, it was difficult to discern properly the stance of the state with 
respect to private capital in the mines. 
6.3.2 Employment 
Employment between the launch and completion of the SNDP had remained virtually 
unchanged. Although between 1971 and 1974 employment had experienced a five 
percent increase, on aggregate growing to 384,890 workers, the completion of certain 
infrastructural projects (for example, of the TAZARA Railway which led to most of 
the project’s 13,000 workers becoming unemployed) and closure of businesses (due 
to, for example, import controls) by the end of the SNDP, no gains in employment 
were recorded. For the major sectors, moderate gains in employment were 
experienced in mining, while, construction, commercial agriculture, transport and 
communications witnessed declines with manufacturing staying put. 
On aggregate, the decline in economic activity during the SNDP did not reduce 
employment figures on account mainly of political expedience. Since the state sector 
was the largest employer, within the context of economic contraction, maintaining 
political legitimacy compelled Kaunda and his allies to leave unaltered employment 
figures. Acknowledging the unemployment problem, the TNDP placed emphasis on 
stimulating employment maximising economic activity through the rhetoric of rural 
development programmes and utilisation of labour-intensive technology. 
6.3.3 Overview of performance of mining and manufacturing sectors 
Between 1971 and 1976, the contribution of mining to GDP remained the same at 
around 23 percent. Clearly, from its share in GDP of around two-fifths in 1964, one 
would think some reasonable structural transformation had taken place, but as seen so 
far, copper continued to dominate the economy both as virtually the only foreign 
exchange earner and a major source of revenue for the state. Even in episodes where 
copper mining did not produce revenue for the state, particularly between 1977 and 




Figure 6-3 Copper Product (metric tons), 1965-1976 
 
Source: Author’s own construction based on TNDP data 
From its 1971 level of output, copper output by 1974 had registered substantial gains, 
rising to 633,400 metric tons to 702,100 metric tons, before dropping by about 9 
percent in 1975 mainly on account of Zambia’s obligation to CIPEC to cut back 
production. By 1976, copper output had increased to 712,900 metric tons, a level 
which was 26 percent less than envisaged at the launch of the SNDP. In short, in terms 
of output, the copper mining sector performed well below what the government had 
hoped. 
In 1965, with an output of 684,000 metric tons of copper, Zambia’s share in world 
mine production stood at 12 percent; yet by 1976, when its output had increased to 
712,900 metric tons, this share had contracted to 8 percent. This shows that copper 
output outside Zambia increased faster than in Zambia. Several reasons have been 
offered to explain this predicament. The government of Zambia through the TNDP 
argued that many of the problems which debilitated copper mining were outside the 
control of the state. While new investments had been undertaken, with the opening of 
new mines, the “the depletion of existing mines” as well as “high rates of turnover 
among managerial, technical and supervisory staff, and transportation difficulties 
caused by the border closure in 1973 and the Angolan civil war in 1975” explained 











of the President National Commission for Development Planning, 1979: 15). Further, 
a substantial portion of the K500 million capital investment of the SNDP for the 
mining industry went into rehabilitation rather than expansion of production. All these 
problems combined to ensure that copper mining operations were executed under 
conditions of capacity underutilisation. Barton (2016, 2015) examined the 
performance of the Zambian economy and, specifically, the copper sector; he placed 
more emphasis on withdrawal of foreign capital due to uncertainty within the context 
of institutional degradation under one-party authoritarian rule. Rather, the problem 
was the inability of the Zambian state to promote structural transformation when 
resources were available in the immediate post-Independence period. 
While these views provide some insight into the factors affecting the performance of 
the Zambian economy more generally and the copper sector in particular, they 
misrepresent the underlying problem. Both views detail symptoms of underlying 
processes, and because they fail to account for a lack of structural transformation as 
the underlying problem, they cannot properly account for the root causes. Institutional 
degradation within the context of an authoritarian and exclusive one-party state that 
Barton pins his analysis on cannot fully explain the underperformance of the Zambian 
economy because it is precisely that states were authoritarian which, as argued in 
Chapter Four, enabled developmental states to condition and order the affairs of their 
development more effectively. Indeed, as I show below, one must examine the nature 
of physical accumulation, and how socio-political and economic interests through the 
state and between themselves interact to promote a particular configuration of 
capitalist development. It is that configuration, and interests attached to it, which 
underpinned the nature and form of Zambia’s post-Independence developmentalism. 
Response of the state through BOZ to dwindling foreign exchange reserves did not 
confront or seek to alter the nature of the structure of production, but instead reflected 
it. Concerned about the level of foreign exchange reserves, BOZ, in 1972, set in 
motion a series of strategies among them enforcing ceilings on foreign exchange 
transactions, prohibiting a number of imports and, finally, in May of the same year, 
suspended all import licences. Consequently, a number of firms had their operations 
disrupted, while some companies such as “two major clothing factories in Ndola and 
Kitwe” completely went out of business on account of refusal by the Ministry of Trade 
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to issue cloth import permits (Barton, 2016: 213, footnote 74). See below also for the 
overall impact of these policy moves on capacity utilisation and, eventually, a 
contraction in production. The interventionist policies the state used were flawed in 
motivation, because they were aimed at protecting the existing spaces of economic 
strength rather than promoting structural transformation. 
6.3.4 Key selected external influences: Rhodesian Border Closure and oil 
crisis 
The Rhodesian border closure of 1973 was another milestone in geopolitical 
influences on Zambia’s economy. Mediated through political expediency, it 
influenced development policy in practice in Zambia in ways that prevented the 
economy from ordering its affairs towards structural transformation. Worried about 
Kaunda’s continued backing of so-called guerrilla fighters against Rhodesia, in 
January 1973 the white Rhodesian state decided to conditionally close its border with 
Zambia, cutting off all trade save for copper. Meanwhile, Kaunda reacted by starving 
Rhodesia of Zambia’s copper business by opting not to use Rhodesia as a transit route 
for copper exports, while also putting in place measures to shelve further foreign 
exchange transactions with both Rhodesia and South Africa. Just before these 
decisions were implemented, Rhodesia transported around half of Zambia’s copper 
exports, making it a crucial trade route, yet Kaunda did not flinch as he saw this as 
part of the wider cause and commitment to liberation struggles of southern Africa. 
Despite facing opposition, since “some Zambians felt this to be at the expense of their 
own concerns” (Larmer, 2010: 56), Kaunda went on with his decision once again to 
delink from Rhodesia. The inherited institutional set up which gave Kaunda 
considerable power ensured that such decisions, though at the expense of the Zambian 
economy, became a matter of national policy. 
Following the Rhodesia border closure, it becomes clear that resource allocation and 
policy priorities as experienced in Zambia were truly a matter of the nature of politics. 
Confidential documents stored in the UNIP archive revealed that rising costs as well 
as restraints on capital investments in copper mining production were anticipated 
(Barton, 2016: 78). However, set against the crash in copper prices in 1975, it seems 
the losses in both foreign exchange and impact on mining production following the 
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Rhodesian border closure were underestimated. Nevertheless, Kaunda revised his 
stance against trade with South Africa, but not with Rhodesia, and eventually struck a 
deal to airlift copper to Johannesburg with return flights bringing with them supplies 
of parts and other inputs such as chemicals for use in existing enterprises, mainly 
copper mines. Partly to account for Zambia’s policy option of avoiding Rhodesian 
transport routes and partly to cushion the Zambian economy from the early-1970s oil 
shock, the IMF, World and other bilateral partners featured in Zamia’s development 
policy space as development partners through their provision of finance. Thus, 
avoiding the Rhodesian trade route was not only extremely onerous upon Zambia’s 
fledgling economy, it also reflected the nature of politics and, subsequently, how this 
restricted options for structural transformation, instead focusing on investing scarce 
resource into existing strengths. 
By 1979, the government was “paying over K100 million more in … oil imports as 
compared to [the] pre-1973 oil bill” (Zambia Office of the President National 
Commission for Development Planning, 1979: iv). Meanwhile, in parallel to the oil 
embargo starting around October 1973, commodity prices experienced an initial 
boost. Copper prices rose rapidly, in excess of 125 percent to US$ 2,733 between 
January 1973 to April 1974, leading to a ballooning of government revenue. 
Confidential government documents revealed that foreign exchange earnings in 1973 
were at least as much as US$980 million based on a copper price of US$1,100 per 
tonne for an average production of 54,500 tonnes per month (Barton, 2016: 79). While 
1973 should have provided windfall of no less than US$250 million in foreign 
exchange revenue, and hence should have offset the rising costs of energy and 
transport arising from the oil shock, politics played a bigger role in shaping the 
Zambian economy. The geopolitical contradictions and reactions within the context 
of the Rhodesian border closure, including redemption of government bonds for 
management contracts in the copper mines, added decisively to Zambia’s 
development trajectory tied to debt.  
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6.4 Post-colonial manufacturing sector development: Industrialisation 
without Learning, 1960s and 1970s 
6.4.1 Introduction 
This sub-section places a microscope on manufacturing sector developments, 
especially within ten years of Independence. I detail the nature of industrial 
development, highlighting the role of the state in capital accumulation, including the 
specific nature of state-capital relations. As Chapter Five argued, geopolitical 
contradictions within a year of Independence placed urgency on installing local 
industries, but a failure of the post-colonial state to develop appropriate structures and 
institutions, reflecting its own weaknesses, paved way for uncoordinated investments 
bereft of local learning. Understandably, given the colonial legacy which ensured that 
virtually no local structures and skills existed at the time of Independence, while the 
politico-economic project of delinking from the South called for self-sufficiency, 
industrial development was forced to rely on foreign technology and expertise by 
establishing industries which did not develop on the basis of an integrated structure of 
production. This forms part of the broader argument of the thesis that a lack of 
developmentalism underpinned by structural transformation is precisely why the 
Zambian economy failed in its crucial formative fledgling post-Independence. That 
Zambia fell prey to the drawbacks of deteriorating terms of trade, was merely a 
reflection of an earlier failure when finances were available to support development 
based on a diversified and integrated structure of production. 
The inability of the post-Independence literature to place industrial development in its 
context, including a failure to adequately capture the role of the state, by instead 
focusing on the kinds of interventionist policies — such as subsidy provision, import 
restrictions, credit controls, foreign exchange allocations and so forth — which 
underpinned and promoted capital accumulation, has provided misleading 
assessments. Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa (2005: 320) generally supported 
neoliberal reform (reliance on market prices and trade liberalisation) and placed blame 
on Kaunda’s interventionist policies for Zambia’s economic decline from mid-1970s 
right up to the end of the Kaunda leadership in 1991: “It was now becoming 
increasingly clear that UNIP’s heterodox policy approach was not working.” In 
addition, they saw import-substitution policies as part of the broader interventionist 
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policies which did not work for Zambia; they argued that “[t]he import-substitution 
industry, which had thrived on high tariffs, became a major victim of the decline of 
the copper sector,” and thus, while “macroeconomic reforms in the 1980s, with 
support from the World Bank and the IMF” were instituted, “the partiality for 
government controls persisted. By the mid-1980s there were already a number of 
reform-minded technocrats in place at the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of 
Zambia, but they received very limited support from the political leadership … There 
was still considerable faith in structuralist ideas and the benefits of pursuing an import-
substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategy” (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2005: 
321). It is clear that Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa were apprehensive about 
interventionist policies, but this is partly because they misunderstood both the nature 
of the policies and their motivation, including the context under which they were 
applied. In their analysis, no mention is made of the geopolitical contradictions and 
influence of foreign interests in establishing a particular configuration of capital which 
was not underpinned by structural transformation. Nevertheless, such analyses and 
recommendations as “[o]verall, Zambia’s economic development during most of the 
Kaunda era (1964-1991) was very poor. There is certainly no basis for any yearning 
for a return to the policies of that era. The policy changes in recent years have not 
been perfect, but they have at least been in the right direction” (Bigsten and Tengstam, 
2010: 5; emphasis added) have been uncritically widely accepted even though they 
are misleading.  
The DSP account has demonstrated that it is insufficient to suggest universally that 
interventionist policies are necessarily bad in and of themselves. Rather, it is more 
apposite to interrogate the wider socio-political and economic context as well as the 
detail of the form of capital accumulation. Zambia’s post-Independence development 
record shows that interventionist strategies and the big push through the state led to 
unprecedented rapid industrialisation, with the manufacturing sector as a share of 
GDP almost doubling in less than a decade of Independence, but absence of a coherent 
and integrated industrial policy strategy aimed at raising competitive capacity and 
integrating production diminished the potential for such growth to be self-sustaining. 
State interventionism in industry through import-substitution and protection of 
domestic production did decisively encourage growth of the manufacturing sector, 
although uncoordinated investments including reliance upon foreign expertise and 
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technology weakened the potential to spread productive linkages and erection of an 
integrated structure of production. With the benefit of hindsight, “there is wide 
agreement that trade liberalisation in Zambia had a negative impact on … 
manufacturing … and was anti-poor” (Weeks et al., 2007: 3). The deindustrialisation 
of Africa more generally following the 1990s neoliberal craze is well known, yet the 
neoliberal dogma surrounding industrialisation continues to dominate discourse.  
By reinterpreting post-Independence industrial development, this subsection aims to 
highlight the importance of interventionist policies for industrial development, but 
adds a nuanced analytical dimension which suggests that the motivation and 
configuration/form of interventionist industrial development strategies matters, which 
must be designed to stimulate broad-based accumulation, while promoting wide-
ranging coherent and integrated developments. Zambia’s immediate post-
Independence record shows that uncoordinated industrial projects distorted the pattern 
of industrial development, yet this must not be seen as the cause of the failure of the 
industrialisation programme in creating an integrated structure of production, but 
merely a symptom of the broader structural and institutional weaknesses reflected in 
the state. One must first address the question of why industrial projects were 
uncoordinated in the sense that they did not support an integrated structure of 
production. For Zambia, this resulted from a host of elements, among them, the most 
enduring, with a lasting imprint on post-colonial development, being the 
socioeconomic and structural difficulties inherited from the colonial era which 
guaranteed dependence of the Zambian economy upon external influences. Firstly, as 
the previous two chapters demonstrated, the Zambian economy depended upon the 
South (specifically, Rhodesia and, to a lesser but considerable extent, South Africa), 
in a direct and decisive manner, for technology, expertise and infrastructure. Secondly, 
inherited capacities in human resources and institutions to deliver broad-based 
development were virtually absent.  
Subsequently, on the occasion of UDI elaborated upon earlier, to sever ties with the 
South, and relying on foreign advice and expertise, and seeking self-sufficiency in 
hitherto imported items, Zambia embarked upon a major project to redirect trade 
routes, mainly to ensure that its chief export commodity, copper, continued to be 
exported, to earn the government much needed revenue to finance national 
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development more broadly. However, delinking from the South and seeking self-
sufficiency planted deeper the Zambian economy to the inherited pattern of production 
centred around the fortunes of copper production. To the extent that the developments 
which followed, though unprecedented for Zambia and therefore praiseworthy, 
depended on the fortunes of the copper sector, they reflected a particular form of 
accumulation. One aspect of self-sufficiency which the post-Independence 
government deemed as crucial was the creation of industries to diversify production 
and relieve the Zambian economy of dependence upon copper, while also producing 
products previously imported. Nevertheless, given the absence of local capacities in 
technology and expertise, industrialisation should have meant acquisition of foreign 
technology, and creation of structures and institutions to do so. 
Dependence upon foreign markets and technology are not uncommon in late 
industrialising countries, and these should not be interpreted as the underlying 
developmental problem (Lall and Urata, 2003; Amsden, 1989; van Arkadie, 1973). 
Here, the experiences of East Asian developmental states are instructive. For Japan, 
argued Goto and Odagiri (2003: 83), “acquisition of advanced technology from abroad 
was essential to help build technological capabilities of its own.” Similarly, “[l]acking 
domestic technological capabilities, Korea, had to depend heavily on foreign 
technology” (Kim, 2003: 146). Although Taiwan is argued to have relied to a higher 
degree on foreign direct investment than Japan or South Korea, its industrial 
development in the earlier phase of rapid industrialisation between 1960 and mid-
1970s substantially relied on “technology embodied in imports of new capital … 
[with] the process of acquiring and using foreign technology … facilitated by the 
availability of an educated labour force as well as the emphasis on the production of 
goods using relatively simple technologies” (Aw, 2003: 168). Overall, as the DSP 
suggests, the processes of technology acquisition were facilitated by aggressive wide-
ranging support from the state. The ability of a nation to ensure that technology 
acquisition takes place within the framework of broad-based development depends 
largely on the development of supporting structures, institutions and effective 
coordination between them and the investments they promote. In other words, learning 
new technology on a national scale is not restricted to firm-level capability building, 
but ability of the state to ensure that supporting structures and institutions are in place, 
to enhance capacity development hinged on spreading productive linkages. 
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For Zambia, there was some tendency in the Kaunda era literature to misrepresent or, 
more appropriately, inadequately investigate, the nature of industrialisation by 
viewing dependence on foreign technology as the underlying problem. Accordingly, 
import substitution itself is seen as a problem because it supposedly promotes 
dependence. For instance, Kaunga (1985: 5) suggested that “[b]y stressing … import 
substitution the country had landed in a situation whereby … external dependence is 
merely shifted and not eliminated.” Firstly, it not true that import substitution 
necessarily encourages dependence as the experience from the DSP indicates. This 
distorts the proper understanding of import substitution. And, secondly, dependence 
itself is not problematical, and neither is it avoidable, especially in early stages of 
development. In this connection, for Africa more generally and Zambia in particular, 
van Arkadie's (1973: 94, emphasis added) insights are revelatory: “Difficulties arising 
from dependence result not so much from reliance on foreign markets … Nor is the 
problem reliance on foreign technology, which is inevitable. Rather it is that access to 
foreign markets, foreign technology and designs, and managerial talents came in a 
form in which understanding, access to information and critical decisions were either 
controlled elsewhere, or whatever local elements existed were drawn from the 
immigrant community.” Precisely because Zambia’s post-Independence development 
stimulus was conditioned by a particular kind of dependence, which reflected 
socioeconomic structural contradictions while facing geopolitical tensions within the 
context of UDI, the form of industrialisation was far removed from a self-sustaining 
and cohesive accumulation of physical assets. The absence of a coordinated and 
cohesive investments which reflected in high capital and import dependent industries 
was symptomatic of the broader political economy factors and structural 
contradictions which plagued the Zambian economy immediately after Independence.  
Seen through the prism of a system of accumulation, the pattern of industrial 
development measured by a particular form of accumulation of physical assets was 
merely a reflection of the nature of socio-political and economic interests entrenched 
in the state apparatus, private sector and broader Zambian society which interacted to 
influence decisively resource allocation for industrial development as well the specific 
configuration of investment technology. This will be shown by first discussing the 
broader post-Independence industrial policy strategy which underpinned 
industrialisation, in order to establish the role the post-Independence Government 
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envisioned for the manufacturing sector in Zambia’s overall development strategy. I 
then sketch the major features of industrial growth and patterns of capital 
accumulation in industry. In addition, an examination of select industrial projects will 
be offered, to demonstrate the nature of technologies adopted and the interests behind 
them. 
6.4.2 Post-Independence Industrial Policy, 1964 to early-1970s 
Soon after Independence, the new African government quickly came to grips with the 
urgency of transforming the structure of the economy. But what has evaded the state 
until today, is how to do it, seeing that this goal is still but a dream. Broadly, 
development strategy spelled out in the transitional development plan, profiting from 
the insights of the Seers report (UN/ECA/FAO report), aimed at diversifying 
production by industrial and agricultural development, while simultaneously 
enhancing the country’s health, educational and infrastructural profile. With the 
private sector taking the lead, the state was responsible for planning which in practice 
meant drawing up development targets and supervising their pursuit. 
Young (1973: 71) suggests that “[t]he nearest thing to a coherent state of this role [of 
manufacturing sector in Zambia’s economy] was given in a white paper, Outline of 
the Government’s Industrial Policy, which was published in October, 1964 on the eve 
of Independence and revised and reissued in January 1966; as late as 1969 it was still 
being quoted in the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Mines as the official statement of 
government policy.” In brief detail, industrial policy was aimed at supporting selected 
industries with largest potential to promote diversification. With its focus on meeting 
existing demand, promoting employment and skills development, industrial policy 
emphasised supporting labour-intensive consumer goods industries. Demonstrating 
the flawed nature of promoting consumer goods industries at Independence, it should 
be noted, as Chapter Three illustrated, that Zambia had by Independence a fairly 
developed consumer goods industry which, because of its relatively high import-
dependence, should not have been promoted on the basis of not being complementary 
to domestic production to serve final demand. Preferably, as argued by Young (1973: 
87), “the problem was to ensure that the economies of scale in basic and intermediate 
industries would not be ignored as the more obvious but ultimately limited 
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possibilities for import substitution in the consumer goods industries were exploited.” 
Put differently, selective industrial promotion should not necessarily have ignored 
consumer goods industries, but recognition should have been made that maximising 
spread effects required resources to be channelled elsewhere, especially given that 
consumer goods industries were already by Independence fairly large and expanding. 
A hint on enhancing export capacity of manufacturing sector industries also appeared 
in the White Paper: “Government will encourage especially those industries which 
have a potential likely to lead to the establishment of other related industries, and will 
be prepared to consider special assistance where the product not only will meet 
requirements of the local market but also provide a surplus for exports at competitive 
prices” (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 1966: 1). The White Paper also outlined 
Government’s commitment to establish industries outside the main economic centres. 
By aiming to promote labour-intensive industries, including industries outside the 
main economic centres, the White Paper was believed to be partly responding to 
political pressures (Young, 1973). By the time the FNDP was crafted, particularly 
within the context of UDI, self-sufficiency became so important that it was elevated 
as a matter of national security. In addition, the reliance upon copper even at 
Independence was well known, that diversification of production was a matter of 
urgency. 
Gleaning from industrial policy strategies which were believed to have been applied 
to develop (Southern) Rhodesia’s industries at the expense of Zambia, the post-
Independence Zambian Government focused mainly on methods of intervention 
(Young, 1973; Martin, 1972). In practice, this implied application of a mixture of 
incentives such as tax holidays, other price mechanisms like tariffs, and administrative 
means such as import licensing, exchange control permission, preferential treatment 
in government contracts, administrative support for obtaining work permits for foreign 
staff if needed and so on. Managed by a former Federal civil servant, a Tariff Advisory 
Board was established, which operated much like the days of the Federation. 
“It was not government policy, as rule,” maintains Martin (1972: 57), “to manage or 
control industry,” but, besides the interventionist methods to attract and support 
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foreign capital and, to a much lesser extent, local capital, the Government also called 
on the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO) as its agent to apply part of its 
industrial policy, although limited in function by mainly supplying financial support 
to private capital, and only initiating projects in strategic sectors where private capital 
was reluctant to traverse. If serving the national interest as defined by industrial policy, 
INDECO would be required to initiate projects, but eventually hand them over to 
private capital if interests did arise. INDECO was also charged with the responsibility 
of offering technical and economic advice to prospective investors.  
A brief history of INDECO is worth revisiting, if only to trace the evolution of 
industrial policy. Assuming the role of the Northern Rhodesian Loans Board, 
INDECO was in 1960 in the hands of the Northern Rhodesian Government. Run by a 
politician, Mr. John Roberts, the Northern Rhodesian leader of Roy Welensky’s 
United Federal Party, INDECO was seen by “federal politicians … as a useful sop for 
those northern settlers who felt unhappy about the slow progress of industry in their 
territory by comparison with what was going on in the south” (Martin, 1972: 60). The 
coming to existence of the Loans Board and eventually INDECO has already been 
explored in Chapter Three, but it is here worth recalling that it was a reflection through 
the state of white settler interests. In 1963, however, it was placed in private hands, 
with the Northern Rhodesian Government holding minority shares. In addition to 
making it clear that it would not directly participate in industry as majority owner, it 
also restricted its realm of influence to promotion only of private capital through 
provision of loans and other incentives deemed necessary as enablers of germination 
and expansion of private capital. Between 1963 and 1966, INDECO had projected an 
increase in the rate of investment to only a meagre £500,000, an amount which was 
dwarfed by post-Independence developments up to 1966. Reflecting the inability of 
the existing industrial policy stance to stimulate sufficient private capital 
accumulation to support manufacturing sector growth, in 1962 only a handful of 
applications amounting to £123,000 had been approved, rising to twelve approved 
applications valued at £187,500 in 1963. Then, when it reverted to Government in 
August 1964, the number of projects doubled to 24, valued at £400,000 (Turok, 1989: 
123; Martin, 1972: 60). 
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Two months before Independence, INDECO returned to Government majority 
control, although with the caveat of assuring potential industrialists that they would 
be fully supported, provided they were making a net contribution to the development 
of the country. “INDECO had,” contended Sardanis (2003: 165), “a portfolio 
consisting entirely of loans made to settler-owned businesses.” Running on a business 
model, and seeking to insulate itself from political interference, INDECO made it 
clear that reliance upon foreign capital and expertise would be inevitable. Although 
this kind of thinking would be confronted a few months into Independence, its 
underlying contradictions had a lasting imprint on the Zambian economy. 
It will be shown below that, though industrial development expanded rapidly when 
INDECO management changed, and especially within the context of UDI, a number 
of industrial projects schemed before the newly independent Zambian Government 
proper took over eventually saw the light of day well into Independence. On the one 
hand, these will be seen to contradict Government’s policy of promoting investments 
with highest potential to spread linkages. On the other hand, that they represented 
uncoordinated investments with flawed technological designs, reinforced by absence 
of technological acquisition, reflects the nature and relations of interests which 
entrenched themselves in the state architecture, in alliance with a particular 
configuration of (foreign private) capital. 
Thus, in its early days after Independence, industrial policy was mainly restricted to 
promotion of private capital through a series of interventionist strategies. For Martin 
(1972: 58), “[i]t all added up to a policy along conventional liberal lines.” In a similar 
light, Young (1973: 82) contended that “[w]hile the state was responsible for 
infrastructural provision, decisions on the level and direction of investment in directly 
productive activities [including manufacturing] were left entirely to private 
individuals.” In addition, localisation of capital was at the time not a specific object 
in the Government’s interest. Writing on the attitudes of private investors in the early 
1970s, and thus with the benefit of hindsight of the rapidity and eventual levelling-off 
of post-Independence industrial development, Young (1973: 83) argued that “[m]any 
businessmen seem to have been anxious about the political stability of the Zambian 
economy and, in particular, about the future of private foreign investment within it. 
Under these circumstances, they had an understandable preference for projects 
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yielding quick returns, rather than those which would lay the basis of a diversified 
economy.” This suggests that the formulation of private-sector-led industrial 
development under circumstances of (political risk and) uncertainty could very well 
deposit/concentrate resources and, subsequently, direct development towards existing 
spaces of economic strength based upon prevailing demand. 
Organisationally, at Independence, INDECO was under the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, with a board exclusively composed of white capitalists (Sardanis, 2003; 
Martin, 1972). Between April and May 1965, Andrew Sardanis, aged in his mid-
thirties, was appointed as the full-time General Manager of INDECO. Sardanis would 
eventually leave a lasting imprint on Zambia’s industrialisation agenda, hence the 
need to personify his narrative.  
Triggered by UDI, although the official industrial policy strategy was one of 
promoting private sector activity, the Government through INDECO embarked on a 
number of developmental projects more generally, and industrial projects in 
particular. However, in 1968, the Government instituted measures to ensure state 
participation by acquiring majority shares in a number of existing large-scale private 
enterprises. Thus, after 1968, industrial policy, in addition to emphasizing 
interventionism, would also seek to promote expansion of state participation in the 
economy. As will be seen below, despite the shift in policy, the material base of the 
underlying system of accumulation was unaffected. Reorganisation and consolidation 
of existing spaces of economic strength was the main feature of developmentalism, 
which did little to alter the structure of production. For Meyns (1984: 21), “[t]he 
institutionalization of state capitalism in Zambia between 1968-74 could not prevent 
the problems the country has experienced since 1975 because the basic economic 
structures were untouched.” Below (and in the next chapter), I argue that this is 
precisely because of the nature of the socio-political and economic interests which 
underpinned the structure of production; industrialisation took place without 
promoting learning of foreign technology. 
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6.4.3 Performance of the manufacturing sector 
The neglect of manufacturing at the time of Independence has already been shown; it 
contributed around six percent of GDP. Table 6-10 Value-Added in Manufacturing in 
Zambia, 1965 and 1972, below, demonstrates the post-Independence growth of the 
manufacturing sector, growing from K48 million in 1965 to K 164.5 million in 1972. 
Table 6-10 Value-Added in Manufacturing in Zambia, 1965 and 1972 











Food  6.6 13.8 23.6 14.3 
Beverages and tobacco 13.0 27.1 67.9 41.3 
Textiles and wearing apparel 3.9 8.1 12.6 7.7 
Wood and wood products, including furniture 2.4 5.0 3.3 2.0 
Paper, paper products, publishing and printing 2.1 4.4 6.5 4.0 
Rubber products 0.8 1.7 5.4 3.3 
Chemicals, chemical petroleum and plastic products 2.8 5.8 7.6 4.6 
Non-metallic mineral products 6.1 12.7 10.6 6.4 
Basic metal products 5.8 12.1 2.3 1.4 
Fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment 4.4 9.2 24.4 14.8 
Other manufacturing 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Total 48.0 100.0 164.5 100.0 
Source: Seidman (1974: 602), Table 1 
The dominance of consumer goods subsectors is apparent, but reflects continuities of 
the colonial legacy. By 1972, ‘Food’ and ’Beverages and tobacco’ subsectors 
combined to account for more than half of the manufacturing sector. Surprisingly, at 
Zambia’s level of development, the fabricated metals subsector was prominent. 
However, when one examines the structure of the Zambian economy, it is not difficult 
to see why this is the case; it was a reflection of copper-centric developmentalism. 
The basic metals subsector was based in the Copperbelt, providing services and inputs 
in the form of repairs and basic parts to the mines, the railways and Government 
infrastructural developments.  
Indeed, the manufacturing sector recorded substantial gains during the immediate 
post-Independence period before levelling off in the early 1970s (see index of 
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manufacturing production below). Gross manufacturing output grew at 4.9 percent 
between 1965 and 1970, and a further 4.5 percent between 1971 and 1976. Meanwhile, 
while value added in the manufacturing sector grew at about 10 percent between 1971 
and 1974, it experienced a continued decline for 1975 and 1976. The TNDP argued 
that the contraction of the manufacturing sector in this latter period was explained 
mainly by the inability of the sector to import inputs due to restrictions on foreign 
exchange and limitations placed on import licence allocations. The developments in 
the latter half of the SNDP took place within an environment of foreign exchange 
scarcity due mainly to a decline in copper revenues. 
Table 6-11 Index of Manufacturing Production, 1964-1984 (1969=100) 









Source: Seshamani (1988: 54, Table 1) 
Reaching its peak in the mid-1970s, industrial production began to contract, largely 
due to absence of foreign exchange to import inputs necessary to sustain production. 
By 1975, import content of manufacturing was nearly as much as 72 percent 
(Seshamani, 1988: 54). Thus, when foreign exchange availability became a serious 
problem, manufacturing production contracted. Between 1971 and 1983, for instance, 
“only about 50% of installed capacity was utilised” following the foreign exchange 
constraint (Karmiloff, 1990: 306). Between 1971 and 1974, only 2,000 jobs were 
created in the manufacturing sector, placing manufacturing total sectoral employment 
at 44,000. Accounting for this disappointing employment creation was mainly the 
nature of technology (capital-intensive) chosen for industrial development as well as 
limited real expansion, particularly following contraction in foreign exchange 
earnings. Capital-intensive technologies were adopted even in areas of production 
wherein labour-intensive techniques existed, with the Kalulushi and Nega Nega brick-
making factories being examples. 
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Since independence, capital accumulation demonstrated that little meaningful 
structural change had taken place within the manufacturing sector itself: between 1965 
and 1972, in terms of manufacturing industries’ value added as a proportion of the 
value added of the entire manufacturing sector, there were some notable increases — 
fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment increased from 9.2 percent to 
14.8 percent; food, beverages and tobacco increased from about 41 percent to around 
56 percent — as well as some prominent reductions — non-metallic mineral products 
declined by half, from about 13 percent to around 6 percent; wood and wood products, 
including furniture dropped from about 5 percent to only 2 percent. Whereas 
beverages and tobacco industries alone were the only sub-sector whose increase 
corresponded to local value-addition rising above the value of the finished product, 
other industries exhibited a disappointing trend; for machinery and equipment, for 
instance, imports were about eight times more than domestic value added.  
Whereas between 1966 and 1969 the census of industrial production recorded that the 
total number of establishments had fallen by about 33 percent, the remaining 
establishments seemed to have been of a larger size since employees per establishment 
and the value of fixed capital per worker doubled during this period. The value added 
created per establishment increased more than threefold during this period, exceeding 
K300,000 from about K90,000 (Seidman, 1979: 102). Capital accumulation, 
especially through the state, tended to be premised on promoting larger more capital-
intensive economic concerns. 
The growth of the manufacturing sector reinforced the pre-existing regional 
disparities, while deepening further the dependence on copper for its foreign exchange 
earnings. The copper complex itself must be seen in terms of its direct and indirect 
capacity to call forth industrial and infrastructural development. In a direct relational 
sense, inter-regional cleavages were more enduring as more manufacturing 
establishments were located along the so-called line-of-rail regions, accounting for 
almost all the employment of the manufacturing sector. The wages and salaries of this 
employment, including those in mainstream government and public enterprises, 
contributed to the pattern of manufacturing sector growth, particularly in influencing 
the location and output of industry. Industrial development proceeded along the lines 
of serving existing markets. 
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While manufacturing sector growth had been supported by public sector demand, a 
decline in copper prices by about 27 percent, and a reduction in total reserves by 
around 67 percent between 1970 and 1972, caused the government to respond by 
imposing tight foreign exchange controls and introducing import restrictions in the 
form of import licences as mechanisms to curtail the balance of payments deficit. 
Imports declined, while the rate of inflation rose to over 20 percent. Geopolitical 
tensions and conflict with Rhodesia also limited the amounts of imports into the 
country, particularly when the Rhodesian border was closed in January 1973.  
While conventional statistics would imply reasonable structural change given the 
growth of the manufacturing sector, doubling in terms of contribution to GDP by 1972 
from Independence, with the declining share of copper as a share of GDP from a peak 
of about 48 percent in 1969 to about 23 percent in 1972, a telescopic examination of 
the pattern and structure of manufacturing sector growth uncovers the enduring 
presence of the copper complex. In reality, this simply shows that the pace of industrial 
development was much faster than the growth of national output and copper given, 
for example, the Mufulira mine disaster which cut annual copper production by about 
100,000 tons. Virtually all the manufacturing sector growth depended on a buoyant 
copper industry, one that could provide revenue to the state to keep public expenditure 
apace with the expectations and the trajectory of (industrial) development and, not 
least, to provide foreign exchange earnings for the import-dependent manufacturing 
sector. 
Nevertheless, through INDECO, the government had made substantial strides in 
promoting industrialisation, especially between 1966 and 1972. Between 1964 and 
1970, INDECO’s net assets increased sixtyfold to K120 million, with profits at about 
K6 million, representing an increase of around 130 times (Martin, 1972: 59). By 1979, 
INDECO, with group assets reaching K406 million, employed about 25,000 people, 
accounting for more than half of total manufacturing sector employment. The 
expansion of INDECO followed from its acquisition of majority interests in existing 
enterprises as well as extensions to existing assets, and new projects as well. 
Overall, between 1970 and 1975, profitability of the INDECO group averaged around 
six percent of total turnover, dropping to one percent in 1975, before making a loss 
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(of about 1.5 percent) of turnover for the first time in 1976. INDECO’s enterprises 
had mixed results. 
6.4.4 Industrial development, the state and private capital: Broader 
considerations 
This subsection considers the role the state played — through its agencies, institutions 
and individuals — in promoting industrialisation, including its relation to private 
interests. The effects of the state’s role are seen through the prism of the nature and 
configuration and, pace and direction, of capital accumulation. The nature and 
configuration of capital accumulation have to do with some detailed observations 
about the technology of investments, groups involved, including the potential for these 
to promote spread effects, defined in terms of linkages and an integrated structure of 
production. The pace and direction of capital accumulation investigates the main 
factors responsible for how quickly industrial projects came into being, and where 
industrial development took place. This is to situate the socio-political and economic 
factors within the broader context of Zambian society. 
It is worth beginning here by exploring the scope of influence of expatriates on 
Zambia’s direction of industrial development, and how it restricted production within 
a limited space, bereft of the features of cohesiveness and integration that would be 
required to launch structural transformation. By ignoring this facet, the literature on 
Zambia’s post-Independence development has tended to be restricted in its analysis. 
Without understanding the nature of post-Independence thinking in its infancy, and 
how this influenced development in practice and the trajectory of development, it is 
difficult to give a fuller analytical perspective. Thus, when discussions are made 
regarding the kinds of projects and structure of investment underpinning them, it is 
important to establish the thinking behind them, and its evolution. Part of this has 
already been addressed by examining the thinking behind development planning. In 
this subsection, I examine how foreign influences determined the nature of capital 
accumulation, and with what effects on the subsequent trajectory of development. 
Nevertheless, the flawed design and execution of industrial policy reflected the 
broader institutional and ideological weaknesses.  
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When Sardanis came on the scene through a Presidential appointment, as INDECO 
Chairman, to reposition the organisation, a number of industrial projects had already 
been underway, and some under study. For example, “[a]n agreement on the sugar 
project, in which Indeco was to hold only 12 per cent stake, had already been reached 
with Tate and Lyle when Sardanis arrived on the scene” (Martin, 1972: 63). Sardanis 
himself also recalls that “[b]y the beginning of 1966 … we began [him and his staff] 
to set up a couple of the projects, which had been on the drawing board for years.” 
Firstly, this raises questions over whether sufficient lessons had been learnt from the 
pre-Independence development record as to the forms and dimensions of dependence 
which would arise as a result of implementing industrial projects crafted not to 
reinforce structural transformation, but merely to localise production. It had already 
been a lesson that industrial developments, and indeed broader economic activity in 
Zambia, were fashioned to depend upon the South for capital inputs and expertise for 
their sustenance. Secondly, even more enduring, it reflected the virtual absence of 
industry, such that, when UDI came in November 1965, the agenda for self-
sufficiency placed increasing urgency on localisation of production and installation of 
investments as criteria far removed from promoting coordinated and integrated 
investments.  
Understandably, “[a]fter UDI in November 1965 the whole exercise took on a new 
urgency, because Zambians were seriously concerned that the Smith regime could 
dislocate the Zambian economy simply by interrupting the jointly run services” 
(Burdette, 1988: 135). Consequently, the Government called on INDECO to perform 
wide-ranging functions which, by not being ordered to promote a self-sustaining 
integrated and cohesive structure of production planted deeper the Zambian economy 
into dependence upon the fortunes of copper. Measured by what it was called to do, 
Sardanis regarded INDECO during his time to have been successful in the industrial 
sector: “Through the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO), the government 
embarked upon a number of a projects to ease import and export bottlenecks that 
resulted from UDI and the Rhodesian sanctions; to kick-start local manufacturing 
which the Federation had steered towards Southern Rhodesia; to generate local 
production using local inputs, in order to substitute imported products; and generally 
to promote Zambian participation in business. INDECO was quite successful” 
(Sardanis, 2014: 34). 
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Yet, with the benefit of hindsight, the urgency that came post-UDI to catalyse 
development in Zambia was flawed in design and execution if less in motivation. 
Indeed, the principle behind aspirations for economic independence are well justified, 
but less so was the manner in which it was executed. The absence of local skilled and 
experienced staff in Zambia did account for part of the problem. For example, when 
Sardanis took over INDECO operations, it served well the purpose of placing a 
Zambian to manage the affairs of the state’s industrial policy agency, but the 
subsequent structure of investments under his wing, though laudable, and not 
necessarily attributed exclusively to his failings, did demonstrate the broader 
weaknesses of the Zambian economy. Sardanis (2003: 182-183) recalls that: “One of 
the earliest projects we did was the construction of two international hotels … Bechtel 
caused a stir when they put the International Hotels to a tender. Some of the prices 
they received from local subcontractors, like the supply of aluminium doors and 
windows, were exorbitant … The arrival of Bechtel in the country was godsend for 
me. I had no experience — in fact there was no expertise in the country — for the 
negotiation, adjudication and supervision of large engineering projects. Over the years 
they would undertake those tasks for the oil pipeline from Dar to Ndola, the oil 
refinery at Ndola, the fertilizer factory at Kafue, the iron steel project and their 
executives in Zambia would give me valuable advice on many subjects I knew little 
about.” Against the background of chronic absence of local skills, this recollection 
suggests the submission of design and execution of individual projects to foreign 
interests. 
It is difficult to discern the precise implications on development of these relations, but 
when the details of these projects are seen in terms of the kinds of technology they 
required, it suggests that reliance on foreign expertise did not correspond to national 
development aspirations of employment and building an integrated structure of 
production. Young (1973: 231) observed that not only did manufacturing enterprises 
depend on imported inputs, but imported technology itself showed a tendency of being 
capital-intensive, calling for additional imported maintenance services and inputs. 
Sardanis also mentions that one of the early challenges he faced was staffing 
INDECO. “There were only three Zambians, two drivers and a messenger … [while] 
all senior officers (exclusively white] informed me that they would be leaving … One 
292 
 
of them had been fully engaged in researching a scheme for the manufacture of grain 
bags in Zambia,” remembers Sardanis (2003: 167-168), although he also said he 
would be leaving. Not that the particular configuration of the grain bag project was 
influenced by the erstwhile INDECO staff, but it could be argued that when Sardanis 
finally pushed through this project, he could have been influenced by the then existing 
thought, especially because he concedes that some of his first responsibilities of work 
were focused on rolling out projects which had already been on the drawing board.  
Between Independence and the appointment of Sardanis, there was hardly any project 
worthy of mention except “one to manufacture salt-glazed pipes for the building 
industry in conjunction with the South African Hume Pipe Company,” although it was 
only after Sardanis appeared on the scene that the project “came into existence as 
Zambia Clay Industries Ltd. [which later] ran into difficulties when it emerged that 
the design of the plant supplied by Hume was forty years old and only worked at sea 
level: by 1970, the company had lost K400,000 of its original K700,000 capital” 
(Martin, 1972: 61). Between his appointment and 1967, Sardanis approved a number 
of projects, ranging from textiles, fertilisers, explosives, copper fabrication, tyres to 
grain bags, including smaller establishments, which came into full operation in the 
early 1970s. This suggests that much of the capital accumulation in manufacturing 
had been overseen by the structures of INDECO more generally. 
The inability of private capital led industrialisation to catalyse large-scale industrial 
development was something Sardanis quickly came to grips with in his experience at 
INDECO. Sardanis (2003: 182) himself pointed out that he “soon realized that 
Indeco’s participation encouraged foreign investors to go forward with their plans … 
[and] that Indeco needed their management expertise.” Martin (1972: 64) earlier made 
this observation of Sardanis: “Sardanis grasped … that there was no queue of foreign 
investors anxious to be given the chance to bring their money and skills into sunny 
Zambia.” Martin went on to give some practical difficulties of relying on foreign 
investment to promote domestic industrialisation in developing countries, arguing 
that, in the face of risk, whatever its forms, large multinational corporations would 
usually start by supplying a small developing country with exports before committing 
to setting up physical investments. Only if a multinational company is blackmailed 
into thinking its export market share hangs on a thread, either through a potential 
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competitor or otherwise, would it usually commit to physical location. Zambia’s 
record demonstrated that legislation in the form of such practices as the Pioneer 
Industries Act, with its features such as tariff protection, did support domestic 
industrial growth but only in a very limited sense.  
“In the first years of Zambia’s Pioneer Industries Act,” contended Martin (1972: 65), 
“only about thirty applications were considered of which eight were granted.” Aiming 
to install a fertiliser plant, “Sardanis was unable to interest a single manufacturer of 
fertilisers in the project to put up a Zambian factory and had to resort to ‘turn-key’ 
deal with Kobe Steel and find the management himself” (Martin, 1972: 65).  
There are a number of lessons to be grasped from this. Firstly, the design of industrial 
policy matters. Structures, institutions and resources must be organised in such a 
fashion to stimulate industrial activity, and promote it within the broader development 
strategy. Secondly, Zambia’s post-Independence developmentalism, although 
promoting localisation of labour and capital, increasingly relied on foreign interests. 
Industrialisation in Zambia was being increasingly seen in terms of physical 
accumulation of capital (purchase and installation of production capacity), and less in 
terms of acquisition and learning of imported technology, a feature which must be 
contrasted with the DSP. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all ensured that physical 
accumulation of capital proceeded apace learning of foreign technology (Lall and 
Urata, 2003; Amsden, 1989).  
Faced with the emergency created by the geopolitical crisis under the banner of UDI, 
INDECO was called on by the state to execute a series of projects aimed at delinking 
Zambia from its Southern neighbour. With the help of Italian partners, INDECO 
mounted two large projects – Zam-Tan Road Services and the TAZAMA oil pipeline, 
both running all the way to Dar-es-Salaam. Another notable project was the Chilanga 
Cement Ltd., 45 percent owned by INDECO, which cost the Zambian government 
more to build with a quicker Italian contractor than it would have had if the slower 
British firm Mitchell Construction were awarded the project on the basis of the latter’s 
lower bid. INDECO reckoned that a slower contractor in addition to continued 
importation of cement would turn out more expensive in the long term. Whether this 
was conducive for Zambia’s development pursuits was questioned by critics who 
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argued that the emphasis on speed rather than cost may have worked for the cement 
project but its suitability as a criterion for project execution elsewhere proved far too 
costly. The fertiliser plant which utilised expensive local coal ended up raising the 
price well over imported fertiliser. In fact, delaying the project until such a time that 
the oil pipeline had been completed would have left open the option of setting up a 
cheaper and more efficient fertiliser plant running on oil rather than coal. Martin 
(1972) notes that the state felt pressured for at least two reasons: firstly, to meet the 
Independence expectations, and speed over cost as a criterion for project execution, 
meant that jobs would be readily available with immediate investments spill-over 
effects; secondly, geopolitical contradictions associated with UDI more generally had 
placed an urgency on the Zambian state to cut ties with the south. A possible third 
reason for the urgency in project implementation within the context of realigning trade 
options was to diversify sources of supply. This meant entering existing markets 
where private firms (using traditional sources of supply) already existed. Here, 
INDECO, created two import and wholesale companies – Zambia Steel and Building 
Supplies Ltd. (ZSBS) and the Zambia National Wholesale Corporation (ZNWC) – 
which, lacking in adequate management skills, underperformed in the face of existing 
competition. 
On the political side, that INDECO was able to manage its operations with reasonable 
budget and political support, can be seen from the good relations Sardanis had 
developed with top personnel in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Since 
Zambia had limited trained professional and managerial personnel, including skilled 
artisans, recruitment was being politicised, with the Zambia Public Service 
Commission remaining resolute in sticking to proper civil service etiquette. 
‘Turnkey’ rather than ‘build to order’ projects were by design incapable of being 
maximally integrated into a proper national development agenda that detailed the 
choice of technology and possibly the source of supply. But this was a secondary issue 
if INDECO’s accumulation model is to be seen within the context of an entire system. 
Of primary concern then, if accumulation is to be underpinned by structural change, 
is to determine to what extent efforts were made to stimulate economic activity outside 
of the existing structure of industry. This is the underlying argument of this thesis, a 
suggestion that structural change has not underpinned Zambia’s developmentalism 
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because the post-Independence accumulation has reinforced rather than modified the 
inherited structure of production. For example, it has been established that INDECO, 
conditioned by the supposed urgency to delink from the south, embarked on 
infrastructure development (in terms of altering trade routes and sources of supply) 
that did account for much of the expansion, but this took place to reinforce rather than 
modify the system of accumulation. The transport and trade routes for instance were 
primarily aimed at serving the mines, although use of them would be made to cover 
imports. In fact, a fleet of trucks were bought to haul copper by road and depend less 
on the rail to the south, while also transporting loads of oil. Once the pipeline had been 
completed, little use was made of these trucks and when INDECO tried to salvage 
them, they were found worthless, the total cost in this operation alone running to losses 
of about K1.5 million were mainly covered by Lonrho management as owners of the 
operating company running the fleet of trucks (Martin, 1972: 198). 
The operations of INDECO, although on paper to be directed by the state, were not 
insulated from the influence of foreign private capital. The government more 
generally approached development with the help of foreign partners whose influences 
penetrated into the realm of industrial development, determining not just which 
industrial projects would be created, but also the pattern of industrial development 
itself and the structure of investment. Profit maximisation, if seen as the motive of 
private capital, must be understood to determine the type of technology adopted. 
Foreign capital will maximise profits if it can provide and maintain technology in 
addition to supplying technical support. Capital-intensive techniques are preferred as 
the blueprint of the type and form of technology that embody such profits maximising 
attributes. But whether these are adopted in a (foreign) host nation depends upon the 
willingness of the hosts. This is where Tangri (1999, 1984) sees the role of foreign 
advisors acting to influence choice of technique. Rather than upgrade and expand the 
existing labour-intensive plants, the government in 1975 created two state-of-the-art 
brick factories under the Zambia Clay Industries. This minimised the government’s 
employment-creating investments, yet making the government more dependent on 
foreign input, be it physical or technical. 
In spite of INDECO’s objectives of utilising local resources, the way in which it was 
funded could also help explain why it failed to insulate its operations from foreign 
296 
 
influences. Around fifty percent of INDECO’s operations were funded by foreign 
resources. Such funding came with its own set of conditions regarding the source and 
type of technology to be adopted. Arrangements such as these not only undermined 
the government’s structure of investments, they also sabotaged the government’s 
plans on employment since, in part, investment type, whether labour- or capital-
intensive, determines how many jobs can be created. 
Mansa Batteries, an INDECO subsidiary, relied upon the expertise of a Finnish firm 
to install machinery which was later heard, through a parliamentary committee, to be 
inappropriate because it could not run continuously over an extended period of time 
as required and subsequently came short of its expected output. A host of problems 
plagued the brick-making factory at Kalulushi built by a German company: in addition 
to extortionate charges incurred in the acquisition of the installed machinery, the 
machines were outdated, incompatible with local inputs such as coal, and also had no 
spare parts such that they could not be maintained. Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia 
(NCZ), commissioned by the Japanese, established to produce fertilizer, incurred 
technical difficulties underpinned by construction problems causing intermittent 
shutdowns, so much that INDECO had to receive damages to the tune of around one 
million Kwacha (Tangri, 1999, 1984). These examples highlight some of the costs and 
problems associated with relying upon foreign assistance. Put differently, filling the 
void left by absence of domestic capacity with foreign capacity does not guarantee 
success. In fact, as the Zambian case has suggested, foreign partners, their 
representatives and/or expatriates made investment decisions that did not align with 
the national development plans. On the whole, however, this demonstrates that 
industrial policy requires adequate state structures to supervise even the minute and/or 
intricate details of projects in order to align them to national development. 
A number of home-grown factors were identified in explaining part of the poor 
performance of INDECO. First, there was absence of a cohesive and coherent 
industrial development plan, highlighting in clear detail the specific strategies and 
approaches necessary for industrial development. This is partly seen in how the state 
left to the foreign partners many of the important decisions regarding composition of 
investment. Such a plan would underwrite and guide the principles and standards for 
project selection and approval. Instead, a good number of INDECO projects were 
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adopted on an impromptu basis (Tangri, 1984). Indeed, such guiding principles could 
also establish and ground an investment criterion necessary to insulate INDECO from 
capture by interests. Too much was left in the hands of managers, such that no proper 
index could be used to judge how far off management choices moved from 
corresponding overall development goals. Subsequently, projects that would be easily 
deemed cost-effective would be those that aligned themselves with demand, and these 
tended to meet immediate needs (consumer goods), irrespective of the nature of 
technology and direction of accumulation. 
Political interference is normally cited as distorting the pattern of industrial 
development and sabotaging the use of INDECO projects to gain political rather than 
economic mileage. The struggle for the state to balance development regionally often 
influenced the direction and location of accumulation. But this failed to incorporate 
the economic costs, much to the detriment of its intended purpose to even out 
development while creating employment. Balanced regional development appears to 
be underpinned by the privileging of politics over economics. Supported by notions 
of employment creation in less developed regions, some notable projects that bore the 
weight of political directives regarding their location were Mansa Batteries, Kapiri 
Glass Products, and Livingstone Motor Assemblers. However, good or bad, the 
government had as its key priority an agenda to strike a balance in regional 
development, and this influenced the location of investment. From the instructions of 
the higher echelons of political power and without the advantage of a cost-benefit 
survey, while subverting an already appraised and approved project, the Chinese 
maize mill in Chingola replaced one in Kitwe. At times, cost-benefit studies were 
simply set aside even when they warned of non-viability of certain locations for 
certain projects such as was the case for Mansa Batteries in Mansa. 
While political interference served important functions in attempting to even out 
regional development, in hindsight, it was unnecessary to do so at the expense of the 
broader benefits and linkages stemming from economically viable projects. Two rural 
areas—Nega Nega and Kalulushi—enjoyed short-lived economic benefits when they 
were chosen to lodge two large-scale brickmaking factories. However, such 
investment projects are pinpointed to have ignored wider economic costs (Tangri, 
1999). These factories were located in distant places from the demand sites in urban 
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areas, hence requiring high road haulage costs to transport the bricks. When the high 
transport costs of transportation inflated the prices of bricks, consumers opted for a 
cheaper substitute, concrete blocks. Eventually, the brickmaking factory at Nega Nega 
shut down in 1979 due to insufficient demand, while the Kalulushi outlet was running 
serious losses for similar reasons. Existing demand in the urban areas was sufficient 
to support these factories had they been located in close proximity because this would 
have kept costs low. Indeed, the government would have profited from fiscal linkages 
these factories would have potentially provided, and used these instead to support 
agriculture development in the rural areas. Ikpe (2011) and Karshenas (1995) make a 
case for intersectoral transfers in the process of structural change more generally, and 
agriculture development specifically. By means of fiscal and sectoral linkages, the 
state can support rural areas by promoting agriculture development through a mix of 
interventions such as direct funding, technical and input support. There is no 
automatic transfer of resources across sectors to a scale that can be said to support 
structural transformation. A decisive form of intervention, including appropriate 
structures and institutions, is necessary. 
The dearth of local skilled management must also be sought as an explanation of 
INDECO’s substandard performance, yet it was politics that interfered the most with 
effective management of parastatals. The government’s way of dealing with, or 
minimising, corruption was to reshuffle management across the parastatals. Tangri 
(1999) views this as disruptive and one of the causes of poor management. 
Compounding this problem were unprofessional practices of placing in top positions 
in the state companies on political grounds to individuals that did not possess the 
qualifications and/or proficiency for the job. Hence, INDECO operations were 
sabotaged by personal gain and political connections. But if post-Independence 
developmentalism is traced in context, it appears the more decisive element was the 
structure of investment which impacted upon subsequent development and political 
discourse. 
While TFP calculations in Chapter Two suggested that the pre-1968 situation in 
Zambia was more or less market-based, the failure to investigate details leads to 
misleading recommendations which attribute to market-based policies the favourable 
economic circumstances Zambia experienced before the economic reforms of 1968. 
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A considerable portion of economic activity before the reforms can be accounted for 
largely by direct state participation in economic activity, in erecting infrastructural 
and industrial projects. Even before the economic reforms, the Government through 
INDECO already started buying off private capital. To cite one example, following 
approval by Cabinet, in May 1965, INDECO bought forty percent of Chilanga 
Cement. In addition, it also created a number of establishments with foreign partners 
— Zambia Clay Industries in December 1965, with 56 percent Government shares. 
Although INDECO’s assets skyrocketed to K35.6 million, by 1967 the pace of capital 
accumulation was insufficient to promote adequate growth in the manufacturing 
sector. Reinforced by socio-political contradictions, particularly localisation of 
capital, and its wider implications, the April 1968 Mulungushi reforms marked a 
watershed in Zambia’s developmentalism more generally, and industrial policy in 
particular. President Kaunda announced that, through INDECO, the Government was 
to take over majority shares in about 24 existing large-scale, mainly foreign-owned, 
businesses. INDECO’s net assets ballooned to K108 million in 1969, with new 
developments accounting for only 43 percent of this figure (Tangri, 1984: 114). 
Chapter Five has shown that despite the Government’s commitment to alter the 
structure of production through diversification, the scale and scope remained limited 
partly because insufficient resources were allocated to industrial development.  
Burdette (1988: 82; emphasis added), questioned whether by the amount of resources 
under its control, including its underlying ideology, INDECO could launch 
meaningful industrial development: “The tiny state Industrial Development 
Corporation (INDECO) whose assets in 1967 were only K35.6 million, was 
practically and ideologically unsuited to redirect manufacturing development in an 
aggressive fashion.” Indeed, genuine, as opposed to rhetorical, “political support 
enjoyed by a policy determines the amount of resources that will be allocated to its 
execution out of all transferable resources available in that society” (Dror, 1968: 35). 
Thus, if resource allocation is seen as a result of the interplay of socio-political forces 




The TNDP, for example, noted that only twenty percent of Government’s capital 
budget was spent on directly productive a sector, while 26 percent on social and 
community services, with economic infrastructure consuming 47 percent. For Turok 
(1989: 137), this demonstrates that “official documents acknowledged that available 
resources were not allocated to encourage growth.” 
Some evidence exists that selective industrial projects were called into being due to 
their potential for backward linkages with agriculture and, potentially, their ability to 
gain political mileage. Given that Zambia’s agriculture sector supported more than 
half the population, particularly on a subsistence basis, a case can be made that 
Government through INDECO supported the establishment of a number of 
manufacturing projects in consumer goods and textiles — for example, the maize 
milling project, the pineapple canning plant at Mwinilunga and the textile industry. 
Nostalgic about his INDECO days, Sardanis (2003: 186) recollects what he perceived 
as successful industrial projects with strong backward linkages with agriculture. In 
general, Sardanis contended that the white settler community mocked most 
government development projects, arguing that they were doomed. For example, on 
grounds that local cotton production was insufficient to justify construction of a textile 
plant, the white settler community was sceptical about the economic viability of 
localising textile manufacturing. Consequently, when Sardanis approved the 
construction of the Kafue textiles, he faced grave opposition from the white 
community so much that the then Minister of Finance, Arthur Wina, who had been 
influenced by the white settlers, got involved to bar the project. It took Sardanis’ own 
influence from personal relations to convince the Minister of the project’s viability. A 
couple of years later, with the help of Chinese contractors, another textile mill at 
Mulungushi would be opened. Measured by the textile industry’s ability to stimulate 
local cotton production, Sardanis was especially pleased by his decision to support the 
establishment of textile mills. However, from the encounter with the Minister, this 
narrative suggests the potential for existing structures to facilitate political 
interference. 
Whatever the weaknesses, that wide-ranging industrial projects saw the light of day 
under the guidance of the state reflect the effectiveness of the Zambian state’s 
interventionism in ordering development to whatever path. That is, the Zambian state 
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possessed reasonable capacity and policy tools to intervene effectively and it executed 
these successfully, although not necessarily sustainably developmentally. Thirdly, it 
illustrates the divergence in motivation for interventionism between the Zambian state 
and the developmental states discussed in Chapter Four. For the latter, interventionist 
policies such as restrictions on import licensing and foreign exchange allocations were 
mainly used to promote an integrated structure of production rather than to preserve 
foreign exchange as did the Zambian economy when it was faced with foreign 
exchange difficulties. Understandably, the lack of sufficient foreign exchange 
required the state to restrict its use, but this shows that the state had its disposal this 
instrument as part of its arsenal for industrial development. 
Wade (1990: 129) explains how interventionism, specifically through import 
licensing, was tied to industrial development and export promotion. Import licences 
would be awarded on condition that producers were expanding their exports: “This 
tying of import licenses to exports is designed insure that those who get the windfalls 
(“rent”) from importing scarce commodities are at the same time contributing to the 
economic success of the country by exporting” (Wade, 1990: 129). Wade goes on to 
explain how import licence applications are assessed through an elaborate interaction 
of banks and state agencies, with industrial development kept as the overriding goal. 
“When a would-be importer applies to a bank for a license to import,” explains Wade 
(1990: 129), “the bank must check … [with] … the Board of Foreign Trade, which 
generally passes it on to the Industrial Development Bureau.” Thus, by mounting 
restrictions on foreign exchange and imports without due regard to how it might affect 
the promotion of industrial development, the Zambian government diminished the 
growth of industry. Therefore, because it cannot be a universal truth that 
interventionism is bad, one must examine the motivation and mechanisms under 
which interventionism is executed. 
Meanwhile, in Zambia, “import policy [was] used as a means of regulating 
transnational corporations,” such that, “gaining approval of their licenses application 
… [measured] government’s favorable or preferential treatment of them“ (Libby, 
1983: 383). Fundamentally, in this study, Libby argued that import licensing gauged 
the strength of “alliance formation between foreign capital and dominant class 
interests” (Libby, 1983: 383). Thus, in seeing how import licences were awarded, it is 
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here suggested that such policy instruments were used less to promote structural 
transformation more generally, or, specifically, industrialisation; instead, they were 
used to advance both the interests of the personnel manning the state architecture and 
those lodged in a particular configuration of capital. The nature of material base and 
interests lodged upon it, in alliance with interests within the apparatus of the state, 
largely determined the direction and intensity of accumulation, within the context of 
the prevailing economic conditions.  
Although Libby is correct in making these observations, he does not delve into the 
area of understanding what mechanisms and power dynamics within the state 
architecture facilitated alliance formation between dominant political-administrative 
interests and (private) capital. Enabling this kind of interaction and direction of 
accumulation is the nature of the inherited institutions which kept the power of the 
state architecture in centralised institutions. The failure to transform the state deprived 
Zambia of the opportunity to enjoy diffusion of power and interests. It will be 
suggested in the next chapter for further research that socio-political and economic 
interests have bearing upon the trajectory of development. For example, in Zambia, 
the consequences for development from the centralisation of power in central state 
institutions were well understood by the state actors, and this led to attempts to 
transform the state through so-called administrative reforms. However, these reforms 
led to a reorganisation of the state without transforming it. In the end, the 
reorganisation, faced with external geopolitical and economic influences, only worked 
to strengthen the dependence upon the existing system of accumulation, with the 
alliance of state actors and capital being a reflection of it. 
Seidman (1974; 1979) explains the lack of structural change as a result of the planning 
and implementation strategy of industrial policy adopted by the state, embedded 
within the notion of import-substitution and the institutional framework underpinning 
capital accumulation. The structure of imports reflected the nature of domestic 
demand, dominated by consumer goods meeting the demands of the affluent dominant 
class. This class was responsible for designing and executing industrial policy, 
including influencing what kinds of projects would be approved and funded. As a 
proportion of the total population, this dominant class was only about one-tenth, yet 
it received between 50 percent to 75 percent of the nation’s domestic income. By 
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replacing previously imported goods with domestic manufactures, the state was in part 
conceding to the existing structure of demand aimed at serving the interests of the 
dominant class. But the nature of capital accumulation in such industries must be 
examined on its merits and potential to diffuse productive linkages to the rest of the 
economy. Hence, questioning the scope of linkages of domestically produced goods 
that were previously imported becomes essential.  
Some of the noteworthy domestically-established industries which emerged to 
substitute imports were the car assembly plant in Livingstone and the textile mill in 
Kafue. These were capital-intensive, requiring imported inputs, spares, parts and 
repair services, hence limiting the scope of spreading productive linkages. Seidman 
(1974; 1979) views such industrial development as experienced in Zambia as a failure 
to discern and prioritise correctly what would bring about meaningful productive 
linkages to fuel structural change. She asked, “should Zambia, at this stage of 
development, use scarce government investment funds to produce private cars for the 
few people with high incomes? Or should it give priority to the production of simple 
tools and equipment — for example, animal-drawn ploughs, maize-grinding 
machines, bore-hole drills — to increase rural productivity and levels of living?” 
(Seidman, 1979: 104). While this examination is important in uncovering the direction 
of accumulation, and how it blocked structural change, it does not analyse what forces 
and processes necessarily influenced the trajectory of such capital accumulation. 
Understanding the socio-political processes and the role of the dominant class adds an 
explanatory dimension that makes thorough the analysis of structural change. This has 
to be discussed in terms of the nature of the polity, particularly how the political and 
technocratic classes used the state structures to serve their own interests.  
The manner in which import-substitution industrialisation was pursued as an industrial 
development strategy in Zambia appears to demonstrate its nature and potential to 
exacerbate rather than alter the existing structure of production. However, this is not 
to say that ISI is inherently problematic as some have suggested since it is “by its very 
definition … biased against exports” (Seshamani, 2008: 270). Again, the DSP 
experience is instructive; ISI need not necessarily underprivilege nor fail to 
create/spread productive linkages. The nature of projects in terms of the type of 
technology being used will speak more on the ability of the policy to spread productive 
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linkages. For example, South Korea did create capacity in steel production through 
ISI before becoming a net exporter of this product. 
In fact, conventional analysis has proceeded along the lines of seeing import 
substitution strategy in technical terms: first, as a ratio of imports to total supply (local 
and imports) of goods, so that a declining ratio represents successful import 
substitution. Second is a measure of how reliant domestic manufacturing is on 
imported inputs (that is, imported inputs as proportion of total manufacturing output). 
Again, a declining ratio is indicative of successful import substitution. But such 
statistics do not speak of the social and political processes that reproduced them, 
although reference is usually made to the institutional structure of the state machinery 
executing import substitution strategies. The inefficient state hypothesis is well 
known; it underscores state machinery as a political tool to reward supporters by 
giving them jobs without corresponding increases in productivity. Additionally, the 
response by Africans to inequality in the workplace by seeking to indigenise 
administrative and management-level positions is seen as the wrong approach given 
the dearth of skills within the pool of the African workforce. 
The bureaucratic nature and associated red-tapeism of the parastatal enterprises are 
argued to compound the problems of an already inefficient delivery structure. Further, 
although also encompassing the private sector, the state’s response to dwindling 
foreign exchange by instituting exchange controls and designing structures to 
implement import licensing strategies is also seen as problematic in efficiency terms. 
Little is said about the socio-political and geopolitical conditions under which these 
policies were applied; yet these policies are universally negated. 
The structure of mainstream government in terms of ministries and other 
governmental agencies were seen as a continuation of colonial administrative 
structures, focused on administration and implementation of infrastructural 
development to create an environment for business. This was a critique not so much 
the notion of ministries per se, but of their purpose and function. Underpinning the 
state structure embedded in ministries was the presumption that the domestic 
economy’s productive development funds needed to be augmented by foreign capital 
in order to bring about meaningful development. Ministries were thus less aggressive 
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in supervising development projects, leaving the decisions on composition of 
investment to be made by INDECO through the operating companies of its 
subsidiaries. This should be contrasted with the Japanese Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI), which had central planning structures for making 
decisions not just on what type and location of projects but also on what kind of 
technology would be permissible within the context of an overall development 
strategy (Johnson, 1982).  
Accordingly, the state structures, at least seen by the notion and purpose of ministries, 
were created, and functioned, to attract and retain foreign capital. In other words, the 
opportunities for structural change that Independence brought should have confronted 
the structure and pattern of production, partially in the way the state itself was 
perceived, formed and developed. In fact, Seidman (1974) showed that Zambia’s 
problem was not a lack of funds for productive investments per se, but a failure to 
discern where investible surplus would be extracted and then allocated under a 
decisive drive to stimulate and condition structural change. The inequality of income 
distribution within urban centres and across urban and rural centres not only 
influenced the pattern of demand and industrial development, it also hid the sources 
of investible surplus. 
The state’s instrument for industrial development and direct productive participation 
in the market, INDECO, had total assets half of what would have been potentially 
extracted as investible surplus from the economy. But a number of factors, events and 
activities prevented this. First, through the Mulungushi reforms, the state nationalised 
private enterprises, consequently requiring the government to undertake payments as 
compensation for its acquired shares. Second, partly related to the dearth of skilled 
personnel, the government paid substantially attractive salaries to foreign expatriates 
who then remitted large portions of these earnings. Third, fractions of private capital 
operating in business in Zambia did not take a long-term view, integrating and placing 
their interests in Zambia’s, thus they too remitted their profits, salaries and dividends 
despite the government’s attempts at clamping down repatriation of such funds. 
Overall, funds repatriated out of Zambia between 1970 and 1972 were well over 
INDECO’s assets, even exceeding the total value of foreign capital, including private 
mining interests, invested in the Zambian economy in any given year since the 
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takeover of black African leadership. This reflected absence of state structures to 
extract investible surplus. 
By comparing Zambia with East African countries, (Seidman, 1974a, 1979) showed 
convincingly that part of Zambia’s problem was not a lack of financial means per se, 
but rather one of ordering its development priorities properly since sufficient funds 
existed within the spaces of the Zambian dominant class. Tax revenues that the 
Zambian state extracted were consistently higher in per capita terms than its East 
African neighbours, even as much as threefold in 1972 alone. In the context of the 
1972-1976 so-called second national development plan (SNDP), the government had 
retreated its lead role in industrial development, limiting public investment in 
manufacturing to no more than eight percent of total public investment, leaving private 
capital to occupy up to fourfold as much. But this approach to industrial development 
came into conflict with the government’s view of private capital. 
The cutback of public investment in industrial development, while maintaining high 
social or recurrent spending, could not have supported the state’s posture of 
diversifying the economy. If high social spending and recurrent expenditure are seen 
as a political strategy as a government sop to its political base, then this is to place the 
interests of the beneficiaries at the heart of development policy. Hence, national 
development plans simply reflected the dynamics of socio-political processes, with 
the state choosing to gain short-term political legitimacy over short-term political 
sacrifices for long-term development. But again, it is precisely because the interests 
upon which the state derived its legitimacy and support were lodged within the 
institutions of the state architecture absorbing much of the investable surplus. 
This argument can be stretched further if it acknowledged that “[t]he state itself is not 
monolithic, but reflects the struggle within local classes. Thus, variations in the nature 
of control and in relations with foreign capital, which are frequent responses to 
changes in class relationships, must be understood in detail. Although local ownership 
does not guarantee control, it nevertheless brings the control of industry within the 
sphere of national class relationships, and it is at this level that that analysis must 
begin” (Fincham, 1980: 312). In the next chapter, I will suggest for further research 
how the expansion of the state architecture can establish interests within the state more 
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generally which, lacking an economic base, may act in a manner which denies the 
productive economy of capital investment, as reflected in growth of recurrent 
expenditure discussed earlier. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The 1970s, particularly after 1975 were a turning-point in Zambia’s 
developmentalism. Real copper prices came down, reflecting low demand for copper, 
but geopolitical tensions after the closure of the Rhodesian border in 1973, made it 
increasingly more expensive to transport copper. Zambia’s balance of payments went 
into deficit and, in response, the government erected a series of interventionist 
strategies to cushion the economy. These developments were, however, a reflection 
of the failure in an earlier period of the Zambian Government to genuinely promote 
structural transformation.  
Reflecting high copper prices, “the FNDP was the most successful of all the Zambian 
national development plans [in the Kaunda era]” (Burdette, 1988: 85). Zambia’s 
immediate post-Independence development record witnessed the coming into 
existence of a number of development projects but these did not strengthen the 
Zambian economy. Whatever the achievements, these developments, both in 
infrastructure and industry, tied the Zambian economy tighter to the fortunes of the 
copper sector. The performance of the Zambian economy in the SNDP period, and 
afterwards, was disappointing. 
Partly accounting for the weaknesses in developmentalism, the examination of the 
SNDP showed that copper continued to be at the centre of development thinking. In 
addition, the restricted understanding of industrialisation, which aimed to replace 
hitherto imported goods, led to a series of developments in consumer goods industries, 
reflecting continuities with the colonial structure of production.  
But industrial development was also undermined by a lack of adequate political 
commitment. This is shown by the allocation of public expenditure. The allocation of 
public resources in the development plan, as well the actual developments in the 
manufacturing sector, showed that where there is political will, corresponding results 
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will most likely follow. In addition, absence of foreign exchange denied further 
industrial growth by limiting import of inputs for industry. If recurrent expenditure is 
to be seen as resources committed to the apparatus of the state, then it is not difficult 
to see that socio-political interests embedded in the state architecture continued to act 
in ways which concentrated resources in their structures.  
Overall, however, industrial development was flawed in design, and the deployment 
of existing capacities only reinforced the problem. The various industrial projects 
which came to light were defective in that they were characterised by dependence 
upon foreign technology. Indeed, the form in which dependence came derailed 
industrial development as the basis for promoting structural transformation. Yet, this 
was merely a reflection of the socio-political and economic interests acting through 
the state. Ultimately, industrialisation in Zambia was restricted to installing 
uncoordinated investments which depended on foreign technology. 
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7 Conclusion and further thoughts on investigating Zambia’s post-
Independence system of accumulation 
7.1 Rethinking the growth process and capital accumulation: bringing back 
the social 
The focus on technicalities of the growth process has sabotaged the study of 
development as a process and outcome of socio-economic and political processes and 
interactions. By neglecting the role of social forces which can inform the features of 
development such as distribution of income and structure of production, too much 
attention has been placed on one-dimensional ahistorical factors such as techniques of 
production. But technicalities of the growth process such as choice of technology in 
the production process and indeed its wider role in development cannot fully be 
accounted for by economic rationalisation alone. The social is important as well as the 
economic. While the thesis has not delved into deeper understanding and analysis of 
social processes of development, it offers an opportunity to begin further analysis by, 
first, submitting a critical appraisal of studies which downplay the role of social forces 
in understanding the growth process and, second, exploring in what ways the social 
forces might be responsible for the trajectory of development more broadly. 
The extent to which an economy will design, adopt and implement economic policies 
reflects the configuration of socio-political and economic interests, confounded by 
structural and external contradictions. For example, as the thesis has argued, Zambia’s 
post-Independence developmentalism was one which sought to confront the socio-
structural dislocations festered in the colonial era, which denied indigenous 
participation in the modern economy. Yet, the administrative and economic policies 
which resulted through colonial governance were premised on social conceptions of a 
superiority-complex, designed to advance one group over people over another, solely 
in terms of race. In addition, the direction, pace and scope of capital accumulation 
itself, although processed and promoted by (interventionist) economic policies, was 
underpinned by socio-political and economic interests, interacting and impacting upon 
the economy in different ways and with varied rhythms across time and place.  
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Accordingly, capital accumulation must also be understood in terms of the structural 
and social context, and not solely as an outcome of which technique of production to 
adopt, or what kind of economic policy to implement. The idea of universalistic (if 
successful) notions of policy in every time and place must be questioned, or, indeed, 
placed within a particular context. Again, this requires an understanding of unique 
processes which reflect a particular interaction of socio-political and economic 
interests.  
If analysis begins by questioning the factors responsible for resource allocation, then 
it is set on an open path of discovery. However, if resource allocation and, 
subsequently, capital accumulation, is placed within a model, then analysis is liable to 
stretch facts and imposes conditions which obscure rather than illuminate. That has 
been shown to be true for the computation of total factor productivity, and 
understanding of structural transformation within it.  
Political processes and capital accumulation underscore a two-way relation in that the 
nature of the political discourse can bear upon the degree, direction and intensity of 
capital accumulation while the nature of capital accumulation can stamp its influence 
on the range and scope of the political discourse. It has been a contention in the thesis 
in launching an alternative framework of understanding structural transformation that 
the state can influence both the direction and pace of accumulation through wide-
ranging interventionist policies, but this merely reflects the configuration of 
underlying socio-political and economic interests. A brief account of this was given 
in chapter 3, discussing the pre-Independence state of developmentalism. For 
example, in pre-Independence Zambia, as white settler populations began to associate 
their progress with accumulation outside the core (the copper sector), there was a 
decisive influence on the political process and, subsequently, the functioning of the 
state, nudging the balance of power and resource allocation. Chapters 5 and 6 
proceeded on the assumption that socio-political and economic interests are reflected 
in the design and execution of development planning. Some detail was shown in post-
Independence industrial policy of the nature of interests embedded within the state 
when analysing in some detail industrial policy more generally. 
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While Zambia’s post-Independence state promoted wide-ranging development, it 
bumped into a number of constraints, among them absence of skilled workers. Forced 
to rely on foreign assistance in form of capital and expertise, and confounded by 
structural and geopolitical contradictions, capital accumulation via uncoordinated 
investments was characterised by a form of dependence which precluded structural 
transformation. The material base which underpinned Zambia’s post-Independence 
developmentalism thus could not be self-sustaining; it lacked export capacity and 
relied instead on further imports of technology, reflecting both its lack of 
competitiveness and absence of an integrated structure of production. Although 
unprecedented industrialisation took place, it was not characterised by learning as was 
the case for developmental states of East Asia. Overall, however, this raises questions 
for the motivation of economic policies, with motivation itself being shaped by the 
underlying socio-political and economic interests.  
If structural transformation, narrowly conceived in terms of industrialisation, is a 
feature of development, then it follows that underlying characteristics and functioning 
of social forces must be unpacked. Industrial policy is therefore not simply the 
execution of economic policy, but an agenda to promote a particular configuration of 
interests, within a given socio-structural context. Thus, the conflation of 
socioeconomic and political processes is reflected in the notion of a system of 
accumulation which steers development in whatever direction. A trajectory of 
development is underpinned by a system of accumulation which, in context, serves a 
particular configuration of interests. Thus, shifting composition of output in favour of 
industry is the creation and promotion of a particular configuration of interests. This 
is where further analysis must begin. 
7.2 Towards interrogating a system of accumulation for Zambia’s post-
Independence developmentalism 
Development planning in the previous two chapters has demonstrated that the strategy 
of the post-Independence Government was to deploy, adopt and marginally adapt 
existing capacities and institutions and models to promote development. However, 
this strategy faced a number of structural constraints. Firstly, given the colonial 
inheritance of a dual economy, with limited economic activity and development 
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outside of mining, including virtual absence of socioeconomic development for at 
least three quarters of the population, the existing structures, institutions and capacities 
including the development model inherited from the colonial era could only succeed 
in a very narrow and limited sense. Secondly, also a feature of the colonial legacy, 
absence of indigenous education and skills hampered the ability of the post-colonial 
state to deliver development on a national-wide scale. Thirdly, while using resources 
from the spaces of economic strength, specifically a flourishing copper sector, the 
state embarked on a programme of indigenisation of labour and capital, both in the 
public and private sector, but this created elites (or, loosely, groups or people) with 
interests. Fourthly, however, these vested interests were not homogenous, they were 
fragmented and differentially based, made up of politicians, bureaucrats, 
entrepreneurs and the variegated labour force. Thus, their constituency also implied a 
conflict of interest, but it is important to examine in what ways their contestations 
hampered or promoted structural transformation. 
Development strategy thus bumped into at least one of these constraints, with differing 
intensity and outcomes across time and place, with the most binding and severe being 
the deterioration of the economic strength of the system of accumulation, particularly, 
a fall in copper revenues. These constraints have often been analysed in isolation. For 
instance, in Charles Elliott's (1971) edited book entitled ‘Constraints on the Economic 
Development of Zambia’, contributors ranged over constraints specific to sectors and 
themes, from the skilled manpower constraint, contradictions in industrial relations 
and incomes policy, the fiscal system and financial constraints, to mining agricultural 
and manufacturing sector developments, and then to constraints in transport and 
construction. This book is an indispensable contribution to Zambia’s post-
Independence development literature, and provides numerous insights and lessons. 
However, because these constraints are analysed in isolation from one another, the 
contributions in the book, individually and together, do not adequately address nor 
demonstrate Zambia’s accumulation model as a system.  
Another notable contribution to Zambia’s post-Independence development literature 
is William Tordoff's (1980) edited book entitled ‘Administration in Zambia’. 
Primarily, it sets out to explore the evolving socio-economic and political framework 
under which administration is exercised. The contributions in the book trace the 
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expansion of the state apparatus as well as the political system, including 
administrative aspects of implementing government policy in, for example, rural 
development. Again, each of the themes are more or less treated remotely, with 
minimal interaction. Perhaps not the weakness of the book but a reflection of its focus, 
it does not address the underlying economic base as having restricted both further 
accumulation and administration. 
By viewing post-Independence developmentalism as a system, the processes of 
accumulation can be uncovered, and the failure to build the Zambian economy on a 
sustainable developmental path underpinned by structural transformation can be 
demonstrated. This can be done by highlighting how post-colonial socio-political and 
economic interests emerged and got entrenched, and on what kind of economic base 
they thrived. Accordingly, analysing these processes would give meaning to aggregate 
developmental statistics which demonstrated the dependence of the Zambian 
economy on copper, the restricted form of industrial development and the nature of 
the distribution of income, including the structure of the Zambian economy. The 
foregoing two chapters through the lens of development planning have unpacked 
resource allocation and the nature and scope of capital accumulation. 
If to shed light on Zambia’s post-Independence developmentalism by dispelling the 
neoclassical total factor productivity model discussed in Chapter Two, van Arkadie's 
(1973: 91) insights are instructive: “The neo-classical model of the market economy 
rests heavily on the notion of commodity exchanges in which the two sides meet under 
conditions of equality… [However,] [i]f the actual relationships between people, 
rather than the idealised relationship between commodities, are considered then the 
equality of the market place seems more an ideological mystification than an 
analytical tool.” By examining the nature of socio-political and economic interests, it 
can be shown that economic development is much a social as it is an economic 
process. Relations between people or groups determine in what ways and on what 
resources will be used. Interventionism then becomes determining of which interests 
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Appendix 6.1 GDP, consumption of fixed capital and compensation 
of employees by kind of economic activity, 1965-1973 
 
GDP, consumption of fixed capital and compensation of employees by kind of economic activity, 1965-1973 
Kind of economic 
activity 
OLD SNA NEW SNA 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1970 1971 1972 1973 
Total GDP* 
         
730.4  
         
852.8  
         
922.7  
      
1,083
.2  
      
1,326
.0  
      
1,231
.2  
      
1,277
.7  
      
1,188
.6  
       
1,348
.0  





         
244.1  
         
282.1  
         
349.3  
         
391.3  
         
396.6  
         
468.8  
         
481.4  
         
567.7  
          
618.6  
         
672.0  
Total Compensation 
of employees as a % 
of total GDP 
           
33.4  
           
33.1  
           
37.9  
           
36.1  
           
29.9  
           
38.1  
           
37.7  
           
47.8  
            
45.9  
           
42.2  
Total Consumption 
of Fixed Capital 
           
56.6  
           
61.6  
           
73.6  
           
99.6  
         
109.0  
         
114.9  
         
136.7  
         
163.2  
          
194.6  
         
211.7  
 Total Consumption 
of Fixed Capital as % 
of total GDP 
             
7.7  
             
7.2  
             
8.0  
             
9.2  
             
8.2  
             
9.3  
           
10.7  
           
13.7  
            
14.4  
           
13.3  
  
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
Sectoral GDP 
           
99.5  
         
109.2  
         
112.8  
         
117.4  
         
122.0  
         
124.0  
         
136.1  
         
154.0  
          
172.2  





             
6.8  
             
9.2  
             
9.8  
             
9.7  
           
11.0  
           
13.3  
           
19.7  
           
28.9  
            
36.2  




employees as % of 
sectoral GDP 
             
6.8  
             
8.4  
             
8.7  
             
8.3  
             
9.0  
           
10.7  
           
14.5  
           
18.8  
            
21.0  
           
18.2  
Mining and Quarrying 
Sectoral GDP 
         
303.0  
         
376.2  
         
331.9  
         
411.5  
         
645.0  
         
458.0  
         
460.3  
         
275.1  
          
324.4  





           
77.6  
           
81.3  
           
92.6  
           
95.2  
           
93.9  
         
117.5  
         
118.7  
         
126.2  
          
126.1  




employees as % of 
sectoral GDP 
           
25.6  
           
21.6  
           
27.9  
           
23.1  
           
14.6  
           
25.7  
           
25.8  
           
45.9  
            
38.9  




           
48.0  
           
69.0  
           
86.1  
         
109.3  
         
112.2  
         
129.1  
         
129.2  
         
149.7  
          
181.4  





           
18.9  
           
26.4  
           
31.4  
           
39.4  
           
39.9  
           
49.0  
           
49.0  
           
55.5  
            
61.3  




employees as % of 
sectoral GDP 
           
39.4  
           
38.3  
           
36.5  
           
36.0  
           
35.6  
           
38.0  
           
37.9  
           
37.1  
            
33.8  
           
37.3  
Electricity, gas and water 
Sectoral GDP 
             
5.4  
             
7.4  
             
8.4  
           
12.6  
           
14.2  
           
19.4  
           
19.4  
           
22.5  
            
30.7  







             
1.6  
             
1.8  
             
3.3  
             
3.2  
             
3.7  
             
5.3  
             
5.3  
             
5.8  
              
7.4  




employees as % of 
sectoral GDP 
           
29.6  
           
24.3  
           
39.3  
           
25.4  
           
26.1  
           
27.3  
           
27.3  
           
25.8  
            
24.1  




           
44.7  
           
59.2  
           
63.6  
           
69.6  
           
75.2  
           
80.8  
           
90.3  
           
98.2  
            
99.8  





           
22.3  
           
32.4  
           
32.8  
           
42.8  
           
48.0  
           
51.6  
           
51.6  
           
61.1  
            
71.0  




employees as % of 
sectoral GDP 
           
49.9  
           
54.7  
           
51.6  
           
61.5  
           
63.8  
           
63.9  
           
57.1  
           
62.2  
            
71.1  
           
63.8  
Wholesale and Retail trade 
Sectoral GDP 
           
81.9  
           
76.0  
         
105.1  
         
126.2  
           
94.7  
         
118.7  
         
118.7  
         
112.4  
          
127.9  





           
25.3  
           
26.1  
           
37.5  
           
46.3  
           
43.1  
           
49.0  
           
49.0  
           
54.6  
            
63.8  




employees as % of 
sectoral GDP 
           
30.9  
           
34.3  
           
35.7  
           
36.7  
           
45.5  
           
41.3  
           
41.3  
           
48.6  
            
49.9  
           
51.8  
Hotels, bars and restaurants 
Sectoral GDP 
             
4.6  
             
6.3  
             
7.4  
           
10.5  
           
13.1  
           
14.8  
           
14.9  
           
16.7  
            
18.7  





             
2.0  
             
2.6  
             
3.2  
             
4.3  
             
4.6  
             
5.4  
             
5.4  
             
7.8  
              
9.0  




employees as % of 
sectoral GDP 
           
43.5  
           
41.3  
           
43.2  
           
41.0  
           
35.1  
           
36.5  
           
36.2  
           
46.7  
            
48.1  
           
50.5  
Transport, communication and storage 
Sectoral GDP 
           
31.3  31.4 
           
47.6  
           
45.7  
           
42.2  
           
39.3  
           
48.8  
           
62.3  
            
63.5  





           
16.5  
           
19.5  
           
28.2  
           
28.9  
           
28.3  
           
31.2  
           
32.5  
           
43.1  
            
41.1  




employees as % of 
sectoral GDP 
           
52.7  
           
62.1  
           
59.2  
           
63.2  
           
67.1  
           
79.4  
           
66.6  
           
69.2  
            
64.7  
           
66.7  
Financial institutions and insurance 
Sectoral GDP 
           
10.7  
           
11.4  
           
15.9  
           
19.2  
           
31.2  
           
42.9  
           
42.9  
           
40.7  
            
44.6  





             
4.8  
             
5.8  
             
6.2  
             
7.9  
             
8.4  
             
8.5  
             
8.5  
           
12.2  
            
16.4  




employees as % of 
sectoral GDP 
           
44.9  
           
50.9  
           
39.0  
           
41.1  
           
26.9  
           
19.8  
           
19.8  
           
30.0  
            
36.8  




           
10.5  
           
12.3  
           
17.9  
           
20.1  
           
22.4  
           
28.0  
           
28.0  
           
35.7  
            
35.1  





             
1.8  
             
2.3  
             
4.9  
             
5.5  
             
3.8  
             
4.3  
             
4.3  
             
4.6  
              
4.1  






employees as % of 
sectoral GDP 
           
17.1  
           
18.7  
           
27.4  
           
27.4  
           
17.0  
           
15.4  
           
15.4  
           
12.9  
            
11.7  




             
9.5  
             
8.7  
           
13.4  
           
15.6  
           
13.6  
           
16.7  
           
16.7  
           
20.4  
            
24.1  





             
2.1  
             
3.5  
             
6.8  
             
7.5  
             
7.2  
             
9.7  
             
9.7  
           
13.9  
            
16.5  




employees as % of 
sectoral GDP 
           
22.1  
           
40.2  
           
50.7  
           
48.1  
           
52.9  
           
58.1  
           
58.1  
           
68.1  
            
68.5  
           
64.5  
Community, social and personal services 
Sectoral GDP 
           
66.8  
           
73.4  
           
97.6  
         
106.2  
         
112.4  
         
131.0  
         
150.0  
         
176.9  
          
193.4  





           
64.5  
           
71.2  
           
92.6  
         
100.6  
         
104.7  
         
124.0  
         
127.0  
         
154.0  
          
165.7  




employees as % of 
sectoral GDP 
           
96.6  
           
97.0  
           
94.9  
           
94.7  
           
93.1  
           
94.7  
           
84.7  
           
87.1  
            
85.7  
           
85.5  
Less imputed service 
charge                     
Source : CSO, 1980 'National Accounts and Input-Output Tables 1973', Lusaka. 
*GDP at Producers' values at current prices in K' million 
The results show that labour and capital shares fluctuated considerably in the post-Independence period, 
contrary to the assumption of constant factor shares implanted in models which make use of a Cobb-Douglas 












Appendix 5.1 Actual Educational Attainment of Employed Civilian Labour Force By Race and Occupation, 1965-
1966 
Actual Educational Attainment of Employed Civilian Labour Force By Race and Occupation, 1965-1966 





































135 3 1 26 63 42 2 
    
2 133 3 1 26 63 40 
001 Civil Engineers 277 1 2 20 96 158 1 1 
    
276 
 
2 20 96 158 
002 Electrical and 
Mechanical 
Engineers 
327 2 41 61 108 115 0 
     







414 3 51 81 98 181 6 
 
2 3 1 
 
408 3 49 78 97 181 
006 Mining 
Technicians 
498 13 188 194 64 39 1 
 
1 
   
497 13 187 194 64 39 




1 192 3 16 70 70 33 
010 Chemists 112 0 0 17 32 63 1 
    
1 111 
  
17 32 62 
011 Other Physical 
Scientists 






4 10 5 79 
012 Animal 
Scientists 
310 45 24 25 73 143 69 43 9 1 12 4 239 2 15 24 61 139 
015 Physicians and 
Dentists 
295 0 0 2 2 291 11 
    
11 284 
  
2 2 280 
019 Other Medical 
Workers 
1841 597 384 310 487 63 927 586 273 52 15 1 903 11 111 258 472 62 
020 Teachers 10765 5595 3003 222 915 1030 8849 5595 2975 159 99 21 1916 
 





464 63 176 136 41 48 283 56 123 79 19 6 174 7 53 57 22 42 
022 Clergy 215 44 44 19 15 93 60 35 16 
 
6 3 146 9 28 19 9 90 
023 Jurists 167 3 10 19 40 95 21 3 5 2 1 10 146 
 
5 17 39 85 
026 Artists and 
Writers 
189 10 47 71 31 30 95 9 45 31 5 5 93 1 2 40 26 25 
027 Accountants 671 17 29 167 352 106 40 16 7 7 8 2 630 1 22 160 344 104 
029 Social Workers 
and Librarians 
456 156 104 77 59 60 318 151 89 46 30 2 133 5 15 31 29 58 
030 Social Scientists 41 0 4 1 3 33 7 
   
1 6 34 
 
4 1 2 27 
031 Personnel 
Officers 
398 14 102 124 99 59 80 14 27 25 6 8 318 
 
75 99 93 51 
032 Draughtsmen 297 23 46 159 48 21 33 19 7 6 1 
 
260 4 39 153 47 21 
034 Other 
Technicians 
1167 301 339 355 130 42 350 262 38 36 9 5 778 39 301 319 121 37 
338 
 
Sub-total: profession and 
Technical 
19335 6893 4618 2167 2831 2826 11160 6790 3620 448 213 89 8096 103 998 1719 2618 2737 
042 Administrative 3698 273 718 1399 912 396 594 169 190 153 40 42 3000 104 528 1246 872 354 
043 Clerical 11656 1689 4167 4313 1334 153 3967 1525 1665 589 175 13 7525 164 2502 3724 1159 140 
052 Sales 4189 829 1528 1341 417 74 754 414 260 50 29 1 3020 415 1268 1291 388 73 
054 Agricultural 1169 156 254 378 304 77 92 72 18 2 
  
993 84 236 376 304 77 
058 Mining 1991 187 1098 550 130 26 228 62 136 23 4 3 1638 125 962 527 126 23 
068 Transport and 
Communications 
2693 1201 980 432 76 4 1781 1128 499 128 26 
 
839 73 481 304 50 4 
093 Craftsmen 9503 1789 4833 2462 378 41 1856 1066 700 63 27 
 
6924 723 4133 2399 351 41 
100 services 1802 851 471 391 78 11 1048 789 194 60 3 2 692 62 277 331 75 9 
Sub-total with or requiring 
Secondary Education of 
above 
56036 13868 18667 13433 6450 3618 21480 12015 7282 1516 517 150 32703 1853 11385 11917 5933 3468 
339 
 
Others 214871 214757 24 48 11 31 214666 214666 
    
114 91 24 48 11 31 
Total Employment 270907 228625 18691 13481 6461 3649 236146 226681 7282 1516 517 150 32817 1944 11409 11965 5944 3499 
Percentage Distribution 100.0 84.4 6.9 5.0 2.4 1.3 100.0 96.0 3.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 100.0 5.9 34.8 36.5 18.1 10.7 
Source: Manpower Survey, 1965, and Statistical Records Division, Office of the President quoted in Sindab (1984: 102, Table 5.1) 
N.B. Occupations are defined in terms of the work done, not the qualifications presented. This accounts for some cases in which persons are classified as professionals even though having fairly low levels 
of educational qualifications. 
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Appendix B: Industry Shares of GDP by Type of Economic Activity 
KIND OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 13.5  16.2  15.5  16.4  18.7  21.6  19.8  19.6  19.9  20.7  21.4  21.0  20.2  19.8  19.8  20.8  20.1  19.4  19.2  
Agriculture 4.9  7.1  6.6  6.3  6.0  6.1  5.5  4.8  4.6  4.9  4.8  4.4  4.0  3.4  3.3  3.6  3.6  3.6  3.8  
Forestry 4.8  5.6  6.3  8.3  11.0  13.8  12.7  13.5  13.9  14.4  15.4  15.4  15.2  15.4  15.6  16.3  15.8  15.2  14.9  
Fishing 3.9  3.6  2.6  1.9  1.7  1.7  1.5  1.3  1.4  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.1  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.7  0.6  0.6  
Mining and Quarrying 16.7  14.4  12.1  9.9  6.3  3.8  4.1  3.9  3.5  2.7  3.1  3.2  4.2  4.4  3.6  2.6  3.7  3.4  2.6  
Metal Mining 16.5  14.2  11.9  9.8  6.2  3.7  4.0  3.9  3.5  2.7  3.1  3.2  4.1  4.4  3.6  2.6  3.6  3.4  2.6  
Other mining and quarrying 0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
PRIMARY SECTOR 30.2  30.6  27.6  26.4  25.0  25.4  23.9  23.5  23.4  23.4  24.5  24.2  24.4  24.2  23.5  23.4  23.8  22.8  21.8  
Manufacturing 9.8  9.9  11.8  11.6  11.5  10.8  10.1  9.8  10.4  10.9  10.9  10.7  10.4  9.7  9.4  9.3  8.7  8.3  8.4  
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 6.0  6.5  8.1  7.1  7.0  6.7  6.1  5.8  6.3  6.8  6.6  6.6  6.3  5.9  5.9  6.0  5.6  5.4  5.3  
Textile, and leather industries 1.1  0.9  1.1  1.8  1.9  1.9  1.8  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.6  1.6  1.3  0.9  0.7  0.3  0.1  0.1  
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Wood and wood products 0.9  0.7  0.8  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.9  0.9  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  
Paper and Paper products 0.3  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.9  
Chemicals, rubber and plastic products 0.8  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  
Non-metallic mineral products 0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  
Basic metal products 0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  
Fabricated metal products 0.4  0.5  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  
Electricity, Gas and Water 3.2  3.1  3.3  4.2  3.7  3.3  3.2  3.4  3.0  2.9  2.7  2.9  3.0  2.9  2.8  2.8  2.8  3.1  3.0  
Construction 5.0  4.1  3.5  4.4  4.4  4.3  4.9  5.5  6.5  7.7  8.9  10.0  12.2  14.5  16.1  18.3  20.2  22.3  23.3  
SECONDARY SECTOR 18.0  17.1  18.6  20.2  19.6  18.4  18.3  18.7  19.9  21.5  22.5  23.6  25.6  27.1  28.2  30.4  31.8  33.8  34.7  
Wholesale and  Retail trade 14.8  14.6  17.5  16.6  17.4  18.5  18.6  17.7  18.4  18.8  18.6  18.3  16.9  16.0  15.6  15.3  14.4  14.0  13.7  
Restaurants, Bars and Hotels 1.6  1.7  2.2  2.2  2.2  1.9  2.0  2.4  2.5  2.6  2.6  2.8  2.9  2.9  2.9  2.4  2.4  2.3  2.1  
Transport, Storage and Communications 6.0  5.9  5.9  5.3  5.7  5.7  6.3  6.5  6.5  5.1  4.8  4.4  4.2  4.3  4.1  3.6  4.0  3.8  3.8  
Rail Transport 0.6  0.6  0.6  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  
342 
 
Road Transport 2.3  2.4  2.4  2.2  2.3  2.3  2.5  2.4  2.0  1.9  1.8  1.7  1.7  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  
Air Transport  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  1.0  1.0  0.8  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.9  1.1  1.0  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.8  
Communications 2.1  2.0  2.0  1.8  2.0  2.0  2.2  2.5  3.1  2.1  1.9  1.6  1.4  1.4  1.3  1.2  1.4  1.3  1.3  
Financial Institutions and Insurance 8.2  10.3  8.8  8.8  9.1  9.0  9.7  9.4  9.1  9.0  8.8  8.6  8.4  7.9  8.0  8.6  8.7  8.1  8.5  
Real Estate and Business services 5.0  5.4  5.6  5.7  6.3  6.6  6.5  6.3  6.4  6.5  6.5  6.2  6.0  5.8  5.7  5.7  5.5  5.7  5.5  
Community, Social and Personal Services 8.0  8.3  7.1  8.0  8.5  8.9  9.4  9.8  9.1  8.9  8.2  8.8  9.0  9.4  10.0  10.3  10.5  10.4  11.1  
Public Administration & Defence/Public sanitary 
services  
4.6  4.8  3.3  4.2  4.5  4.4  4.9  4.6  4.0  3.7  3.1  3.1  2.5  2.7  2.6  2.5  2.2  2.2  2.5  
Education 2.1  2.3  2.5  2.5  2.6  2.6  2.5  3.0  3.0  3.4  3.3  3.9  4.8  5.1  5.6  6.0  6.0  5.9  6.1  
Health 0.5  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.6  1.1  1.1  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.1  1.1  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.6  1.6  1.8  
Recreation, Religious,Culture  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  
Personal Services 0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  
TERTIARY SECTOR 43.6  46.3  47.1  46.6  49.2  50.8  52.5  52.1  51.9  51.0  49.5  49.1  47.4  46.3  46.3  45.9  45.5  44.4  44.6  
Less: FISIM (4.7) (5.9) (5.1) (5.0) (5.2) (5.2) (5.6) (5.4) (5.3) (5.2) (5.0) (5.0) (4.8) (4.5) (4.6) (4.5) (5.0) (4.7) (4.9) 
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TOTAL GROSS VALUE ADDED 87.1  88.0  88.1  88.1  88.5  89.3  89.2  88.9  90.0  90.8  91.5  91.9  92.6  93.1  93.4  95.2  96.1  96.2  96.2  
Taxes less subsidies on Products 12.9  12.0  11.9  11.9  11.5  10.7  10.8  11.1  10.0  9.2  8.5  8.1  7.4  6.9  6.6  4.8  3.9  3.8  3.8  






































Source: Central Statistical Office 
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